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Supreme Court of the United States.

HAROLD CROWLEY, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, V. THE UNITED STATES.

Error to the district court of the United States for the district of Porto Rico.

(194 U. S., 461.)

No. 205. October Term, 1903. Submitted April 12, 1904. Decided May 31, 1904.

SYLLABUS.

Where the accused contends in the district court of the United States for the District of Porto Rico that under the provisions of the Foraker Act of April 12, 1900 (31 Stat. L., 77), the qualifications of the grand jurors by whom he was indicted should have been controlled by the local law of January 31, 1901, and the court decides adversely, a right is claimed under a statute of the United States and denied; and under section 35 of the Foraker Act this court has jurisdiction on writ of error to review the judgment.

Under sections 14 and 34 of the Foraker Act providing that the district court of the United States for the District of Porto Rico shall have jurisdiction in all cases cognizant in the circuit courts of the United States and shall proceed therein in the same manner as a circuit court, the provisions of section 800, Revised Statutes, apply to criminal prosecutions, and the court must recognize any valid existing local statute as to the qualification of jurors in the same manner as a circuit court of the United States is controlled in criminal prosecutions by the applicable statute of the State in which it is sitting.

The disqualification of a grand juror prescribed by statute is a matter of substance which can not be regarded as a mere defect or imperfection within the meaning of section 1025, Revised Statutes.

After April 1, 1901, there was a local statute in Porto Rico, regulating the qualifications of jurors and the presence of persons on the grand jury of the district court of the United States for the District of Porto Rico disqualified under that act and who were summoned to serve after the act took effect, vitiates the indictment when the facts are seasonably brought to the attention of the court.

An objection by pleas in abatement, and before arraignment of the accused, to an indictment on the ground that some of the grand jurors were disqualified by law, was in due time and was made in a proper way.

Quaere, was not decided whether the presence of jurors disqualified by the act, but summoned before it took effect, would affect an indictment found after the act took effect.

Opinion by Harlan, J. Concurring, Fuller, Brewer, Brown, Day, Peckham, McKenna (in result), Holmes, JJ. Dissenting, White, J. Judgment reversed, and the case is remanded with directions to overrule the demurrer to the plea in abatement, and for such further proceedings as may be consistent with law.

Crowley was indicted in the above-named court for embezzling from the mails under sections 5467, 5468, 5469, Revised Statutes. Whether the provisions of the act of April 12, 1900 (Foraker Act), or the act of the legislative assembly of Porto Rico of January 31, 1901, controlled in regard to the qualifications of the grand jurors was the question involved.

Supreme Court of the United States.

THOMAS E. KEPNER, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, V. THE UNITED STATES.

Error to the supreme court of the Philippine Islands.
(195 U. S., 100.)

No. 244. October Term, 1903. Argued April 22, 1904. Decided May 31, 1904.

SYLLABUS.

The express declaration of the President in Military Order, No. 58, of April. 23, 1900, and in the act of July 1, 1902, establishing a civil government in the Philippine Islands, both adopting with little alteration the provisions of the Bill of Rights, show that it was intended to carry to the Philippine Islands those principles of our government which the President declared to be established as rules of law for the maintenance of individual freedom; and those expressions were used in the sense which has been placed upon them in construing the instrument from which they were taken.

It is a well-settled rule of construction that language used in a statute which has a settled and well-known meaning, sanctioned by judicial decision, is presumed to be used in that sense by the legislative body.

It is a well-settled principle of construction that specific terms covering the given subject matter will prevail over general language of the same or other statute which might otherwise prove controlling. Although a right of appeal was given to the Government by military order, No. 58, in criminal cases in the Philippine Islands, section 5 of the act of July 1, 1902, establishing a civil government in the islands, specifically provided that no person should be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense, thereby repealing the provision in the military order and nothing in section 9 of the act of 1902 can be construed as intending to prevail over the specific guarantee contained in section 5.

In ascertaining the meaning of a phrase in the Constitution taken from the Bill of Rights, it must be construed with reference to the common law from which it was taken. At common law protection from second jeopardy for the same offense clearly included immunity from second prosecution where the court having jurisdiction had acquitted the accused of the offense; and it is the settled law of this court that former jeopardy includes one who has been acquitted by a verdict duly rendered, although no judgment be entered on the verdict and it was found upon a defective indictment. The second jeopardy is not against the peril of second judgment, but against being again tried for the same offense.

