Chincha Islands, and, while respecting existing contracts between the Peruvian Government and the citizens of neutral nations, to sell and export guano therefrom. Mr. Tassara remarked, in compliance with the terms of the despatch, that it was doubtful whether the instruction to the Spanish commander would be carried into effect, and that his Government had not been influenced by the idea of acquiring territory or of intervening in the internal affairs of the Spanish-American republics, but was moved solely by the idea of taking important resources from its enemies and making itself whole for the sacrifices of Spain in the war. After this interview Mr. Seward instructed the American minister at Madrid, by direction of the President, that, if the proceeding indicated in the despatch to Mr. Tassara should be persisted in, the United States must be understood as protesting against it, and that, if it should be persisted in in spite of the protest, the United States must not be expected "to remain in their present attitude of neutrality between Spain and the Spanish-American republics." Before sending off this instruction Mr. Seward permitted Mr. Tassara to read it, and, at the latter's instance, withheld it. At the same time Mr. Tassara withdrew the copy of the despatch which he had read to Mr. Seward, in order that he might refer the whole matter to his Government. Mr. Seward deemed it proper, however, confidentially to acquaint the American minister at Madrid with the circumstance and with the President's views, and instructed him to intimate to the Spanish minister of foreign affairs, "in an informal and most friendly manner, without entering into written correspondence, that the President sincerely and earnestly trusts that Spain may not proceed to any reoccupation of the Chincha Islands, because such a proceeding would seriously tend to disturb the harmonious relations with her Catholic Majesty's Government which it is the President's desire may remain without interruption." Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hale, min. to Spain, No. 35 (confid.), See, also, memorandum by Mr. Seward, approved by the President, MS. It was held in 1881 inexpedient for the United States to unite with France and Great Britain in intervening to terminate hostilities between Chile and Peru. Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, to Mr. Morton, min. to France, No. 30, Sept. 5, 1881, For. Rel. 1881, 426. With reference to the possible renewal by France, Germany, and Great Britain of the project of intervention, which they had in contemplation in 1879, to bring about a settlement of the quarrel between Chile on the one hand and Peru and Bolivia on the other, the American ministers at Lima, La Paz, and Santiago were instructed, in case the pressure of the governments in question upon the combatants should tend to assume a coercive character, to preserve an attitude which would facilitate a joint and friendly resort to the good offices of the United States. (Mr. Evarts, Sec. of State to Mr. Christiancy, min. to Peru, No. 68 (confid.), March 9, 1880, MS. Inst. Peru, XVI. 441; Mr. Evarts to Mr. Osborn, min. to Chile, No. 85 (confid.), March 9, 1880, MS. Inst. Chile, XVI. 273.) The action of the American diplomatic representative at Lima, in February, 1883, in uniting with the representatives of France, Great Britain, and Italy in submitting to their respective governments a suggestion that they unite in an interference in the South American difficulties, was taken without authority and without previous communication with the Department of State, and was disapproved. (Mr. Frelinghuysen, Sec. of State, to Mr. Logan, min. to Chile, No. 39, March 7, 1883, MS. Inst. Chile, XVII. 60.) 12. SANTO DOMINGO. (1) AMERICAN-EUROPEAN INTERVENTION, 1850-51. § 960. In a circular of February 22, 1850, addressed to the American, British, and French consuls at Santo Domingo City, the minister of foreign affairs of the Dominican Republic solicited the mediation of the Governments of the United States, France, and Great Britain for the purpose of bringing about a peace between the Empire of Hayti and that Republic. This solicitation was followed by conferences at Washington between Mr. Clayton, who was then Secretary of State, and the British and French Ministers, in which a plan of cooperation was tentatively agreed upon. It comprised the appointment by the United States of a chargé d'affaires to the Dominican Republic. In a note of May 11, 1850, Sir Henry Bulwer, who was then British minister at Washington, informed the Department of State that the French Government had expressed its willingness to cooperate with the Governments of Great Britain and the United States for the purpose indicated. Mr. Clayton replied, May 20, that upon the return to Washington of Mr. Green, the United States consul at Santo Domingo, his correspondence would be submitted to the Senate with the nomination of a chargé d'affaires, and that if the nomination should be confirmed the President would be prepared to cooperate. with the Governments of England and France in the manner and for the purposes suggested. Soon after Mr. Green's return, however, President Taylor died and was succeeded by Mr. Fillmore, while Mr. Webster succeeded Mr. Clayton as Secretary of State; and it was decided, instead of nominating a chargé d'affaires to Santo Domingo, to confide the business to a special agent. For that mission Mr. Robert M. Walsh was selected. He was furnished, through the Department of State, with letters of introduction from the British and French ministers at Washington to the British and French consuls at Port au Prince and Santo Domingo, and with a copy of the instructions which Sir Henry Bulwer had, by direction of his Government, addressed to Mr. Usher, British consul at Port au Prince. These instructions, which the French Government adopted, set forth, said Mr. Webster, in an instruction to Mr. Walsh of Jan. 18, 1851, "the motives and objects of the intervening parties clearly and luminously" that it was unnecessary for him to advert to them. He entirely concurred in the views which they expressed, and expected that Mr. Walsh would be governed by them. Webster further said: SO Mr. "On arriving at Port au Prince you will accordingly seek a conference with Mr. Usher and the consul of France upon the subject of your mission, and particularly with a view of inducing the Emperor Soulouque to consent to a lengthened truce or a permanent peace with the Dominicans. As in co-operating for this end the three governments are actuated by philanthropic views, to which they believe any material interests which all or either may have in the question are quite subordinate, you will endeavor, in all your communications with your colleagues, and with either the Dominican or the Haytian governments, to keep your mind free from any prejudice resulting from color or forms of government. You will not deny justice to the Emperor Soulouque because he and his subjects are of African extraction and his government professes to be monarchical; and