Ripley, decedent. Sidney Dillon, the grandfather of the decedent, died in 1892, leaving a will by which he created a trust for the benefit of his daughters and his grandson, Sidney Dillon Ripley. The income from the trust property was directed to be paid to his daughters and grandsons during their respective lives, "and on the death of either leaving lawful issue surviving, the share of the one so dying shall, unless otherwise disposed of as directed by the last will of the one so dying, be held for the use and benefit of such lawful issue, equally, share and share alike." Sidney Dillon Ripley died in 1905, leaving him surviving a widow and four children, the fourth of which children was born in June, 1892, after the death of Sidney Dillon. Sidney Dillon Ripley left a will containing the following provision, viz.: "As to the property over which my grandfather, Sidney Dillon, by his last will and testament gave me the power of disposition by will, I give, devise and bequeath the same to my wife and children me surviving share and share alike, one share for my wife and one share for each child, and in case of the death of any of my said children leaving issue him or her surviving one share for the issue of each child collectively." The tax appraiser found and reported that the share thus given to the widow of Mr. Ripley was subject to the payment of a transfer tax, but that the shares of the four children were exempt from such tax. The report was confirmed, and on appeal from the order of confirmation the order was affirmed. The State Comptroller now appeals to this court, and contends that the shares of the children should not have been exempted, but are subject to taxation by virtue of the provisions of subdivision 5 of section 220 of the tax law (Laws 1896, p. 868, c. 908, as amended by Laws 1897, p. 150, c. 284), reading as follows: "Whenever any person or corporation shall exercise a power of appointment derived from any disposition of property made either before or after the passage of this act, such appointment when made shall be deemed a transfer taxable under the provisions of this act in the same manner as though the property to which such appointment relates belonged absolutely to the donee of such power and had been bequeathed or devised by such donee by will." We think the surrogate was right in refusing to impose a transfer upon the children's share in the trust property. We have reached this conclusion because we are of the opinion that the children of Sidney Dillon Ripley take their interests directly from and under the provisions of the will of their great-grandfather, Sidney Dillon, and not by virtue of the exercise of the power of appointment given their father. The will of Sidney Dillon directed: "The share of the one so dying shall, unless otherwise disposed of as directed by the last will of the one so dying, be held for the use and benefit of such lawful issue." It was the manifest purpose and intent of the testator to give his grandson the right to dispose of his share of the trust estate by will to others than his own children; but, in case he did not so dispose of it, his share became the property of his children, share and share alike. What, then were the provisions of the will of Sidney Dillon Ripley? He in form assumed to dispose of all of his share of the trust property, but in fact he only "otherwise" disposed of one-fifth part of it. This and 140 New York State Reporter he gave to his widow, while the remaining four-fifths went to the same identical beneficiaries and legatees named in Sidney Dillon's will, and in the same relative share. By the power of appointment Mr. Ripley simply disposed of one-fifth of this trust fund, while the remaining four-fifths remained "otherwise" undisposed of within the meaning of his grandfather's will. Inasmuch as this four-fifths was not "otherwise" disposed of than as provided in the will of Sidney Dillon, in case the power of appointment had not been exercised, the provisions and directions of the grandfather's will became operative, and the children thereby took their interests directly from and under that will, and independent of any power of appointment attempted to be exercised by their father in his will. The language employed by Sidney Dillon in his will is significant. The testator does not say the children shall take in case his grandson fails to exercise any power of appointment, but that they shall take unless the trust fund is "otherwise disposed of." As to four-fifths Mr. Ripley made no other disposition than the testator made. As to this four-fifths the disposition by appointment was identical with the disposition by Sidney Dillon's will. We see no reason why the fact that Mr. Ripley gave one-fifth to his widow should in any way change or prevent the application of the bequest contained in Sidney Dillon's will as to the remaining four-fifths, and we conclude the children took by virtue of that will. It is questionable, at least, whether Sidney Dillon's will, when properly construed, gave to his grandson, Sidney Dillon Ripley, any power of appointment unless he exercised it to make a disposition different from that contained in the Dillon will. Granting, however, for the argument, that the right of appointment by which Mr. Ripley gave onefifth to each of his children was a valid exercise of the right conferred, and that the children had the right to claim under and avail themselves of the property in question under such appointment, nevertheless they also had the right to repudiate such provisions and claim directly under their great-grandfather's will. Matter of Lansing, 182 N. Y. 238-244, 74 N. E. 882. In the Lansing Case the Court of Appeals said: "An appointee under a power has the right of election, the same as a grantee under a deed. 