Mr. Buchanan, Sec. of State, to Mr. Harris, min. to Argentine, March 30, 1846, MS. Inst. Argentine Republic, XV. 19. Though the United States had in its possession in 1846 information that would justify it in extending, in accordance with its settled policy, recognition to Paraguay as an independent state, yet the President determined to suspend action on the subject "purely from regard to the Argentine Republic and in consideration of the heroic struggle" which it was "maintaining against the armed intervention of Great Britain and France in the concerns of the Republics on the La Plata and its tributaries." Mr. Buchanan, Sec. of State, to Mr. Harris, March 30, 1846, MS. Inst. The situation referred to in the foregoing instruction arose as follows: 4. CASE OF YUCATAN. $942. An Indian outbreak having occurred in Yucatan the authorities of the country offered to transfer "the dominion and sovereignty to the United States, and at the same time made a similar offer to Great Britain and Spain. With reference to this offer President Polk said: "Whilst it is not my purpose to recommend the adoption of any measure, with a view to the acquisition of the dominion and sovereignty over Yucatan, yet, according to our established policy, we could not consent to a transfer of this dominion and sovereignty' to either Spain, Great Britain, or any other European power. In the language of President Monroe, in his message of December, 1823,' we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.' In my annual message of December, 1845, I declared that near a quarter of a century ago, the principle was distinctly announced to the world, in the annual message of one of my predecessors, that the "American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power." This principle will apply with greatly increased force, should any European power attempt to establish any new colony in North America. In the existing circumstances of the world, the present is deemed a proper occasion to reiterate and reaffirm the principle avowed by Mr. Monroe, and to state my cordial concurrence in its wisdom and sound policy."" President Polk's special message, April 29, 1848, Cong. Globe, 39 Cong. 1 See, also, S. Ex. Docs. 40, 45, 49, 30 Cong. 1 sess.; 51 Br. & For. State On May 4, 1848, a bill to enable the President "to take temporary military occupation of Yucatan" was introduced in the Senate. On May 17, however, Mr. Hannegan, who had reported the bill from the Committee on Foreign Relations, of which he was chairman, asked that it be informally passed over, as news had been received of the conclusion of a treaty between the whites and the Indians. Cong. Globe, 30 Cong. 1 sess. 727, 778. Seen Lawrence's Wheaton (1863), 124, citing Calhoun's Works, IV. 454; The foregoing bill gave rise in the Senate to a spirited debate, in which Mr. Calhoun, who had been a member of President Monroe's Cabinet took part. After discussing that part of Monroe's message relating to the Holy Alliance he proceeded to examine the noncolonization principle, to which, as he contended, President Polk had given an unwarranted extension. The word "colonization," said Mr. Calhoun, had a specific meaning, namely, "the establishment of a settlement by emigrants from the parent country in a territory either uninhabited or from which the inhabitants have been partially or wholly expelled." The passage on colonization, in President Monroe's message, did not, said Mr. Calhoun, become a subject of discussion in the Cabinet. In this respect his memory did not differ from that of Mr. Adams. "My impression," said Mr. Calhoun, " is that it never became a subject of deliberation in the Cabinet. I so stated when the Oregon question was before the Senate. I stated it in order that Mr. Adams might have an opportunity of denying it, or asserting the real state of the facts. He remained silent, and I presume my statement is correct, that this declaration was inserted after the Cabinet deliberation. It originated entirely with Mr. Adams, without being submitted to the Cabinet, and it is, in my opinion, owing to this fact that it is not made with the precision and clearness with which the two former are. It declares, without qualification, that these continents have asserted and maintained their freedom and independence, and are no longer subject to colonization by any European power. This is not strictly accurate. Taken as a whole, these continents had not asserted and maintained their freedom and independence. At that period Great Britain had a larger portion of the continent in her possession than the United States. Russia had a considerable portion of it, and other powers possessed some portions on the southern parts of this continent. The declaration was broader than the fact, and exhibits precipitancy and want of due reflection. Besides, there was an impropriety in it when viewed in conjunction with the foregoing declarations. I speak not in the language of censure. We were, as to them, acting in concert with England, on a proposition coming from herself a proposition of the utmost magnitude, and which we felt at the time to be essentially connected with our peace and safety; and of course it was due to propriety as well as policy that this declaration should be strictly in accordance with British feeling. Our power then was not what it is now, and we had to rely upon her co-operation to sustain the ground we had taken. We had then only about six or seven millions of people, scattered, and without such means of communication as we now possess to bring us together in a short period of time. The declaration accordingly, with respect to colonization, striking at England as well as Russia, gave offense to her, and that to such an extent that she refused to cooperate with us in settling the Russian question. Now, I will venture to say that if that declaration had come before that cautious Cabinetfor Mr. Monroe was among the wisest and most cautious men I have ever known-it would have been modified, and expressed with a far greater degree of precision, and with much more delicacy in reference to the feelings of the British Government. "In stating the precise character of these declarations, and the manner in which they originated, I have discharged a double duty; a duty to my country, to whom it is important that these declarations should be correctly understood-and a duty to the Cabinet of which I was a member, and am now the only