A HISTORY OF THE PRESIDENCY

I

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

THE evolution of the Constitution of 1787 forms one of the most interesting chapters in the history of human government. For the first time, the representatives of an inchoate nation, meeting to ordain and establish a fundamental law for themselves and their posterity, could write that law upon tabula rasa. They had to expunge nothing, to abolish no old institutions, to violate no traditions, to reform no long-standing abuses. Their task was not made easier by their unexampled freedom from the trammels of an established order; on the contrary, it was thereby rendered more difficult. To know what is not liked goes far toward teaching one what will be liked. The members of the Philadelphia Convention had no indication of what would be agreeable to those for whom they acted. Yet they proceeded, first to draw in the rough, and afterward to fill in and refine the detail, of a constitution that has converted the unorganized communities of a congeries of mutually repellant States into a united nation, under a government more conservative and less subject to change than that of any other self-governing people in the world.

Particularly worthy of study is the process by which the executive department of the government to be created was moulded, as the perfect statue is developed from the rough block of marble. By successive resolutions the convention determined that there should be an executive; consisting of one person; holding office for a limited period; reëligible; elected; endowed with certain powers. The Convention hesitated upon many points; the decisions first reached were not always, not even usually, final. Indeed, almost every feature of the plan

ultimately adopted was at least once rejected, after full debate. Yet it cannot be said, after a full study of the debates, that the Convention was unduly vacillating. The truth is that it was a series of independent propositions which was rejected in all these cases, but that when they were combined in a whole, the scheme became that toward which the Convention was all the time working. This will explain why Hamilton, whose plan of a government was widely different from that which formed the basis of the Convention's deliberations, who, indeed, had but little part in the formation of the Constitution, could without great inconsistency become a defender of the instrument as a whole, and could write: 1 "The mode of the appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United States is almost the only part of the system of any consequence which has escaped without some censure, or which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents." Notwithstanding this statement, which was strictly true, it is now to be said that the only part of the machinery of government, ordained by the people when they adopted the Constitution, that has suffered the least change since the government came into being, is the article which then gave universal satisfaction; and that no part of the Constitution has been so earnestly and so continuously criticised as this same article, already once amended to remove a supposed defect.

The plan of a national government submitted to the Convention on the 29th of May, 1787, by Mr. Edmund Randolph, provided for " a national executive to be chosen by the national legislature for the term of years," ""and to be ineligible the second time." Charles Pinckney proposed, at the same time, "that the executive power be vested in a 'President of the United States of America,' which shall be his style; and his title shall be 'His Excellency.' He shall be elected for

-years, and shall be reëligible." In some of the propositions made during the early days of the Convention the proposed executive was styled the "governor;" but it was a mere suggestion, resulting from the fact that as there was not, and never had been, a model from which to copy the executive which the Convention intended to create, no precedent existed to guide them in giving him a title. The first question was, In how many persons should the executive power be vested? One voice was raised in favor of three, one to be chosen

1 Federalist, No. 67.

from the North, one from the Middle States, and one from the South. It was speedily determined that there should be a single chief magistrate, and the decision was not reopened or criticised afterward.

There

The questions concerning the executive department of the government divided themselves into two classes: What should be the powers and duties of the President? and, How and by whom should he be chosen? With the first class we have nothing to do, save incidentally. To understand why the Convention was puzzled, and why it changed its mind, apparently, so often, it is necessary to inquire briefly what it was the purpose of the Convention to accomplish, and against what apprehended evils it endeavored to guard. It was one of the guiding principles, early adopted and rigidly adhered to, that the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the government should be separate and mutually independent. were two, and only two, natural ways of selecting the Presi dent by popular vote, and by the national legislature. At no time was the proposition of a popular election received with favor, although it had the support of powerful advocates, particularly of Mr. Gouverneur Morris. The chief objections urged against it were three: the great advantage this method would give to the large States; the probable ignorance of the people at large as to the comparative merits of candidates, and the consequent likelihood that they would in all cases give a preference to a candidate each from his own State; and the general incompetence of the populace to decide a question of such moment. Superficial writers are responsible for a popular impression that the third of these reasons was the controlling one, that the Convention by its action registered its distrust of the people, that if the members had felt a greater confidence in the people, the decision would have been differFrom this it is plausible to draw an argument that the present generation, which knows that the people may be trusted, should introduce the popular election. In truth, a distrust of the good judgment of the people was expressed by one member only, Colonel Mason, of Virginia, who happens to have been one of the three members of the Convention who did not sign the Constitution,1 in the often quoted remark that it would be "as unnatural to refer the proper character for chief magistrate to the people as it would be to refer a trial

ent.

