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will carry us no further. But should foreign nations choose to consider the Philippines as part of the United States ? they would be open to attack should we become involved in war, and we must keep a larger force in the islands during the term of our protectorate. To avoid this burden, and also the risk of making the islands the theater of a war in which their people would have no interest, the establishment of a protectorate should be followed by negotiations with the Maritime Powers looking to the neutralization of the Philippines.
A protectorate is not necessarily unconstitutional. Provided it be an honest arrangement, and not a sub
, terfuge for complete control, it is among those foreign relations maintainable by the United States, as well because they are one of the family of nations as by the express contemplation of the Constitution. While the United States have never entered into a relation with another state like that suggested in the case of the Philippines, they have occasionally assumed a protectoral office, notably in respect of the possible routes of interoceanic canals.
And our relation to the island of Tutuila is not only distinctly protectoral, but, formerly, was complicated by partnership with Great Britain and Germany in a protectorate over the entire Samoan group.
Our courts have never been required to define the position of the United States in respect of protected territory, but it may be indicated. Bearing in mind that the establishment of a protectorate will mark our relinquishment of territorial sovereignty, it is “ By the
1 See supra, p. 12.
perceived that the Philippines will pass straightway from the territorial jurisdiction of Congress to that of the protected state ; for, as Mr. Justice Story states the rule, “The laws of no nation can justly extend be“yond its own territories, except so far as regards its "own citizens. They can have no force to control the "sovereignty or rights of any other nation within its “own jurisdiction. And, however general and com“prehensive the phrases used in our municipal laws “may be, they must always be restricted in construc“tion to places and persons upon whom the legis“lature have authority and jurisdiction.”1 Another statement of the Supreme Court will suggest our manner of dealing with the protected state. “Constitution a government is ordained and estab“lished for the United States of America,' and not " for countries outside of their limits. ...
.. The Con“stitution can have no operation in another country. “When, therefore, the representatives or officers of "our government are permitted to exercise authority “of any kind in another country, it must be on such “conditions as the two countries may agree, the laws “of neither one being obligatory upon the other.”? This was written of our consular jurisdiction in Japan, now ended by limitation, but it applies to any protectoral relation we may assume toward the Philippines. Upon the establishment of a protectorate, the Federal Government will be no longer the government of the islands. Any influence it may have therein will be exerted in a foreign land by agreement with its sovereign. Our rights under this
1 The Apollon, 9 Wheaton 362, 370.
agreement will be maintained by the President like other treaty rights. Any legislation that Congress may enact in regard to the Philippines will be of an ancillary nature, based upon a general power to provide the means for maintaining the lawful rights and obligations of the United States without regard to locality. This jurisdiction of Congress is not territorial jurisdiction in a foreign country. It is a power to be exercised in furtherance of rights lawfully acquired by the United States in that country. That is to say, Congress cannot impose its will on a Philippine state, because it is the legislature of the United States only, but it may aid in effectuating the rights defined by the treaty of protection. Its aid may take the form of new legislation: for example, an act creating an international court and defining its jurisdiction. More often it will be given by an appropriation of money, a precedent for which is found in the following item inserted for some years in the act making appropriations for the diplomatic and consular service: “For the execution of the ob
ligations of the United States and the protection of “the interests and property of the United States in “the Samoan Islands, under any existing treaty with “the government of said islands and with the gov“ernments of Germany and Great Britain, six thou“sand dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary, , “to be expended under the direction of the President.”
I have defined a protectorate on somewhat conventional lines, but with the hope that a better comprehension of conditions may permit even a lighter hand on our part than the comparatively light one I have suggested. Indeed, were the islands free from the demoralizing influence of war, we might see our way clear to recognizing a Philippine state needing no protection at home, and finding ample security against foreign conquest in the power of the United States.
THE EXPEDIENCY OF ALIENATION
The United States, having the right and the opportunity to withdraw their sovereignty from the Philippines, are brought to the question of expediency. Here we are met by the plea that by taking the islands we have given bonds to the world and the islanders to hold them. A perverse guide to conduct! The world has no rights in this domestic matter, and while the interests of the Filipinos should have weight in determining the time and manner of disposing of our territories in Asia, the expediency of disposition must be determined frankly in the interests of the American section of the United States; for, so far as we are entitled to forecast the future of our republic from a study of its past, its strength must forever lie here, not there. With no thought of repudiating our real duties in Asia, with the assurance that these will be best performed by upholding the true ideals of the United States in America, we shall consider the disposition of the Philippines chiefly from the American standpoint.
First from the standpoint of commerce.
The widespread desire for an export trade in something besides foodstuffs and a chance surplus of manufactures is a welcome event, though foreign war has only quickened the forces that have been surely pressing us beyond the “home market,” so long extolled as the sufficient field for our energies provided we shut out competitors.
The acquisition of the Philippines being the striking feature of our outward movement, their retention has been assumed, mistakenly, to be essential to its development. Retention of the Philippines has no relation to the bulk of our export trade. During the fiscal years 1898–1900 we exported merchandise to the value of $3,852,000,000, of which all Asia took but $157,000,000 — not very much in excess of the amount taken by Belgium.
Retention of the Philippines is not essential to the very trade so plausibly asserted to depend upon it
the trade of Asia, especially of China. During the fiscal years 1898–1900 our exports to China, including Hong Kong, averaged $20,000,000. The potential volume of this export trade is, perhaps, very great, assuming that the affairs of China shall be settled satisfactorily; but we must decline to accept hysterical prophecy about Asiatic trade as our inspiration to duty in the Philippines. It is known that when four hundred million Chinese' buy annually five dollars' worth of foreign goods per head they will buy $2,000,000,000 worth ; but the date is not set, and were it in sight our industrial community would be aghast in anticipation of the flood of cheap goods coming from China in payment. It is known
1 If there are so many. 2 Sir Robert Hart says: “Many regard China as a far-distant land,