Page images
PDF
EPUB

A ratification by act of Congress will not be extended to cover what was not, in the judgment of the courts, intended to be covered, because otherwise the ratification would be meaningless or unnecessary. Congress out of abundant caution may ratify, and at times has ratified, that which was subsequently found not to have needed ratification.

Opinion on first hearing, by Holmes, J. No dissenting opinion. Opinion on rehearing, by Fuller, C. J. Concurring, Harlan, Brewer, Brown, Peckham, Holmes, Day, JJ. Dissenting, White, McKenna, JJ.

Judgments reversed.

The validity of imposing duties under the order of the President of July 12, 1898, on goods imported into the Philippine Islands from the United States after the ratification of the treaty of peace with Spain and before Congress legislated in regard to the Philippine tariff is the question involved in these cases. The Supreme Court held that the right to levy such duties ceased upon the exchange of ratifications of the treaty, and decided the question in favor of the claimants.

These cases were reheard. Petitions for rehearing were allowed May 29, 1905. The cases were reargued January 18, 19, 1906, and decided on reargument May 28, 1906.

Decisions on rehearing in the cases of Lincoln v. United States and Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd., v. United States (Nos. 149 and 466 of 1904 term), and decisions in the cases of United States v. American Sugar Refining Co. and Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. United States (Nos. 269 and 652 of 1905 term) were rendered subsequent to March 5, 1906.

Supreme Court of the United States.

RAFAEL AND EURIPIDES RODRIGUEZ, PLAINTIFFS

UNITED STATES.

IN ERROR, v. THE

Error to the district court of the United States for the district of

Porto Rico.

(198 U. S., 156.)

No. 183. October Term 1904. Submitted March 15, 1905. Decided May 1, 1905.

SYLLABUS.

Under sections 34, 35, of the Foraker Act of 1900 (31 Stat. 85), this court can review judgments of the district court of the United States for Porto Rico in criminal cases where the accused claimed and, as alleged, was denied a right under an act of Congress and under the Revised Statutes of the United States.

Although a motion in arrest of judgment, based on the ground that the grand jury was not properly impaneled by reason of the deputy clerk acting in place of the clerk, was made in time, and the court below, may have erred in its interpretation of the statute, the accused can not avail of that even in this court unless the record shows that an exception was proprely taken. The accused could have waived such an objection to the grand jury and by not excepting to the ruling he must be held to have acquiesced in the ruling and waived his objection.

Opinion by Harlan, J. No dissenting opinion.

Affirmed.

This was a criminal case. The plaintiffs in error were indicted for embezzlement and theft of bank notes and United States notes from

the mails. After conviction in the court above mentioned the case was brought to the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of the court to reexamine the judgment below was the principal question involved. The judgment was affirmed.

Supreme Court of the United States.

VALENTIN TRONO ET AL., PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, v. THE UNITĘd States. Error to the supreme court of the Philippine Islands.

No. 34. October Term 1905.

(199 U. S., 521.)

Argued October 31, 1905. Decided December 4, 1905.

SYLLABUS.

Plaintiffs in error were tried for murder in the court of first instance in the Philippine Islands and were acquitted of the crime of murder and convicted of the crime of assault and were sentenced to six months' imprisonment and a fine. They appealed to the supreme court of the Philippine Islands, which reversed that judgment and found them guilty of homicide and sentenced them to various terms from eight to fourteen years' imprisonment and a fine. On a writ of error seeking to review the judgment on the ground that the action of the supreme court of the Philippine Islands amounted to putting the accused in second jeopardy, Held, that: There is a vital difference between an attempt of the Government to review a verdict of acquittal in the court of first instance and the action of the accused in himself appealing from a judgment which convicts him of one offense while acquitting him from the higher one charged in the indictment. Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S., 100, distinguished. Where upon the indictment of a greater offense the one accused is found not guilty thereof but guilty of a lower offense included therein, and upon appeal from that judgment a new trial is granted by the appellate court, the accused can, on the new trial, be tried for the greater offense in the indictment and such new trial does not amount to placing him in jeopardy a second time for the same offense within the meaning of the Federal Constitution or of the provisions in that regard in the Philippine act of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat., 691).

