Polk v. Wendell. ciple of law, since the jury in that case (which is a recent one), manifested their dissatisfaction with the charge of the court, by finding against it. There was one point made in the argument of this case, which, from its general importance, merits our serious a.tention, and which may have entered. into the views of the circuit court in making their decision. It was, whether, admitting this grant to be void, innocent purchasers, without notice, holding under it, should be affected by its nullity? This would seem to depend on the question, whether we shall, as to innocent purchasers, view it as a void or voidable grant. On general principles, it is incontestable, that a grantee can convey no more than he possesses. Hence, those who came in under the holder of a void grant, can acquire nothing. But it is clear that the courts of the state of Tennessee have held otherwise. In Miller v. Holt (1 Overt. 111), it is expressly adjudged, that whether a grant be *void *309] or voidable, a junior grantee shall not avail himself of its nullity, as against an innocent purchaser without notice. Yet the North Carolina act of 1777, certainly declares grants, obtained by fraud, to be absolutely void. And the same result must follow, where the state has relinquished its power to grant, or no law exists to support the validity of a grant. But it seems, that the courts of Tennessee have adopted this distinction, that grants, in such cases, shall be deemed void only as against the state, and not then, until adjudged so by some process of law. That as between individuals, the title shall be held to vest sub modo, and innocent purchasers, without notice, shall not be ousted by the intervention of a subsequent grantee. If this be the settled law of Tennessee, we are satisfied, that it should rest on the authority of adjudication. There is certainly a palpable distinction between the cases of an original grantee, and a subsequent purchaser, without notice. There can be no reason why the grantee should be favored by the leaning of courts; but the latter, finding the grantee in possession of the patent of the state, which on its face presents nothing to put him on his guard, has strong claims upon the favor of courts, and the justice of the country. Upon analyzing the bill of exceptions, it will be found, that the plaintiff does not propose to prove, in express terms, that the warrants in this case were forgeries. But with a view to proving that there were no entr'es to authorize the issuing of the warrants, he tenders various certified documents from the several offices of North Carolina and Tennessee, from *310] which he would raise an inference, that it was impossible that such entries could have existed; and then tenders parol evidence to prove, that the locations on which the warrants purport to have issued, had never been pas ed to entry, and together with the warrants and surveys founded upon them, had been rejected by a particular entry-taker (the successor of him who is supposed to have issued these warrants), on the ground of their being spurious and invalid. Also, that they had been reported as spurious, by a commi tee of the Tennessee legislature. As the exception does not come up, on a misdirection of the court, but generally on the rejection of the evidence offered, the only remaining questions arise on its legal competency. And first, we are of opinion, that the document marked K, in the tran cript of the record, was competent evidence to prove the fact of the existence of the entries therein specified, and so far it ought to have been admitted, because it is expressly made evidence Polk v. Wendell. by the act of the 21st of September 1801. But so far as a negative use was intended to be made of that abstract, we are of opinion, that the certificate of the officer was properly rejected. There is no such effect given, either to that document, or the clerk's certificate, by any legislative act, and such an effect could only be given to the production of the whole abstract, from which the court might, by inspection, have ascertained the fact of the nonexistence of the contested entries; or from an examination *of the [*311 keeper of that document, as an ordinary witness, or inspection of it made under a commission. The documents offered, marked H, and L, were numerous certificates from the secretary's office of North Carolina, of warrants and grants, introduced to prove, that on the entries of the dates specified as the dates of the entries to Sevier, other warrants issued, and other grants were obtained in the name of various individuals, but none to Sevier. This evidence also, we are of opinion, was competent circumstantial evidence, and ought not to have been wholly rejected. With regard to the report of the committee of the house, we can hardly think it could have been seriously offered; and the parol evidence respecting the rejection by the subsequent entry-taker, was also properly rejected, inasmuch as the rejection of the return of these warrants and surveys, was a perfectly immaterial circumstance upon this issue. It might as well have been the result of that entry-taker's folly, or his wrong, as of any other cause. The emanation of the grant is sufficient evidence, that the claim of Sevier must have met with a more favorable reception from a higher quarter. Upon the whole, the only ground on which we could sustain the decision in the court below is, that a subsequent purchaser, without notice, is not to be affected by any legal defects in a grant, which might have issued conformable to existing laws. For in that case, all the evidence rejected may have been immaterial to the issue. But, non constat, that the evidence rejected *was not connected with proof to rebut that defence. It is, [*312 therefore, not necessary here to decide definitively on that point of the law. If it is the received doctrine of the Tennessee courts, we have expressed our inclination not to shake it. But the cause must necessarily be sent back upon the rejection of the documents marked H, K, and L. Judgment reversed. JUDGMENT.