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that by drawing ever-widening circles about Manila ever-widening areas are brought within its reach on the map; but the rulers of Hong Kong, of Port Arthur, of Saigon, of Kiao Chau, of Yokohama may find as much fun and as little profit in playing this nursery game with their own ports for centers. It is known that when merchants the world over send goods for the mainland of Asia to Manila, there unlade and store them, and reship them thence to their destination, Manila will indeed realize the pre
with an immense population, but so wanting in all that others possess as to be ready to purchase, in unlimited quantities, whatever is offered for sale; whereas, what is true is this: China needs neither import nor export, and can do without foreign intercourse. A fertile soil, producing every kind of food, a climate which favors every variety of fruit, and a population which for tens of centuries has put agriculture, the productive industry which feeds and clothes, above all other occupations — China has all this and more; and foreign traders can only hope to dispose of their merchandise there in proportion to the new tastes they introduce, the new wants they create, and the care they take to supply what the demand really means.
“The sanguine expectations which were expressed when treaties first regulated intercourse, a cycle back, have never been realized. Trade, it is true, has grown, and the revenue derived from it has multiplied; but as yet it is far, far from what our predecessors looked for; and the reason is not that the Chinese Government actively opposed foreign commerce, but that the Chinese people did not require it. Chinese have the best food in the world, rice; the best drink, tea; and the best clothing, cotton, silk, and fur; and possessing these staples, and their innumerable native adjuncts, they do not need to buy a penny's-worth elsewhere; while their Empire is in itself so great, and they themselves so numerous, that sales to each other make up an enormous and sufficient trade, and export to foreign countries is unnecessary. This explains why sixty years of treaty trade have failed to reach the point the first treaty framers prophesied for it.”- North American Review, January, 1901.
diction of the Philippine Commission by becoming “the distributing center of the Far East”; but this event must await a discovery that transhipment and storage en route lessen freight charges.
Moral and Political Considerations
Passing from commercial interests, which do not require the retention of the Philippines, we consider the moral and political obligations of the republic; and these forbid it.
The annexation of the Philippines was accomplished with the supposition that the islanders, with negligible exceptions, would welcome our rule. This supposition was at best a mistaken one, discouraged by the teachings of history, and unsupported by even plausible evidence; and after the annexation the absolute demonstration of its falsity was persistently ignored in official reports and utterances until on October 1, 1900, General MacArthur made his first report as military governor of the islands. In the course of his report General MacArthur says:
“The Filipinos are not a warlike or ferocious peo“ple. Left to themselves, a large number (perhaps “a considerable majority) would gladly accept Ameri
can supremacy, which they are gradually coming to “understand means individual liberty and absolute “security in their lives and property. The people of “the islands, however, during the past
have "been maddened by rhetorical sophistry and stimu"lants applied to national pride, until the power of discriminating in behalf of matters of public concern
“or private interest (never very strongly established "among them) has for the time being been almost "entirely suspended. As a substitute for all other “considerations, the people seem to be actuated by “the idea that in all doubtful matters of politics or “war, men are never nearer right than when going “with their own kith and kin, regardless of the nature “of the action, or of its remote consequences.
“This peculiar psychological condition has raised practical difficulties in obstruction of pacification. “For example, most of the towns throughout the "archipelago, under the advice and control of mili"tary authority, have organized municipal govern
ments, for which kind of local administration the “people have evinced such intelligent capacity as to
encourage the expectation of rapid progress in the “art of self-government when the larger political ad“ministrations are organized.
“The institution of municipal government under “ American auspices, of course, carried the idea of “exclusive fidelity to the sovereign power of the • “United States. All the necessary moral obligations "to that end were readily assumed by municipal
bodies, and all outward forms of decorum and loy“alty carefully preserved. But precisely at this point “the psychological conditions referred to above began "to work with great energy in assistance of insur
gent field operations. For this purpose most of the “towns secretly organized complete insurgent mu
nicipal governments, to proceed simultaneously and “ in the same sphere as the American governments, “and in many instances through the same personnel ; " that is to say, the presidentes and town officials
“acted openly in behalf of the Americans and secretly “in behalf of the insurgents, and, paradoxical as it
may seem, with considerable apparent solicitude for “the interests of both. In all matters touching the "peace of the town, the regulation of markets, the “primitive work possible on roads, streets and “bridges, and the institution of schools, their open “activity was commendable; at the same time they
were exacting and collecting contributions and sup“plies and recruiting men for the Filipino forces, and
sending all obtainable military information to the “Filipino leaders.
“Wherever, throughout the archipelago, there is a "group of the insurgent army, it is a fact beyond “dispute that all contiguous towns contribute to the “maintenance thereof. In other words, the towns,
regardless of the fact of American occupation and “town organization, are the actual bases for all in“surgent military activities; and not only so in the “sense of furnishing supplies for the so-called flying “columns of guerrillas, but as affording secure places “of refuge. Indeed, it is now the most important “maxim of Filipino tactics to disband when closely “pressed and seek safety in the nearest barrio, a maneuvre quickly accomplished by reason of the
assistance of the people and the ease with which “the Filipino soldier is transformed into the appear“ance of a peaceful native, as referred to in a preced"ing paragraph.
“The success of this unique system of war depends
“ "upon almost complete unity of action of the entire “native population. That such unity is a fact is too “obvious to admit of discussion; how it is brought
“about and maintained is not so plain. Intimidation “has undoubtedly accomplished much to this end, “but fear as the only motive is hardly sufficient to
account for the united and apparently spontaneous “action of several millions of people. One traitor in
. “each town would eventually destroy such a complete
organization. It is more probable that the adhesive “principle comes from ethnological homogeneity, “ which induces men to respond for a time to the ap“peals of consanguineous leadership, even when such "action is opposed to their own interests and convic“tions of expediency. These remarks apply with “equal force to the entire archipelago, excepting only " that part of Mindanao occupied by Moros, and to “the Jolo group.
every reason to believe “that all of the Moros are entirely satisfied with ex“isting conditions and are anxious to maintain “them.” 1
While General MacArthur indulges in hopes of better things at the beginning of this excerpt and in other parts of his report, he confirms the fact that, excepting the Moros, the islanders are practically united in opposition to American rule; and the satisfaction of the Moros is due to toleration for their barbarous customs, and payment of blackmail to keep them from piracy.
Prattle about the eighty-nine tribes, the character of Aguinaldo, the absence of national feeling, the yearning for American control, the quieting influence of the presidential election, and treasonable sympathy with rebellion no longer diverts us from the 1 Report of General MacArthur, October 1, 1900, Army
and Navy Journal, November 10, 1900.