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happy coincidence between the dictates of his conscience and the interest of his Empire. And as from the very circumstance of his preponderancy, partial alliances might be most easily contracted by him, from the natural resort of the weak for succour to the strong, by discountenancing all such partial combinations he has the appearance of discarding advantages entirely within his command, and reaps the glory of disinterestedness, while most efficaciously providing for his own security.

"Such is accordingly the constant indication of the Russian policy since the peace of Paris in 1815. The neighbors of Russia which have the most to dread from her overshadowing and encroaching power are Persia, Turkey, Austria, and Prussia; the two latter of which are members of the European and even of the Holy Alliance, while the two former are not only extra-European in their general policy, but of religions which excluded them from ever becoming parties, if not from ever deriving benefit from that singular compact. "The political system of the United States is also essentially extraEuropean. To stand in firm and cautious independence of all entanglement in the European system, has been a cardinal point of their policy under every administration of their Government, from the peace of 1783 to this day. If at the original adoption of their system there could have been any doubt of its justice or its wisdom, there can be none at this time. Every year's experience rivets it more deeply in the principles and opinions of the nation. Yet in proportion as the importance of the United States as one of the members of the general society of civilized nations increases in the eyes of the others, the difficulties of maintaining this system and the temptations to depart from it increase and multiply with it. The Russian Government has not only manifested an inclination that the United States should concur in the general principles of the European league, but a direct though unofficial application has been made by the present Russian minister here that the United States should become formal parties to the Holy Alliance. It has been suggested, as inducement to obtain their compliance, that this compact bound the parties to no specific engagement of anything. That it was a pledge of mere principles-that its real as well as its professed purpose was merely the general preservation of peace-and it was intimated that if any question should arise between the United States and other governments of Europe, the Emperor Alexander, desirous of using his influence in their favour, would have a substantial motive and justification for interposing if he could regard them as his allies, which, as parties to the Holy Alliance, he would.

"It is possible that overtures of a similar character may be made to you; but whether they should be or not it is proper to apprize you of the light in which they have been viewed by the President.

No direct refusal has been signified to Mr. Poletica. It is presumed that none will be necessary. His instructions are not to make the proposal in form unless with a prospect that it will be successful. It might, perhaps, be sufficient to answer that the organization of our Government is such as not to admit of our acceding formally to that compact. But it may be added that the President, approving its general principles and thoroughly convinced of the benevolent and virtuous motives which led to the conception and presided at the formation of this system by the Emperor Alexander, believes that the United States will more effectually contribute to the great and sublime objects for which it was concluded by abstaining from a formal participation in it than they could as stipulated members of it. As a general declaration of principles, disclaiming the impulses of vulgar ambition and unprincipled aggrandizement and openly proclaiming the peculiarly Christian maxims of mutual benev olence and brotherly love to be binding upon the intercourse between nations no less than upon that of individuals, the United States not only give their hearty assent to the articles of the Holy Alliance, but will be among the most earnest and conscientious in observing them. But independent of the prejudices which have been excited against this instrument in the public opinion, which time and an experience of its good effects will gradually wear away, it may be observed that for the repose of Europe as well as of America, the European and American political system should be kept as separate and distinct from each other as possible. If the United States as members of the Holy Alliance could acquire a right to ask the influence of its most powerful member in their controversies with other states, the other members must be entitled in return to ask the influence of the United States, for themselves or against their opponents, in the deliberations of the league they would be entitled to a voice, and in exercising their right must occasionally appeal to principles, which might not harmonize with those of any European member of the bond. This consideration alone would be decisive for declining a participation in that league, which is the President's absolute and irrevocable determination, although he trusts that no occasion will present itself rendering it necessary to make that determination. known by an explicit refusal."

Mr. Adams, Sec. of State, to Mr. Middleton, min. to Russia, No. 1, July 5, 1820, MS. Inst. to U. S. Mins. IX. 18.

2. ANXIETY AS TO CUBA.

$931.

"The present condition of the Island of Cuba has excited much attention, and has become of deep interest to this Union. From the

public despatch, and other papers which you will receive with this, you will perceive the great and continued injuries which our commerce is suffering from pirates issuing from thence; the repeated demands made upon the authorities of the island for their suppression, and the exertions, but partially effectual, of our own naval force against them. There is another point of view, however, in which the condition of the island is yet more an object of concern. From various sources intimations have been received here that the British Government have it in contemplation to obtain possession of the island. It is even asserted from sources to which some credit is due that they have been for more than two years in secret negotiation with Spain for the cession of the island; and it is added that Spain, though disinclined to such an arrangement, might resist it with more firmness if for a limited period of time she could obtain the joint guarantee of the United States and France, securing the island to herself.

"There is reason also to believe that the future political condition of the island is a subject of much anxiety and of informal deliberations among its own inhabitants. That both France and Great Britain have political agents there observing the course of events and perhaps endeavoring to give them different directions. The President has therefore determined to despatch to you a special messenger to deliver this letter, upon receipt of which he wishes you to take such measures as may be adapted to obtain correct information whether such a negotiation as has been above suggested is on foot between Spain and Great Britain, and if so to communicate to the Spanish Government in a manner adapted to the delicacy of the case the sentiments of this Government in relation to this subject, which are favorable to the continuance of Cuba in its connection with Spain." Mr. Adams, Sec. of State, to Mr. Forsyth, min. to Spain, No. 28, Dec. 17, 1822, MS. Inst. U. States Ministers, IX. 158.