-This cause came on to be heard, on the transcript of the record of the circuit court for the district of West Tennessee, and was argued by counsel on consideration whereof, it is the opinion of this court, that there is error in the proceedings of the said circuit court, in rejecting the documents marked in the transcript of the record with the letters H, K, and L, as incompetent evidence: It is, therefore, adjudged and ordered, that the judgment of the circuit court for the district of West Tennessee, in this case, be and the same is hereby reversed and annulled and it is further ordered, that the said cause be remanded to the said circuit court, with directions to award a venire facias de novo. 143 *MARSHALL v. BEVERLEY. Injunction. In equity, a final decree cannot be pronounced, until all parties in interest are brought before the court. 1 Where a bill was filed for a perpetual injunction, on judgments obtained on certain bills of exchange, drawn by the plaintiff, and negotiated to the defendant, and which had subsequently passed from the latter into the hands of third persons, by whom the judgments were obtained : held, that the injunction could not be decreed, until their answers had come in, although the bill stated, and the defendant admitted, that he had paid the judgments, and was then the only person interested in them; because such statement and admission might be made by collusion. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Virginia. Carter Beverley, being indebted to the appellant, Horace Marshall, assigned to him several bills of exchange, amounting, in the aggregate, to 9007. sterling, which had been drawn by the respondent, Peter R. Beverley, on Bird Beverley, of London, in favor of the said Carter Beverley. These bills were severally transferred, for valuable consideration, by the appellant, to Luke Tiernan & Co., Stewart Montgomery & Co., Jesse Eichelberger & Co., and Cornelius and John. Comegys; and having been forwarded by them to London for payment, were protested for non-acceptance and non-payment, and so returned. Suits were instituted by these parties against Peter R. Beverley, on *314] which he confessed judgments. Having been taken in execetion *and imprisioned, he gave bonds for the prison-bounds, which he broke. A second series of suits were brought on the prison-bounds bonds, after judgments on which, he filed the present bill against Horace Marshall, Carter Beverley, Luke Tiernan & Co., Stewart Montgomery & Co., Jesse Eichelberger & Co., Cornelius and John Comegys, and John Brown, charging usury in the transactions between Carter Beverley and Horace Marshall, and a fraudulent sale of certain slaves of Carter Beverley, on which Horace Marshall retained a lien, as a collateral security for his debt; and charging also, that although the suits were in the name of Luke Tiernan and others (to whom the bills had been transferred), they were, in fact, for the complainant's benefit, he having paid to his indorser what was due on those bills. On these grounds, a perpetual injunction was prayed for and awarded. The appellant, in his answer, admitted the last allegation; but denied the usury, and insisted, that the sales of Carter Beverley's negroes had been made in strict conformity with the deed of trust under which they were sold. None of the other defendants answered the bill. March 4th, 1820. This cause was argued by the Attorney-General, for the appellant, and by Jones and Taylor, for the respondent. March 9th. LIVINGSTON, Justice, delivered the opinion of the court.— This is an appeal from a decree in equity, of the circuit court for the dis*315] trict of Virginia, *to which the following objections have been made : 1st. That there is a defect of parties. Although all the persons in interest are made defendants to the bill, yet none of them had appeared to it 1 Caldwell v. Taggart, 4 Pet. 190; Pratt v. m, 5 Mason 95, 114; Hoxie v. Carr, 1 Sumn. 173; Gordon v. Lewis, 2 Id. 144; Bowman v. Wathen, 2 McLean 376. Marshall v Beverley. except the appellant, on whose answer, and the proofs in the cause, the decree was made. 2d. Another objection is, that there was competent relief at law against the usurious contract stated in the bill; but as no defence of this kind was there set up, a court of chancery ought not to have interfered, especially, after judgment had been obtained on the bills, and even on the prison-bounds bonds, which were taken on the execution which had issued on those judg ments. 3d. It is also contended, that there was no usury in any of the contracts between the appellant and Carter Beverley, and that the sale of the negroes under the deed of trust was fair, and in strict pursuance of the authority vested in the trustee. 