248 AMERICAN PROTESTS ... [1852 he said: "The policy of the Spanish government, as far as the same can be carried out without an actual interruption of peaceful relations, will be that of non-intercourse between our people and the island of Cuba. . . . The difficulties of adjusting all commercial questions with a people and government so wedded to antiquated and obsolete ideas, may well be inferred from the recent correspondence . . . on the subject of the refusal of [Spain] to . . . place American shipping in the Peninsula and adjacent islands on a footing with that of other nations. The tone assumed, and the policy pursued, toward the United States, . . . may be fairly attributed not only to their devotion to ancient prejudices and notions of government and their want of a true knowledge of our people and institutions, but to expectations of foreign aid for the security of the island of Cuba to the Spanish crown, in the event of a rupture with the United States." 1 The American minister energetically protested against the exclusion of "any American vessel from the ports of Cuba because she may have one objectionable person on board . . . more especially when that vessel partakes of a public character, by being employed by the government of the United States for the transportation and delivery of the public mail, and is commanded by an officer of the war marine for that purpose. . . . Such a course is a gross violation of that international comity on which is founded almost all commercial intercourse." " The United States executive was directing its efforts, however, against a practically irresponsible authority. Its weakness in not pressing the Spanish government to a disclaimer of the captaingeneral's conduct in the case of the Crescent City had its natural effect in a continuance of like unjustifiable interference with the ordinary and necessary movements of shipping, the mail steamer Ohio, for example, from Colon to New York, belonging to a line which at this period was almost the only means of communication with California, being detained nearly three days on putting into Havana for coal, on April 10, 1853, without being able to communicate with the shore. The ship carried the mails, had on board 'Mr. Barringer to Mr. Everett, December 14, 1852, House Ex. Doc. 86, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., 54. 2 Mr. Barringer to Spanish minister of state, December 12, 1852, Ibid., 57. 1853] THE CASE OF THE "OHIO" 249 four hundred and fifty-six passengers, some fifty of whom were expecting to land at Havana to proceed thence to New Orleans, and two and a half millions of dollars in gold. She had a clean bill of health, and the health officers who came alongside, but not aboard, were informed that the only sick were some few cases of the ordinary Panama malarial fever. Without making any further investigation, the captain was ordered to remain where he was, not to approach the coal wharf, and not to communicate in any way with the shore. An armed guard was stationed to prevent any passengers from leaving the ship, and the captain was refused permission even to send a letter to the consul. Permission was given to coal from lighters, the small force of the ship only to be employed. The ship, however, was finally set at liberty by the volunteering of a Spanish naval surgeon to come aboard and make a personal examination and assure the authorities as to the safety of the conditions.1 The procedure of the authorities in this instance, though showing a high-handed disregard of the ordinary comity which should facilitate the movements of the ships of a friendly power, was evidently the outcome of unreasoning fear, as shown in the failure of the health officers to examine the ship. The protest of the American government, however, but brought a statement from the Spanish minister of state, who, referring to a phrase used by the American minister, said that "the only analogy which, for my part, I encounter between these two cases [of the Crescent City and the Ohio] is, that in the case of the Crescent City the government of your excellency recognized explicitly, as I flatter myself it will on this occasion, the right of the captain-general of the island of Cuba to take, by virtue of the powers with which he is invested, whatsoever measure, however restrictive may be its character, which he may consider necessary for the preservation of the island whose government is given him in charge." The captain-general was thus declared above the law, either municipal or international. It is not to be wondered at that with such powers, and in face of the weakness which had been exhibited by the American 'House Ex. Doc. 86, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., 87. 2 'General Lersundi, minister of state, to Mr. Barringer, June 15, 1853, Ibid., 89. (Italics in original.) 250 CAPTAIN-GENERAL ABOVE LAW [1853 government in the cases of the Georgiana and Susan Loud and in that of the Crescent City, American vessels should be continued to be fired upon, boarded, and sometimes searched on the high seas, as had already occurred in the case of the mail steamer Falcon, August 16, 1851,' and was to occur, March 31, 1853, in the case of the ship Harriet. Ignorance, despotic authority, and a total disregard of international usage and right, seem at this time to have characterized the conduct of the Spanish government toward the United States, both in the Peninsula and in Cuba. 1 House Ex. Doc. 86, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., 129. CHAPTER XIII THE CASE OF THE BLACK WARRIOR: THE OSTEND MANIFESTO PIERRE SOULÉ, French in birth and rearing; an exiled revolutionist who had come to New Orleans; who had thriven in its Gallic atmosphere, and had become United States senator from Louisiana, was now appointed minister to Spain. His attitude toward the French government, not only in earlier days, but later, when he was accused of holding communication with the new emperor's adversaries;1 his avowed sympathy with the filibusters shown in a speech in the Senate just before his appointment; the speeches made in Washington in reply to felicitations, and in New York when, cheered and serenaded just before sailing by a vast crowd in which were several Cuban revolutionary associations, made his appointment a wholly improper one, and one to which the Spanish government could most justly have objected. At no time in American history did the pro-slavery leaders feel themselves more firmly seated; the Mexican war, a distinctively Southern war, had been brought to a triumphant conclusion; Texas had been secured, and there was now a distinct policy of further territorial extension to increase slave territory, and this French "fire-eater," with as little of the American in his mental and psychic make-up as could well be found, was sent to represent the United States at a point where he could only arouse distrust and antagonism, with the hope, on the part of those who caused his appointment by the President, that the threatening bluster which was part of his character would succeed in carrying out their views as to Cuba. An indication of what was to come was given in the speech prepared for his audience on presentation of his credentials, which contained such allusions to other powers 1 Moore, International Law Digest, IV, 558. 252 INSTRUCTIONS TO SOULE [1853 that he was requested by the Spanish minister of state to modify it. He thus delivered, on his presentation at the end of October, 1853, a short, and what he called in his despatch communicating the event, an "emasculated and insipid harangue," well satisfied, however, to have been received at all, as he remarks of his presentation that "the strange, though altogether unaccountable, emotion created by my appearance here in the official character which I hold, has happily subsided, and I may now address you, free from the anxiety which I had been, for some time past, laboring under, in anticipation of the obstacles which it was supposed my admittance at this court would have to encounter." 1 While Soule's appointment was of this objectionable character, the instructions from Mr. Marcy, July 23, 1853, differed but little in tenor from those of so many of his predecessors in the office of secretary of state. "Nothing will be done," said Mr. Marcy, as to Cuba, "on our part to disturb its present connection with Spain, unless the character of that connection should be so changed as to affect our present or prospective security. While the United States would resist at every hazard the transference of Cuba to any European nation, they would exceedingly regret to see Spain resorting to any power for assistance to uphold her rule over it. . . . While Spain remains, in fact as well as in name, the sovereign of Cuba, she can depend upon our maintaining our duty as a neutral nation toward her, however difficult it may be. Under certain conditions the United States might be willing to purchase [Cuba]; but it is scarcely expected that you will find Spain, should you attempt to ascertain her views upon the subject, at all inclined to enter into such a negotiation. There is reason to believe that she is under obligations to Great Britain and France not to transfer the island to the United States. . . The sort of joint protest by England and France against some of the views presented in Mr. Everett's letter of the 2d of December would alone be satisfactory proof of such an arrangement. . . . In the present aspect of the case, the President does not deem it proper to authorize you to make any proposition for the purchase of that island. . . . The United States would cordially favor . . . a vol ... 1 For both addresses, see House Ex. Doc. 93, 33 Cong., 2 Sess. (Vol. X), p. |