Iuka with 10,000 men, marched in that direction with his whole army. His cavalry arrived on the 13th'. A small detachment, left there to cover the removal of the stores, abandoned them; and on the 14th, Price entered the town.

2

Several days before Price moved, Grant, seeing that an attack upon Corinth or some other point was contemplated, moved Hurlbut from Memphis Grant's

uncertainty.

towards Brownsville, and withdrew Rosecrans's troops at Iuka to the vicinity of Corinth. On the 10th, he reported3 to Halleck:

With all the vigilance I can bring to bear I cannot determine the object of the enemy. Everything threatens an attack here, but my fear is that it is to cover some other movement. It may have been instituted to prevent sending reinforcements to Wright [on the Ohio], or to cover a movement on New Orleans by Van Dorn, or to the east on General Buell.

Van Dorn's

plans.

This shows the disadvantage of exterior lines. Grant could learn of Farragut and Butler only by the ocean route. Van Dorn had first thrown a handful of troops into Vicksburg, and driven back Farragut, Williams, and Davis; then he had seized Port Hudson and secured the Mississippi: and now he was coming, with all the troops he could gather, to join Price, and help Bragg to win Kentucky by attacking Grant; or if too late for that, to clear Western Tennessee of the enemy, and push on into Kentucky along the Ohio River. This was indeed a brilliant plan. Lee was invading Maryland, and there was a panic in the North. Although Grant's forces were even then more numerous than those of Van Dorn and Price

125 R., 702, 121. * 24, R., 64.

325 R., 213.

425 R., 696.

together, they were somewhat scattered; and Van Dorn hoped to fall upon one of the fractions before the others could come up; such an attack, however, could not succeed if Grant should take the proper measures to meet it.

Grant's dispositions.

4

2

On the 12th of September, Rosecrans3 commanded Grant's left wing at Corinth, Rienzi, Jacinto, and Danville; Ord, the centre at Jacksons and Bolivar; Sherman,' the right wing at Memphis; Quinby was in reserve near Columbus and Hurlbut,' on the Hatchie River near Brownsville. On the 12th, Hurlbut was ordered to Bolivar. To prevent Price from crossing the Tennessee, and to be ready to defend Corinth in case it should be attacked by Price from the east and by Van Dorn from the west, Grant moved Ord to that point by rail.

Grant's plans.

The Tennessee River to the northeast, and Bear Creek a few miles east of Iuka were formidable obstacles to the movement of troops, and Grant proposed to surround Price, or to drive him against these streams and rout his army, before Van Dorn could come to help him. .... Rosecrans13 was familiar with the ground, Grant deferred very much to him in his plans for the approach. Ord with 8000 men was to move by rail to Burnsville and then march by the north side of the railroad and attack Price from the northwest; while Rosecrans was to move14 eastward from Jacinto with about 9000 men, and leave a small force to hold the Jacinto road where it turns to the

10 I Grant, 410; for Iuka and Corinth see also 2 Comte de Paris, 396,

and Greene's Mississippi, 29.

11 I Grant, 410.

12 See map, p. 28. 131 Grant, 408. 1424 R., 64-69.

northeast, while the main force was to move on the Fulton road which comes into Iuka farther east.

Grant had made a fair estimate' of his enemy's strength, and had thrown between Price's troops and Van Dorn's a force about equal to both together. If he had kept Rosecrans and Ord within supporting distance of each other, he would have had a fair chance to rout Price and Van Dorn in succession; but he was more ambitious, and in his effort to follow Rosecrans's plan of surrounding 14,000 or 15,000 men with 17,000, he deliberately gave Price the same advantage that he had so skilfully obtained for himself. The country for some distance between the two roads on which Grant was to advance, was impassable for cavalry and almost so for infantry, and if Price should throw all his forces on one of Grant's columns he could probably defeat it before the other could come to its aid.

On the morning of the 18th of September, Ord moved to Burnsville. He was to get as near the enemy as possible during the day, and intrench himself

Grant's movements,

so as to hold his position until the next morning. Rosecrans was to be up by the morning Sept. 18th. of the 19th on the Jacinto and Fulton roads, and the attack was to be made from all three quarters simultaneously. Grant remained at Burnsville with a detachment of about 900 men from Ord's command, and communicated with his two wings by courier. Ord met the advance of the enemy soon after leaving Burnsville, drove them back, and took up a position about six miles from Iuka. Rosecrans's march was delayed through the fault of one of the guides. Grant notified Ord, and directed him to be in readiness to attack

125 R., 214.

21 Grant, 411.