The closeness of the vote in Pennsylvania already has been recorded, and the fact that two Federalist electors slipped in. One of the two voted for Jefferson and Pinckney. The treachery of this elector was the subject of an exceedingly plainspoken communication in the "United States Gazette" from an exasperated Federalist. "What!" he exclaimed. "Do I chuse Samuel Miles to determine for me whether John Adams or Thomas Jefferson shall be President? No! I chuse him to

act, not to think."

Not until a week or two after the electors had voted was the result definitely known, namely, that John Adams had one vote more than the number necessary to elect him; and that Jefferson, having the next highest number, only two less than a majority, was chosen Vice-President. votes were, by States, as

follows:

The

electoral

The proceedings in preparation for the count of the electoral votes were in all respects similar to those of four years previous, except that the proposition for a joint committee originated this time in the Senate. The count itself is in

teresting on account of the fact that Mr. Adams himself presided, opened, and read the certificates, and declared himself elected, when the rejection of four votes which had been called in question would have defeated him and elected his opponent. The legislature of Vermont had appointed electors, but had not previously passed a law directing how they should be appointed. It was contended privately, by some persons, that the appointment was invalid. But the question was not raised in Congress, or at the joint meeting for the count of the votes. Mr. Adams's opponents did not feel sure of their ground, and probably did not know how to proceed to make their objections effective. Mr. Madison wrote to Jefferson, January 8, 1797, "If the Vermont votes be valid, as is now generally supposed, Mr. Adams will have seventyone and you sixty-eight, Pinckney being in the rear of both."

Mr. Adams himself could certainly not raise the question of the validity of the Vermont votes; but he seems to have given an opportunity for objections if anyone should see fit to raise them. The record shows this. When the tellers had reported the result, Mr. Adams thus addressed the assembled senators and representatives: :

Gentlemen of the Senate and House of Representatives,— By the report which has been made to me by the tellers appointed by the two Houses to examine the votes, there are 71 votes for John Adams, 68 for Thomas Jefferson [and so on to the end of the list]. The whole number of votes are 138; 70 therefore make a majority; so that the person who has 71 votes, which is the highest number, is elected President, and the person who has 68 votes, which is the next highest number, is elected Vice-President.

At this point Mr. Adams sat down for a moment. After an interval of silence, he arose again and said:

In obedience to the Constitution and laws of the United States, and to the commands of both Houses of Congress, expressed in their resolution passed in the present session, I declare that John Adams is elected President of the United States for four years, to commence with the fourth day of March next; and that Thomas Jefferson is elected Vice-President of the United States for four years, to commence on the fourth day of March next.

And may the Sovereign of the Universe, the Ordainer of civil government on earth, for the preservation of liberty, justice and peace among men, enable both to discharge the duties of these offices conformably to the Constitution of the United States, with conscientious diligence, punctuality, and perseverance.

The inauguration took place in the chamber of the House of Representatives, which was crowded to its utmost capacity. The oath was administered by Chief Justice Ellsworth. General Washington was present, with a "countenance as serene and unclouded as the day," so Adams reports in a letter to his wife, descriptive of the ceremony, which he closes by saying, "All agree that, taken altogether, it was the sublimest thing ever exhibited in America."

V

THE JEFFERSON-BURR CONTEST

THE administration of John Adams witnessed the total wreck of the Federalist party, a result of divided leadership.. Although Mr. Adams had become President by an extremely narrow majority of votes, yet his party was stronger in both branches of Congress than it had been during Washington's second administration. Of the sixth Congress, during the latter half of Adams's term, the Republicans formed but a small minority. The strength which the dominant party might wisely have used in consolidating its own power, through the adoption of a policy in harmony with its principles, was wasted in internal conflict. The blame, in a political sense, rested upon both the Federalist factions. Hamilton had become accustomed to exert a great, almost a controlling influence over Washington. He was consulted by the general quite as freely after his retirement from the cabinet as before. He was the leader of his own party in the same sense that Jefferson was the leader of the Republicans. That is to say, the chief men of the party sought his advice; he frequently volunteered counsel to them, upon the public questions that arose; and his opinion was usually followed. Mr. Adams was not one of Hamilton's coterie, nor was he a man either to seek advice as to his course of action, or to accept it with equanimity. From this situation arose all the bad feeling and secret intrigue that make this administration a period of political scandal.

Adams continued in office all the members of Washington's cabinet; Pickering, Secretary of State; Wolcott, Secretary of the Treasury; McHenry, Secretary of War; and Lee, Attorney-General. These men were in frequent correspondence with Hamilton. Before the first month of Adams's administration had closed, Hamilton wrote to Wolcott advocating strongly the sending of three ministers to France. Wolcott replied the next day; and in his letter revealed to Hamilton,

"in the most perfect confidence," the fact that the President had already proposed to him the formation of such a commission to negotiate with France. In this incident is to be found the key of the whole situation within the administration during the ensuing four years. Hamilton could not, or would not, - at any rate, did not, throw off the habit of advising the government and endeavoring to control its action. Since he had not the same influence over Adams as he had exercised over Washington, he operated through the secretaries who were already accustomed to receive and act upon his counsel. The secretaries, habituated to this influence, which had been so potent over the first President, whom they revered more than they did the second, dropped insensibly into the way of listening to Hamilton rather than to their chief, and — what wrought all the mischief — of measuring the intelligence and political sagacity of the President by the degree of deference he paid to Hamilton's judgment. It is not necessary to hold them base or even treacherous on this account, as does John Adams's grandson and biographer, and as all the anti-Federalist historians do. But the situation created was intolerable; and a much more even-tempered man than Mr. Adams might well be excused for losing control over himself when he discovered that his own subordinates were executing not his will, but that of another. In the very case under consideration, Mr. Wolcott had been approached by the President on the subject of a mission to France, and had shown a decided opposition to the measure. But in replying

to Hamilton he wrote: "You know that I am accustomed to respect your opinions; and at any rate I am not so ignorant of the extent of your influence with the friends of government as not to be sensible that if you are known to favor the sending a commission, either nothing will be done or your opinion will prevail." Mr. Wolcott did not quite give up his opposition to the mission, but he was less strenuous after learning what Hamilton thought.

As time went on, the secretaries, particularly Pickering and Wolcott, besprinkled their correspondence with phrases indicating their contempt for their chief. That he was vain, indiscreet, opinionated, jealous, distrustful of many prominent men in his own party, yet guilelessly trustful toward some of the most artful of his political opponents, all this must be admitted. Yet it might have been prevented from causing the