528

GENERAL WEYLER'S PROTEST

[1897

nounced before a council of war on account of this, which might have given cause for grave diplomatic difficulties; but the United States, where, it must be borne in mind, attacks of this kind were almost of daily occurrence, had the good taste to attach no importance to this act of one who had become a private person."1

Le Fur, Étude sur la Guerre Hispano Américaine, 15. Weyler's protest appeared in the Paris Temps, 2-3, January, 1898.

CHAPTER XXVI

CUBAN RELIEF.-HAVANA RIOTS.—THE INTERCEPTED LETTER AND RESIGNATION OF DUPUY DE LOME.-DESTRUCTION

"MAINE"

OF THE

WHATEVER the cause of Cuban suffering, the situation was one to call for sympathy from the coldest heart. The President took the initiative, and on December 24, 1897, the eve of the day which most appeals to kindly feeling among the Christian nations, a circular was sent from the department of state announcing that "in deference to the earnest desire of the government to contribute effective action toward the relief of the suffering people in the island of Cuba, arrangements have been perfected by which charitable contributions in money or the kind can be sent to the island by the benevolently disposed people of the United States." It was arranged with the Cuban authorities to admit all such articles free of duty. Consul-General Lee was directed to receive the offerings and to co-operate with the local authorities and the charitable boards in their distribution. The response was immediate and effective. The Red Cross Society lent its aid, both in contribution and in management, the president of the society, Miss Clara Barton, going herself with an excellently organized staff to Cuba.1

Though nothing beyond what has been already said is needed to show the necessity of such relief in general, a few words may be quoted from the report, January 18, 1898, of Consul Brice at Matanzas, which show that misery had extended to all classes.

1 The earlier shipments were carried to Havana free of cost by the Ward line of steamships. Later the naval supply steamer Fern was used for the outlying ports, twelve thousand persons applied for relief on the first day of issuing rations. (See Miss Clara Barton, in North American Review, May, 1898, p. 554.) The aid thus rendered was continued until the outbreak of hostilities and did much to relieve the misery of the population.

530 BLANCO'S EFFORTS TO RELIEVE DISTRESS [1898

Declaring that there were 90,000 people in the province of Matanzas alone in a starving condition, he added: "There are thousands of families (of the better classes, formerly well-to-do) who to-day are living on one meal a day, and that very scant. They have sold or pawned furniture, jewelry, clothing, etc., to eke out an existence, until all is gone or nearly so. . . . The daughter of a former governor of this province was seen begging in the streets (incognito) of this city. Many of these people call on me privately at my residence asking and praying for God's sake to be remembered when this relief comes from the United States." 1

...

It was under such conditions that General Blanco had taken office. His earnest efforts to relieve distress, which included the appropriation of $100,000 for this purpose, a special tax on real estate in Havana, which by November 27 had already reached the amount of $88,000, and the formation of relief committees wherever the Spanish authorities had power, availed little against the disinclination of many subordinate officers to help forward autonomy. Both Spaniard and Cuban were against it. The consequence even of a message of peace to the Cubans in the field meant death to the messenger. Said Consul Hyatt at Santiago de Cuba: "Personal appeals of provincial governors and other important officers have been made earnestly and often to the same individuals.

2

.. Wholesale removals of Spanish officers from civil positions are made by sweeping orders with instructions to fill their places with Cuban autonomists. About a week since came an order dismissing every employee of the custom-house in this city, to take effect as soon as proper autonomists could be found to fill their places. As yet only two have been named. . . . It is given out that sometime in the month of February there will be an election held for . . . sixty members of the council of administration, while seventeen additional ones are to be appointed by the governorgeneral. . . . The Cuban leaders declare that they will neither 'Senate Doc. 230, 55 Cong., 2 Sess., 31.

Consul Hyatt to Assistant Secretary of State Day, January 1, 1898, Senate Doc. 230, 55 Cong., 2 Sess., 31. The trial by a summary court-martial and execution of Colonel Ruiz of the Spanish army for an endeavor to lay such a message before his friend Colonel Aranguren, of the Cuban forces, was a notable case in point. (See Pepper, To-morrow in Cuba, 86.)

