[G. L. c. 83, § 14 some portion of the cost of the sewer should be apportioned to the upper drains which depend upon it for discharge, although such apportionment is not essential to the validity of the assessment, but part of the cost of an existing sewer cannot be arbitrarily included in the assessment for the construction of a new sewer tributary to it. The board laying the assessment may lawfully divide the assessment into three classes designated as direct benefit, remote benefit, and more remote benefit, respectively. In fixing the assessable cost, all revenue derived from the sewer should be deducted." It is the duty of the proper officials to levy the assessment within a reasonable time after the completion of the sewer,10 but there is no requirement in the statute that the assessment . be made within a certain time limit and the court will impose none." The provision in the general laws that sewer assessments in cities shall be laid by the board of aldermen supersedes inconsistent provisions in the several city charters previously granted.12 When the same structure is used for a sewer and also for another purpose an assessment of the cost of what it would have cost if built solely as a sewer is proper.13 It is not necessary to give the owners of estates to be assessed notice of intention to levy a sewer assessment," but notice must be given after the assessment is levied. A notice in writing of Patton v. Springfield, 99 Mass. 627 (1868). Fairbanks v. Mayor and Aldermen of Fitchburg, 132 Mass. 42 (1882); Ayer v. Mayor and Aldermen of Somerville, 143 Mass. 585 (1887). 'Brown v. Mayor and Aldermen of Fitchburg, 128 Mass. 282 (1880). The cost of the use of an excavator belonging to another city department, and a proportionate part of the overhead expenses of the sewer department may be included in the assessable cost of a sewer. Parsons v. Worcester, 234 Mass. 108 (1919). "Collins v. Mayor and Aldermen of Holyoke, 146 Mass. 298 (1888). Patton v. Springfield, 99 Mass. 627 (1868). 10 Dunn v. Mayor of Taunton, 200 Mass. 252 (1908). "Fairbanks v. Mayor and Aldermen of Fitchburg, 132 Mass. 42 (1882); Hester v. Collector of Brockton, 217 Mass. 422 (1914). In the former case an assessment levied six, and in the latter case seventeen, years after the completion of the sewer was sustained. 12 13 Woodbridge v. Mayor and Aldermen of Cambridge, 114 Mass. 483 (1874). Gray v. Aldermen of Boston, 139 Mass. 328 (1885). If separate sewers are laid for sewage and surface water respectively, and the surface water sewer is of no benefit to a particular parcel of land, an assessment based on the cost of both is valid, if it does not exceed the benefit to the land from the construction of the other sewer. Parsons v. Worcester, 234 Mass. 108 (1919). 1* Allen v. Charlestown, 111 Mass. 123 (1872); Collins v. Mayor and Aldermen of Holyoke, 146 Mass. 298 (1888); Smith v. Abington Savings Bank, 171 Mass. 178 (1898). G. L. c. 83, § 14] the amount of the assessment and a statement of what it is for, with a demand for payment, is sufficient.1 After a lawful order of assessment has been passed, a warrant for its execution committed to the collector and notices given to the owners of the estates assessed, it is not within the power of the board levying the assessment at a subsequent meeting to reconsider or rescind the order laying the assessment.16 Sewer Assessments in the City of Boston As already stated, sewer assessments were first established in the city of Boston by a city ordinance and without special authority of statute, and although the method adopted by the ordinance was held unreasonable and the ordinance consequently invalid it was not intimated that it was beyond the power of the city to build sewers and levy assessments therefor.1 In 1841 however general provision was made by statute for public sewers and sewer assessments2 and there was no special legislation regarding sewer assessments in the city of Boston until 1892. It was provided in a statute enacted in that year that the whole cost of every sewer thereafter constructed in the city whether in a street or in a strip of private land should be assessed upon the abutting land in proportion to frontage upon the sewer, to an amount not exceeding four dollars for each lineal foot of sewer. This statute was held unconstitutional in 1898 in that it applied to all parts of the city whether cut up into house lots or not and to sewers in strips of private land taken for the purpose as well as in highways, so that it might be expected to work gross injustice in many cases, and that it excluded all inquiry as to actual benefits either in the original assessment or upon appeal.* In 1897 provision was made for assessing the cost of maintenance of sewers upon real estate in the city," and this statute 15 Collins v. Mayor and Aldermen of Holyoke, 146 Mass. 298 (1888); Lawrence v. Webster, 167 Mass. 513 (1897). 16 Woodbridge v. Mayor and Aldermen of Cambridge, 114 Mass. 483 (1874). And see also Farnsworth v. Boston, 121 Mass. 173 (1876); Barnstable Savings Bank v. Boston, 127 Mass. 254 (1879). Boston v. Shaw, 1 Met. 130 (1840). 2 Supra, page 709. 3 St. 1892, c. 402. Weed v. Boston, 172 Mass. 28 (1898). And see also Dexter v. Boston, 176 Mass. 247 (1900); White v. Gove, 183 Mass. 333 (1903). St. 1897, c. 426, §7. [G. L. c. 83, § 14 also was held unconstitutional in May, 1899, because it authorized an assessment for a purpose improper for special assessments and because it made no provision for a hearing. Shortly afterward the provision for sewer assessments was enacted in its present form and this statute has been sustained as constitutional. It provides that the assessments shall be proportional, and this is construed as meaning proportional to benefits, and, it is to be assumed, not in excess of benefits actually received.' The statute further provides that the assessment must be levied within two years after the completion of the work; that it shall not exceed four dollars per linear foot; and that it shall constitute a lien for two years after the assessment. Provision is also made for the revision and correction of an assessment by the board which levied it, and for appeal to the superior court in the manner provided for appeals from the board of assessors in the case of the general property tax. By other statutes still in force provision is made for the abatement and suspension of assessments when the board deems it just and proper, for the suspension of assessments upon exempt lands as long as