4th. Admitting the usury, and a fraud in the sale, it is insisted, that the respondent, being an entire stranger to these transactions, had no right to call the appellant to account, or to any relief as against him. The court has had under its consideration all these objections; but will now give its opinion only on the first of them. We are all satisfied, that when this decree was pronounced, the case was not prepared for a final hearing. The bills, which had been drawn by P. R. Beverley, having been passed by Marshall into the hands of third persons, who had *obtained [*316 judgments on them, and it being a principal object of the suit to enjoin further proceedings on them, the parties in whose favor they were rendered, ought not only to have been made defendants, but a perpetual injunction ought not to have been decreed, until their answers were filed. It was not enough, in their absence, that the complainant should state, and the defendant admit, that the latter had paid these judgments, and was now the only person interested in them. This might be done by collusion, and although that may not be the case here, it is not the course of a court of equity, to make a decree which is to operate directly upon the parties in interest, as the perpetual injunction does here, without affording them an opportunity of being heard. For this error, the decree must be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. Decree reversed. DECREE. This cause came on to be heard, on the transcript of the record of the circuit court for the district of Virginia, and was argued by counsel on consideration whereof, it is the opinion of this court, that the said circuit court erred, in perpetually enjoining the proceedings on the judgments obtained against the respondent, Peter R. Beverley, and the appellant, Horace Marshall, because the bills of exchange, which had been drawn by the said Peter R. Beverley, had passed into the hands of third persons, by whom the said judgments had been obtained, and before the answers of such creditors, who had been made defendants to said bill of complaint, had come in. It is, therefore, decreed and ordered, that the decree of the said circuit court in this case be, and the same is [*317 hereby, reversed and annulled. And it is further ordered, that the said cause be remanded to the said circuit court for further proceedings to be had therein according to law. 5 WHEAT.-10 145 LOUGHBOROUGH v. BLAKE. Direct tax.-District of Columbia. Congress has authority to impose a direct tax on the District of Columbia, in proportion to the census directed to be taken by the constitution. The power of congress to levy and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, is co-extensive with the territory of the United States. The power of congress to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in all cases whatsoever within the district of Columbia, includes the power of taxing it. March 7th, 1820. THIS case, which was an action of trespass brought in the Circuit Court for the district of Columbia, to try the right of congress to impose a direct tax on that district, and in which the court below gave judgment for the defendant, was argued by Jones, for the plaintiff, and by the Attorney-General, for the defendant. March 10th. MARSHALL, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court.This case presents to the consideration of the court a single question; it is *318] Columbia? this: *Has congress a right to impose a direct tax on the district of The counsel who maintains the negative has contended, that congress must be considered in two distinct characters. In one character, as legislating for the states; in the other, as a local legislature for the district. In the latter character, it is admitted, the power of levying direct taxes may be exercised; but it is contended, for district purposes only, in like manner as the legislature of a state may tax the people of a state for state purposes. Without inquiring, at present into the soundness of this distinction, its possible influence on the application, in this district, of the first article of the constitution, and of several of the amendments, may not be altogether unworthy of consideration. It will readily suggest itself to the gentlemen who press this argument, that those articles which, in general terms, restrain the power of congress, may be applied to the laws enacted by that body, for the district, if it be considered as governing the district in its character as the national legislature, with less difficulty, than if it be considered a mere local legislature. But we deem it unnecessary to pursue this investigation, because we think the right of congress to tax the district does not depend solely on the grant of exclusive legislation. The 8th section of the 1st article gives to congress the "power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises," for the purposes thereinafter mentioned. This grant is general, without limitation as to place. It, conse quently, extends to all *places over which the government extends. *319] If this could be doubted, the doubt is removed by the subsequent words which modify the grant. These words are, "but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." It will not be contended, that the modification of the power extends to places to which the power itself does not extend. The power, then, to lay and collect duties, imposts and excises may be exercised, and must be exercised, througout the United States. Does this term designate the whole, or any particular portion of the American empire? Certainly, this question can admit of but one answer. It is the name given to our great republic, which is composed of states and territories. The district of Columbia, or the ter |