States at Vienna, a communication in which he maintained that "no foreign government or its representative can take just offense at anything which an officer" of the United States "may say in his private capacity;" that "official communications only are to be regarded as indicating the sentiments and views of the Government of the United States;" and that, if those communications were of a "friendly character," the "foreign government has no right or reason to infer that there is any insincerity in them, or to point to other matters as showing the real sentiments of the government." S. Ex. Doc. 92, 32 Cong. 1 sess. Mr. Hülsemann afterwards returned to Washington on an intimation by Mr. Everett, who had succeeded Mr. Webster as Secretary of State, that it would be agreeable to the President if he should resume his post. The following documents contain correspondence in relation to Kossuth : "M. Kossuth [because of the President's repulse of his appeal for inter- "I think it was on the following day that the President gave a dinner to M. Kossuth, to which General Scott and the Cabinet and a few other public men, and to which also I and my wife were invited. As we were about to proceed to the reception room we encountered Mr. and Mrs. Webster, and at the suggestion of the latter Mrs. Webster took my arm and he gave his own to my wife. As we were about to move in this order, a servant announced that M. Kossuth was immediately behind us, whereupon Mr. Webster turned to welcome him, announcing to his wife at the same moment-against her remonstrances, for she felt that he had been rude to her-that we must change the order of our going,' and that she must take M. Kossuth's arm. During and after dinner the bearing of the guest, in behalf of whom the banquet had been given, was stately and constrained. It was evident that he felt sore and angry. He stood apart after dinner, in a manner which repelled attempts to enter into conversation with him. His whole appearance, alike by his picturesque cos 54 64 POLICY OF NONINTERVENTION. § 905.] tume and his attitude and expression, suggested a moody Hamiet. whom neither man nor woman pleased. After a vain attempt to .engage him in conversation on Hungarian topics, I asked Mr. Fillmore what had happened to his illustrious guest to have thrown him into such an evidently ungenial state of feeling. He said it was in consequence of what had occurred at his presentation. Mr. Fillmore told me that there had been an explicit understanding with M. Kossuth, through his secretary, that there was to be no allusion in his speech, upon being presented, to the subject of aid or intervention on the part of the Government of the United States, in behalf of the party in Hungary that aimed to secure its independence of Austria, and that he had prepared his reply on the assumption that such would be the character of the address. His surprise was therefore great when M. Kossuth in his address invoked that aid, and expressed the hope that it would be given. The President was compelled, on the spur of the moment, to omit what he had prepared to say, and to declare to him, with perfect courtesy, but with equal explicitness, that nothing like sanction, much less material aid, for the cause of the independence of Hungary could be given by the Government of the United States. The reply was admirable, and could not have been improved had Mr. Fillmore anticipated the tenor of Kossuth's address and prepared his answer. It was courteous, yet extremely dignified and decided. Indeed, it may be regarded as fortunate that an occasion so conspicuous occurred for proclaiming at home and to foreign states that the policy of the Government was then, as it had always been, that of absolute nonintervention in the affairs of European nations. 'Mr. Webster, who presented M. Kossuth to the President, wrote on the same day to a friend that Mr. Fillmore received him with great propriety, and his address was all right-sympathy, personal respect, and kindness, but no departure from our established policy.' I inferred from Mr. Fillmore's animated description of the scene that he regarded it as an unfair attempt to entrap him into some expression or some omission which might seem to countenance M. Kossuth's cherished hope of inducing the Government to give both its moral and material aid to renew the struggle for Hungarian independence. It is not strange that he should have passionately desired such a result; but it was a singular delusion to suppose it possible that our Government would enter upon the quixotic career of making the United States the armed champion of European nationalities struggling for liberty and independence. At the Congressional dinner given to M. Kossuth his reception was most enthusiastic. In common with all the audience, I was completely