you will not be partial in your judgments in favor of the Dominican government because its officers are supposed to be for the most part of the Castilian race, and because it claims to be republican in its form. "The material interests of the three countries, however, are largely involved in the restoration and preservation of peace between the contending parties in St. Domingo. France is a creditor of the government of the Emperor Soulouque to a large amount. She can not hope for a discharge of her debt when the resources of his country, instead of being developed by pacific pursuits and in part, at least, applied to that purpose, are checked in their growth and wasted in a war with a conterminous state. Great Britain and France are both interested in securing that great additional demand for their productions which must result from the impulse to be expected for industry in Hayti and the Dominican Republic from a termination of the war; and the United States have a similar interest, both from the augmentation of their trade with the island which would then ensue and from the consideration that their commercial prosperity is intimately connected with that of both France and Great Britain. When, there fore, you shall have held free and full conferences with your colleagues and shall have ascertained the reciprocal claims of the parties .to the war, if the Emperor Soulouque shall insist upon maintaining a belligerent attitude until all his demands shall have been satisfied by the opposite party, you will unite with your colleagues in remonstrating against this course on his part. If the remonstrance should prove to be unavailing, you will signify to the Emperor that you shall give immediate notice to your government, that the President, with the concurrence of Congress, may adopt such measures, in cooperation with the governments of England and France, as may cause the intervention of the three powers to be respected; and you will lose no time in communicating the result to this Department. The Emperor should be made properly aware of the dangers which he and his country may encounter, if he should be unfortunately advised to reject reasonable terms of pacification; but you will stop at remonstrance until further orders. "If, however, your joint and concurrent representations should induce the Emperor Soulouque to make an abatement of his demands, which you and your colleagues may deem reasonable, you will, in concert with them, make this known to the Dominican Government, and will recommend their adoption of a peace on that basis. You will, however, give a patient hearing to any objections which that government may advance, and if you and your colleagues should deem those objections solid, you will communicate them to the minister for foreign affairs of Hayti and will require from him an answer to them. If this answer should not be given within a reasonable time, or if when given it should not prove to be satisfactory, you will then, conjointly with your colleagues, require the Emperor to conclude a permanent peace with the Dominican Government, upon the basis which you may jointly prescribe to him, or to consent to a truce with that government of not less than ten years. "You will write to the department as frequently as opportunities may permit, in order that, if further instructions should be necessary, they may, after consultation with the ministers of Great Britain and France, be transmitted accordingly. The instructions given by Sir Henry Bulwer to Mr. Usher, and adopted by Mr. Webster, stated that the object of the powers was "to stop the effusion of blood which is being uselessly spilled in barbarous hostilities between the two races which inhabit the island"-"hostilities abhorrent to humanity, destructive to commerce, and threatening, by the possibility of jealousies or differences arising out of the intervention or supposed desire of intervention of one or other of the great powers interested in this question, to disturb the general good understanding which at present prevails between all such powers and Great Britain." The object to attain, consequently, was either (1)" a settled peace upon a fair and durable basis," or (2) "a lengthened truce upon reasonable conditions." Whichever of these might seem the "most feasible" was to be considered the "best." To this end Mr. Usher was to insist on an immediate cessation of hostilities, or, if hostilities were not actually taking place, on a postponement till "a certain limited period." Should the Emperor Soulouque refuse this reasonable request, he was to be advised that he had placed himself in a position that would justify the powers in immediately taking such steps as their interests or their general duty to humanity might lead them to adopt. Should he accede to it, the representatives of the powers were to present a plan for a truce or a peace, which was to be fair to both parties. "When great and civilized nations interfere," said Sir Henry, "to regulate the affairs or quarrels of smaller or less civilized ones, their justification must be founded on the beneficent policy which directs, and the strict impartiality which limits their line of conduct." Besides, all differences between the representatives of the powers were to be avoided, so that no person within the governments of Hayti or St. Domingo should imagine that there is an English policy, or an American policy, or a French policy to be pursued in this matter, but that all should recognize that it is merely a general policy consistent with the general interests of commerce and humanity, which the three governments unanimously adopt, and expect their respective agents impartially to carry out." Should the Government of Hayti persist in refusing the "mediation," the Emperor was to be menaced, as a last resort, with the determination of the powers to have the terms proposed adopted in the main, or at all events not to allow the war to continue or to recommence till other terms had been "submitted by the mediating powers in lieu thereof." The measures of coercion which England and France would be willing to adopt were at the moment confined to a blockade of Haytian ports, such as Port au Prince, Jacmel, Aux Cayes, Gonaives; but, if it should seem that a blockade would not suffice to obtain the object in view, the menace of force, if made at all, should be made in such vague terms as would not commit Her Majesty's Government to employ force, till it should learn what species of force would be necessary. In the unforeseen contingency of a plan acceptable to Hayti being rejected by Santo Domingo, all that could be asked of the Haytian Government would be a suspension of hostilities till fresh instructions could be obtained. Mr. Walsh embarked at Norfolk, January 25, 1851, on the U. S. S. Saranac, and on the 2d of February arrived at Port au Prince, where, after announcing his presence to the Duke of Tiberon, the Haytian minister of foreign affairs, he was promptly received by the latter, and, together with the officers of the Saranac, presented to the Emperor. |