1 The others were Randolph and Gerry.

of colors to a blind man." On the other hand, the fear of aggrandizement by the large States was ever present as a controlling principle; for unless the frame of government were such as the smaller States would adopt, the Convention must be a failure. The consideration that the public characters of the country were not generally known, save in the neighborhood of their homes, was also potent, and was founded upon a real condition.

Yet the alternative, an election by the legislature, was equally objectionable on other grounds. To require that the Executive should be independent of the law-making power, and at the same time to give the election to the legislature, was an inconsistency so glaring as to shock the Convention whenever the clause relating to the choice of a President came under consideration. The only escape from it, and that but a partial one, was to forbid the reëlection of a chief magistrate, a provision which, as was pointed out, might and would sometimes exclude from the office the person best fitted to exercise it. The proposition to avoid these difficulties by creating a body of electors for the sole purpose of choosing a President was made early in the session. On the 2d of June, James Wilson proposed that there should be "certain districts in each State which should appoint electors to elect outside of their own body." The objection was made that, inasmuch as the most eminent citizens would be already serving as senators, representatives, and State governors, the choice of a President would, by this plan, be committed to a body of inferior men, ignorant of the merits of citizens in all parts of the country, and therefore apt to vote for candidates living in their own State. Dealing with the conditions that prevailed in their time, - a dearth of men capable of filling so many new positions as it was necessary to create, and an absence of the means by which information regarding public men and public affairs is now disseminated, they were right.

The statement of the perplexities by which the Convention was confronted prepares us to understand the frequent reversal of its decisions. The first resolution, adopted before the objections to it had occurred to the members, was that the Executive should be chosen by the legislature. Then Elbridge Gerry brought forward a suggestion that the President should be elected by the governors of the States; this was negatived. Hamilton's plan of a government, offered on the 18th of June,

which was never considered by the Convention, committed the election to a body of electors to be chosen by the people, by districts. These electors were to meet, those for each State within that State, and vote not only for a President of the United States, but also for two "second electors." A majority of all the "first electors" was to be necessary to make choice of a President. Should such a majority not be obtained, the "second electors" were to meet in one place, be presided over by the Chief Justice, and effect a choice.

The convention returned to the subject of the Executive on the 17th of July, and after a debate rejected a motion that he should be chosen "by electors appointed by the legislatures of the several States.' On the 19th it adopted a motion in almost the identical words of the rejected proposition: "to be chosen by electors appointed for that purpose by the legislatures of the States." The question as to the length of the President's term, as well as that of his reëligibility, was closely involved with the consideration of the body to which he was to owe his election. A long term and ineligibility for a second term were both measures to insure the President's independence of the legislature. The bugbear of legislative tyranny was held up before the Convention almost as frequently as was that of a control of the government by the larger States. Seven years, therefore, was the term first agreed upon; and the question of reëligibility was left open. After the second vote, above noted, committing the choice to independent electors, the term was reduced to six years; and an amendment that a President should not hold office more than six years of any twelve years was rejected. This was on the 19th of July. The next day the Convention adopted Mr. Gerry's proposition regarding the number of electors: Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia were to have three each; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Maryland, North Carolina, and South Carolina, two each; Rhode Island, Delaware, and Georgia, one each. On the 26th the Convention reverted to the seven years' term, with the provision of ineligibility for reëlection. Then, on the same day, the whole subject was referred to a committee of five. The committee reported a draft of a Constitution on the 6th of August. The article relating to the election of President was in these words:

ART. X., SECT. 1. The executive power of the United States shall be vested in a single person. His style shall be "The President of