'It is essential to the legal operation of a deed that the grantee assents to receive it. It cannot be imposed upon him, and there can be no delivery without an acceptance.' He can accept the title tendered, or reject it, in his discretion. It cannot be forced upon him against his will. He cannot be compelled to receive additional evidence of title, when he does not want it, and does not need it, because his title is perfect without it. His consent is necessary before the attempt to exercise the power becomes binding upon him, the same as consent is necessary in making a contract or agreement. Declining or refusing to take has the same effect as incapacity to take, as in the case of a devise to a corporation which has no power to hold any more property because the statutory limit has been exceeded. The title is not affected, but remains where it was before. Mrs. McVickar [the appointee], by accepting under her mother's will property which belonged to her mother at the time of her death, did not accept the title tendered by the appointment, although both gift and appointment were made by the same instrument. She could claim as the devisee of her mother, and disclaim as her appointee, because a gift and an appointment are wholly unlike in character and substance. * While the mother could appoint, the daughter could reject. Mrs. McVickar could therefore repudiate the action of her mother in attempting to exercise the power, and hold the property from her grandfather." It is not necessary for the children of Mr. Ripley to claim under the appointment made by him in his will. If he had simply bequeathed one-fifth to his widow, and made no disposition of the remaining fourfifths, his children would have taken just the same under Sidney Dillon's will. The provision bequeathing the four-fifths to them added nothing to their title. They now repudiate the attempt to exercise the power of appointment in their behalf by their father, and the result is that four-fifths of the trust property necessarily becomes theirs by the express provisions.of the will of their great-grandfather, Sidney Dillon, because it is not "otherwise disposed of." As this interest of the beneficiaries was acquired in 1892, the instant Sidney Dillon died, it became a vested property right, which could not be cut down by the subsequent imposition of a transfer tax created by chapter 284, p. 150, of the Laws of 1897. Matter of Pell, 171 N. Y. 48, 63 N. E. 789, 57 L. R. A. 540, 89 Am. St. Rep. 791; Matter of Langdon, 153 N. Y. 6, 46 N. E. 1034. View this case in whatever light we may, we reach the same conclusion that the interest of the children is not subject to the payment of a transfer tax. The interests of the children vested upon the death of Sidney Dillon, subject to the contingency of being divested by the exercise of the power of appointment in a will by their father. The father did not divest four-fifths of that interest, but rather sought to confirm it; and, as a transfer tax is a tax on the right of succession, there appears no substantial reason for imposing a succession tax on the children's shares. Their interest was not increased, but diminished, by such exercise of the power of appointment as was attempted. In-. stead of being benefited, their interests were injured, by the exercise of that power, and this court can find no justification, either in law or equity, under such circumstances, in disturbing the order appealed from. The order should be affirmed, with costs. All concur. In re PRITCHETT. (Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department. November 22, 1907.) 1. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-OFFICE OF ATTORNEY-DISBARMENT - GROUNDS — FRAUD IN PROCURING ADMISSION. -- Under Code Civ. Proc. § 67, providing that an attorney who is guilty of fraud or deceit in proceedings by which he was admitted to practice may be suspended from practice or removed from office by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, an attorney who secured admission to prac tice law in New York upon affidavits and certificates suppressing the facts of his conviction of crime and disbarment in another state, which facts, if known, would have prevented him from securing admission, was guilty of fraud and deceit within the statute, requiring his disbarment. [Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 5, Attorney and Client, $ 58.] 