instructions, which are contrary to the true interest of their country, yet I hope he will allow, that in times past, the crown has been oftner misled, and consequently, we must conclude, that it is more apt to be misled in time to come, than we can suppose the people to be.

As to the contests about the next election, sir, that they were begun a long while ago, is a certain fact; but who the beginners were may not be so certain, or, at least, not so generally known; and the honourable gentleman who spoke last seemed to be ignorant, or indeed, rather to mistake who were the beginners of them; but if he pleases to look about him, he may see one not far distant from him, who, by his agents, was the first and the principal beginner of them, in most parts of the kingdom. To see them begin so soon, is no new thing, sir. It is a stale ministerial artifice; it has been practised ever since septennial parliaments took place, and will be practised as long as they continue. Ministers of state know well how unequal the contention is between a country gentleman, who has nothing but his own estate, greatly exhausted by the many taxes he pays, to depend on; and ministerial election mongers, supplied by gentlemen in office, who have for seven years been heaping up money for that purpose, or perhaps supplied even by the publick treasure of the nation. And the sooner this contention begins, the greater disadvantage the country gentlemen labour under, the more time those tools of corruption have to practise upon the electors, and to discover where that money may be placed to the best advantage, which is issued for corrupting the people, and overturning the constitution. From hence it is obvious who have been, and who will always be the first beginners of such contentions.

The learned gentleman, as well as some others, particularly an honourable gentleman under the gallery, who spoke early in the debate, and who, indeed, said as much, and in as handsome a manner as can, in my opinion, be said against the question, has told us, that our constitution has been often varied; and

that there was no time, when it was such as we ought, or would desire, to return to. Sir, it is not to be doubted, but our constitution has often varied, and perhaps, there is no time when it was without a fault; but I will affirm, that there is no time in which we may not find some good things in our constitution. There are now, there have been in every century, some good laws existing. Let us preserve those that are good; if any of them have been abolished, let them be restored, and if any of the laws now in being, are found to be attended with inconveniences, let them be repealed: this is what is now desired; this is what the people have reason to expect from parliament; there is nothing now desired but what the people have a right to; they have now, they always had a right to frequent new parliaments; and this right was established and confirmed, even by the claim of rights, notwithstanding what the learned gentleman has said to the contrary. At the time of the revolution, nay, at the present time, at all times, the word parliament, in the common way of speaking, comprehends all the sessions held from one election to another. That this is the common meaning of the word, I appeal to every gentleman in this house; and for this reason, those patriots who drew up our claim of rights, could not imagine, that it was necessary to put in the word new. They could not so much as dream, that the two words, frequent parliaments, would afterwards be interpreted to mean, frequent sessions of parliament; but the lawyers, who are accustomed to confound the sense of the plainest words, immediately found out, that a session of parliament was a parliament, and that therefore the words frequent parliaments, meant only frequent sessions. This quirk the lawyers found out immediately after the revolution; this quirk the courtiers at that time caught hold of; and this set the people anew, upon the vindication of their rights, which they obtained by the triennial bill. By that bill, the right of the people to frequent new parliaments, was established in such

clear terms, as not to be misunderstood; and God forgive them, who consented to the giving them up.

I am extremely surprised, sir, to hear it said, that the triennial bill was introduced by the enemies to the revolution. I will not say that it was introduced by the courtiers at that time: we seldom see such bills introduced by such gentlemen; but does not every one know, that it was my lord Somers who was the chief promoter of that bill, and that most of those who supported him in it, were gentlemen who had been deeply concerned in bringing about the revolution? It is true, the courtiers opposed it, and even king William himself, by the advice of some wicked ministers, refused to pass it the first time it was offered; but when it came back again to him, he was better advised; and if he had not passed it, he had not done what he ought to do, he had not done all he came to do, nor that which, when he came, he promised to do, which was to restore the people to the full enjoyment of all their rights and privileges.

To pretend, sir, that the triennial bill was introduced with a view of distressing king William's government, is really casting a reflection upon his government; for to tell us, that the people's claiming those rights, which he came to establish, was a distressing of his government, is to tell us, that his government was contrary to the rights of the people, which is in my opinion, a very high reflection, and such a one as the gentlemen, who tell us so, would not patiently hear cast upon that reign by others. The other pretence, that triennial parliaments were the cause of his putting an end to the war, or of that treaty which was so much complained of, is, I am sure, as groundless; for the second war was begun and carried on with great success, under the influence of triennial parliaments, till the balance of power was fully restored, and so firmly established, that France has never since endeavoured to make the least encroachment upon any of her neighbours. What some late measures may encourage her to do hereafter, I shall not pretend to determine; but this nation has, ever

since that time, enjoyed what I think I may call a profound tranquillity, which, if the triennial law had remained in force, we should, I believe, have made a much better use of, than we now seem to have done.

The learned gentleman has told us, that the sep. tennial law, is a proper medium between the unlimit ed power of the crown, and the limiting that power too much; but, sir, before he had fixed upon this as a medium, he should first have discovered to us the two extremes. I will readily allow, that an unlimited power in the crown, with respect to the continuing of parliaments, is one extreme; but the other, I cannot really find out; for I am very far from thinking, that the power of the crown was too much limited by the triennial law, or that the happiness of the nation was any way injured by it, or can ever be injured by frequent elections. As to the power of the crown, it is very certain, that as long as the administration of publick affairs, is agreeable to the generality of the people, were they to choose a new parliament every year, they would choose such representatives as would most heartily concur in every thing with such an administration; so that even an annual parliament could not be any limitation of the just power of the crown; and as to the happiness of the nation, it is certain that gentlemen will always contend with more heat and animosity about being members of a long parliament, than about being members of a short one; and therefore, the elections for a septennial parliament must always disturb the peace, and injure the happiness of the nation, more than the elections for an annual or triennial parliament. Of this the elections in the city of London, mentioned by my worthy friend, are an evident demonstration.

As to the elections coming on when the nation is in a ferment, it is so far from being an objection to frequent elections, that it is, in my opinion, sir, a strong argument in favour of them; because it is one of the chief supports of the freedom of the nation. It

is plain, that the people seldom or ever were in a ferment, but when encroachments were made upon their rights and privileges; and when any such are made, it is very proper, nay it is even necessary, that the people should be allowed to proceed to a new election, in order that they may choose such representatives, as will do them justice, by punishing those who have been making encroachments upon them; otherwise one of these two effects may very probably ensue : either the ferment will break out into an open insurrection, or the encroachment that has been made, may happen to be forgot before a new election comes on, and then the invaders of the people's rights, will have a much better lay for getting such a new parliament chosen, as will not only free them from all punishment, but will confirm the encroachments that have been made, and encourage the making of new. Thus the rights of the people may be nibbled and curtailed by piecemeal, and ambitious criminals may at last get themselves so firmly seated, that it will be out of the power of the people to stop their career, or to avoid the chains which they are preparing.

Now, sir, to return to the power of the crown, which the learned gentleman has told us was too much limited by the triennial law. I think I have made it plain, that the just power of the crown cannot possibly be limited by frequent elections, and consequently could not be too much limited by the triennial law. But by long parliaments the crown may be enabled to assume, and to make use of an unjust power. By our constitution, the only legal method we have of vindicating our rights and privileges, against the encroachments of ambitious ministers, is by parliament. The only way we have of rectifying a weak or wicked administration, is by parliament. The only effectual way we have of bringing high and powerful criminals to condign punishment, is by parliament. But if ever it should come to be in the power of the administration to have a majority of this house depending upon the crown, or to get a majority of such men returned as the representatives of the people,