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State. It was, in reality, the chief element of the foreign policy of the
United States.

Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to the Marquis de Montholon, French min.,
Feb. 12, 1866, H. Ex. Doc. 73, 39 Cong. 1 sess. pt. 2, p. 548.

"It is with very great satisfaction that I find that the two Governments of the United States and France have come to an agreement in regard to the present military intervention of France in Mexico.

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"This agreement I understand to be of the effect following, viz: The French military forces in Mexico will be withdrawn from that country in three separate detachments; the one to leave in November next, and the two others to leave in March and November, 1867. On our part all the sentiments heretofore expressed concerning the principle of nonintervention are now with cheerfulness reaffirmed I think it due to the frankness and sincerity which is required by the occasion to suggest that the continuance of the intervention during the period limited will necessarily be regarded with concern and apprehension by the masses of our people, and perhaps by Congress. Under these circumstances our army of observation must also be continued in some proportion on the southern bank of the Rio Grande. . . It seems to me not improbable that France, having determined upon the complete withdrawal of her forces from Mexico within the term of seventeen months, may hereafter find it convenient and consistent with her interest and honor even to abridge that term." Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to the Marquis de Montholon, French min., April 25, 1866, Dip. Cor. 1866, I. 378.

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For further correspondence in relation to the evacuation of Mexico by the
French troops, see message of the President, Jan. 29, 1867, and accom-
panying correspondence, H. Ex. Doc. 76, 39 Cong. 2 sess.

See a memorandum of a conversation by the Secretary of State with the
Marquis de Montholon, signed by Mr. Seward, July 30, 1866, MS.
Notes to French Leg. VIII. 252.

See Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Campbell, min. to Mexico, No. 3,
Oct. 25, 1866, Dip. Cor. 1866, III. 4.

As to attempts of Santa Anna and Oretga in 1866 to overthrow the Mexi-
can Government, see Message of the President, Dec. 20, 1866, H. Ex.
Doc. 17, 39 Cong. 2 sess.

As to proceedings in Mexico and the French evacuation, see Mr. Seward's report, Jan. 29, 1867, H. Ex. Doc. 76, 39 Cóng. 2 sess.

As to subsequent proceedings in Mexico, see S. Ex. Doc. 20, 40 Cong. 1 sess.; II. Ex. Doc. 30, 40 Cong. 1 sess.; H. Ex. Doc. 31, 40 Cong. 1 sess.

When the time came for the departure of the first detachment of the French army, it was intimated that the Emperor had decided to postpone the withdrawal of all his troops till the spring of 1867. Mr. Seward replied by cable, November 23, 1866, that the United States could not acquiesce in this plan, (1) because the term "next

spring" was vague and indefinite, (2) because there was no better guarantee for the withdrawal of the whole force in the spring than there had been for the withdrawal of a part in November, and (3) because such delay would seriously conflict with the plans of the United States. The Emperor intended to withdraw his troops, but wished to postpone their departure as long as possible. He proposed that a provisional government be formed to the exclusion of both Maximilian and Juarez. On January 18, 1867, Mr. Seward positively declined the proposition. The Emperor then gave up hope, and in February, 1867, the French evacuated the City of Mexico, and intervention quickly came to an end. In a few weeks Maximilian's forces were routed, and he and two of his most prominent Mexican supporters were tried by court-martial. On June 19, 1867, they were shot. Mr. Seward endeavored to obtain clemency for Maximilian, "but the passions of the army seem to have prevented Juarez from commuting the sentence."

Bancroft, Life of Seward, II. 438-440.

See, as to Louis Napoleon's attitude, Callahan's Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy, 99 et seq.; and as to the attitude of the Confederacy toward the Monroe doctrine, id. 75, 79, 83, 98, 161, 196, 204, 217, 241, 254, 257, 266, 275.

"In November, 1865, I went to Paris, at the solicitation of the Emperor Napoleon, breakfasted with him, and after breakfast spent two hours and a half with him in his cabinet, during which period he made with me a secret treaty, subject to the approval of the President, by which he agreed to withdraw his army from Mexico, in twelve, eighteen, and twenty-four months; and on that occasion I also arranged for the purchase of French Guiana, and placed in Mr. Seward's hands the terms of purchase fixed by the French minister of foreign affairs. The arrangement in regard to Mexico was approved by the President; and I so informed the Emperor. One of the conditions of that arrangement was, that it should be considered a profound secret, and not to be made known to our minister in Paris, or even to the French minister of foreign affairs, until the Emperor should make the annunciation in the Moniteur in the following April. At the solicitation of Marshal Niel, however, who, when he was advised of the arrangement, declared it to be unsafe to try to evacuate Mexico in separate detachments, and insisted that the whole army must be removed at once, the Emperor subsequently gave us notice. that he would retire from Mexico in March, 1867, sixteen months from the time of our arrangement, instead of twelve, eighteen, and twenty-four months, and this he did in good faith."