survivor. I remove a false interpretation, which makes safe and proper declarations improper and dangerous. "But it is not only in these respects that these famous declarations are misunderstood by the Chief Magistrate of the country, as well as by others. They were but declarations-nothing more; declarations, announcing in a friendly manner to the powers of the world, that we should regard certain acts of interposition of the allied powers as dangerous to our peace and safety; interposition of European powers to oppress the Republics which had just arisen upon this continent, as manifesting an unfriendly disposition, and that this continent, having become free and independent, was no longer the subject of colonization by European powers. Not one word in any one of them in reference to resistance. There is nothing said of it; and with great propriety was it omitted. Resistance belonged to us--to Con gress; it is for us to say whether we shall resist or not, and to what "Whether you will resist or not, and the measure of your resistance whether it shall be by negotiation, remonstrance, or some intermediate measure, or by a resort to arms; all this must be determined and decided on the merits of the question itself. This is the only wise course. We are not to have quoted on us, on every occasion, general declarations to which any and every meaning may be attached. There are cases of interposition where I would resort to the hazard of war with all its calamities. Am I asked for one? I will answer. I designate the case of Cuba. So long as Cuba remains in the hands of Spain-a friendly power-a power of which we have no dread-it should continue to be, as it has been the policy of all Administrations ever since I have been connected with the Government, to let Cuba remain there; but with the fixed determination, which I hope never will be relinquished, that, if Cuba pass from her, it shall not be into any other hands but ours: This, not from a feeling of ambition, not from a desire for the extension of dominion, but because that island is indispensable to the safety of the United States; or rather, because it is indispensable to the safety of the United States that this island should not be in certain hands. If it were, our coasting trade between the Gulf and the Atlantic would, in case of war, be cut in twain, to be followed by convulsive effects. In the same category, I will refer to a case in which we might most rightfully have. resisted, had it been necessary, a foreign power; and that is the case of Texas." Calhoun's Works, IV. 457 et seq. Mr. Calhoun's views as to President Polk's position are adopted in Wool- "It is to be borne in mind that the declarations known as the Monroe doctrine have never received the sanction of an act or resolution of Congress; nor have they any of that authority which European governments attach to a royal ordinance. They are, in fact, only the declarations of an existing administration of what its own policy would be, and what it thinks should ever be the policy of the country, on a subject of paramount and permanent interest. Thus, at the same session in which the message was delivered, Mr. Clay introduced the following resolution: That the people of these States would not see, without serious inquietude, any forcible interposition by the allied powers of Europe, in behalf of Spain, to reduce to their former' subjection those parts of the continent of America which have pro claimed and established for themselves, respectively, independent governments, and which have been solemnly recognized by the United States.' But this resolution was never brought up for action or discussion. It is seen also, by the debates on the Panama mission and the Yucatan intervention, that Congress has never been willing to commit the nation to any compact or pledge on this subject, or to any specific declaration of purpose or methods, beyond the general language of the message. "In the debates on the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, in 1855-56, above referred to, all the speakers seemed to agree to this position of the subject. Mr. Clayton said: 'In reference to this particular territory, I would not hesitate at all, as one Senator, to assert the Monroe doctrine and maintain it by my vote; but I do not expect to be sustained in such a vote by both branches of Congress. Whenever the attempt has been made to assert the Monroe doctrine in either branch. of Congress, it has failed. The present Democratic party came into power, after the debate on the Panama mission, on the utter abnegation of the whole doctrine, and stood upon Washington's doctrine of nonintervention. You can not prevail on a majority, and I will venture to say that you can not prevail on one-third, of either House of Congress to sustain it.' Mr. Cass said: 'Whenever the Monroe doctrine has been urged, either one or the other House of Congress, or both Houses, did not stand up to it.' Mr. Seward said: 'It is true that each House of Congress has declined to assert it; but the honorable Senators must do each House the justice to acknowledge that the reason why they did decline to assert the doctrine was that it was proposed, as many members thought, as an abstraction, unnecessary, not called for at the time.' Mr. Mason spoke of it as having 'never been sanctioned or recognized by any constitutional authority.' Mr. Cass afterwards, in a very elaborate speech (of January 28, 1856), gave his views of the history and character of the doctrine. He placed it upon very high ground, as a declaration not only against European. intervention or future colonization, but against the acquisition of dominion on the continent by European powers, by whatever mode or however derived; and seemed to consider it as a pledge to resist such a result by force, if necessary, in any part of the continent. He says: 'We ought years ago, by Congressional interposition, to have made this system of policy an American system, by a solemn declaration; and, if we had done so, we should have spared ourselves much trouble and no little mortification.' Referring to Mr. Polk's message, in 1845, he said there was then an opportunity for Congress to adopt the doctrine, not as an abstraction, but on a practical point. 'We refused to say a word; and, I repeat, we refused then even to take the subject into consideration.' He denied the correctness of Mr. Calhoun's explanation (supra), and contended that the non |