558 SPAIN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE "MAINE” [1898

make like request, the President might undertake such office of friendship."

1

On March 26, also, a summary of the report of the court of inquiry was telegraphed by the state department to General Woodford. The telegram ended: "Upon the facts thus disclosed a grave responsibility appears to rest upon the Spanish government. The Maine, upon a peaceful errand, and with the knowledge and consent of that government, entered the harbor of Havana, relying upon the security and protection of a friendly port. Confessedly she still remained, as to what took place on board, under the jurisdiction of her own government, yet the control of the harbor remained in the Spanish government which, as the sovereign of the place, was bound to render protection to persons and property there, and especially to the public ship and the sailors of a friendly power. The government of the United States has not failed to receive with due appreciation the expressions of sympathy by the government of the queen regent. . . This fact can only increase its regret that the circumstances of the case, as disclosed by the report of the board of inquiry, are such as require of the Spanish government such action as is due where the sovereign rights of one friendly nation have been assailed within the jurisdiction of another. The President does not permit himself to doubt that the sense of justice of

1 Foreign Relations, 1898, 704. The assistant secretary of state would seem somewhat in error in view of the official statements from the governor-general of Cuba, sent on this date by the Spanish minister at Washington to the secretary of state (but which no doubt had not been received when the telegram was sent), that there had been no relief to the starving in Cuba except that supplied by the American people. General Blanco mentioned that $100,000 had been distributed on November 23, 1897, and $50,000 on March 2, 1898. His report continued: "The zeal of the local governors and alcaldes was invoked, those authorities being invited to set an example, which they have done with a devotion worthy of all praise. In this manner private charity being stimulated, and with the confidence of official support, likewise took active measures, organizing productive boards, economical kitchens, and beneficent associations, thus contributing greatly to the alleviation of the suffering." He, as well as the provincial governors in their reports, gratefully acknowledged the relief which had come from the United States. (For these reports, see Foreign Relations, 1898, 705-710 and 714-717.) On March 28 it was arranged that supplies could be sent to the reconcentrados by the American government, to be conveyed and distributed under the same conditions as the private supplies which had been sent. (Ibid., 717.)

1898]

SPECIFIC TERMS OF PEACE SUGGESTED

559

the Spanish nation will dictate a course of action suggested by the friendly relations of the two governments." 1

1

On Sunday, March 27, Mr. Day telegraphed General Woodford: "Believed the Maine report will be held in Congress for a short time without action. A feeling of deliberation prevails in both Houses of Congress. See if the following can be done:

"First. Armistice until October 1. Negotiations meantime looking for peace between Spain and insurgents through friendly offices of President United States.

"Second. Immediate revocation of reconcentrado order so as to permit people to return to their farms, and the needy to be relieved with provisions and supplies from United States, co-operating with authorities so as to afford full relief.

"Add if possible:

"Third. If terms of peace not satisfactorily settled by October 1, President of the United States to be final arbitrator between Spain and insurgents.

"If Spain agrees, President will use friendly offices to get insurgents to accept plan."

On the evening of the day (March 25) that the memorandum expressing willingness to submit the question of peace to the Cuban congress was received, General Woodford was called upon by Señor Moret, who informed him that Señor Sagasta, the president of the council of state, "would be glad to talk with him informally on the subject of an immediate suspension of hostilities in Cuba through the means of an armistice or truce." General Woodford telegraphed for instructions, acknowledging at the same time the reception of the state department's telegram of March 26, and asking the meaning of the words "full self-government" and "with reasonable indemnity" used therein. He added: "Under Spanish constitution, ministry cannot recognize independence of Cuba or part with nominal sovereignty over Cuba. Cortes alone can do this, and Cortes will not meet until April 25. If I can secure immediate and effective armistice or truce between Spanish troops and insurgents, to take effect on or before April 15, will this be satisfactory?" He mentioned the possibility of submission of the question of peace to the Cuban congress, and continued: "If I 1 Foreign Relations, 1898, 1036. 1 Ibid., 712.

