As will be seen from an examination of the cases cited in the notes, a case of slander of title generally arises where one's estate in lands or real property is so impeached as to cast a cloud upon his title, or to injure or prevent a sale of the property; but it may occur also in the case of personal property. So where, at a public sale of rye, the defendant attended, and in the presence and hearing of those assembled, said, "I forbid selling the rye; it is mine," in consequence of which persons were deterred from bidding, and the rye sold for less than it otherwise would have done, it was held an action could be maintained.1 Or, an action would lie for alleging that plaintiff's machines. were an infringement on defendant's patents.”

And, similarly, where the author of a work sold the copyright to the defendant, who afterwards published a new edition, purporting to be edited by the author, but which contained mistakes and errors, it was held, if this was calculated to injure A.'s reputation as an author, he might maintain an actions

It has been held slanderous to say that a newspaper has a low circulation, but it is not without

1 Like v. McKinstry, 41 Barb. 186; aff'd 4 Keyes, 397; and see Carr v. Duckett, 5 Hurl. & N. 783; Hill v. Ward, 13 Ala. 310; and slander of title to a slave; Ross v. Pines, Wythe, 71; Gutsole v. Mathers, 1 M. & W. 495; 1 Tyrw. & Gr. 694; Green v. Button, 1. Gale, 349; 2 C. M. & R. 707; 1 Tyrw. & G. 118; Malachy v. Soper, 3 Bing. N. C. 371; 3 Scott, 723; Rowe v. Roach, 1 M. & S. 304.

2 Wren v. Wield, 14 L. R. 213 Q. B.

3 Archbold v. Sweet, 5 C. & P. 219; 1 M. & R. 162.

* Heriot v. Stewart, 1 Esp. Cas. 437. See also Lattimer v. West. Morning News Asso., 25 L. T. N. S. 44.

"For instance, it would be slander to say of Jones, that he is a vulgar, ignorant, and scurrilous editor; but it would not. be slanderous to say that Jones' newspaper is a vulgar, ignorant, and scurrilous journal. As experience shows, this may be a benefit rather than a detriment to Jones. One may, with

the limits of criticism to say that a picture is a "mere daub."1

82. A comment upon a literary production, exposing its follies and errors, and holding up its author to ridicule, will not be deemed a libel," says Broom,* 'provided such comment does not exceed the limits of fair and candid criticism, by attacking the character of the writer unconnected with his publication.

But if a person, under the pretense of criticising a literary work, defames the private character of the author, and, instead of writing in the spirit and for the purpose of fair and candid discussion, travels into collateral matter, and introduces facts not stated in the work, accompanied with injurious comments upon them, such person may become a libeler of the author, and liable to an action.3

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out malice, securely say that Robinson's candles are short of weight; but not that Robinson makes his candles short of weight, for that would implicate him in a wicked business. The effect of both allegations may be the same so far as the sale of the candles goes, but not the same as to Robinson's character." -Albany Law Journal, Feb. 28, 1874, art. “Defamation."

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1 Thompson v. Shackell, I Mo. & Malk. 187; and as to an architect, see Soane v. Knight, Id. 74. This question will be more fully discussed, post, in chapter on Newspapers, which see. Leg. Max. 288.

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* The case of Reade v. Sweetzer (6 Abb. Pr. 9, note), carefully discusses the question of libel in literary criticism, and its value seems to justify its insertion here at length:

This was a trial at circuit.

The action was brought by Charles Reade, an Englishman, residing in London, as author of a novel, "Griffith Gaunt,” to recover $25,000 damages, for an alleged libel published in the "Round Table," a New York weekly paper.

The complaint, after stating the plaintiff's profession as an author, and averring his authorship of the novel, alleged that when, in pursuance of arrangements therefor with the author, the book "Griffith Gaunt" was in course of publication in the "Argosy," a London magazine, and in the "Atlantic Monthly," by Ticknor & Fields, of Boston, on the 9th day of

83. If one requests, dictates, or suggests defamatory matter to another, who publishes it, even though the latter alter the form or otherwise changes the June, 1866, "the said defendants falsely and with malice, composed, and published in said newspaper, at the city of New York, called the "Round Table," as aforesaid, of and concerning the plaintiff as an author; and of and concerning him in his said profession, business or employment, and thereby to injure him in his said business or employment, an article containing the false, libelous, and defamatory matter following." There was set forth the notice published in the "Round Table,” of "Griffith Gaunt," which charged that it was "one of the worst stories that had been printed since Sterne, Fielding and Smollett defiled the literature of the already foul eighteenth century;" that the book "is not only tainted with this one foul spot, it is replete with impurity, it reeks with allusions that the most prurient scandal-monger would hesitate to make;" and the article recommended that the publishers discontinue it, as unfit for circulation in families.

For a second cause of action, the plaintiff alleged the publication, on the 28th of July, 1866, of another article of similar tenor; and for a third cause of action, alleged that the defendant published, on the 11th of August, 1866, an article, entitled "Did Charles Reade write Griffith Gaunt?" which article asserted doubts as to whether the plaintiff was the real author of the work.

