I vessels," said Davis, "might easily have been captured if we had possessed the means of towing them out of action." On the 25th, Colonel Charles Ellet, Jr., a civil engineer, arrived with seven Federal rams2 of his own invention, which he made at the expense of the Quartermaster Department; and which he was authorized, with the rank of colonel, to operate in these waters, in no manner under control of the naval commander. He carried no armament but carbines and pistols, for he did not propose to destroy the enemy from afar. The Federal gunboats that ran ashore and the Confederate rams were soon repaired. Nothing but Fort Pillow kept Davis from advancing, and, like all the defences above, it must soon be abandoned as Halleck's army was already on its line of communications. spring of 1862. Meanwhile Curtis and Schofield in Missouri and Arkansas had kept pace with Grant and Halleck in Kentucky and Tennessee. The battle of Pea Ridge3 on the 8th of March, 1862, broke the Missouri in power of the Confederates in Arkansas and Missouri. Under a special agreement with President Lincoln, the Governor of Missouri was authorized to raise a force of militia to be employed within the limits of the State. Schofield was placed I B. & L., 1, 448. 2 The Federal rams (Mahan, G. & I. W., 46) were designed and constructed by Col. Chas. Ellet, Jr., a civil engineer, who under authority of the War Department bought a few stern-wheel and a few side-wheel river boats, strengthened them with bulkheads, iron rods, and cross braces, and built bulkheads of oak two feet in thickness around the boilers. Ellet was himself placed in command of these rams with the rank of Colonel, and was allowed to act within the limits of Captain Davis's command without coming in any way under his control. 3 Part I., 187. in command; and by his skill and tact, he so organized this force that Missouri was kept in a state of comparative peace; and most of the volunteers already there were sent to Corinth to reinforce Halleck. Early in June Schofield's effective force of volunteers and militia was about 17,000.1 Arkansas After the battle of Pea Ridge, Van Dorn withdrew the Confederate army to the Arkansas River and then moved eastward to be prepared to co-operate with Beauregard. On the 8th of April, immediately after the battle of Shiloh and the capture of Island No. 10, his troops embarked from Des Arc on the White River under orders from Gen. A. S. Johnston to join him in Tennessee. The Confederate Colonel Snead says": Arkansas was thus utterly undefended, and her people, feeling that they had been abandoned by the Confederate Government, were fast becoming despondent or apathetic. Those living to the north of the Arkansas among the mountains which rise west of the White and Black Rivers were fast submitting to the authority of the Union, and many of them were enlisting in the Union army. The slave-holders that lived in the valley of the Arkansas and on the rich alluvial lands south of that river and along the Mississippi were in despair. The governor and State officers were making ready to abandon the capital, and that part of the population which still remained loyal to the Confederacy was panic-stricken. Curtis followed Van Dorn for a short distance; but early in April, by Halleck's orders, he moved down White River to Batesville, and on the 9th of May, sent Davis's and Asboth's divisions to Corinth. 3 On the 31st of May he reported about 10,100 men present for duty in the field, and 2300 in garrisons in northern Arkansas and southern Missouri.' On the 1st of May, 1862, after the city of New Orleans had surrendered to the Federal fleet under Farragut, Butler's army, of about 14,000 men, landed 2 Louisiana, spring of 1862. and took possession. The forts at the mouth of the Mississippi had already surrendered. The fortifications on the Gulf, and the defences on the river and on the neighboring lakes were abandoned by the Confederates without a struggle. The New Orleans and Opelousas railway was taken and held as far as Brashear City, eighty miles west of New Orleans. 3 The Confederate authority in Louisiana had virtually ceased with the fall of New Orleans. Such was the military destitution [says the Confederate general who afterwards commanded the district] that a regiment of cavalry could have ridden over the State, while innumerable rivers and bayous, navigable a large part of the year, would admit Federal gunboats to the heart of every parish. In fact, by the first of June, when Halleck's army halted at Corinth; the Confederate power west of the Mississippi River was completely shattered. Let us now follow the operations on the river itself and in Mississippi and eastern Louisiana, in which the Federal Navy played the leading part. The Lower original orders from Washington required Mississippi that, after the occupation of New Orleans River, spring by Butler's army, 4 in case the expedition from Cairo had not already descended the river, Farragut 119 R., 407. 2 Irwin, 9-16; 2 B. & L. 74, 75; 6 R., 716–718. 3 Taylor, 102, 103. 4 • Mahan, Farragut, 177. of 1862. 1 should take advantage of the panic to push a strong force up the river to take all the defences in the rear, and that Butler should occupy1 Baton Rouge as soon as possible and then endeavor to open communication with the northern column by the Mississippi. The problem assigned to Butler and Farragut was not an easy one. Mahan says of the orders to ascend the river: Mahan's criticisms. Although the flag-officer seems to have acquiesced in this programme in the beginning, it was probably with the expectation that the advance, up the river and against the current, required of his heavydraught and slow-moving ships would not be very far; that the Cairo expedition, .. would from the character of the vessels composing it, many being iron-clad, and from the advantage of the current, have progressed very far before he had taken New Orleans. The question ... now was not one of fighting batteries. . . . To take the defences in the rear, and in their then state to drive the enemy out of them was one thing; but to hold the abandoned positions against the return of the defenders, after the fleet had passed on, required an adequate force which Butler's army, could not afford. . . . It is due to the Navy Department [says Mahan]3 to say that they expected the army from the north to advance more rapidly than it did; but without seeking to assign the blame, the utterly useless penetration of the United States fleet four hundred miles into the heart of the enemy's country and its subsequent mortifying withdrawal when contrasted with the brilliant success resulting from Farragut's dash by the forts, afford a very useful lesson. 16 R., 694. 2 Mahan, Farragut, 177-180. 3 Mahan's Farragut, p. 180. Farragut and Williams river. On the 2d of May Farragut sent seven vessels up the river, and on the 8th Butler sent Williams with about 1400 men on transports to accompany them. Baton Rouge and Natchez surrendered; and on the 18th, the advance division of the fleet under Lee, followed by the transports ascend the with Williams, arrived off Vicksburg1 and demanded its surrender, which was refused. Farragut arrived a few days later with the remainder of the fleet. Williams made a careful reconnaissance; and reported to Farragut that it would be impossible to land, and that he saw no chance of doing anything with the place so long as the enemy were in such force, having at their command thirty thousand men within an hour by railroad. On the 26th, the fleet opened fire on Vicksburg and its defences. 2 Lovell's prepara tions. The Confederates had anticipated this attack. After the loss of New Orleans, Lovell withdrew his troops to Camp Moore on the New Orleans and Jackson Railroad, sending M. L. Smith with two regiments to Vicksburg. On the 12th of May Lovell reported 2600 men at Camp Moore and 600 at Jackson, besides the two regiments, or about 800 men, sent to Vicksburg. When M. L. Smith arrived,' three batteries were built and a fourth begun. On the 18th, when the Federal fleet appeared, six batteries were ready. On the 26th, Smith's force was increased by 13 B. & L., 553; Mahan, Farragut, 182; 21 R., 8; see Map XII, end of Book II. 221 R., 733. 3 See map, p. 8. 48th La. and 27th La. s About the 20th of April Lovell sent to Beauregard at Corinth (R. 21, 811) to ask his assistance in occupying and fortifying Vicksburg. Beauregard had already sent an officer there to collect laborers, tools, and other supplies. Guns were sent from Pensacola by Bragg and from New Orleans by Lovell. |