existing laws are adequate to the suppression of such disorders, and they will be, as they have been, faithfully carried into effect. The miserable disorderly movement *of a number, not exceeding seventy, lawless individual stragglers, who never [*155 assembled within the jurisdiction of the United States, into a territory to which his Catholic Majesty has no acknowledged right, other than the yet unratified treaty, was so far from receiving countenance or support from the government of the United States, that every measure necessary for its suppression was promptly taken under their authority; and from the misrepresentations which have been made of this very insignificant transaction to the Spanish government, there is reason to believe, that the pretended expedition itself, as well as the gross exaggerations which have been used to swell its importance, proceed from the same sources, equally unfriendly to the United States and to Spain.
As a necessary consequence of the neutrality between Spain and the South American provinces, the United States can contract no engagement not to form any relations with those provinces. This has explicitly and repeatedly been avowed and made known to your government, both at Madrid and at this place. The demand was resisted, both in conference and written correspondence, between Mr. Erving and Mr. Pizarro.
Mr. Onis had long and constantly been informed, that a persistence in it would put an end to the possible conclusion of any treaty whatever. Your sovereign will preceive, that as such an engagement cannot be contracted by the United States, consistently with their obligations of neutrality, it cannot justly be required of them, nor have any of the European nations ever bound themselves to Spain by such an engagement.
Extract of a Letter from General Vives to the Secretary of State, dated May 5th, 1820. [Translation.]
SIR: In answer to your note of the 3d instant, and in pursuance of what I expressed to you in both our late conferences, I have to state to you, that I am satisfied upon the first point of the proposals contained in my note of the 14th ultimo, and am *per[*156 suaded, that if the existing laws enacted for the suppression of piracy should prove inadequate, more effectual measures will be adopted by your government for the attainment of that important object.
I also admit as satisfactory, the answer given to the second point; but I cannot assent to your assertion, that the laws of this country have always been competent to the prevention of the excesses complained of; it being quite notorious, that the expedition aluded to, has not been the only one set on foot for the invasion of his Majesty's dominions; and it is, therefore, not surprising, that the king, my lord, should give credit to the information received in relation to that expedition, or that he should now require of your government a pledge, that the integrity of the Spanish possessions in South America shall be respected.
I mentioned to you in conference, and I now repeat it, that the answer to the third point was not such as I could, agreeable to the nature of my instructions, accept, as being satisfactory; and that, although his Majesty might not have required of any of the European governments, the declaration which he has required of yours, yet that ought not to be considered as unreasonable, it being well known to the king, my master, that those governments, so far from being disposed to wish to recognise the insurgent governments of the Spanish colonies, had declined the invitation, intimated to them some time past, by yours, to acknowledge the pretended republic of Buenos Ayres.
Extract of a Letter from the Secretary of State to General Vives, dated May 8th, 1820.
The assurances which you had given me in the first personal conference between us, of your own entire satisfaction with the explanations given you upon all the points on which you had been instructed to ask them, would naturally have led to the expectation, that the promise which you was authorized to give would at least not be withheld. From your letter of the 5th *instant, however, it appears that no discre
*157] tion has been left to you, to pledge even his Majesty's promise of ratification, in the event of your being yourself satisfied with the explanations upon all the points desired; that the only promise you can give is conditional, and the condition a point upon which your government, when they prescribed it, could not but know it was impossible that the United States should comply; a condition incompatible with their independence, their neutrality, their justice and their honor.
It was also a condition which his Catholic Majesty had not the shadow of a right to prescribe. The treaty had been signed by Mr. Onis, with a full knowledge that no such engagement as that contemplated by it, would ever be acceded to by the American government, and after long and unwearied efforts to obtain it. The differences between the United States had no connection with the war between Spain and South America. The object of the treaty was to settle the boundaries, and adjust and provide for the claims between your nation and ours; and Spain, at no time, could have a right to require that any stipulation concerning the contest between her and her colonies should be connected with it. As his Catholic Majesty could not justly require it, during the negotiation of that treaty, still less could it afford a justification for withholding his promised ratification, after it was concluded.
The proposal which, at a prior period, had been made by the government of the United States, to some of the principal powers of Europe, for a recognition, in concert, of the independence of Buenos Ayres, was founded, as I have observed to you, upon an opinion then and still entertained, that this recognition must, and would, at no very remote period, be made by Spain herself; that the joint acknowledgment by several of the principal powers of the world, at the same time, might probably induce Spain the sooner to accede to that necessity, in which she must ultimately acquiesce, and would thereby hasten an event, propitious to her own interests, by terminating a struggle in which she is wasting her strength and resources, without a possibility of success; an event ardently to be desired by every *friend of humanity, afflicted by the con
*158] tinual horrors of a war, cruel and sanguinary almost beyond example; an event
not only desirable to the unhappy people who are suffering the complicated distresses and calamities of this war, but to all the nations having relations of amity and commerce with them. This proposal, founded upon such motives, far from giving to Spain the right to claim of the United States an engagement not to recognise the South American governments, ought to have been considered by Spain as a proof at once of the moderation and discretion of the United States; as evidence of their disposition to discard all selfish or exclusive views in the adoption of a measure which they deemed wise and just in itself, but most likely to prove efficacious, by a common adoption of it, in a spirit entirely pacific, in concert with other nations, rather than by a precipitate resort to it, on the part of the United States alone.
