and 140 New York State Reporter LATHER v. BAMMANN. (Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department. November 22, 1907.) LANDLORD AND TENANT-UNLIGHTED HALLWAYS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. In an action by a tenant for injuries received in falling down a stairway in a hallway which was not lighted as required by Tenement House Act, Laws 1901, p. 908, c. 334, § 82, held, that plaintiff was negligent and could not recover. [Ed. Note.--For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 32, Landlord and Tenant, § 642.] Patterson, P. J., and Houghton, J., dissenting. Appeal from Trial Term. Action by Conrad Lather against Peter F. Bammann. From a judgment for plaintiff, and an order refusing a new trial, defendant appeals. Reversed, and new trial ordered. Argued before PATTERSON, P. J., and INGRAHAM, McLAUGHLIN, HOUGHTON, and SCOTT, JJ. Edwin A. Jones, for appellant. Alexander B. Greenberg, for respondent. INGRAHAM, J. The plaintiff seeks to hold this defendant responsible for injuries sustained in falling down the stairway of a tenement house of which defendant is the owner and in which the plaintiff at the time of the accident resided. The plaintiff occupied the entire third floor of the building No. 262 West Nineteenth street, in the city of New York. In the rear of this building was the kitchen, and adjoining it the dining room; both rooms opening into a hall. Immediately opposite the kitchen door a stairway descended to the street. Immediately alongside this stairway there was a bath room, the door of which also entered into the hall between the dining room , door and the stairway. A person coming out of the dining room door to enter the bath room door would turn to the left, and there was but the width of a partition between the stairway and the bath room door. The plaintiff had occupied these premises for about eight months, and was perfectly familiar with the situation. There was a gas jet in this hall, which was lighted at sundown, but was extinguished at 10 o'clock at night, so that after that hour the hall was dark. The plaintiff had noticed this situation, and had never known any gas to be lighted in the hall after 10 o'clock at night. The plaintiff was in the habit of getting up at 6 o'clock. He then had his breakfast, and sometimes went to the bath room, and at halfpast 6 went to work. On the morning of January 7, 1904, after his breakfast, he came from the dining room into the hall. What then happened he described as follows: "I feel with my hand around, and I kicked. I feel with my feet, and I tumbled the whole way down. I was feeling with my hands, looking for to feel the knob, and I could not find it." The knob of the bath room door was about 61⁄2 inches from the stairway. On this particular morning there was no light in the dining room, but there was a light in the kitchen, which made it pos sible to see in the dining room without a light; but after going out from the dining room into the hall he shut the door behind him. Having thus shut the door from the dining room, which shut off all light into the hall, he started to feel for the knob on the bath room door, located but 61⁄2 inches from the stairway. A daughter of plaintiff testified that she heard her father moan and came into the hall, and that as soon as she passed the bath room door to the head of the stairs she was able to distinguish the stairs, and from the head of the stairs saw plaintiff at the foot. The only negligence alleged is a violation of section 82 of the tenement house law (chapter 334, p. 908, of the Laws of 1901), which provides: "In every tenement house a proper light shall be kept burning by the owner in public hallways, near the stairs, upon the entrance floor, and upon the second floor above the entrance floor of said house, every night from sunset to sunrise throughout the year, and upon all other floors of the said house from sunset until ten o'clock in the evening." It seems to have been conceded by the defendant that he had failed to comply with this provision of the statute. This failure to comply with the provision of the statute was evidence of negligence which would justify a recovery, unless the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. From this evidence there would seem to be no question but that, if the dining room door into the hall had been left open, there would have been sufficient light to have enabled the plaintiff to find the door into the bath room. The plaintiff was perfectly familiar with the situation, was in the habit of going from the dining room into the bath room, and knew, the stairs were right alongside the bath room door. He had lived in this apartment about eight months, knew that the gas had never been lighted upon this floor after 10 o'clock at night, and knew it was not lighted on the morning in question. When, he walked out of the dining room he knew that the hall was dark. (Yet he deliberately shut the door and excluded what light there was from his apartment, knowing that the door of the bath room and the stairway were immediately adjoining. The darkness of the hallway which