1896] ANNUAL MESSAGE OF 1896 483 less sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of the very subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obligations, which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge. Deferring the choice of ways and methods until the time for action arrives, we should make them depend upon the precise conditions then existing; and they should not be determined upon without giving careful heed to every consideration involving our honor and interest or the international duty we owe to Spain. Until we face the contingencies suggested, or the situation is by other incidents imperatively changed, we should continue in the line of conduct heretofore pursued, thus in all circumstances exhibiting our obedience to the requirements of public law and our regard for the duty enjoined upon us by the position we occupy in the family of nations. "A contemplation of emergencies that may arise should plainly lead us to avoid their creation, either through a careless disregard of present duty or even an undue stimulation and ill-timed expression of feeling. But I have deemed it not amiss to remind the Congress that a time may arrive when a correct policy and care for our interests, as well as a regard for the interests of other nations and their citizens, joined by considerations of humanity and a desire to see a rich and fertile country, intimately related to us, saved from complete devastation, will constrain our government to such action as will subserve the interests thus involved and at the same time promise to Cuba and its inhabitants an opportunity to enjoy the blessings of peace. . . . Congress, however, was inclined to go farther. On December 21, 1896, Senator Cameron reported from the majority of the committee on foreign relations a joint resolution: "That the independence of the republic of Cuba be, and the same is hereby, acknowledged by the United States of America," and "That the United States will use its friendly offices with the government of Spain to bring to a close the war between Spain and the Republic of Cuba." The resolution was accompanied by an elaborate and able report upon the general subject of recognition, citing all previous cases in Europe and America. After an analysis of those of Europe, the report said: "From 484 PRECEDENTS IN INTERVENTION [1896 this body of precedent it is clear that Europe has invariably asserted and practised the right to interfere, both collectively and separately, amicably and forcibly, in every instance, except that of Poland, where a European people has resorted to insurrection to obtain independence. The right has been based on various grounds: 'impediments to commerce,' 'burdensome measures of protection and repression,' 'requests' of one or both parties 'to interpose,' 'effusion of blood,' and 'evils of all kinds,' 'humanity' and 'the repose of Europe' (Greek treaty of 1827); 'a warm desire to arrest with the shortest possible delay the disorder and the effusion of blood' (protocol of November 4, 1820, in the case of Belgium); 'his own safety or the political equilibrium on the frontiers of his empire' (Russian circular of April 27, 1849, in the case of Hungary); 'to safeguard the interest and honor' and to ‘maintain the political influence' of the intervening power (French declarations of 1849-50 in regard to the States of the Church). Finally, in the latest and most considerable, because absolutely unanimous act of all Europe, simply the 'desire to regulate' (preamble to the treaty of Berlin in 1878, covering the recognition of Servia, Roumania, Montenegro, and Bulgaria)." The report also referred to "the declaration of Lord John Russell on the part of the British government in the House of Commons, May 6, 1861, in which he announced that the law officers of the crown had already 'come to the opinion that the Southern Confederacy of America, according to those principles which seem to them to be just principles, must be treated as a belligerent.' This astonishing promise of belligerency to an insurrection which had by the latest advices at that time neither a ship at sea nor an army on land, before the fact of war was officially known in England to have been proclaimed by either party, was accompanied by a letter of the same date from Lord John Russell to the British ambassador at Paris, in which he said that the accounts which had been received from America were 'sufficient to show that a civil war had broken out among the states which lately composed the American Union. Other nations have therefore to consider the light in which, with reference to the war, they are to regard the confederacy into which the Southern states have united themselves; and it appears to her majesty's government that, looking 1896] PRECEDENTS IN INTERVENTION 485 at all the circumstances of the case, they cannot hesitate to admit that such confederacy is entitled to be considered as a belligerent invested with all the rights and prerogatives of a belligerent.' "On May 8 the French minister 'concurred entirely in the views of her majesty's government' and pledged himself to the joint action. . . . We know that early as March, 1861, the French minister at Washington advised his government to recognize the Confederate States, and in May, he advised it to intervene by forcibly raising the American blockade. Mercier's recommendation was communicated to