entranced by his singularly captivating eloquence. I was assigned a seat next to Mr. Seward, and his demonstrations of applause by hands and feet and voice were excessive. The Hungarian Whirlwind' certainly carried away everything on that occasion, and mingled all parties into one confused mass of admirers prostrate at Kossuth's feet. The speech seemed to me wanting in no element of a consummate masterpiece of eloquence. The orator's picturesque appearance, his archaic English style, his vibrant and thrilling voice, and his skillfully selected and arranged topics, all concurred in the production of an effect upon his audience such as I have never seen surpassed. As addressed to American statesmen, it exhibited, what was very rare among foreigners, a perfect understanding of our Government, as the union of separate states with their autonomy in a given sphere, under a general constitution. His eulogium of this arrangement, and his description of its adaptation and its probable adoption by various nationalities in Europe, was very skillful. The union of Germany in one empire may be regarded by some as the first step toward that confederated German republic which he foretold. "It was doubtful up to the last moment before Mr. Webster's appearance whether he would come and make a speech on that occasion. . "The speech which Mr. Webster made, as we now read it, seems very appropriate to the occasion and to his own position; but his manner was constrained, and after the high pitch of enthusiasm to which the audience had been wrought up, it fell rather heavily upon them, and did not give that measure of encomium of M. Kossuth which their feelings at the moment craved. But Mr. Webster spoke to an audience, many of whom were bitter political foes or alienated friends, and his recent experience in connection with M. Kossuth, while it had not diminished his admiration of his brilliant ability, had convinced him that, though matchless as an orator, he was no statesman. Moreover, his position as Secretary of State made it incumbent upon him to speak with great caution. If there was an intention on the part of Mr. Seward to entrap Mr. Webster into any compromising declarations by which his influence or his prospects might be injured, it was not successful. The speech might not be vehemently admired; it could not justly be condemned." (The Rev. C. M. Butler, Reminiscences of Mr. Webster (pamphlet).) “The sober second thought brought our public men and our people back to a sense of the true destiny of the Republic, and in this way they were greatly aided by Kossuth's own indiscreet conduct. It soon became apparent that in all this Hungarian business we had departed from the policy marked out by Washington to abstain from intermeddling in the political affairs of Europe, and that our action was inconsistent with the Monroe doctrine, whereby we sought to exclude European nations from extending their political influence on the American hemisphere." (Mr. John W. Foster, A Century of American Diplomacy, 331-332.) Mr. Marcy, Secretary of State, in a letter to Mr. Mason, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 25, 1854, presented the claim of Mr. Marsh, United States minister at Constantinople, and of the United States consul at the same place, for reimbursement for expenses which they had incurred in respect of the Hungarian refugees. "The original number of the refugees," said Mr. Marcy, "was much diminished during their stay in Turkey; a large number escaped through the connivance of the Turkish authorities, and made their way by means of passports or official certificates, given by the United States agents, to different parts of Europe, and even to the United States, some returned to Hungary, others wandered into the interior, and many arrived in Constantinople. ... Their necessities compelled the legation and the consulate of the United States the latter then and for a considerable period previously in charge of the memorialist-to contribute, as it is alleged by both, to their relief to an extent which, as stated by Mr. Marsh, was a serious embarrassment to him. He was aware that he could not lawfully claim any allowance for this expenditure in his account with the contingent fund, but the action of the Government and the expression of public sympathy in America had put him in a position which absolutely compelled him to go much beyond his means in supplying the wants of these suffering outcasts." (7 MS. Report Book, 126.) With reference to the reception of Mr. A. Dudley Mann, when a Confederate agent, by His Holiness the Pope, and the letter of the Pope to Mr. Davis, see supra, § 72, I. 211. See, for another version of the letter, translated from the Moniteur, of Paris, and the letter of Mr. Davis, taken from the same journal, Dip. Cor. 1864, III. 