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Per curiam. Concurring, Brown, White, McKenna, Holmes, Day, JJ. Dissenting, Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, Peckham, JJ.

Judgment affirmed.

Supreme Court of the United States.

WARNER, BARNES & COMPANY (L/TD.), PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR v. NEVADA

N. STRANAHAN, COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS OF THE PORT OF NEW YORK, DEFENDANT IN ERROR.

In error to the circuit court of the United States for the southern dis

trict of New York.

(191 U. S., 560.)

No. 331.. October Term, 1903. Argued December 4, 1903. Decided December

14, 1903.

The question here involved was the constitutionality of the exaction of duties on importations into the United States from the Philippine Islands after the passage of the Philippine Act.

No opinion was written in this case. The judgment was affirmed with costs on the authority of Downes v. Bidwell (182 U.S. 244, 287).

Per curiam. Judgment affirmed.

Concurring, Brown, White, McKenna, Holmes, Day, JJ. Dissenting, Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, Peckham, JJ.

Supreme Court of the United States.

ISABELLA GONZALES, APPELLANT, v. WM. WILLIAMS, U. S. COMMIS

SIONER OF IMMIGRATION AT THE PART OF NEW YORK, APPELLEE.

Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the southern

district of New York.

(192 U. S., 1.)

No. 225. October Term, 1903. Argued December 4, 7, 1903. Decided January

4, 1904.

SYLLABUS.

The immigration act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1084, relates to foreigners as

respects this country—to persons owing allegiance to a foreign government; citizens of Porto Rico are not “ aliens," and upon arrival by water at the ports of our mainland are not "alien immigrants” within the intent and

meaning of the act. Opinion by Fuller, C. J. No dissenting opinion.

Final order reversed and cause remanded with a direction to discharge Gonzales.

The question here involved was whether a citizen of Porto Rico is to be regarded as an alien within the meaning of the immigration laws, which deny admission to the United States to certain classes of aliens.

Supreme Court of the United States.

J. RIBAS Y HIJO, A SPANISH CORPORATION DOING BUSINESS IN THE

ISLAND OF Porto Rico, APPELLANTS, v. THE UNITED STATES. Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district

of Porto Rico.

(194 U. S., 315.)

No. 151. October Term, 1903.

Submitted April 28, 1904. Decided May 16, 1904.

SYLLABUS.

Under section 35 of the act of April 12, 1900, this court can review on writ of

error a final judgment of the district court of the United States for Porto Rico, where the amount in dispute exceeds $5,000, and a final judgment in a like case in the supreme court of one of the Territories of the United

States could be reviewed by this court. An action which could be brought under the Tucker Act against the United

States in either a district or a circuit court of the United States is within the cognizance of the district court of the United States of Porto Rico. Quaere, and not decided, whether a foreign corporation can maintain any action under the Tucker Act in any court in view of the provisions of the

act that the petition must be filed in the district where the plaintiff resides. The seizure and detention by the naval and military forces of the United States

during the war with Spain, of a vessel owned by Spanish subjects, was a seizure of enemy's property and an act of war within the limits of military operations, although the owners were not directly connected with military operations, and a claim for damages for such seizure and detention is not founded on the Constitution of the United States, or on any act of Congress, or regulation of an executive department, or on any contract express or implied, and an action based thereon is not sanctioned by the Tucker

Act and can not be maintained thereunder. The fact that the vessel was retained pending negotiations for a treaty of peace

and during a cessation of hostilities does not connect the original seizure with an implied contract to compensate the owners for the detention of

the vessel. If the owners had any claim against the United States it was relinquished by

the stipulation in the treaty of peace relinquishing claims, such stipulation covering all claims arising prior to the exchange of ratifications of the

treaty. In case of a conflict between a statute and treaty the one last in date prevails.

Opinion by Harlan, J. No dissenting opinion.
So ordered.

