1823] RECEPTION OF MESSAGE ABROAD 203 Protected by the two nations that possess the institutions and speak the language of freedom-by Great Britain on one side and the United States on the other-their independence is placed beyond the reach of danger." 1 1 Rush wrote: "The most decisive blow to all despotic interference with the new states is that which it has received in the President's message. It was looked for here with extraordinary interest, . . . and I have heard that the British packet which left New York at the beginning of this month was instructed to wait for it and bring it over with all speed. It is certain that this vessel first brought it, having arrived at Falmouth on the 24th instant. On its publicity in London . . . the credit of all the Spanish-American securities immediately rose, and the question of the final and complete safety of the new states from all European coercion is now considered as at rest." 2 ... There was one dissentient in England, however, to the extreme ground taken in the message, that "unoccupied parts of America are no longer open to colonization from Europe." Canning, while pleased with the demand of non-interference which was in accord with what he had so vigorously maintained-"that foreign powers had no right, either directly or indirectly, to interfere forcibly between Spain and her American colonies, and that they had consequently no right to aid Spain in her attempt to recover them"-held that "the United States has no right to take umbrage at the establishment of new colonies from Europe on any such unoccupied parts of the American continent." The Pacific Northwest, which was about to become the subject of negotiation between Russia, Great Britain, and the United States, was in Canning's mind. The matter at stake was the great region west of the Rocky Mountains, and which, north of the parallel of 49°, to Alaska, was to be lost to the United States by the compromise of 1848. But Canning's main object was gained. The pro 'Quoted by McMaster, United States, V, 48. Rush to Adams, December 27, 1823, Ford, Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings, XV, 436. . Stapleton, Canning and His Times, 396. For a discussion of the situation, see Adams to Rush, July 22, 1823, State Papers, V, 447. Prominent men of the period were, so late as 1829, curiously wanting in prescience respecting this subject. It was to some "the 204 EFFECT OF MESSAGE DECISIVE [1823 posal to hold a conference at Paris to advise Spain in regard to her late South American possessions sank to inanition through the American pronouncement and the attitude of England; to Spanish continental dominion in America it was a death-blow. It was impossible for the continental European powers to think of oversea military action in the face of the British and American fleets. Such hopes were sunk in the waters of Trafalgar beyond the possibility of resurrection. decree of nature herself that the Rocky Mountains shall be the western boundary of this republic."—Register of Debates in Congress, V, 1828-29, pp. 134-137. CHAPTER XI THE PANAMÁ CONGRESS THE recognition by the United States of South American and Mexican independence; the declaration of President Monroe and the friendly attitude of Great Britain toward the new states which led to complete recognition in 1825, despite the opposition of George IV, who himself favored the Holy Alliance,' brought an increased political activity in Spanish America, and the project of what to-day would be termed a pan-American congress took form in a circular addressed to the Spanish American states by Bolivar in December, 1824, in which the concurrence and representation of the United States was earnestly desired. The ministers of Mexico, Central America, and Colombia, in the spring of 1825, requested interviews with Mr. Clay, who had become secretary of state upon the accession of Mr. John Quincy Adams to the presidency, to ask if such concurrence could not be had. They were received separately on the same day, and asked to state later, more explicitly and more officially than they were then able to do, the objects of the congress and the powers to be given the representatives composing it. They were informed "that of course" the United States could not make themselves a party to the existing war with Spain nor to councils for deliberating on the means of its further prosecution." 2 3 Mexico and the South American states were now bound together by treaties of "perpetual union, league, and confederation," " and it was understood that one of their aims was the wresting from Spain of Cuba and Puerto Rico, the continued occupancy of 1 See the king's memorandum to Lord Liverpool, January 27, 1825, Stapleton, George Canning and His Times, 416-419. Clay to President Adams, December 20, 1825, State Papers, V, 835. 206 CLAY'S ADVICE TO SPAIN [1825 which afforded a base for military and naval action by Spain or her supporters against themselves. Already, however, the United States had begun to look askant at the idea of the independence of these islands or their possession by any power other than Spain. Two, and certainly powerful, reasons were that the character of the population rendered "extremely problematical their capacity to maintain independence," and that a premature declaration would probably result only in the afflicting repetition of the disastrous scenes of St. Domingo." A third reason not yet acknowledged, and to be of overpowering influence, was the possible effect upon our Southern states of the declaration of negro freedom in Cuba, which would certainly follow independence gained by the aid of the new nations, all of which had abolished slavery. Vera Cruz had fallen to the Mexican forces November 18, 1825, and so great had been the sensation in Havana that a fast ship was sent to Spain to make known the news, and "implore the king immediately to terminate the war and acknowledge the new republic as the only means left of preserving Cuba to the monarchy." "2 The good offices of the United States were now earnestly turned to inducing Spain to accept the actualities of the situation. "True wisdom," said Clay, "dictates that Spain, without indulging in unavailing regrets on account of what she has irretrievably lost, should employ the means of retaining what she may yet preserve from the wreck of her former possessions. . . . Not a solitary foot of land from the western limits of the United States to Cape Horn owns her sway; not a bayonet in all that vast extent remains to sustain her cause. .. If she can entertain no rational hope to recover what has been forced from her grasp, is there not great danger of her losing what she yet but feebly holds? . . . The armies of the new states, flushed with victory, have no longer employment on the continent, and yet while the war continues, if it be only in name, they cannot be disbanded without a disregard of all the maxims of just precaution. . . . Will they not strike wherever they can reach? And from the proximity and great value of Cuba and Puerto Rico, is it not to be anticipated that they will aim, and aim 'Middleton, minister to Russia, to Count Nesselrode, January 2, 1825, State Papers, V, 917. Clay to Middleton, December 26, 1825, Ibid., V, 850. 1825] CLAY'S ADVICE TO SPAIN 207 a successful blow, too, at those Spanish islands? . . . It is not, then, for the new republics that the President wishes you to urge upon Spain the expediency of closing the war. . . It is for Spain itself, for the cause of humanity, for the repose of the world that you are required, with all the delicacy which belongs to the subject, to use every topic of persuasion to impress upon the councils of Spain the propriety by a formal pacification of terminating the war. . . . The United States are satisfied with the present condition of those islands in the hands of Spain with their ports open to our commerce, as they are now open. This government desires no political change of that condition. The population itself of those islands is incompetent at present, from its composition and amount, to maintain self-government. The maritime force of the neighboring republics of Mexico and Colombia is not now, nor is it likely shortly to be, adequate to the protection of those islands, if the conquest of them were effected. The United States would entertain constant apprehension of their passing from their possession to that of some less friendly sovereignty; and of all the European powers this country prefers that Cuba and Puerto Rico should remain dependent on Spain. If the war should continue . . . and those islands should become the object and theatre of it, their fortunes have such a connection with the prosperity of the United States that they could not be indifferent spectators; and the possible contingencies might bring upon the government of the United States duties and obligations, the performance of which, however painful it should be, they might not be at liberty to decline. A subsidiary consideration," continued Clay, ". . . is that as the war has been the parent cause of the shocking piracies in the West Indies, its termination would be, probably, followed by their cessation." A despatch of the same tenor was sent to the American minister in Russia instructing him to endeavor "to engage the Russian government to contribute its best exertions toward terminating the contest." 2 Neither appeal, however strongly backed by reason, met with acceptance. The Spanish minister said that "the king would never abandon his claim to those his ancient and rightful posses 2 1 Clay to Everett, minister to Spain, April 27, 1825, State Papers, V, 866. Clay to Middleton, May 10, 1825, Ibid., V, 846. |