The appeal of the accused in such case amounts to a waiver of the plea of second jeopardy by asking that he be again tried for the same offense for which he has once been convicted and if that request be granted he must take the burden with the benefit and go back for the new trial upon the whole case.

Quaere, whether the constitutional provision against second jeopardy was intended to apply to a judgment under these circumstances.

In reversing the lower court and itself convicting the accused on such appeal, the supreme court of the Philippine Islands acted within its powers, and in ordinary procedure in the courts of that country under the act of July 1, 1902.

Opinion by Peckham, J. Concurring, Brewer, Brown, Day, Holmes (in result), JJ. Dissenting, Fuller, Harlan, White, McKenna, JJ. Affirmed.

This was a criminal case. The plaintiffs in error were tried for murder in the court of first instance, Philippine Islands. They were acquitted of the crime of murder but convicted for assault and were sentenced to a term of imprisonment and to pay a fine. They then appealed to the supreme court of the Philippine Islands, which court reversed the judgment of the lower court and found them guilty of homicide. The main question involved was whether the conviction by the supreme court of the Philippines violated the act of Congress

of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat. L., 691), and placed the accused twice in jeopardy. The judgment of that court was held to be right, and was affirmed.

Supreme Court of the United States.

THE UNITED STATES, APPELLANT, v. THE AMERICAN SUGAR REFINING COMPANY, APPELLEE.

Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York.

(202 U. S., 563.)

No. 269. October term, 1905. Argued April 27, 1906. Decided May 28, 1906.

SYLLABUS.

Under the treaty between the United States and Cuba of December 11, 1902, and the act of Congress of December 17, 1903, imports from Cuba were not entitled to reduction of duties imposed by the tariff act of July 24, 1897, until December 27, 1903, the date proclaimed by the President of the United States and the President of Cuba for the commencement of the operation of the treaty.

After the treaty was amended by the Senate and the amendment accepted by Cuba the time of its going into effect was to be fixed by act of Congress and not as originally fixed by the treaty ten days after the exchange of ratifications. There is a presumption against retrospective legislation and words in a statute will not be construed as having such effect unless they clearly can have no other effect, and the legislative intent cannot otherwise be satisfied; and in this respect the use in the statute of the future tense must be given weight.

Opinion by McKenna, J. No dissenting opinion.

The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the case remanded with directions to affirm the order of the board of general appraisers.

The question here was whether certain goods-sugars-which were imported into New York from Cuba between June 12 and September 28, 1903, were dutiable under the tariff act of July 24, 1897, or whether they were entitled to 20 per cent reduction prescribed by that act, under the treaty between the United States and Cuba of December 11, 1902, and the act of Congress of December 17, 1903; and did the treaty go into effect on April 10, 1903, or December 27, 1903? Treaty went into effect December 27, 1903. See, also, 202 U. S., 580.

Supreme Court of the United States.

FRANKLIN SUGAR REFINING COMPANY, APPELLANTS, V. THE UNITED STATES.

Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Pennsylvania.

(202 U. S., 580.)

No. 652. October term, 1905. Argued April 27, 1906. Decided May 28, 1906. United States v. American Sugar Refining Co. (202 Ú. S., 563), followed, to effect that treaty of December 11, 1902, with Cuba, went into effect December 27, 1903.

Under section 20 of the customs administrative act as amended December 15, 1902 (32 Stat., 753) merchandise in bonded warehouse on which duties are paid and permits for delivery issued to the storekeeper is thereupon withdrawn from consumption and subject to rate of duty in force at that time; this is not affected by the fact that the merchandise may remain in the warehouse after such permit is issued and if directly exported the owner will under section 2977 Revised Statutes, be entitled to drawbacks. Under section 20 of the customs administrative act merchandise in bonded warehouse is subject to the rate of duty in force at the time of withdrawal for consumption and not to the rate in force at time of liquidation.

Cuban sugar in bonded warehouse on which duty was paid and for which withdrawal permits were issued and delivered to the storekeeper prior to December 27, 1903, but which remained in the warehouse after that date were subject to full duty, and not entitled to the 20 per cent reduction under the act of December 17, 1903, and the treaty with Cuba.

Opinion by McKenna, J. No dissenting opinion.
Judgment affirmed.