This case arose in Porto Rico. A Spanish corporation sued to recover a certain sum for the use of a merchant vessel which was taken by the United States at Ponce, Porto Rico, when that city was captured by the United States forces in 1898. The court below, on final hearing, dismissed the action upon the ground that the vessel was properly seized as enemy's property. The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the action of the lower court.

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HAROLD CROWLEY, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. THE UNITED STATES.

2

Error to the district court of the United States for the district of

Porto Rico.

(194 U. S., 461.)

No. 205. October Term, 1903. Submitted April 12, 1904. Decided May 31, 1904.

SYLLABUS.

Where the accused contends in the district court of the United States for the

District of Porto Rico that under the provisions of the Foraker Act of April 12, 1900 (31 Stat. L., 77), the qualifications of the grand jurors by whom he was indicted should have been controlled by the local law of January 31, 1901, and the court decides adversely, a right is claimed under a statute of the United States and denied; and under section 35 of the Foraker Act this court has jurisdiction on writ of error to review

the judgment. Under sections 14 and 34 of the Foraker Act providing that the district court

of the United States for the District of Porto Rico shall have jurisdiction in all cases cognizant in the circuit courts of the United States and shall proceed therein in the same manner as i circuit court, the provisions of section 800, Revised Statutes, apply to criminal prosecutions, and the court must recognize any valid existing local statute as to the qualification of jurors in the same manner as a circuit court of the United States is controlled in criminal prosecutions by the applicable statute of the State

in which it is sitting. The disqualification of a grand juror prescribed by statute is a matter of sub

stance which can not be regarded as a mere defect or imperfection within

the meaning of section 1025, Revised Statutes. After April 1, 1901, there was a local statute in Porto Rico, regulating the quali

fications of jurors and the presence of persons on the grand jury of the district court of the United States for the District of Porto Rico disqualified under that act and who were summoned to serve after the act took effect, vitiates the indictment when the facts are seasonably brought

to the attention of the court. An objection by pleas in abatement, and before arraignment of the accused,

to an indictment on the ground that some of the grand jurors were dis

qualified by law, was in due time and was made in a proper way. Quaere, was not decided whether the presence of jurors disqualified by the

act, but summoned before it took effect, would affect an indictment found

after the act took effect. Opinion by Harlan, J. Concurring, Fuller, Brewer, Brown, Day, Peckham, McKenna (in result), Holmes, JJ. Dissenting, White, J.

Judgment reversed, and the case is remanded with directions to overrule the demurrer to the plea in abatement, and for such further proceedings as may be consistent with law.

Crowley was indicted in the above-named court for embezzling from the mails under sections 5467, 5468, 5469, Revised Statut Whether the provisions of the act of April 12, 1900 (Foraker Act), or the act of the legislative assembly of Porto Rico of January 31, 1901, controlled in regard to the qualifications of the grand jurors was the question involved.

Supreme Court of the United States.

THOMAS E. KEPNER, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. THE UNITED STATES.

Error to the supreme court of the Philippine Islands.

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No. 244. October Term, 1903. Argued April 22, 1904. Decided May 31, 1904.

SYLLABUS.

The express declaration of the President in Military Order, No. 58, of April,

23, 1900, and in the act of July 1, 1902, establishing a civil government in the Philippine Islands, both adopting with little alteration the provisions of the Bill of Rights, show that it was intended to carry to the Philippine Islands those principles of our government which the President declared to be established as rules of law for the maintenance of individual freedom; and those expressions were used in the sense which has been placed upon them in construing the instrument from which

they were taken. It is a well-settled rule of construction that language used in a statute which

has a settled and well-known meaning, sanctioned by judicial decision,

is presumed to be used in that sense by the legislative body. It is a well-settled principle of construction that specific terms covering the

given subject matter will prevail over general language of the same or

other statute which might otherwise prove controlling. Although a right of appeal was given to the Government by military order, No.