they remain exempt,10 for the relieving of portion of a parcel of land from an assessment when part of the assessment is paid11 and for the recording of notice by the superintendent of streets before he starts the construction of a sewer.12 Special assessments are not permitted in the case of sewers designed for the disposal of surface drainage solely.13 In the absence of a general legislative revision and consolidation of the innumerable special acts governing the construction of public ways and sewers in the city of Boston, and relating to the authority of the officers charged with the supervision of the various municipal departments, there are seemingly inconsistent or contradictory provisions which make it very difficult to construe them so as to formulate a clear and comprehensive system of municipal administration. The original board of survey act of 1891 provided for the inclusion of the cost of Sears v. Street Commissioners of Boston, 173 Mass. 350 (1899). St. 1896, c. 359. 10 St. 1892, c. 402, §4. "St. 1895, c. 297. 12 St. 1903, c. 268, §1. 13 St. 1902, c. 526. See, however, as to brook courses, Sp. Acts 1915, c 108. G. L. c. 83, § 14] 15 building a sewer in the assessable cost of the street, and there is nothing inconsistent with these provisions in the general betterment law. A similar provision in a statute applicable to a particular improvement in the city of Boston was held constitutional and the joining of these two items is thus in itself unobjectionable.1 In some instances when for some reason it was not desired to assess betterments for the laying out and construction of the street, assessments for the cost of the sewer alone were laid under the board of survey act and acts in amendment thereof, and while the act was unconstitutional and the assessments void because they were not limited to the actual benefit1 there seemed to be no objection to an assessment under this statute merely because it was for the sewer only. In the sewer maintenance assessment act of 1897 there was a provision that no sewer should thereafter be constructed except under authority of that act; but the assessment feature of that act, which was held unconstitutionalis was so inseparable from the rest of the statute that the whole statute was invalid; 19 and a sewer might be constructed as part of a street under the street betterment act while the sewer act remained unrepealed.20 The provision that no sewer should be constructed except under the provisions of the sewer assessment act however was re-enacted in the unobjectionable sewer assessment act of 1899 and is still in force, although a later street betterment act, which was superseded by the general betterment law of 1918, provided for assessments for the cost of laying out or constructing a highway "with or without a sewer." 21 1722 Under the original statute of 1841 and all other statutes relating to the laying out of sewers down to 1897, including the unconstitutional statute of 1892, the order of laying out and 14 Lincoln v. Street Commissioners of Boston, 176 Mass. 210 (1900). 15 Parke v. Boston, 175 Mass. 464 (1900); Harwood v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 487 (1905); Tappan v. Street Commissioners of Boston, 193 Mass. 498 (1907). 16 Smith v. Boston, 194 Mass. 31 (1907). 17 St. 1897, c. 426, §1. 18 Sears v. Street Commissioners of Boston, 173 Mass. 350 (1899). 19 20 Tappan v. Street Commissioners of Boston, 193 Mass. 498 (1907). Tappan v. Street Commissioners of Boston, 193 Mass. 498 (1907). The distinction is of practical importance; if an assessment for a sewer is under the betterment act it cannot be levied until the street is completed. St. 1899, c. 450, §1; St. 1903, c. 268, §1. "St. 1906, c. 393, §2; St. 1913, c. 536. See Sullivan v. Mandell, 212 Mass. 174, 177 (1912). [G. L. c. 83, §§ 14, 15 the assessment were made by the mayor and aldermen, or, after 1882, by the board of aldermen alone. In 1897 these powers were given to the street commissioners, and since that date. no sewer can be laid out even in an existing street except by order of the board of street commissioners with the approval of the mayor; and an assessment by the street commissioners for the cost of a sewer constructed on the order of the mayor alone is not valid.23 Assessment for Sewerage System at Uniform Rate SECTION 15. The city council of a city or a town may adopt a system of sewerage for a part or the whole of its territory, and may provide that assessments under section fourteen shall be made upon owners of land within such territory by a fixed uniform rate, based upon the estimated average cost of all the sewers therein, according to the frontage of such land on any way in which a sewer is constructed, or according to the area of such land within a fixed depth from such way, or according to both such frontage and area; but no assessment in respect to any such land, which by reason of its grade or level or any other cause cannot be drained into such sewer, shall be made until such incapacity is removed. If the assessment is according to the area within such fixed depth, the lien therefor shall attach to the parcel assessed. A special statute similar to the above was held unquestionably constitutional before the general provision was enacted' and the latter was enforced for several years without any question of its constitutionality, but the later decisions threw grave doubt upon its validity. It was held however that the statute 93 Sullivan v. Mandell, 212 Mass. 174 (1912). 'Butler v. Worcester, 112 Mass. 541 (1873). The general statute was first enacted in 1878. 8 See the following extract from the report of the commissioners who prepared the Revised Laws in reference to this section. "This section has been retained notwithstanding the decisions in Weed v. Boston, 172 Mass 28, and Dexter v. Boston, 176 Mass. 247. In the first of these cases, the section was referred to with the implication that on account of its limitations it may not be unconstitutional, and in the second no reference is made to it. The principles laid down in the opinion in Sears v. Boston, 173 Mass. 75, would clearly sustain it as applied to a certain class of cases in which the result of the method prescribed coincides with the result of an assessment 'according to the benefits received.' See also Carson v. Brockton, 175 Mass. 242, and Hall v. Boston, January 4, 1901 [177 Mass. 434]. It would be possible so to redraft the section as to bring it clearly within the rule enunciated in these cases; but as |