Letter of Gen. James Watson Webb to Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, May 17, 1873, S. Ex. Doc. 52, 43 Cong. 1 sess. 204.

"In regard to the purchase of French Guinea, the President disapproved, but Mr. Seward, I presume by authority of the President, directed me, in announcing the decision in regard to Mexico, to say to the Emperor Napoleon that we should be pleased to negotiate for the purchase of the island of Martinique or that of St. Pierre. Our proposition was declined, and there the matter ended." (Ibid.)

In his dispatch No. 43, of August 10, 1867, Gen. Webb, who was then still minister to Brazil, requested Mr. Seward to return to him "certain original notes of a conversation concerning Mexican affairs" which was held between him and the Emperor Louis Napoleon, and which notes, after having been transmitted to the President, were left in Mr. Seward's possession. "Your dispatch," said Mr. Seward, “also refers to autograph letters on the same subject, which, before that conversation, you had received from the Emperor of France, and which you at one time left in my care. The papers thus described were confidentially held by me and no copy of either of them was taken." It appeared, by Mr. Seward's statement, that two letters had been written to Gen. Webb by Mr. F. W. Seward, apparently for the purpose of returning the papers in question. "I shall regret the circumstance," said Mr. Seward, "if either or both of those communications miscarried. Until the receipt of your dispatch, I had no doubt that all the papers you have called for were in your possession. It is scarcely necessary to add that I have no copy or transcript of either of them." (Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Gen. Webb, min. to Brazil, No. 216, Sept. 28, 1867, MS. Inst. Brazil, XVI. 187.)

As to the resumption of diplomatic relations between France and Mexico, see Mr. Fish, Sec. of State, to Mr. Washburne, min. to France, No. 242, March 3, 1871, MS. Inst. France, XVIII. 485; Mr. Fish to Mr. Mariscal, Mex. min., Dec. 16, 1873, MS. Notes to Mex., VIII. 8; Mr. Fish to Mr. Nelson, min. to Mex., private and confidential, Dec. 19, 1872, MS. Inst. Mex. XVIII. 349; between Great Britain and Mexico, see Mr. Fish to Mr. Foster, min. to Mex., Jan. 31, 1874, MS. Inst. Mex. XIX. 66.

(4) PREVENTION OF AUSTRIAN AID, 1866.

$ 958.

With reference to a report that a representative of Maximilian was in Paris to obtain money to fit out 10,000 Austrian troops, who were ready to embark from Trieste for Mexico, Mr. Seward, on March 19, 1866, directed Mr. Motley, if the report appeared to be well founded, to bring it to the knowledge of the Austrian Government, and to say that the United States could not regard with unconcern a proceeding which would seem to bring Austria into an alliance with the invaders of Mexico, to subvert the domestic republic and build up foreign imperial institutions.

Subsequently news was received of the conclusion of a military convention under which the Austrian Government had consented that volunteers should be levied in the Empire by the Emperor's brother, in numbers sufficient to keep the full original legion in Mexico of

6,000 men, the levies to be made at the rate of 2,000 men a year for a certain period. Mr. Motley, in a despatch of April 6, 1866, raised a question whether the United States could protest against this proceeding, arguing that it was a matter within the sovereign rights of Austria; and, before sending the dispatch in which these views were advanced, he showed it to the Austrian minister of foreign affairs.

On April 6, 1866, Mr. Seward instructed Mr. Motley to state to the Austrian Government "that, in the event of hostilities being carried on hereafter in Mexico by Austrian subjects, under the command or with the sanction of the Government of Vienna, the United States will feel themselves at liberty to regard those hostilities as constituting a state of war by Austria against the Republic of Mexico; and in regard to such war, waged at this time and under existing circumstances, the United States could not engage to remain as silent or neutral spectators."

When Mr. Seward wrote this instruction he had not received Mr. Motley's despatch of the 6th of April. On reading it and perceiving that it had been submitted by Mr. Motley to Count Mensdorff, Mr. Seward, on the 30th of April, declared that it had come necessary to say that he did not acquiesce in Mr. Motley's position. His despatch, said Mr. Seward, was calculated to produce the impression that he expected the Austrian Government, in spite of the protest of the United States, still to permit the departure of volunteers under the convention, without waiting to discuss the matter with the United States. Should the Austrian Government take that course, and troops should be dispatched to Mexico in conformity with the convention, Mr. Motley was directed "at once to withdraw from Vienna to some convenient place in Europe and await instructions."

