the valour of Englishmen ; they suffered severely in action; they suffered still mere severely from disease; they incurred the cold neglect of the Spanish Government, but they effected nothing of importance. In 1837 Evans returned The dissoluto England; and in 1838 the British Ministry withdrew the Order in Council which had sanc- Legion. tioned the formation of the Legion; and the force was accordingly dissolved.1

tion of the

British

The dissolution of the British Legion did not arrest the successes which Isabella's troops were gaining. The brutal warfare 2 gradually ceased from the exhaustion of the Carlists. In one sense, this result constituted a fresh triumph for the British ministers. They had again allied themselves with a popular cause; they had encountered in consequence the fierce opposition of their political opponents; 3 and they had succeeded in securing the success of their allies. But the triumph, which they had achieved in Spain, was very different from the success which they had won in Belgium and Portugal. In Belgium they had succeeded in establishing the rule of

1 For the conduct of the British Legion see Hansard, vol. xxxvii. pp. 13291388, 1394-1460; and vol. xxxviii. p. 1; but cf. Evans' defence of it in ibid., vol. xli. p. 823. Out of a force of 9600 men 2078 perished in Spain (ibid., p. 830); and it is stated on Colonel Humfrey's authority that 80 officers and 800 men were killed and wounded in one action. (Ibid., vol. xliii. p. 827, note.) The members of it were grossly treated by the Spanish Government. (Ibid., p. 81.) They were only paid by a promise to pay. (Ibid., vol. xlviii. p. 36; and Lord Londonderry's motion on the subject, ibid., vol. xliii. p. 806; and cf. vol. lii. p. 511.) The ill success of the Legion made it unpopular in England; and, in April 1837, Hardinge endeavoured to induce the House of Commons to advise the Crown not to renew the Order in Council sanctioning its enrolment. He was beaten by 278 votes to 242. (Ibid., vol. xxxvii. p. 1329; and vol. xxxviii. p. 120.) But there can be little doubt that this debate prepared the road for the withdrawal of the Order in 1838. The ministry endeavoured to cover its ill success by making Evans a K.C.B.—a proceeding which was loudly questioned. (Ibid., vol. xli. p. 56.) It may be added that Palmerston's intervention cost this country £616,000 in stores, &c. (Ibid., vol. lii. p. 553.) 2 The war continued to be conducted with the utmost brutality; and Palmerston, stimulated probably by parliamentary criticism, in November 1838 appealed to Austria, Prussia, and Russia to use their influence with the Carlists to stop the massacres. State Papers, vol. xxvii. pp. 1095, 1117. Metternich seems to have done his best to stop them. Ibid., p. 1136.

3 Hansard, vol. xxxv. p. 946; and vol. xxxvii. p. 223, where all the arguments of the Conservatives will be found carefully stated by Lord Mahon.

Leopold without separating themselves irremediably from any of the great Continental Powers; in Portugal they had succeeded in establishing the rule of Donna Maria in opposition to the views of the autocrats of Northern Europe. But, in Spain, years of warfare, years of bloodshed, years of disorder, had resulted from their policy; and the cordial understanding with France, which had been the chief feature of Palmerston's foreign policy, had been replaced by Britain and cold distrust and divided action. From 1830 to 1835 Britain and France had acted on every great European question together. From 1835 each country often acted independently of the other.

Growing coldness between

France.

The defection of France was the more serious because Britain was in need of a powerful ally. During the whole period of Palmerston's tenure of office Russia had either

directly or indirectly opposed his policy. Nicholas had sided with Holland; he had sided with Dom Miguel. It was no secret that he sympathised with the cause of Don Carlos. Wherever a crushed and subject population was resisting the The attitude autocracy to which brute force had subjected it, of Russia. there Russia was busily counselling or employing repression. Every rebel against autocracy found in Russia her chief foe; every rebel against freedom looked to Russia for support. There had, indeed, been one conspicuous instance in which Russia had sided with revolt, and had been instrumental in securing the independence of a free people. But even her warmest admirers admitted that, in that instance, she had not interfered to win freedom for the Greeks, but to effect the humiliation of the Turk. Her hereditary hatred of the Turk had proved a stronger force than her detestation of freedom.

The altera

tion in

The course which Russia had pursued in the East in 1827 won for her the temporary friendship of the Liberal Palmerston's party in England, and the temporary admiration of Palmerston. But Palmerston's opinions soon underwent a remarkable change. He could not help perceiving that Russia repaid his confidence by throwing every

views towards Russia.

obstacle in the way of his policy. In common with the entire Liberal party he was shocked at the horrrible cruelties with which the revoit of the Poles was stamped out; in common with all his countrymen he was annoyed at the signature of the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. He prevailed upon France to join him in protesting against the treaty, and to declare that, if its "stipulations should hereafter lead to the armed interference of Russia in the internal affairs of Turkey," she would hold herself "at liberty to act upon such an occasion in any manner which the circumstances of the moment may appear to require, equally as if the treaty above-mentioned was not in existence." He prevailed upon the Government to strengthen the Mediterranean fleet, and to station it off the Dardanelles ; and he told his intimate friends that he was anxious to reorganise the Ottoman Empire, and thus enable it to remain in occupation of the road to India.2

