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1923 SUPPLEMENT

Page 6. A state inspection law may properly be intended to provide both regulation and revenue. Texas Co. v. Brown,

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Page 7. It was held in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., U. S. (1922), that the power of taxation cannot be used to regulate a subject which the legislative body levying the tax has no constitutional power to regulate.

Page 9. A state may impose an inspection fee on gasolene within its borders when moving in commerce from state to state, if the fee merely covers the cost of inspection, and it may impose inspection fees in excess of the cost of inspection on gasolene which has come to rest within the state. Texas Co. v. Brown, U. S. (1922).

Page 10. A penalty is not a tax, and the mere use of the word "tax" in the statute which imposes it is not enough to make it a tax. When a pecuniary imposition is levied, not to provide for the support of government, but to provide punishment for the infraction of law, it is a penalty and not a tax. Lipke v. Lederer, (1922).

U. S.

Page 13. The federal estate tax is a duty or excise, and not a direct tax. Grenier v. Llewellyn,

U.S.

(1922).

Page 14. An excise tax is not converted into a property tax because it is measured by the value of property. Southern Ry. Co. v. Watts, (decided January 2, 1923).

U. S.

Page 20. The decision in Knights v. Treasurer & Receiver General was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States October 16, 1922.

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Page 21. An inspection fee in excess of the cost of inspection upon gasolene which has come to rest in the state is not objectionable as a tax on interstate commerce, although the state produces no gasolene. Texas Co. v. Brown,

(1922).

U. S.

Page 35. Oil gathered in pipe lines and moving out of the state is beyond the taxing power of the state, and a license or occupation tax on the company operating the pipe line is unconstitutional. Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U. S. 265 (1921). Natural gas in pipe lines, an undetermined part of which is on its way outside the state, is in interstate commerce, and the company operating the pipe line cannot be subject to an occupation tax based on volume of traffic. United Fuel Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U. S. 277 (1921).

Page 38. In Judson Freight Forwarding Co. v. Commonwealth, decided July 1, 1922, it was held that a foreign corporation engaged in collecting goods outside the state, shipping them into the state in car-load lots, and distributing them, and collecting and storing goods in the state and shipping them out of the state, is engaged in intrastate business, and is subject to the excise tax.

Page 41. A state statute taxing foreign corporations on the authorized capital stock represented by business done and property owned in the state, under which all of the stock of a foreign corporation was taxed when all of its property was in the state and much of its business was in selling goods manufactured in the state to persons in other states, is constitutional. The business is interstate commerce, but the statute is not a disguised attempt to burden interstate commerce. Hump Hairpin Mfg. Co. v. Emmerson, 258 U. S. 290 (1922).

Page 47. No state can tax the property of the United States within its limits. Irwin v. Webb, 258 U. S. 219 (1922).

Page 43. It was held in Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., U. S. (decided November 27, 1922), that a tax on all anthracite coal thereafter mined payable when the coal was

ready for shipment or market, might be imposed by a state, although anthracite coal was found only in that state, was a necessity in other states and the greater part of it was shipped to other states.

U. S.

Page 44. It was held in Champlain Realty Co. v. Brattleboro, (decided December 11, 1922), that logs cut in Vermont and floated down stream to a mill in New Hampshire were not taxable in Vermont while held in a pond in Vermont when because of high water it was unsafe to proceed down the river.

Page 53. It was held in Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., U. S. (decided November 27, 1922), that a statute imposing a tax on anthracite coal and not on bituminous coal was not unconstitutional as imposing an arbitrary discrimination.

Page 54. Discrimination in taxation, effected by systematic inequality of assessment, may violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Keokuk etc. Bridge Co. v. Salm, 258 U. S. 122 (1922).

U.S.

Page 55. It was held in Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, (decided January 2, 1923), that when it appears that one taxpayer's property is assessed at its full value and all other property is assessed at about half its value, he is constitutionally entitled to an abatement, and is not remitted to the impossible relief of securing an increase in the assessment of the great mass of taxable property in the county. On the other hand, it was held in Southern Ry. Co. v. Watts, U. S. decided the same day, that unless it was shown that the undervaluation of other property was intentional and systematic, mere unequal assessment will not be held to violate the equality clause. A difference in the remedy for excessive taxation given to owners of different classes of property is not necessarily unconstitutional.

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Page 56. Exemption from double taxation by one and the same state is not guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment; much less is taxation by two states upon identical or closely

related property interests falling within the jurisdiction of both forbidden. Citizens National Bank v. Durr, 257 U. S. 99 (1921).

Page 57. A seat on a stock exchange is taxable as property. Citizens National Bank v. Durr, 257 U. S. 99 (1921).

Page 75. It was held in Citizens National Bank v. Durr, 257 U. S. 99 (1921), that a seat in the New York Stock Exchange owned by a resident of Ohio might be taxed as personal property in Ohio.

U. S.

Page 84. It was held in St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, (decided December 4, 1922), that a state statute imposing a tax upon the premiums paid for fire insurance upon property within the state to insurance companies not authorized to do business in the state was unconstitutional when applied in a case where the policies were contracted for, delivered and paid for in another state, and the rate of taxation clearly indicated that it was intended to be prohibitive.

Page 105. The decision in Boston v. Treasurer & Receiver General was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States December 4, 1922.

Page 107. In Opinion of the Justices, 240 Mass. 616 (1922), it was held that a resolve providing for the payment of the salary of the Clerk of the Senate, who had died during the year, to his widow, for the remainder of the year was constitutional, when the long and faithful service of the deceased was a matter of general knowledge.

Page 114. The decision in Knights v. Treasurer & Receiver General was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States October 16, 1922.

Page 115. The decision in Boston v. Treasurer & Receiver General was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States December 4, 1922.

Page 116. The decision in Knights v. Treasurer & Receiver General was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States October 16, 1922.

Page 127. G. L. c. 35 § 30 is amended by St. 1922 c. 127 which provides that the county commissioners shall levy annually as a county tax a sum sufficient to meet the debt and interest maturing that year, if no other provision is made therefor.

It was held in Breiholz v. Pocahontas County, 257 U. S. 118 (1921), that a statute providing that the cost of repairs of a drainage system should be assessed in the same proportion as the original cost was constitutional; and that the board of supervisors might determine when repairs were necessary without notice or a hearing.

Page 139. G. L. c. 14 § 4 is amended by St. 1922 c. 330 so as to remove the limit on the salary of the principal appraiser.

By St. 1922 c. 520 § 25 all taxes committed to the state treasurer for collection prior to January 1, 1923, were on that date recommitted to the commissioner of corporations and taxation for collection.

Page 140. G. L. c. 14 § 2 is amended by St. 1922 c. 520 § 1 so as to provide for the giving of bond by the commissioner.

Page 142. G. L. c. 33 § 6 is amended by St. 1922 c. 152, relative to assessors' lists for enrolment in the militia.

Page 154. In Bailen v. Assessors of Chelsea, decided May 20, 1922, it was held that an assessor who had been appointed for three years might be removed without notice and a hearing.

Page 159. G. L. c. 41 is amended by St. 1922 c. 135, which inserts the following new section:

Section 54A. The auditor or similar officer in cities and the town accountant, if any, otherwise the town treasurer in towns, shall notify the assessors, not later than May first in each year, of the total receipts of the preceding financial year, except from taxes, loans and trust funds and shall specify in detail the source of such receipts.

Page 167. G. L. c. 58 § 8 is amended by St. 1922 c. 34, which provides that the commissioner may authorize the assessors to abate overdue and uncollected taxes.

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