In a confidential dispatch, No. 161, of April 17, 1866, Mr. Motley reported that only 600 volunteers had been gathered to Laybach with a view to shipment from Trieste to Vera Cruz, and that the recruiting for the service was becoming very languid.

On May 6, 1866, Mr. Motley, in conformity with his instructions, addressed to Count Mensdorff a protest against the dispatch to Mexico of troops levied in Austria, and on May 12, 1866, he informed Mr. Seward that the departure of the volunteers for Mexico had been prevented.

On May 27, 1866, Count Mensdorff informed Mr. Motley, in an official note, that "the necessary measures have been taken to prevent the departure of the volunteers lately enlisted for Mexico."

Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Motley, min. to Austria, No. 167, March 19, 1866, MS. Inst. Austria, I. 287, S. Ex. Doc. 54, 39 Cong. 1 sess. 3, H. Ex. Doc. 73. 39 Cong. 1 sess. pt. 2, p. 573; same to same, No. 169, March 19, 1866, MS. Inst. Austria, I. 289, S. Ex. Doc. 54, 39 Cong. 1 sess. 4, II. Ex. Doc 73, 39 Cong. 1 sess. pt. 2, p. 573; same to same, No.

173, April 6, 1866, MS. Inst. Austria, I. 292, S. Ex. Doc. 54, 39 Cong. 1 sess. 5, H. Ex. Doc. 73, 39 Cong. 1 sess. pt. 2, p. 574; Mr. Motley to Mr. Seward, No. 158, April 6, 1866, S. Ex. Doc. 54, 39 Cong. 1 sess. 6, H. Ex. Doc. 73, 39 Cong. 1 sess. part 2, p. 575; Mr. Seward to Mr. Motley, No. 174, April 16, 1866, MS. Inst. Austria, I. 295, S. Ex. Doc. 54, 39 Cong. 1 sess. 9, H. Ex. Doc. 73, 39 Cong. 1 sess. part 2, p. 578; same to same, No. 176, (confid.), April 16, 1866, MS. Inst. Austria, I. 299; same to same, No. 181, April 30, 1866, MS. Inst. Austria, I. 302, S. Ex. Doc. 54, 39 Cong. 1 sess. 10, H. Ex. Doc. 73, 39 Cong. 1 sess. part 2, p. 579; same to same, No. 182, May 3, 1866, MS. Inst. Austria, I. 306, S. Ex. Doc. 54, 39 Cong. 1 sess. 12, H. Ex. Doc. 73, 39 Cong 1 sess. part 2, p. 582; Mr. Motley to Count Mensdorff, May 6, 1866, S. Ex. Doc. 54, 39 Cong. 1 sess. 13, H. Ex. Doc. 73, 39 Cong. 1 sess. part 2, p. 583; Count Mensdorff to Mr. Motley, May 20, 1866, S. Ex. Doc. 54, 39 Cong. 1 sess. 18, H. Ex. Doc. 73, 39 Cong. 1 sess. part 2, p. 587; Mr. Seward to Mr. Motley, No. 189, June 9, 1866, MS. Inst. Austria, I. 311, S. Ex. Doc. 54, 39 Cong. 1 sess. 20, H. Ex. Doc. 73, 39 Cong. 1 sess. part 2, p. 589.

11. PERU.

$ 959.

In the controversy between Spain and Peru, which resulted in the war between Spain and the republics on the west coast of South America from 1864 to 1866, Spain was suspected of a purpose to overthrow the independence of Peru and subvert its government; and this suspicion derived at least apparent support from the declaration of certain representatives of Spain that, as she had never acknowledged the independence of Peru, she might rightly recover her ancient property in the Chincha Islands. In this relation the minister of the United States at Madrid was instructed on May 19, 1864, to make it known to the Spanish Government "that the United States can not yield their assent to the positions thus assumed in the name of Spain, or regard with indifference an attempt to reduce Peru by conquest and reannex its territory to the kingdom of Spain.” On June 3, 1864, the American minister reported that the prime minister had authorized him to assure the United States that Spain had not the slightest intention to reacquire any of her ancient colonies or to encroach upon the independence of Peru.

Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Koerner, min. to Spain, No. 95 (confid.), May 19, 1864, Dip. Cor. 1864, IV. 23-24; Mr. Koerner to Mr. Seward, No. 101, June 3, 1864, id. 30.

Toward the end of June, 1866, Mr. Tassara, Spanish minister at Washington, read to Mr. Seward a despatch from his Government, which, after explaining the progress of the war in South America, announced that the commander of the Spanish squadron in the Pacific was instructed, if he thought proper, to take possession of the

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