MATTERS CONTAINED IN THIS VOLUME.
The References in this Index are to the STAR *pages.
1. The courts of the United States have no
jurisdiction, under the act of April 30th,
1790, of the crime of manslaughter, com-
mitted by the master upon one of the sea-
men on board a merchant vessel of the
United States, lying in the river Tigris, in
the empire of China, 35 miles above its
mouth, off Wampoa, about 100 yards from
the shore, in four and a half fathoms of
water, and below low-water mark. United
States v. Wiltberger...
.*76, 93
2. In the same act, the description of place con-
tained in the 8th section, within which the
offences therein enumerated must be com-
mitted, in order to give the courts of the
Union jurisdiction over them, cannot be
transferred to the 12th section, so as to give
those courts jurisdiction over a manslaughter
committed in the river of a foreign country,
and not on the high seas..
Id.
3. History and extent of the criminal jurisdic-
tion of the admiralty..
Id. *106
4. Information under the act of the 3d of
March, 1807, to prevent the importation of
slaves into the United States. The alleged
unlawful importation attempted to be ex-
cused upon the plea of distress. Excuse re-
pelled, and condemnation pronounced. The
Josefa Segunda......
.*338, 351
5. Upon a piratical capture, the property of the
original owners cannot be forfeited for
the misconduct of the captors, in violating the
municipal laws of the country where the ves-
sel seized by them is carried. .. .. . .
..Id.
6. But where the capture is made by a regu-
larly-commissioned captor, he acquires a title
to the captured property, which can only be
divested by re-capture, or by the sentence of
a competent tribunal of his own country;
and the property is subject to forfeiture, for
a violation, by the captor, of the revenue or
other municipal laws of the neutral country
into which the prize is carried..
Id.
7. Speech of Mr. (now Chief Justice) Marshall,
in congress, in the case of Thomas Nash
alias Thomas Robins. Appendix, Note 1. *3
See PIRACY: PRIZE.
1. The acts of agents do not derive their valid-
ity from professing on the face of them to
have been done in the exercise of their
agency. Mechanics' Bank v. Bank of Co-
lumbia...
.*326, 337
2. The liability of the principal for the acts of
his agent depends upon the facts. 1st.
That the act was done in the exercise, and,
2d. Within the limits of the power dele-
gated....
....Id.
3. In ascertaining these facts, as connected
with the exercise of any written instrument,
not under seal, parol testimony is admis-
sible......
...Id.
1. Where a chose in action is assigned by the
proprietor, he cannot interfere to defeat the
rights of the assignee, in the prosecution of a
suit brought to enforce those rights. Mande-
ville v. Welch. . . . . .
*277, 283
2. It makes no difference, in this respect,
whether the assignment be good at law, or in
equity......
..... Id.
3. A bill of exchange is an assignment to the
payee, of the debt due from the drawee to
the drawer...
.....Id.
4. But this principal does not apply to a
partial assignment of the fund.......... Id.
1. Where claims against a party, both in his
own right, and in a representative character,
are submitted to the award of arbitrators, it
is a valid objection to the award, that it does
not precisely distinguish between moneys
which are to be paid by him in his representa-
tive character, and those for which he is
personally bound. Lyle v. Rogers..*394, 407
2. An award may be void in part, and good for
the residue, but if the part which is void be
so connected with the rest as to affect the
justice of the case between the parties, the
whole is void
..Id.
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1. A deposit of title-deeds, as security for a
debt, creates a lien, which is considered
an equitable mortgage. Mandeville v.
Welch..
.*276, 284
2. So also, the deposit of a note, not negotiable,
as security for a debt, will entitle the creditor,
after notice to the maker, to enforce, in
equity, his lien against the depositor and his
assignees in bankruptcy...
.Id.
3. But this doctrine proceeds upon the suppo-
sition that the deposit is clearly established
to have been made as security for the debt,
and not upon the ground, that the mere fact
of a deposit, unexplained, affords such
proof.
..Id.
4. In equity, a final decree cannot be pro-
nounced, until all the parties in interest are
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5. Where a bill was filed for a perpetual in-
junction, on judgments obtained on certain
bills of exchange, drawn by the plaintiff,
and negotiated to the defendant, and which
had subsequently passed from the latter
into the hands of third persons, by whom the
judgments were obtained: held, that the in-
junction could not be decreed, until their
answers had come in, although the bill stated,
and the defendant admitted, that he had paid
the judgments, and was then the only per-
son interested in them, because such state-
ment and admission might be made by col-
lusion....
...Id.
6. In appeals to this court, from the circuit
courts, in chancery cases, the parol testimony
which is heard at the trial in the court below,
ought to appear in the record. Conn v.
.*424
7. A final decree in equity, or an interlocutory
decree, which in a great measure decides the
merits of the cause, cannot be pronounced,
until all the parties to the bill, and all the
parties in interest are before the court... Id.