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Monday night, 17 Feby. [1823]

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Clay says that Canning told him the day before yesterday, as I also heard Mr. Adams state publickly, that England has no views on Cuba. Clay told him distinctly that we would fight for it should they attempt the possession, which sentiment I find more general than I supposed. Mr. Baylies, of Massachusetts, a Federalist, is for it as he said this afternoon. The idea given out is that any English force going there is to protect it from the French who might try to take it, as I heard Mr. Adams say, in the event of war between France & Spain."

Diary of Mr. Ingersoll, Life of Charles Jared Ingersoll, 128, 129–130.

"In the war between France and Spain, now commencing, other interests, peculiarly ours, will, in all probability, be deeply involved.

Whatever may be the issue of this war as between those two European powers, it may be taken for granted that the dominion of Spain upon the American continents, north and south, is irrevocably gone. the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico still remain nominally, and so far really, dependent upon her, that she yet possesses the power of transferring her own dominion over them, together with the possession of them, to others. These islands, from their local position are natural appendages to the North American continent, and one of them (Cuba) almost in sight of our shores, from a multitude of considerations has become an object of transcendent importance to the commercial and political interests of our Union. Its commanding position, with reference to the Gulf of Mexico and the West India seas; the character of its population; its situation midway betwen our southern coast and the island of St. Domingo; its safe and capacious harbor of the Havana, fronting a long line of our shores destitute of the same. advantage; the nature of its productions and of its wants, furnishing the supplies and needing the returns of a commerce immensely profitable and mutually beneficial, give it an importance in the sum of our national interests with which that of no other foreign territory can be compared, and little inferior to that which binds the different. members of this Union together. Such, indeed, are, between the interests of that island and of this country, the geographical, commercial, moral, and political relations, formed by nature, gathering, in the process of time, and even now verging to maturity, that, in looking forward to the probable course of events, for the short period of half a century, it is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself.

"It is obvious, however, that for this event we are not yet prepared. Numerous and formidable objections to the extension of our territorial dominions beyond sea present themselves to the first contemplation of the subject; obstacles to the system of policy by which alone. that result can be compassed and maintained are to be foreseen and surmounted, both from at home and abroad; but there are laws of political as well as of physical gravitation; and if an apple, severed by the tempest from its native tree, can not choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only towards the North American Union, which, by the same law of nature, can not cast her off from its bosom."

After this exordium Mr. Adams went on to say that, if the constitution of Spain should be demolished by the armies of the Holy Alliance, represented by France, and the people of Cuba should as a result be shorn of the liberties with which they had been invested under that

constitution, it was not to be presumed that they would be willing to surrender them to foreign violence committed upon the parent country. In that case France might attempt the invasion of Cuba, unless restrained by maritime weakness and the probability of resistance by Great Britain. Meanwhile the condition of the island was one of great, imminent, and complicated danger. If the people were homogeneous the invasion of Spain by France would be the signal for their declaration of independence, but in reality they were not competent to a system of permanent self-dependence; and if, in the event of the overthrow of the Spanish constitution, they were obliged to rely for protection on some force outside, their only alternative of dependence must be upon Great Britain or upon the United States. The United States had wished that the connection between Cuba and Spain as it has existed for several years should continue. Of this Mr. Forsyth, the American minister at Madrid, had been authorized in a suitable manner to advise the Spanish Government. But if a government was to be imposed by violence on the Spanish nation it was neither to be expected nor desired that the people of Cuba should submit to be governed by the oppressors of Spain. Great Britain had formally withdrawn from the councils of the European alliance in regard to Spain, and had avowed her determination to defend Portugal against the application of the principles on which the invasion of Spain was based; and unless the conflict between France and Spain should be as short and decisive as that of which Italy had lately been the scene, she might not be able to maintain her neutrality. If she made common cause with Spain, the two remaining islands of the latter in the West Indies might be considered the proper price of the alliance. The Government of the United States had been confidently told more than two years before, by indirect communication from the French Government, that Great Britain was negotiating with Spain for the cession of Cuba, and was so eager as to have offered Gibraltar in exchange. There was reason to believe that the French Government was misinformed. Recently the Government of the United States had been confidentially informed that the present British secretary for foreign affairs (Canning) had declared to the French Government that Great Britain would hold it disgraceful to avail herself of the distressed situation of Spain to obtain any portion of her American colonies. But this assurance was given with reference to a state of peace then existing, and the condition of the parties had since changed, and Great Britain had not forborne to take advantage of Spain's situation by order of reprisals given to two successive squadrons dispatched to the West Indies and stationed in immediate proximity to the island of Cuba. By this means she had obtained the revocation of the blockade which the Spanish generals had proclaimed on the coast of Terra Firma and pledges of reparation for

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