Russell, who entertained no doubt as to the right of intervention, either diplomatic or military, even at that early moment when the serious operations of war had hardly begun. ""There is much good sense in Mercier's observations [wrote Russell to Palmerston, October 17]. But we must wait. I am persuaded that if we do anything it must be on a grand scale. It will not do for England or France to break a blockade for the sake of getting cotton; but in Europe powers have often said to belligerents: 'Make up your quarrels. We propose to give terms of pacification which we think fair and equitable. If you accept them, well and good. But if your adversary accepts them and if you refuse them, our mediation is at an end, and you must expect to see us your enemies.' The offer of the resolution "caused much excitement. Stocks fell and the financial interests of the great Eastern cities rose in wrathful opposition. They declared without any reservation that 'war would unsettle values'-a horrid possibility not to be contemplated with calmness by any right-thinking man. The error of the financial interests was in thinking that war would 'unsettle values.' That which 'unsettled values' was the Cuban question, and so long as that remained unsettled, 'values' would follow suit." 2 'Senate Report, 1160, 54 Cong., 2 Sess. CHAPTER XXIV CUBA IN CONGRESS. THE NEW ADMINISTRATION.-RECONCEN TRATION THE numerous joint resolutions offered at this time in the Senate bore witness to the trend of popular sentiment. On December 9, 1896, Senator Mills, of Texas, introduced a joint resolution that the President be directed to take possession of Cuba and hold the same until the people of Cuba could organize "a government deriving its powers from the consent of the governed." 1 Senator Call, of Florida, offered a joint resolution recognizing the independence of Cuba, and on the same date Senator Cullom, of Illinois, whose character and reputation gave weight to his action, proposed to resolve "that the extinction of Spanish title and the termination of Spanish control of the islands at the gateway of the Gulf of Mexico are necessary to the welfare of those islands and to the people of the United States." On December 21 Senator Hill, of New York, offered a joint resolution declaring "that a state of public war exists in Cuba, and that the parties thereto are entitled to and hereby are accorded belligerent rights . . . and the United States will preserve a strict neutrality between the belligerents." Later, on February 4, 1897, Senator Allen, of Nebraska, in another joint resolution showed himself eager that "United States battle-ships should be sent without delay to Cuban waters to enforce upon Spain the elimination of all unusual and unnecessary cruelty and barbarity" in the conduct of the war. Memorials were received from the legislatures of Louisiana, Nebraska, South Carolina, and Wyoming, favoring belligerent rights, or Cuban independence." 1 Cong. Record, 54 Cong., 2 Sess., 39. * Ibid., 355. • Ibid., 130, 1088, 1638, 1419. 2 Ibid., 39. 3 Ibid., 60. 1897] ADMINISTRATION'S FIRM ATTITUDE 487 The firm attitude of the Cleveland administration, and the announcement by Mr. Olney, the secretary of state, that no attention would be paid to a joint resolution of recognition of belligerency or independence of Cuba even if passed by both houses over the President's veto, as the right of recognition rested solely with the executive and the resolution would only be "the opinion of certain eminent gentlemen," brought congressional action for the moment to a nullity, the question, through the influence of the speaker, Reed, not even being considered by the House. 1 By the end of 1896 over 160,000 men of all arms and ranks had, since the outbreak, been sent to Cuba; an amazing effort which spoke in strongest terms for the efficiency of the Spanish war office. But the ability of Cuban finance to meet such an effort was in inverse ratio to the volume of war traffic. The $76,000,000 of imports from Cuba to the United States in 1894 had fallen to $40,000,000 in 1896, and to $18,000,000 in 1897. The exports from the United States to Cuba were now but $8,000,000, a third of what they were four years before. The continuance of the struggle clearly meant ruin to the island. 2 In the last days of 1896, France, Great Britain, and Germany combined to counsel Spain to accept the good offices of the United States with a view to assure a prompt termination of the war. Spain refused the invitation, but it had its effects in a decree dated December 31, 1896, granting Puerto Rico an elective provincial assembly, and on February 6, 1897, was published the long-lookedfor decree establishing " as soon as the state of war in Cuba will permit it," what was, from the Spanish point of view at least, a reformed system of government for both the Spanish islands." But whatever the influences which had brought Señor Cánovas (for it was he who was the actual government of Spain) to this point, his delayed action was but another unhappy example of the fatal habit of procrastination of his race. It came at the very end of Mr. Cleveland's term of office and at a moment when his administration, which had shown itself so desirous of doing strict justice to Spain, and which took a liberal view of the projected 'The Evening Star (Washington). 'Le Fur, Etude sur la Guerre Hispano-Américaine de 1898, 12. |