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esty of a protectorate. A brief examination of the law and custom of protectorates will show that the United States may assume the office of protector without allowing armed insurgents to terrorize peaceable islanders, or permitting an Aguinaldo to whistle the American people to arms.
“Protectorate” is a name for so great a variety of political relationships that it defines none accurately, but a few general observations will suggest the relation I have in view. The protectorate will be founded upon a treaty or agreement with a Philippine state whose organization and fundamental law shall be satisfactory to the United States. I do not mean that we should draft an ideal constitution for the islands as did Locke for the Carolinas, nor commend, as of course, our own as the perfect model; but we must condition our protection upon the adoption of a practicable scheme of government as enlightened as we have a right to expect.
The study of the protectoral relations of other governments will be profitable, but is not likely to suggest a model." Apart from the Mohammedan districts,
1 Appendix B contains a few documents illustrating some of the methods by which other nations have assumed more or less authority in territory without formally incorporating it in their dominions. Much of the documentary history of this subject will be found in Le Régime des Protectorats, Brussels, 1899; Aitchison, Collection of Treaties (British India); Holland, The European Concert in the Eastern Question; Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty. For the theory and practice of the protectoral relation consult Despagnet, Essai sur les Protectorats ; Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law; Hall, Foreign Jurisdiction of the British Crown; Lee-Warner, The Protected Princes of India; Ilbert, The Government of India, Ch. VII.
appear to be much like the Protected States of the Malay Peninsula, and may require separate treatment, the Philippines are quite dissimilar from any country now under protection, for we find there a population chiefly of Malay origin whose dominant portion has been Christianized and civilized to a degree by Spanish influence. More importantly, our action must be inspired by uncommon purposes.
A protectorate frequently precedes annexation; ours would be the sign of separation. A protectorate is generally a cloak for substantial ownership, but if ownership be our real purpose we must continue to govern the islands constitutionally as part of the United States, and not set up a mock state through which our government may give arbitrary orders to a subject people. A protectorate is usually established without period, though its end may be conditioned upon the happening of an unexpected event; thus, if I may use this case in illustration, it is written that Great Britain shall hold Cyprus until Russia shall surrender Kars. With a clear understanding that our shortcomings at Washington have not necessarily saddled us with interminable responsibilities in the Philippines, our protection should be accorded in the expectation of its withdrawal. Assuming that a protectorate will be declared with a reasonable anticipation that a Philippine state will one day be able to maintain a place among the lesser states of the world, the treaty of protection should fix its own duration.
It is asserted that a Philippine state is impossible, because the Filipinos are incapable of maintaining a
government. On the other hand we have good evidence of the orderly administration of a great part of Luzon by the insurgent government after the cessation of hostilities in the summer of 1898.1 Further evidence of capacity appears in the Report of the First Philippine Commission. The Commissioners describe the Filipinos as being “of unusually promis“ing material”; 2 “strongly desirous of better educa. “tional advantages”;: and say that, after the insurrection has been suppressed, the majority will be found to be "good, law-abiding citizens.” They testify to
4 the marked ability of the educated class, who, “though "constituting a minority, are far more numerous than “is generally supposed, and are scattered all over the "archipelago.” In the matter of government the Commissioners remark a striking likeness between the Filipino ideal and American achievement, going so far as to say that the leading Filipinos have selected “almost precisely the political institutions and “arrangements which have been worked out in prac“tice by the American people; and these are also, "though less definitely apprehended, the political ideas "of the masses of the Philippine people themselves." Finally, the Commissioners cap their appreciation by earnestly recommending for the islands a territorial government substantially of the first class.” It is true that in spite of these tributes to Philippine competency the Commissioners are at some pains to discredit the possibility of establishing a protectorate ; 8 but, like the President, whose views they reflect, they
1 See especially Senate Document 66, 56th Congress, ist Sess. 21, 120. 4 P. 120. 6 Pp. 91, 119.
8 Pp. 99, 103. 5 P. 120.
7 Pp. III, 112.
3 P. 41.
narrow their consideration of protectorates to the obviously impracticable. And their disapproval must be weighed with due regard to the fact that a recommendation of a method of relinquishing sovereignty, or even an open-minded inquiry for practicable methods, would have been altogether foreign to their official instructions.
The mature opinion of the present Philippine Commissioners is not at hand, but the system of government they are striving to establish would seem to be too advanced for a people really lacking the capacity for organization.
I am not much interested, however, in the taking of testimony in regard to capacity for self-government, because, generally speaking, I do not consider it a fit subject for our adjudication. A nation is not authorized to deny the capacity of an alien people to make its own laws, and the right to live its own life; and rarely does a nation assume this authority except to gloss a purpose of conquest.
This is not to say that intervention may not be justified by anarchy or brutal despotism, for in neither case is there a pretense of government by, or for the people.
In the case of the Filipinos we have no right to assume that they cannot, under our temporary protection, organize a government suited to their condition and requirements, and we shall appreciate this truth the moment we abandon the idea that the islands should be held in the interest of American trade. And we may be assured that every generous purpose in regard to the islanders will be more fully developed in a Philippine state, than in a discontented
American Territory. Indeed, I believe that legitimate trade itself will fare better in the state.
While it would be premature to consider the protectorate in detail, some of its broader features may be suggested.
The Philippine state will not be an exception to the rule that a protected state is never a sovereign among sovereigns. It will not be officially known in the family of nations, for it will hold no relations with foreign states, neither making treaties nor exchanging ministers, nor will it fly a national flag upon the high seas. At most points of contact between the state and the world at large the United States must stand, the advocate of its interests, the defender of its rights. This denial of official foreign intercourse is necessary if only for the reason that as the protector must defend the protected, it must, as far as possible, deprive the latter of opportunity to quarrel with a foreign state by taking into its own strong and competent hands the management of foreign affairs.
Considering that the United States will by protecting a Philippine state assume certain responsibilities in the islands, extending at least to the reasonable protection of foreign interests; and considering that for a time the new state may be unable to preserve, unaided, the requisite order, the United States may reserve the right to keep troops in the islands, and to regulate the composition of a native militia. Thus far we shall perform a mere police duty, undertaken for the common benefit, and requiring only a small force, diminishing as the new state grows in experience. Our own legitimate interests