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happened to be King of Great Britain."
in these and similar cases is wholly personal, in no wise resulting from any connection between the states themselves. William was King of Hanover by descent from that Elector of Lüneburg who was called to the English throne as George I (the electorate having been made a kingdom in 1814), not because he was King of Great Britain; and the reason why Queen Victoria did not reign in Hanover was because there females are barred from the succession. Leopold is sovereign of the Congo State by special arrangement, not because he is King of the Belgians; and it appears that he may devise his African estate by will.2
No one will pretend that the United States and the Philippines are two countries linked in a personal union by virtue of one man being the chief magistrate of each. Such a pretense would ignore the fact that our President governs the islands solely as the chief magistrate of the United States. Besides, the President would seem to be constitutionally incapable of exercising a personal and detached sovereignty in another country, whether opportunity should come through invitation, inheritance, or conquest: And this principle is not violated in Cuba, where the President governs as the commander-inchief of our forces in military occupation of a foreign land. The theory that Congress and the President may together govern our new possessions as foreign countries is also erroneous. The powers granted to Congress, and it has no others, are conferred for
1 Stepney Election Case, L. R. 17 Q. B. D. 54. See Calvin's Case, Coke's Rep. vii, 1, on the Union between England and Scotland. 2 Blanchard, L'État Indépendent du Congo, 232.
the governing of the United States, and not of any foreign land. It is "a Congress of the United
States," not of the United States, and of Porto Rico, and of the Philippines, and of any other country we may wish to exploit without troubling ourselves about national unity and equal rights. "By the "Constitution," says the Supreme Court, "a gov"ernment is ordained and established for the United "States of America, and not for countries outside "of their limits."1
In the Goetze case the Court seeks to discredit an incorporation of Porto Rico into the United States by asserting that it would disable us from according to that island (and of course to the Philippines) the practical independence which, in the latter country at least, is desired so ardently by the inhabitants. "If "we cannot hold ceded territory without bringing it "under the Constitution, as an integral part of the "United States," says the Court, "then we cannot "give to Porto Rico practical independence,- a con“stitution and laws of her own, taxes of her own, and "hold merely the sovereignty, confined, perhaps, to "control of foreign relations. If Porto Rico is still a "foreign country, we might adopt that course." 2
This statement seems to contemplate a protectorate, and the embarrassments it suggests are purely imaginary. If the Court means that territory once incorporated can never be handed over to its inhabitants, it ignores the cessionary powers of the United States. If the Court means that Congress may maintain a protected state within the limits of its jurisdiction, it 1 Ross's Case, 140 U. S. 453, 464.
2103 Federal Rep. 72, 82.
mistakes the nature of the true protectoral relation, for it appears that in theory of law a protected state is usually deemed to lie beyond the jurisdiction of the legislature of the protecting state, whose interests are managed by its executive department acting in the domain of foreign relations.1
What the United States might have done in the Philippines by way of a protectorate is now a belated question. What they may do yet, we shall consider later. At present we are concerned to know only that they have brought the islands within the jurisdiction of Congress: And no argument of inconvenience is strong enough to overcome the conclusion that land thus brought within the complete and exclusive sovereignty of our legislature cannot be a foreign country, but must be part of the United States by force of the supreme tenure by which it is held.
The Philippines are not only within the United States in a general sense; they are not distinguished organically from the rest of our territory. Prior to the Treaty of Paris the common property of the States of the Union, called the territory of the United States, comprised New Mexico, Arizona, Oklahoma, Indian Territory, Alaska, Hawaii, and a number of islets. To these are now added the Philippines, Porto Rico, and Guam.
These several districts present different character
1 See Lee-Warner, The Protected Princes of India, 181, 249, 263, 333. Compare Ilbert, The Government of India, 440, note 3, on the West African protectorates.
2 See Chapter V.
istics. All are not governed in the same way. Some will become States or parts of States; others will not. Some, indeed, have been acquired under what has been called a promise of ultimate statehood,' but these are not distinguishable in law from the others, for the admission of a new State is an act of policy within the unlimited discretion of Congress. Hawaii, annexed without promise, may enter the Union before Indian Territory, carved out of that Louisiana purchase in regard to which the promise was made nearly a century ago. All are held by the United States in sovereign proprietorship, and although we unite now in protesting the everlasting unfitness of the Philippines for admission to the Union, our prejudice does not prevent their being, in point of law, as eligible as New Mexico, nor would their admission by the next generation involve a more radical and surprising reversal of prejudice than the admission of millions of negroes to political equality by the last generation. All the districts I have named are organically alike, because each is owned by the United States in sovereign proprietorship, and when this likeness is determined all differences in condition, location, and probable destiny must be purely circumstantial.
1 See New Orleans v. De Armas, 9 Peters 224, 235.
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE RULE OF THE
An anxiety to rule the Philippines free from constitutional restrictions is even more marked than the unwillingness to consider them as part of the United States. Indeed, this unwillingness is due to the apprehension that throughout all this territory the Constitution must be the supreme law; and there is so keen a fear that we shall be obliged to administer the Philippines by constitutional rules that ingenious arguments are advanced to prove that the Constitution is really quite as foreign to these islands, unquestionably ours, as though they belonged to another nation.
Prominent among the arguments are these: that the Constitution is not self-extending; that it is ineffective beyond the North American continent; that it was ordained for the States alone; that the power of the United States over annexed territory is the same as that possessed by other nations.
That the Constitution is Not Self-extending
It has been contended that the Constitution is not in the Philippines because it has not been carried there