caused the accident was thus brought about by his own act in excluding the light from the dining room, which would have enabled him to see the door to the bath room without exposing him to the risk of falling down the stairway. The plaintiff knew that adjoining the bath room door was the stairs, and yet deliberately closed the door and shut off light by which he could see where the door of the bath room was, and in groping around in the dark mistook the stairs for the door. The immediate cause of the lack of light was the act of the plaintiff in closing the dining room door, which excluded it from the hall. The principle applied in the case of Piper v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 156 N. Y. 224, 50 N. E. 851, 41 L. R. A. 724, 66 Am. St. Rep. 560, and Brugher v. Buchtenkirch, 167 N. Y. 153, 60 N. E. 420, bars a recovery. In the latter case, which was an action to recover damages caused by the negligence of the defendant in failing to keep a hallway lighted, it was said: and 140 New York State Reporter "But, whatever may be the reason that the plaintiff was unable to perceive the condition of the hall, that inability imposed upon her the duty of exercising greater caution or of refraining from proceeding further in the building without first finding out where she might safely go." And there was quoted with approval the following from the Piper Case, supra: "The plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in utterly failing to use that prudence which was especially incumbent upon him under the circumstances of the situation. The darkness called upon him to use it, and, had he done so, the accident could not, within any reasonable probability, have happened. A person whose power of vision is temporarily obstructed by some supervening condition should take the greater care, and should, if it be possible, await its passing away. If he neglects to proceed cautiously, he must accept the consequences of his undue precipitation." The present case is much stronger against the plaintiff, for here the plaintiff's voluntary act so obstructed the light that he was unable to see the door of the bath room, and then, instead of opening the door through which he had just passed, and which would have caused the hall to be light enough to avoid danger, knowing that the door to the bath room and the stairs were close together, proceeded to grope around in the darkness until he fell down the stairway. I think this was clearly contributory negligence, and the judgment and order must therefore be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event. MCLAUGHLIN and SCOTT, JJ., concur. HOUGHTON, J. (dissenting). I do not think the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. He had the right to use the hallway, and it was necessary for him to do so. As he left the dining room, he testifies, he began to feel, presumably with his outstretched hand, for the knob of the dining room door. He repeatedly describes himself as feeling along with his right hand. Under such circumstances it is fairly to be inferred that he was walking carefully and slowly. The situation is unlike that in Brugher v. Buchtenkirch, 167 N. Y. 153, 60 N. E. 420. In that case the plaintiff was making a tour of discovery of a strange building and deliberately walked into a dark passageway. In Kenney v. Rhinelander, 28 App. Div. 246, 50 N. Y. Supp. 1088, affirmed 163 N. Y. 576, 57 N. E. 1114, the tenant knew of the torn carpet on the stairway which he was descending in the dark. This court held that whether or not he was guilty of contributory negligence was a question for the jury. And in Brown v. Wittner, 43 App. Div. 135, 59 N. Y. Supp. 385, this court also held that the using of a stairway in darkness was not contributory negligence as matter of law, and reversed a nonsuit. The prevailing opinion concedes that the question of defendant's negligence was for the jury, and I think plaintiff's contributory negligence was also a matter for the jury, which they properly decided. I therefore think the judgment should be affirmed. PATTERSON, P. J., concurs. PEOPLE v. KOSTER. (Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department. November 22, 1907.) 1. ADULTERATION-MILK-Sale. A dealer, who sold milk in cans after having taken from them about two quarts of cream and then filling the same with milk from other cans from which the same quantity of cream had been taken, sold adulterated milk, within Agricultural Law, Laws 1893, pp. 660, 661, c. 338, §§ 20, 22, defining adulterated milk as milk from which any part of the cream has been removed; and where he sold it as milk from which the cream had not been taken he was liable to the penalty imposed, though the milk in other respects complied with the requirements of the law and was in fact wholesome. 