58, in criminal cases in the Philippine Islands, section 5 of the act of July 1, 1902, establishing a civil government in the islands, specifically provided that no person should be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense, thereby repealing the provision in the military order and nothing in section 9 of the act of 1902 can be construed as intending to prevail over the specific

guarantee contained in section 5. In ascertaining the meaning of a phrase in the Constitution taken from the Bill

of Rights, it must be construed with reference to the common law from

which it was taken. At common law protection from second jeopardy for the same offense clearly

included immunity from second prosecution where the court having jurisdiction had acquitted the accused of the offense; and it is the settled law of this court that former jeopardy includes one who has been acquitted by a verdict duly rendered, although no judgment be entered on the verdict and it was found upon a defective indictment. The second jeopardy is not against the peril of second judgment, but against being again tried for the same offense. Opinion by Day, J. Concurring, Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, Peckham, JJ. Dissenting, Holmes, White, McKenna, Brown, JJ.

Judgment reversed and prisoner discharged.

Kepner was tried by the court of first instance, Manila, P. I., for embezzling funds of a client, and was acquitted. The Government appealed the case to the supreme court of the Philippine Islands, which reversed the judgment of the lower court and sentenced the plaintiff in error (Kepner) to serve a certain term in prison, also suspending him from the office of attorney at law. The Supreme Court of the United States held that this put Kepner twice in jeopardy for the same offense.

Supreme Court of the United States.

FRED L. DORR, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. THE UNITED STATES.

Error to the supreme court of the Philippine Islands.

(195 U. S., 138.)

No. 583. October Term, 1903. Argued April 22, 1904. Decided May 31, 1904.

SYLLABUS.

'While it is settled that the Constitution of the United States is the only source

of power authorizing action by any branch of the Federal Government, it is equally well settled that the United States may acquire territory in the exercise of the treaty-making power by direct cession as a result of the war, and in making effective terms of peace and for that purpose has the powers

of other sovereign nations. Congress has the right to make laws for the government of territories, without

being subject to all the restrictions which are imposed upon it when passing laws for the United States considered as a political body of States in union and, until territory ceded by treaty has been incorporated into the United States, it is to be governed under Congress subject only to such constitu

tional restrictions upon its powers as are applicable to the situation. It is evident, from Article IX of the treaty with Spain ceding the Philippine

Islands, that the intention of the framers of the treaty was to reserve to Congress, so far as it could constitutionally be done, a free hand in dealing

with the territory ceded by the treaty. Congress has not up to the present time incorporated the Philippine Islands into

the United States, and by an express provision of the act of July 1, 1902, section 1891, Revised Statutes, by which force and effect is given to the Constitution and laws of the United States in the Territories, does not apply

to the Philippine Islands. The power to govern territory implied in the right to acquire it, and given to

Congress in Article IV, section 3 of the Constitution, to whatever other limitations it may be subject, does not require Congress to exact for ceded territory, not made a part of the United States by Congressional action, a system of laws which shall include the right of trial by jury, and the Constitution does not, without legislation and of its own force, carry such

right to territory so situated. Under sections 7 and 8 of the libel law enacted by the Philippine Commission,

permitting a fair and true report of judicial, legislative and public official proceedings as privileged communications but excluding libelous remarks or comments from the privilege, the headlines “ Traitor, Seducer, PerjurerWife would have killed him," over the report of a trial, although in quotation marks, are not within the privilege given by the act, and, if proved to

be without basis, are libelous. The power of Congress to authorize the temporary government, such as that

established under the Spooner resolution of March 2, 1901, for the Philippine Islands, has been frequently exercised and is not now open to question, and the Philippine Commission established under that act had power to enact the libel law involved in this case.

Opinion by Day, J. Concurring, Brewer, Brown, White, Peckham (Separate opinion), McKenna, Holmes, JJ. Dissenting, Harlan, J. Judgment affirmed.

The question here raised was whether the provision under the Constitution as to the right of trial by jury applied to the Philippine Islands in the absence of an act of Congress conferring the privilege.

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