8. Explanation of the former decree of this
court in the case of Campbell v. Platt, 9
Cranch 500..
*429
1. The act of the state of Pennsylvania, of the
28th of March 1314 (providing, § 21, that
the officers and privates of the militia of that
state, neglecting or refusing to serve, when
called into actual service, in pursuance of
any order or requisition of the president of
the United States, shall be liable to the penal-
ties defined in the act of congress of the
28th of February 1795, c. 277, or to any
penalty which may have been prescribed,
since the date of that act, or which may
hereafter be prescribed by any law of the
United States, and also providing for the
trial of such delinquents by a state court-
martial, and that a list of the delinquents
fined by such court should be furnished to
the marshal of the United States, &c., and
also to the comptroller of the treasury of
the United States, in order that the further
proceedings directed to be had thereon by the
laws of the United States might be com-
pleted), is not repugnant to the constitution
and laws of the United States. Houston v.
Moore....
.*1, 12
2. The powers granted to congress are not
exclusive of similar powers existing in the
states, unless where the constitution has ex-
pressly in terms given an exclusive power to
congress, or the exercise of a like power is
prohibited to the states, or there is a direct
repugnancy or incompatibility in the exercise
of it by the states....
.... Id. *49
The example of the first class is to be found
in the exclusive legislation delegated to
congress over places purchased by the consent
of the legislature of the state in which the
same shall be, for forts, arsenals, dock-yards,
&c.; of the second class, the prohibition of a
state to coin money or emit bills of credit;
of the third class, the power to establish an
uniform rule of naturalization, and the del-
egation of admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion....
...ld.
4. In all other classes of cases, the states retain
concurrent authority with congress....... Id.
5. But in cases of concurrent authority, where
the laws of the states and of the Union are
in direct and manifest collision, on the same
subject, those of the Union being the supreme
law of the land, are of paramount authority,
and the state laws, so far, and so far only, as
such incompatibility exists, must necessarily
yield. . . . . .
...Id.
6. The act of the 3d of March 1819, c. 76, § 5,
referring to the law of nations for a defini-
tion of the crime of piracy, is a constitutional
exercise of the power of congress to define
and punish that crime. United States v.
Smith,...
.*153, 157
7. Congress has authority to impose a direct
tax on the district of Columbia, in proportion
to the census directed to be taken by the
constitution. Loughborough v. Blake...*317
8. The power of congress to lay and collect
taxes, duties, &c., extends to the district of
Columbia, aud to the territories of the United
States, as well as to the states...... ...Id.
9. But congress are not bound to extend a
direct tax to the district and territories... Id.
10. The constitutional provision, that direct
taxes shall be apportioned among the several
states, according to their respective numbers,
to be ascertained by a census, was not inten-
ded to restrict the power of imposing direct
taxes to states only.......
...Id.
11. The power of congress to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction in all cases whatsoever, within
the district of Columbia, includes the power
of taxing it.....
.....Id.
12. The present constitution of the United States
did not commence its operation until the first
Wednesday in March 1789, and the provision
in the constitution, that "no state shall make
any law impairing the obligation of con-
tracts," does not extend to a state law enacted
before that day, and operating upon rights of
property vested before that time. Owings v.
Speed.....
*420, 421 i
See LOCAL LAW, 1, 4, 15, 16.
1. On an indictment for piracy, the national
character of a merchant vessel of the United
States may be proved, without the production
of the certificate of registry, or evidence that
it was seen on board. United States v.
Furlong.....
*184, 199
2. Where a check was drawn by a person who
was the cashier of an incorporated bank, and
it appeared doubtful upon the face of the
instrument, whether it was an official or
private act, parol evidence was admitted, to
show that it was a private act. Mechanics'
Bank v. Bank of Columbia.......*326, 336
3. The acts of agents do not derive their valid-
ity from professing on the face of them to
have been done in the exercise of their
agency; but the liability of the principal
depends upon the facts, 1st, that the act
was done in the exercise, and 2d, within
the limits of the power delegated: And in
ascertaining these facts, as connected with
the execution of written instruments, except
deeds, parol testimony is admissible.....Id.
4. The books of a corporation, established for
public purposes, are evidence of its acts and
proceedings. Owings v. Speed....*420, 423
See BILLS OF EXCHANGE, 1: LOCAL LAW,
11, 12, 15-20: PRIZE, 3, 5, 11.
See LOCAL LAW, 4, 9, 10, 13, 15-17.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.
See LOCAL LAaw, 2, 3.
1. Under the laws of Tennessee, where lands
are sold by a summary proceeding for the
payment of taxes, it is essential to the valid-
ity of the sale, and of the deed made thereon,
that every fact necessary to give the court
jurisdiction should appear upon the record.
McClung v. Ross.
.*116, 119
2. Under the statute of limitations of Tennes-
see, the running of the statute can only be
stopped by actual suit, if the party claiming
under it has peaceable possession for seven
years, but such possession cannot exist, if
the party having the better right take actual
possession in pursuance of his right...... Id.
3. One tenant in common may oust his co-
tenant, and hold in severalty; but a silent
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