1876]

WANT OF DIPLOMATIC INSTINCT

383

But Great Britain's action finally was distinctly against giving aid to Mr. Cushing, Lord Derby declaring "that if nothing were contemplated beyond an amicable interposition having peace for its object, the time was ill-chosen and the move premature."

At the time of the writing of the foregoing in the Times, and of Lord Derby's declaration to Mr. Schenck, and of the saying to Mr. Cushing by the Spanish minister of state that he would like to ask Mr. Fish explicitly for "the precise thing which he would wish Spain to do under the circumstances," the President's message of December, 1875, was in Europe. If by its aid a reasonably good diplomatic instinct had been applied to the interpretation of No. 266, the result, with the Spanish government in the frame of mind expressed in Señor Calderon's note of November 15,2 and as soon as the Carlists should be defeated as they were soon to be, must have been that which the administration at Washington sought: a full amnesty to the rebels in Cuba, a cessation of fighting, a release of embargoed estates, a faithful observance of the stipulations of the treaty of 1795, a liberal local government in the island with nominal sovereignty retained by Spain, and gradual emancipation of the slaves. The Times may have been correct in describing that as a "mild demand," but it also should have been intelligent and frank enough to say that if the property or person of a foreigner was injured unlawfully during the war of secession reparation was made to him.

The real difficulties in Cuba grew out of two insurrections, the primary one that of Yara in 1868; the second grew out of the domination of the captain-general by the Casino Español and the Spanish volunteers, and the consequent disregard of the government at Madrid. What the President of the United States demanded in No. 266 was that, so far as American citizens were concerned, Madrid should make its authority in Cuba, and quick obedience to its orders, a reality.

On January 21, 1876, the President sent to the House of Representatives, on its request, a copy of No. 266 and cognate papers. On the next day the House asked for copies of any correspondence with any European government during the year 1875, other than

1

1 Mr. Schenck to Mr. Fish, January 28, 1876, Sen. Rep. 885, 55 Cong., 2 Sess., 162. 2 Supra, 375.

384

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

[1876

Spain, relative to Cuba. The President replied that there had been none.1

Meanwhile and subsequently there was criticism of the administration, for its violation of the "Monroe doctrine" in what it had done. The documents sent to Congress in 1876, those furnished twenty years later in the period of the second Cuban rebellion, and the information of the contents of notes from the state department to our ministers abroad, set forth in 1906 in the digest of international law so ably edited by Mr. John Bassett Moore, give the details of what occurred. They make apparent that No. 266 had simply been communicated to European governments and conversations had taken place regarding it between our representatives and those governments, as well as between Mr. Fish and the ministers of those governments at Washington. This exhibit clearly shows that the only object of Mr. Fish was that which he had described to Mr. Cushing in the note to him of November 5, 1875. It may possibly be now thought that under the present interpretation of the Monroe doctrine there was, in 1875, a violation of it; but certainly the author of that doctrine, John Quincy Adams, could not have been of that opinion in 1826 had the facts been before him. He was then President, and his secretary of state, Mr. Clay, on May 26 of that year, instructed the American minister at St. Petersburg to ask the Russian government to aid in bringing about peace between Spain and her colonies, with especial reference to safeguarding Cuba from attack by Colombia and Mexico.3

However that may be, the inference is that offering to the great European powers an opportunity to advise Spain, in the greatest of her many great difficulties, was salutary, although nearly all drew back from the suggestion. From the point of view of these powers, whose interests were so much less than those of the United States, there were for the moment fair reasons for their own inaction. The Duke Décazes, the French foreign minister, said: "The great obstacle to any result lies in the powerlessness of the government of the young Alphonso. That weakness as regards

3

1 Richardson, Messages and Papers, VII, 357. 'Moore, Digest, VI, 92–105. Supra, 207; also Moore, Digest, VI, 447, where are many references to the subject at this earlier period.

1875].