One of the questions raised in this case is similar to the question raised in United States v. American Sugar Refining Company (202 U. S., 563); that is, whether or not the treaty of December 11, 1902, with Cuba went into effect December 27, 1903. The court held that it did, following the decision in that case. Certain sugars were imported into Philadelphia from Cuba September 29, 1903, by appellant and placed in bonded warehouses after duties imposed under tariff act of July 24, 1897. Withdrawal permits were issued prior to December 27, 1903; but part of the sugar was not withdrawn until after that date, and the question arose as to whether the sugar which remained in the warehouse after that date was entitled to the 20 per cent reduction under the act of December 17, 1903, and the treaty with Cuba, or whether subject to full duty. The Supreme Court held it was subject to full duty.

This case was argued simultaneously with United States v. American Sugar Refining Company.

Supreme Court of the United States.

FRANCISCO DONES, APPELLANT, v. JOSE URRUTIA, WARDEN OF THE PENITENTIARY OF PORTO RICO, APPELLEE.

Appeal from the supreme court of Porto Rico.

No. 685. October term, 1905.

(202 U. S., 614.)

Submitted May 14, 1906. Decided May 28, 1906.

Dones appealed from a final order of the supreme court of Porto Rico dismissing a writ of habeas corpus. The writ had been issued by order of the chief justice and was directed to Jose Urrutia, warden of the penitentiary at San Juan, who held Dones in custody under a death warrant issued by the district court of Humacao, P. R. A hearing, upon the return to the writ, was had before the supreme court of Porto Rico in banc. After hearing, the writ was dismissed, and Dones then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.

No opinion was written in this case. The final order was affirmed with costs; authority of act of April 12, 1900 (31 Stat. 77, c. 191,

3449-07-22

secs. 33, 34, 35, 15); Ortega v. Lara, 202 U. S. 339; Perez v. Fernan→ dez, 202 U. S. 80; etc., etc.

Decisions on rehearing in the cases of Lincoln v. United States and Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd., v. United States were also rendered at this term (October, 1905) of the court.

Per Curiam. Final order affirmed.

Supreme Court of the United States.

FRED C. FISHER AND CHARLES C. COHN, ON BEHALF OF FELIX BARCELON, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, v. COL. DAVID J. BAKER, JR., AND CAPT. JOHN DOE THOMPSON.

Error to the supreme court of the Philippine Islands.

(203 U. S., 174.)

No. 214. October Term, 1906. Argued October 9, 10. Decided December 3,

1906.

SYLLABUS.

When an application on habeas corpus is denied because the writ had been suspended, and thereafter, and before appeal taken is allowed, the suspension is revoked, the question of power of the authorities to suspend the writ becomes a moot one not calling for determination by this court.

A proceeding in habeas corpus is a civil and not a criminal proceeding, and as final orders of circuit or district courts of the United States in such a proceeding can only be reviewed in this court by appeal, under § 10 of the act of July 1, 1902, 32 Stat., 1369, a final order of the supreme court of the Philippine Islands in habeas corpus is governed by the same rules and can only be reviewed by appeal, and not by writ of error.

Opinion by Fuller, C. J. No dissenting opinion.
Writ of error dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

The petition by Fisher, as next friend on behalf of one Barcelon, for a writ of habeas corpus was denied because the writ had been suspended by the Philippine Commission on January 31, 1905, in Cavite and Batangas on account of the insurrection of ladrones; a writ of error was allowed by this court on January 3, 1906, but prior to that and on October 19, 1905, the suspension of the writ had been revoked, the occasion for the suspension thereof having ceased. The only question argued in the Supreme Court of the United States, and in the court below, was the power of the Philippine Commission to suspend the writ; and the reinstatement of the writ having wiped out the basis of the decision sought to be reviewed, the only question argued became a moot one, not calling for determination by the Supreme Court of the United States.

That court also held that a final order of the supreme court of the Philippine Islands in habeas corpus can only be reviewed by appeal, and not, as was sought in this case, by writ of error.

Questions involving the power of Congress to delegate the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus to the Philippine Islands Commission, and if so, whether the power was properly exercised in this case, were involved and discussed in the brief and by the court below, but were not decided by the Supreme Court or discussed in the opinion.

« PreviousContinue »