2. SAME. Where the affidavits and certificates upon which an attorney secured admission to practice law in the state of New York suppressed the facts of his prior conviction and disbarment in another state. evidence that and 140 New York State Reporter he was unjustly convicted or disbarred in such state would not relieve him from guilt in practicing fraud and deceit upon the courts of the state of New York, so as to save him from being disbarred. [Ed. Note. For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 5, Attorney and Client, § 58.] Motion to disbar Thomas J. Pritchett, an attorney. Motion granted. Argued before PATTERSON, P. J., and INGRAHAM, CLARKE, SCOTT, and LAMBERT, JJ. John L. Lockwood, for petitioner. PER CURIAM. Section 67 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: "An attorney and counselor, who is guilty of any fraud or deceit in proceedings by which he was admitted to practice as an attorney and counsel. or of the courts of record of this state, may be suspended from practice, or removed from office, by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court." The respondent was admitted to the bar as having practiced for three years as an attorney and counselor at law in the state of Maryland and having been a member of the bar of "the circuit court of Hartford county, a court of the highest original jurisdiction in the state aforesaid"; the three years being from 1895, when he was admitted, to 1898. There is another certificate that he practiced from 1898 to 1902. The judge of the circuit court of Maryland certified that on the 16th of November, 1895, the respondent was admitted as a member of the bar for the circuit court of Hartford county, and ever since the 16th of November, 1895, had been entitled to the full privilege of practicing in said court. He further certified that the records of the said court disclose nothing against his good character or habits. It is quite clear that this certificate was insufficient. There was no certificate that the respondent was of good character-simply that the records of the court disclosed nothing against his good character, which is a very different proposition. The reason of the peculiar form of this certificate is made apparent when it appears that the respondent was convicted on an indictment which was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court of that state and sentenced to six months in jail, the sentence to begin on the 13th of May, 1901, and on the 25th of June, 1901, was pardoned by the Governor of Maryland. There can be no question but that there was a suppression by the respondent of the fact of this conviction and that he had been disbarred by a court in Baltimore. His only excuse for the suppression of this information on his application to the court was that he did not want to spread upon the records what he calls the unfortunate occurrence of his conviction, but a much more cogent reason exists in that he knew that if that fact was stated to the court his application would not have been granted. He applied to the judges of the supreme bench of Baltimore to be reinstated as a member of the bar of that court, and in his petition he referred to the unconditional pardon which he had received from the Governor of Maryland, and set forth that it was provided by statute of the state of New York that, whenever an attorney or counselor at law shall be convicted of a felony, there may be presented to the General Term of the Supreme Court a certified or exemplified copy of the judgment of such conviction, and thereupon the name of the person so convicted shall by an order of the court be stricken from the roll of attorneys; that he had no desire or intention to resume the practice of law in the city of Baltimore, but wished to be admitted to the courts of the state of New York, which he would be entitled to under the statute of that state, under circumstances similar to those recited in his petition, had he originally been a member of the courts of that state; and in order to be admitted to the courts of that state from another state he must present his certificate that he is a member of the bar of the state from which he comes. The suppression of information and the production of the certificates, which did not formally state that he was a member of the bar of the state of Maryland in good standing, was certainly deceit practiced upon the court. The respondent knew that if this fact had been disclosed he would not have been admitted to practice, and nowhere in his answer to this application does he state that he did not realize that position, or that the suppression was not made for the purpose of concealing from the court a fact which, if disclosed, would have prevented his admission, and, if he had, he would have been confronted with his petition to the Maryland court for reinstatement. It is clear that this was fraud or deceit in the proceedings by which he was admitted to practice, and that for this fraud and deceit he must be disbarred. No evidence could possibly change this record; for, even if he was unjustly convicted and unjustly disbarred in Maryland, and the pardon of the Governor restored him to his full rights as a citizen, and conceding that injustice was done by his conviction in Maryland, there is still the conceded fact that he obtained his admission to the bar in this state by papers which carefully omitted a disclosure of facts which had relation to the practice of his profession in Maryland, and that he was therefore guilty of fraud and deceit in the proceedings in which he was admitted to the bar. The fact upon which this proceeding is based, namely, the suppression of these facts in his application for admission, is admitted, and there is no necessity, therefore, of taking evidence of a conceded fact which of itself requires us to disbar the respondent. The motion should therefore be granted. 106 N.Y.S.-54 |