13-14. In Dip. Cor. 1862, 561, there is printed a dispatch from Mr. Motley, then minister to Austria, of February 12, 1862. From the dispatch, as printed, a passage is omitted. This passage related to an interview which Mr. Motley had had with the Austrian minister of foreign affairs, Count Rechberg, in which the latter stated that he had been informed of an intention on the part of those hostile to the United States Government to publish the secret instructions given by the United States to Mr. Mann when he was sent as an emissary to Hungary, in 1849. Count Rechberg declared that he did not mention the matter in an unfriendly spirit, but declared that, while the United States was "maintaining the principles of legal authority against insurrection and rebellion," the Austrian Government "had no disposition to throw impediments in their path, or to do them any injury." Count Rechberg referred to the instructions as being “secret,” and later furnished Mr. Motley with a copy of them. The so-called "secret" instructions were Mr. Clayton's instructions to Mr. Mann, of June 18, 1849, which were published in full with President Taylor's message of March 28, 1850, S. Ex. Doc. 43, 31 Cong. 1 sess., which Mr. Motley had not seen. It was in reality the publication of the instructions in 1850 that led to the Webster-Hülsemann correspondence. Mr. Seward wrote to Mr. Motley that it was not worth while to take much trouble about Mr. Mann's revival of the Hungarian question, and that he had not taken the trouble to look it up. (Mr. Seward, Sec. of State, to Mr. Motley, min. to Austria (confid.), March 10, 1862, MS. Inst. Austria, I. 169.) 3. INTERVENTION IN CUBA. (1) RELATIONS, 1825-1867. "It appears, on looking into the papers of 1825 and 1826, that so far from our having prohibited Mexico and Colombia from making any attack upon Cuba, we uniformly abstained from doing anything of the kind. The Americans declared they could not see with indifference any state other than Spain in possession of Cuba, and further their disposition to interpose their power should war be conducted in Cuba in a devastating manner, and with a view to the excitement of a servile war." 2 Diary of Lord Ellenborough, 188, under date of Feb. 8, 1830, his lordship being then a cabinet minister in the Duke of Wellington's administration. "The colonies of Spain are near to our own shores. Our commerce with them is large and important, and the records of Lopez expedition. the diplomatic intercourse between the two countries will show to Her Catholic Majesty's government how sincerely and how steadily the United States has manifested the hope that no political changes might lead to a transfer of these colonies from Her Majesty's Crown. If there is one among the existing governments of the civilized world which for a long course of years has diligently sought to maintain amicable relations with Spain, it is the government of the United States. "Not only does the correspondence between the two governments show this, but the same truth is established by the history of the legislation of the country, and the general course of the executive government. In this recent invasion, Lopez and his fellow-subjects in the United States succeeded in deluding a few hundred men, by a long-continued and systematic misrepresentation of the political condition of the island, and of the wishes of its inhabitants. And it is not for the purpose of reviving unpleasant recollections that Her Majesty's government is reminded that it is not many years since the commerce of the United States suffered severely from armed boats and vessels which found refuge and shelter in the ports of the Spanish islands. These violations of the law, these authors of gross violence towards the citizens of this republic, were finally suppressed, not by any effort of the Spanish authorities, but by the activity and vigilance of our Navy. This, however, was not accomplished but by the efforts of several years, nor until many valuable lives, as well as a vast amount of property, had been lost. Among others, Lieutenant Allen, a very valuable and distinguished officer in the naval service of the United States, was killed in an action with these banditti." Mr. Webster, Sec. of State, to Mr. Barringer, Nov. 26, 1851, 6 Webster's See further, as to the Lopez expedition, 6 Webster's Works, 535; S. Ex. As to the cases of the Georgiana and Susan Loud, and the Contoy pris- cent City." In September, 1852, the Spanish authorities at Havana, on the arrival at that port of the American mail steamer Case of the "Cres- Crescent City, ordered the captain to keep Mr. Smith, the purser, on board, and not to permit him to come on shore, on the ground that he had written calumnies against the captain-general of the island. The political secretary of the island |