The complaint concluded as follows: "And the plaintiff further shows, that by means of the aforesaid wrongful acts and doings of the said defendants, he has been and is greatly prejudiced in his credit and reputation as an author as aforesaid, and brought into public scandal, infamy and disgrace, and otherwise greatly wronged and injured, in and by the aforesaid wrongful and malicious acts and doings of the said defendants, to the damage of the said plaintiff in the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars. Wherefore," &c.

The answer admitted the plaintiff was an author, denied his authorship of the novel in question, denied that the defendants published or owned the "Round Table," but alleged ownership of it by an "association." It admitted the publication of the articles in the "Round Table," and also that the innuendoes in the complaint were true as to persons and publications. It then alleged, that the articles complained of were just and honest criticisms of the novel, and privileged as such. It then justified the publication of the articles on

same in the publication, it seems that the former will be guilty of a libel.

Thus, where the defendant told the reporter of a the ground that they were true. In mitigation of damages, it averred that the novel was identical in plot with two other novels previously published, and that parts of it were selections from other works. It closed with a general denial.

The cause was tried at the circuit, before Mr. Justice Clerke, and a jury.

Frederick Gallatin, Elbridge T. Gerry, and William D. Booth, for plaintiff.

H. F. Dimock, W. C. Whitney, and Robert Sewell, for the defendants.

Gallatin opened the case for the plaintiff, and the articles complained of were read in evidence.

George Vandenhoff, a professor of elocution, was then called by the plaintiff's counsel, and proceeded to read at length the novel, "Griffith Gaunt." After some portion of the book had been read:

Whitney, for the defendants, objected to the further reading, on the ground that the authorship of the book was not proven.

Gerry, for the plaintiff, insisted-I. The course pursued, is sanctioned by precedent (Strauss v. Francis, 4 Fost. & Fin. N. P. 939, 1107).

II. The book was properly read in evidence as part of the plaintiff's case, to prove malice in fact. Justification was pleaded, and in no other way could the jury judge of the truth or falsity of the articles, than by having the book before them.

III. The plaintiff would be shown to have been the author before his case was rested, and it was a mere question as to the order of proof.

IV. As to authorship, the two first articles complained of, and the innuendoes admitted by the answer to be correct, proved it.

Mr. Justice Clerke overruled the objection of non-proof of authorship, but excluded the further reading of the book, on the ground that the articles complained of were libelous on their face, and the book was proper only in rebuttal of the defense of justification.

The plaintiff then proved by two witnesses who had resided with the plaintiff at the time, and had seen him prepare the work for the press, that he was the author of the novel in question; that he was paid twenty dollars a printed page for it, by

newspaper a story defamatory of the plaintiff, saying that "it would make a good case for the newspaper," and afterwards gave the reporter a more detailed acMessrs. Ticknor & Fields, and a still larger sum by certain English publishers; that it had passed through three editions, of 25,000 copies each, in America; that the plaintiff had been an author twenty years, and enjoyed a reputation, as such, equaled only by Charles Dickens.

Plaintiff further proved, by the printers of the "Round Table," that the articles complained of were received by them from the defendants, and inserted pursuant to their directions; that each of the numbers in question were printed and distributed three days before its date, and that over 3,700 copies of each was so printed and published.

Plaintiff then rested.

Dimock, for the defendants, then moved for a nonsuit on the following grounds:-I. The plaintiff, a foreigner, sues for injury to him as an author. Such a character has no recognized existence in our courts, even under the copyright law.

II. There is no sufficient proof that plaintiff is author of the novel reviewed.

III. The articles being written of the book, the plaintiff cannot recover without proof of special damage (Foot v. Brown, 8 Johns. 53; Tobias v. Harland, 4 Wend. 537; Cooper v. Stone, 24 Id. 442; Swan v. Tappan, 5 Cushing, 109).

IV. The articles were privileged as criticisms (Carr v. Hood, I Campb. 355, per Lord Ellenborough), and express malice must be proven to sustain this action (Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y., 369). This is matter of law for the court (Cook V. Wildes, 5 El. & Bl., 340; Somerville v. Hawkins, 10 Com. B., 583; Taylor v. Hawkins, 16 Q. B. 308).

Mr. Justice Clerke.-In regard to the first objection made, that because Mr. Reade sued in a representative capacity, and as a citizen of a foreign state, he could not maintain this action, the point is untenable (Pisani v. Lawson, 6 Bing., N. C. 90; Tuerlote v. Morrison, Yelv., 198; Bulst. 134; Dows v. Maloney, 8 Abb. Pr. 329). Bonaparte sued a London printer, named Peltier, for serious charges made against him as a sovereign; and it was in that case that Mr. Mackintosh first came into prominence as an advocate. But here, Mr. Reade

does not sue only as an author. In his complaint, he says he was greatly prejudiced in his credit and reputation as an author, and brought into public scandal, infamy, and disgrace. The disgrace must refer to him as a man (Lewis v. Walter, 4