Opinion by Day, J. Concurring, Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, Peckham, JJ. Dissenting, Holmes, White, McKenna, Brown, JJ. Judgment reversed and prisoner discharged.

Kepner was tried by the court of first instance, Manila, P. I., for embezzling funds of a client, and was acquitted. The Government appealed the case to the supreme court of the Philippine Islands, which reversed the judgment of the lower court and sentenced the plaintiff in error (Kepner) to serve a certain term in prison, also suspending him from the office of attorney at law. The Supreme Court of the United States held that this put Kepner twice in jeopardy for the same offense.

Supreme Court of the United States.

FRED L. DORR, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, V. THE UNITED STATES.

Error to the supreme court of the Philippine Islands.

(195 U. S., 138.)

No. 583.

October Term, 1903. Argued April 22, 1904. Decided May 31, 1904.

SYLLABUS.

'While it is settled that the Constitution of the United States is the only source of power authorizing action by any branch of the Federal Government, it is equally well settled that the United States may acquire territory in the exercise of the treaty-making power by direct cession as a result of the war, and in making effective terms of peace and for that purpose has the powers of other sovereign nations.

Congress has the right to make laws for the government of territories, without being subject to all the restrictions which are imposed upon it when passing laws for the United States considered as a political body of States in union and, until territory ceded by treaty has been incorporated into the United States, it is to be governed under Congress subject only to such constitutional restrictions upon its powers as are applicable to the situation. It is evident, from Article IX of the treaty with Spain ceding the Philippine Islands, that the intention of the framers of the treaty was to reserve to Congress, so far as it could constitutionally be done, a free hand in dealing with the territory ceded by the treaty.

Congress has not up to the present time incorporated the Philippine Islands into the United States, and by an express provision of the act of July 1, 1902, section 1891, Revised Statutes, by which force and effect is given to the Constitution and laws of the United States in the Territories, does not apply to the Philippine Islands.

The power to govern territory implied in the right to acquire it, and given to Congress in Article IV, section 3 of the Constitution, to whatever other limitations it may be subject, does not require Congress to exact for ceded territory, not made a part of the United States by Congressional action, a system of laws which shall include the right of trial by jury, and the Constitution does not, without legislation and of its own force, carry such right to territory so situated.

Under sections 7 and 8 of the libel law enacted by the Philippine Commission, permitting a fair and true report of judicial, legislative and public official proceedings as privileged communications but excluding libelous remarks or comments from the privilege, the headlines “Traitor, Seducer, Perjurer— Wife would have killed him," over the report of a trial, although in quotation marks, are not within the privilege given by the act, and, if proved to be without basis, are libelous.

The power of Congress to authorize the temporary government, such as that established under the Spooner resolution of March 2, 1901, for the Philippine Islands, has been frequently exercised and is not now open to question, and the Philippine Commission established under that act had power to enact the libel law involved in this case.

Opinion by Day, J. Concurring, Brewer, Brown, White, Peckham (Separate opinion), McKenna, Holmes, JJ. Dissenting, Harlan. J. Judgment affirmed.

The question here raised was whether the provision under the Constitution as to the right of trial by jury applied to the Philippine Islands in the absence of an act of Congress conferring the privilege.

Supreme Court of the United States.

SECUNDINO MENDEZONA Y MENDEZONA, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, V. THE UNITED STATES.

No. 584.

Error to the supreme court of the Philippine Islands.

(195 U. S., 158.)

October Term, 1903. Argued April 22, 1904. Decided May 31, 1904.

SYLLABUS.

This case involves the question just decided in Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S., 100. The plaintiff in error was acquitted in the court of first instance and convicted in the supreme court of the Philippine Islands.

For the reasons stated in the Kepner case, the judgment is reversed and the prisoner discharged.

Opinion by Day, J. Concurring, Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, Peckham, JJ. Dissenting, Brown, White, McKenna, Holmes, JJ. Judgment reversed.