REASONS FOR INACTION

385

this particular question arises from a general condition (ensemble) of affairs in Spain. Many circumstances together have produced such a situation that, although the Spanish government might wish to take such steps as were proposed-tending to self-government and emancipation in Cuba-it does not do it. It would fail if it attempted a policy which could be used against it with Spanish people. The northern provinces disturbed by the Carlists and Cuba with its insurrection are both held with difficulty. The young king's government must move with exceeding care. Besides, there is doubt of the power of the home government to enforce its will. . . . The young king dare not commence his reign with a failure (défaillance). . . . If the Spanish government allowed the Carlists a pretext to assume to be the champions of the preservation of the colony of Spain it would increase its embarrassments. There is the recent letter of Don Carlos, proposing to subdue the rebellion in Cuba; the Spanish people (ces pauvres diables Espagnols) take it for serious and do not see the ridiculous side of it." 1

Portugal feared for her independence and the establishment of an Iberian Union as compensation to Spain should the latter lose Cuba.' Italy, only, of all the powers, offered to instruct her minister to urge the expediency of Spain's fulfilling duties to the United States and pacifying Cuba, without specifying measures.3

While the moment may not have been altogether favorable, eastern Europe, besides the reasons mentioned, being in the ferment which in a little more than a year was to develop into the RussianTurkish war, it is not wholly unjust to suppose that while the concert of the powers was accustomed to act upon questions of such a character affecting Europe, it was not quite ready to admit the United States, a country without dynastic relations with Europe, to its intimacy upon a question so remotely affecting them as that of Cuba. There could be seen in this reserve the jealousy of the entrance to its councils of a comparatively new power, so recently out of the throes of a great civil war, during which it had the real friendship of but one and the marked enmity of two of the most power

4

'Mr. Hitt, chargé d'affaires, to Mr. Fish, December 10, 1875, Sen. Rep. 885, 55 Cong., 2 Sess., 143.

2 Mr. Moran, minister to Portugal, to Mr. Fish, December 31, 1875, Ibid., 171. Mr. Fish to Mr. Cushing, December 20, 1875, Ibid., 65. Russia.

386

REASONS FOR INACTION

[1875

ful. As to England, the significant fact, alluded to in No. 266, is not to be forgotten that, as early as August, 1874, Spain consented to make pecuniary reparation (withheld from the knowledge of the United States) for British subjects on the Virginius who were put to death, but reparation for citizens of the United States, slain under the same circumstances, was delayed and refused for seven months thereafter.

Nor would it have been unnatural if recent incidents growing out of the American case and the Geneva award, checked at London to aid at Madrid one, who as Mr. Cushing, had been so conspicuous in pursuing Great Britain on account of the Confederate cruisers. As events turned, the one country to suffer from the apathy shown by Europe was Spain.

CHAPTER XIX

THE END OF THE TEN YEARS' WAR

ON February 3, 1876, the American minister received from Señor Calderon a memorandum giving a review of the Cuban situation, which had been sent, as a reply to Mr. Fish's No. 266, to the Spanish representatives near European governments as well as to the minister at Washington. It was an able presentation of the Spanish side of the question. Señor Calderon showed that of the leaders of the secession movement, all of whom were Cubans, not one was now living. Of those who succeeded them in command not one was a Cuban. Maximo Gomez, the principal, was a Dominican, as was Modesto Diaz; Rulof was a Pole; the person known as El Inglesito, an Englishman. "Their forces," he said, "now consist of negroes, mulattoes, Chinese, deserters from the battalions which were formed provisionally in Santo Domingo during our brief rule there, and a few independent bodies which were formed in Spain during the most disorderly period of the revolution. . . . It may be confidently asserted that there are to-day not more than eight hundred white natives of Cuba with arms in their hands in the insurgent ranks. The consequence of this radical change in the elements of the insurrection is, that what could be considered, in the beginning, as a struggle for independence has now assumed a character of ferocity, and become a war of races and of devastation, which it was not before. Wherever a band of insurgents make their appearance they steal and plunder everything that they can lay their hands on and set fire to the crops and buildings. . . . Not a single instance can be pointed to in which such a deed has been committed by our troops. It is easy to estimate what would be the consequences, not only for Spain but for the world at large, of the triumph (which is fortunately quite impossible) of such an insurrection. If such a triumph