Fear, distrust, dislike of Russia had impelled Palmerston to adopt the impracticable policy of supporting the Turk. The policy which was thus adopted was opposed to all the traditions of the Whig party, and to the opinions which Palmerston himself had originally formed, and which he was successfully applying to other questions. But the policy, when it was once adopted, was irrevocable. Palmerston was forced forward by a monarch who was inspired with a genuine alarm of Russia,3 and by a public opinion prepared The feeling to quarrel with Nicholas at every pretext. Every against day that passed added fuel to the flame which was fiercely burning in Britain. In 1833 the British nation learned the stipulations to which the Turk had agreed in the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. In 1834 the British people were shocked

of the public

Russia.

1 The French protest is published in State Papers, vol. xxviii. p. 1290; the English protest in ibid., p. 1292. Nesselrode declared in reply that the treaty was purely defensive; and that the Emperor was resolved to carry it out faithfully, "comme si la déclaration contenue dans la note n'existait pas." Ibid., pp. 1292, 1293. William IV., in his memoir, says that France and England declared that they should consider the treaty non avenu," and that Russia replied that she should consider the protest "non avenu." Stockmar, vol. i. P. 347. 2 Palmerston, vol. ii. pp. 145, 170.

3 Melbourne, vol. ii. p. 144.

to find that, by a new treaty concluded at St. Petersburg on the 29th of January, Russia had advanced her frontier towards Kars, and had gained a further strip of territory in Asia.1 In 1835 they were alarmed at discovering that the formidable Emperor, whose advance they were dreading, was publicly displaying his intimate agreement with his brother autocrats of Prussia and Austria. In September of that year Nicholas and Frederick William, attended by large divisions of their troops, met at Kalisch, on the Polish frontier; from Kalisch they proceeded to Toplitz, in Bohemia, where they were joined by Ferdinand of Austria. All Europe understood that it was the object of these meetings to publicly demonstrate the cordial understanding which was established among the autocrats of the North.2

Cracow.

An opportunity was soon found which enabled the Northern Powers to avail themselves of their agreement. The little republic of Cracow bordered on all three of the great military autocracies. It marched upon Russian Poland on the north, upon Prussian Silesia on the west, upon Austrian Galicia on the south. It owed its independence to the singularity of its position. Russia, Prussia, and Austria all coveted the "little vineyard;" but, as each of them objected to its absorption by the others, they all agreed that it should be constituted an independent republic. The republic throve in happy independence from 1815 to 1831. In 1831 the progress of the rebellion in Poland affected its security. Its inhabitants naturally sympathised with the brave nation which was struggling against its oppressors, and, after the suppression of the revolt, afforded an asylum to many of the Polish exiles. The great autocracies of Europe saw with suspicion and dislike a little republic sheltering rebels against their own authority; and, on the 9th of February 1836, addressed a joint demand to the President of the republic for the removal of all the refugees within eight days. The demand

1 For the treaty see State Papers, vol. xxvi. p. 1245. For the opinion of Lord D. Stuart on it see Hansard, vol. xxxi. p. 617.

2 Stockmar, vol. i. p. 351.

Its occupation by

Austria.

was imperfectly complied with; and the three Courts ordered the troops of Austria to occupy Cracow. The decision which was thus taken was opposed to the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna, which had declared that the city of Cracow, and its territory, should be free, independent, and strictly neutral; and had forbidden the introduction of an armed force into it under any pretence whatever. The only excuse for intervention lay in a portion of the treaty which bound the republic to refuse asylum or protection to deserters from other countries. This stipulation, however, did not justify the high-handed proceedings which had been taken by the autocrats of the North. Palmerston admitted in Parliament that there was no sufficient justification for them.1 Other persons, free from the responsibility attaching to Palmerston's office, used language distinctly tending Verney, the member for Buckingham, called on the ministry to obtain permission to send a fleet Indignation into the Black Sea; O'Connell declared that "the three plundering Powers had been guilty of the grossest, most undisguised, and unmitigated violations of treaty." Inglis offered to assent to a vote of £10,000,000 or £20,000,000 in support of the Poles; 2 and Palmerston, amidst the strong display of feeling which was thus manifested, undertook, a few weeks afterwards, to send a diplomatic agent to the republic of Cracow,3

to war.

in Britain.

This concession partly conciliated the numerous opponents of Russia in the House. The Inglises and O'Connells, indeed, would have been glad enough to force the country into hostilities with Russia; but even they could not suggest any practicable method of warfare. France was the only powerful ally which Britain retained; and France was displaying an increasing disposition to withdraw from the Quadruple Treaty, and to connect herself with the despotic Powers of the Con1 Hansard, vol. xxxii. p. 418.

2 Ibid., pp. 420, 421, 423. For the official correspondence respecting Cracow see State Papers, vol. xxiv. p. 1352.

3 Hansard, vol. xxxii. p. 1284. The agent was not, however, sent. Ibid., vol. xxxvii. p. 702.