1898]

RIOTS IN HAVANA

531

make nominations nor go near the polls." Less than a month later the same official could say: "Extremists of both sides seem able to dominate the sentiments of their respective parties. . . Autonomy is already a dead issue." It is not unfair to say that the state of affairs in the island was now not far from anarchic.

...

On January 12 Consul-General Lee telegraphed that serious riots were occurring in which mobs led by Spanish officers had attacked the offices of the newspapers advocating autonomy. The palace was reported heavily guarded and the consulate protected by armed men. Next day he telegraphed: "After a day and night of excitement, all business suspended, and rioting. Everything quiet at this hour. City heavily guarded. Soldiers protect public squares and threatened points. Mobs shouted yesterday, 'Death to Blanco, and death to autonomy,' while 'Viva Weyler' was frequently heard. Contest between Spanish factions. Attention has not been directed to other issues. Heard once yesterday of a few rioters shouting a proposal to march to our consulate. Presence of ships may be necessary, but not now." Later in the day he was more uncertain as to the control by General Blanco of the situation. "If demonstrated he cannot maintain order, preserve life, and keep the peace, or if Americans and their interests are in danger ships must be sent, and to that end should be prepared to move promptly. Excitement and uncertainty predominate everywhere.

" 3

On the next day the consul-general reported: "All quiet"; nor was there a renewal of the rioting. "The recent disorders," said General Lee, "are to be primarily attributed to a group of Spanish officers who were incensed at articles appearing in three of the newspapers of Havana, El Reconcentrado, La Discusion, and El Diario de la Marina. . . . It is probable that the Spanish officers were first provoked by the denunciations of Weyler in the columns of one of these papers, and determined to stop it, and afterward, being supported by the mob, turned the demonstration into an antiautonomistic affair. . . . The intense opposition to [the autonomistic plan] arises from the fact that the first appointment of officers to put into form its provisions were made generally outside of their

'Mr. Lee to Mr. Day, January 8, 1898, Sen Doc. 230, 55 Cong., 2 Sess., 38. 'Ibid., February 1, 1898, 41.

'Telegram, January 13, 1898, Foreign Relations, 1898, 1025.

532

THE NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON

[1898

party in order to show the Cubans in arms that autonomy was instituted for their benefit and protection.1

The decision made early in the winter to send south what was known as the North Atlantic Squadron, whose area of duty was the Atlantic coast and the Caribbean, had caused an inquiry on December 16, 1897, from the Spanish minister of state to Señor Dupuy de Lome as to its mission. This was in itself entirely peaceful; it had already been detained in the bleak northern waters during two winters, in deference to Spanish sentiment and to the detriment of efficiency and health, and it was in no sense unreasonable that it should now be sent to the warmer waters of the Gulf of Florida, an admirable exercising ground specially adapted as such through its calms and the shallowness which allowed anchorage many miles from land. The Spanish minister was informed that the decision to send the squadron had been made some time before, and that its usual drills had been resumed in southern waters in order not to arouse excited public sentiment, and also with the purpose of demonstrating that the situation had improved, and to avoid the demand for ships to go to Cuba.2

While events just mentioned gave reason for concern for the safety of the many Americans resident in Havana, the departure of the squadron at Hampton Roads, assembled in anticipation of its southern cruise, was not hastened; nor was there necessity for so doing as there was already ample force in Florida waters, engaged in looking after filibusters, to render assistance in case of need."

The riots, though the result of party antagonism among the Spaniards themselves, had greatly disturbed American feeling, a change which the Spanish minister at Washington was quick to recognize. He telegraphed Madrid, January 14, 1898, that while no ships would be sent, the change of "sentiment has been so abrupt, and our enemies, influenced by it, so numerous, that any sensational 1 Mr. Lee to Mr. Day (confidential), January 18, 1898, Senate Doc. 230, 55 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 20.

2

Señor Dupuy de Lome to Señor Gullon, December 16, 1897, Spanish Cor. and Docs., 52.

The vessels at or near Key West were the battle-ship Maine, cruiser Montgomery, torpedo-boats Cushing, Ericsson, and Dupont, and several revenue vessels. The original purpose, however, of the Maine was to have a ship at hand which could render assistance to Americans, should need arise, in Havana.