2. SAME-PENALTY. Under Agricultural Law, Laws 1893, p. 666, c. 338, § 37, providing that, where the violation of the act consists of the sale of any prohibited article, the sale of each of several packages shall constitute a separate violation, etc., one selling adulterated milk is liable in one action to cumulative penalties where he is guilty of a series of violations. Appeal from Trial Term. Action by the people of the state of New York against Anton Koster. From a judgment for plaintiff, and from an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed. See 97 N. Y. Supp. 829. Argued before PATTERSON, P. J., and INGRAHAM, HOUGHTON, MCLAUGHLIN, and SCOTT, JJ. C. L. Andrus, for appellant. SCOTT, J. Appeal by defendant from a judgment for penalties for selling adulterated milk, and from order denying motion for new trial. There is no serious question as to the facts. The defendant is a milk dealer in the city of New York, and has a creamery and two receiving stations in Delaware county. He collected the milk at his creamery, and had it shipped to New York, where he sold it in cans. It was the habit of his employés, in the morning prior to each shipment, to take from each can at the creamery about two quarts of cream, and then to fill up the can with milk from other cans from which the same quantity of cream had thus been taken. The evidence showed, upon two days, 25 separate and distinct sales to as many individuals, to whom were sold in all 36 separate cans of skimmed milk. Many more violations were charged in the complaint, but only the number above stated were proven. The evidence justified the belief that the defendant knew all about what his employés were doing, and on this appeal he does not claim ignorance of that fact on his part, although he does claim ignorance of the law. The defendant's acts were precisely within the letter of the agricultural law. Section 22 of that law (Laws 1893, p. 661, c. 338) pro vides that: "No person shall sell or exchange or expose for sale or exchange any adulterated or unwholesome milk," etc. and 140 New York State Reporter And section 20 of the same act provides that: * All "The term 'adulterated milk' when so used [i. e., in the act] means: (5) Milk from which any part of the cream has been removed. * adulterated milk shall be deemed unclean, unhealthy, impure and unwholesome." Thus it clearly appears that the defendant sold milk declared by law to be adulterated and unwholesome. It was testified to by a chemist called by plaintiff that the milk sold by defendant came up in other respects to the requirements of the law; that is, that it contained no more than 88 per cent. of water, and the requisite percentage of solids and fats. And he also testified that such milk was in fact wholesome, and not deleterious. The appellant claims that in so far as the act prohibits the sale of wholesome milk, merely because it has been deprived of some of its richness, it is unconstitutional; and he seizes upon a sentence in the prevailing opinion by Judge Vann, in People v. Bowen, 182 N. Y. 1-10, 74 N. E. 489, which said: "The courts have not yet held that the Legislature have power to prohibit the sale of milk that is wholesome, even if it is not up to standard, provided it is sold for what it actually is, and not as pure milk. If offered for sale as milk simply, the presumption is that it is offered as pure milk, and when so sold, without making it known in any way that it is not pure, the Legislature may inflict a penalty and make the sale a crime, unless the milk has such positive and negative qualities as in its judgment pure milk should have." The opinion goes on to show that the act is aimed as well at fraud in the sale of milk as at unwholesomeness. Whether the milk, after the cream had been taken from it, was or was not wholesome, it is evident that the defendant was guilty of fraud towards his customers, for there is nothing to show that he ever sold it as milk from which the cream had been taken. He says that he sold it as "standard" milk. The statute contains no definition of "standard" milk, and it is evident that all the defendant means is that he sold it as milk having the prescribed percentage of water, solids, and fat. The defendant objects that he should not have been subjected to more than one, or, at most, two penalties, and cites to us Griffen v. I. S. R. R. Co., 179 N. Y. 438, 72 N. E. 513, Id., 180 N. Y. 539, 72 N. E. 1142, U. S. Condensed Milk Co. v. Smith, 116 App. Div. 15, 101 N. Y. Supp. 129, and other cases, in which a recovery of what are termed cumulative penalties has been disallowed. Each one of these cases has turned in great measure upon the language of the particular act under which the penalties were sought to be recovered, and none of them have gone so far as to say that a judgment for more than one penalty would not be allowed if the Legislature had clearly indicated an intention that such a recovery might be had. The language of section 37 of the agricultural law is very comprehensive and precise, and in our opinion expressly provides for the collection of more than one penalty in a single action. It provides that: "Every person violating any of the provisions of the agricultural law shall forfeit to the people of the state of New York the sum of not less than fifty dollars and not more than one hundred dollars for the first violation, and not less than one hundred dollars or more than two hundred dollars for the sec |