Supreme Court of the United States.

RICARDO AMADO, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, V. THE UNITED STATES.

Error to the district court of the United States for the district of Porto Rico.

(195 U. S., 172.)

No. 33. October Term, 1904.

Submitted October 25, 1904. Decided November 7, 1904.

SYLLABUS.

The review of the final judgment of the district court of the United States for Porto Rico by this court is not restricted to cases in which the Constitution or a treaty of the United States or an act of Congress is brought in question and the right claimed under it is denied. There may be cases, certainly civil cases, which if determined in a supreme court of one of the Territories of the United States could be reviewed although not involving any right of a distinctly Federal nature.

But a criminal case like this arising under section 3082, Revised Statutes, could not be reviewed by this court in virtue of the words, in section 35 of the Porto Rico act of April 12, 1900, “in the same cases as from the supreme courts of the Territories of the United States."

Nor will the words in the same act," in all cases where the Constitution of the United States, or a treaty thereof, or an act of Congress is brought in question and the right claimed thereunder is denied," authorize this court to review a judgment of conviction in a criminal case in the court below under section 3082, Revised Statutes, when the only claim at the trial was that the indictment did not charge an offense under the statutes of the United States." Such an objection was too indefinite.

66

Unless a judgment in the United States district court for Porto Rico can be reviewed here, then it is final; for no case determined in that court can be carried to a circuit court of appeals.

Opinion by Harlan, J. No dissenting opinion.

It is so ordered.

This was a criminal case and arose under section 3082 Revised Statutes. The plaintiff in error fraudulently imported certain goods into Porto Rico without paying the duties imposed.

Supreme Court of the United States.

FREDERICK W. LINCOLN ET AL., TRADING UNDER THE FIRM NAME OF HENRY W. PEABODY & Co., PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, V. THE UNITED STATES. (No. 149.)

In error to the Supreme Court of the United States for the southern district of New York.

WARNER, BARNES & Co., (LIMITED), APPELLANT, . THE UNITED STATES. (No. 466.)

Appeal from the Court of Claims.

(197 U. S., 419; also 202 U. S., 484.)

Nos. 149 and 466.

October Term, 1904. Argued March 3, 1905.
3, 1905.

Decided April

SYLLABUS.

The order of the President of July 12, 1898, directing the levying of duties on goods landed in the Philippine Islands, was a regulation for and during the then existing war with Spain, referred to as definitely as if it had been named, and was not a power for any other military occasion. The right to levy duties thereunder on goods brought from the United States ceased on the termination of the war by the exchange of ratifications of the treaty of peace with Spain on April 11, 1899. Dooley v. United States (182 U. S., 222).

After the title to the Philippine Islands passed to the United States by exchange of the ratifications of the treaty of peace, there was nothing in the Philippine insurrection of sufficient gravity to give to the islands the character of foreign countries within the meaning of a tariff act. Fourteen Diamond

Rings (183 U. S., 176).

Under the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, 32 Stat., 691, ratifying the action of the President and the authorities of the Government of the Philippine Islands, the ratification is confined to those acts which were in accordance with the provisions of the order of July 12, 1898, and not to the collection of duties after April 11, 1899, which were within such provisions.

SYLLABUS ON REHEARING.

Lincoln v. United States (197 U. S., 419), reaffirmed, after rehearing, to the effect that the executive order of July 12, 1898, directing that upon the occupation of ports and places in the Philippine Islands by the forces of the United States duties should be levied and collected as a military contribution, was a regulation for and during the war with Spain, referred to as definitely as though it had been named, and the right to levy duties thereunder on goods brought from the United States ceased on the exchange of ratifications of the treaty of peace; that after title to the Philippine Islands passed by the exchange of ratifications on April 11, 1899, there was nothing in the Philippine insurrection of sufficient gravity to give to those islands the character of foreign countries within the meaning of a tariff act; that the ratification of Executive action, and of authorities under Executive order of July 12, 1898, contained in the act of July 1, 1902, 32 Stat., 691, was confined to actions taken in accordance with its provisions; and that the exaction of duties on goods brought from the United States after April 11, 1899, was not in accordance with those provisions and was not ratified.

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