1

2

560

HOPEFULNESS OF AMERICAN MINISTER [1898

can secure these two things, with absolute and immediate revocation of concentration order, may I negotiate? I believe that an immediate armistice means present and permanent peace. Also, I believe that, negotiations once open between insurgents and the Cuban government, some arrangement will be reached during the summer which the Spanish government will approve, and that Cuba will become practically independent and pass from Spanish control." 1

This was answered next day. "Full self-government with indemnity would mean Cuban independence." For the answer to the remainder of the inquiry General Woodford was referred to the state department's telegram of Sunday the 27th, adding: “Very important to have definite agreement for determining peace after armistice, if negotiations pending same fail to reach satisfactory conclusions." A second telegram followed, saying: "Important to have prompt answer on armistice matter." 2

'General Woodford to secretary of state, March 27, 1898, Foreign Relations, 1898, 713.

Mr. Day to General Woodford, March 28, 1898, Foreign Relations, 1898, 713.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE REPORT ON THE "MAINE" BEFORE CONGRESS.-RESOLUTIONS

IN CONGRESS.-SPANISH PROPOSITIONS

ON March 28 the President sent the report of the court of inquiry to Congress with a special message dignified and reserved in tone, and which was strictly confined to a presentation of the facts and statements before him.' It ended with the final sentence quoted in the state department telegram of March 26,2 adding: “It will be the duty of the executive to advise the Congress of the result [of Spain's action in the premises], and in the meantime deliberate consideration is invoked." The report was referred without debate to the committee on foreign affairs. The House adjourned. On this same date the Spanish minister at Washington transmitted to the secretary of state a résumé of the findings of the Spanish court, declaring the ship destroyed by an internal explosion. The

'The report signed on March 21, 1898, on board the battle-ship Iowa (of which the senior member of the court, Sampson, was captain) found that "the Maine was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine, which caused the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines. The court has been unable to obtain evidence fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the Maine upon any person or persons.' (For the finding in full see Senate Doc. 207, 55 Cong., 2 Sess.; also Sigsbee, The Maine, Appendix A.) The finding was based chiefly upon the fact that "at frame 17 the outer shell of the ship from a point eleven and a half feet from the middle line of the ship and six feet above the keel when in a normal position, has been forced up so as to be now about four feet above the surface of the water, and therefore about thirty-four feet above where it would be had the ship sunk uninjured," also that the outside bottom plating was bent into a reversed V-shape, and at frame 18 the vertical keel was broken in two, and the flat keel bent into an angle similar to that just mentioned. This break was about thirty feet above its normal position. It was impossible to the court to conceive such lifting effects upon a ship's bottom from an interior explosion, a judgment borne out by the results of the explosions of the forward magazines in the Spanish ships destroyed in the battle of Santiago, where there was no disturbance of the ships' bottoms. It is to the mind of the present writer also impossible to conceive that the bottom of the Maine could 2 Supra.

562

THE "MAINE" REPORT

[1898

weight of the finding was, however, greatly weakened by the statement that "the divers, when examining the hull of the Maine, could not see its bottom as it was buried in the mud"; whereas, in fact, the state of the bottom, so clearly described by the American court, was the essential element in the latter's finding.

The presentation to Congress of the report of the court brought next day a flood of joint resolutions, among the more important of which were those of Senators Frye and Foraker, both of which demanded the withdrawal of the Spanish forces and the recognition of the independence of Cuba.1 The resolution of the former repeated the technical error so frequently made, that "the warfare for the past three years has been conducted by the Spanish government in violation of the rules of civilized warfare." That of Senator Foraker, while giving the reason for interference, held insufficient in international law, that the war was "destructive of the commercial and property interests of the United States," was

be bent as described by any lurching forward of the after body of the ship as it sank in the shallow water. For this sank so slowly that no such effort could have bent the heavy girder formed by the strong cellular bottom of the Maine, strengthened as this was by the vertical keel and six longitudinals.

It should also be mentioned that the scantling of the Maine was far heavier than that of any other ship in the service.

That an interior explosion may be caused by an exterior one was shown conclusively in the Russian-Japanese war, in the cases of Admiral Makaroff's flag-ship, the Petropavlovsk, and of the Japanese battle-ship Hatsuse.

The writer would also mention that when the court was ordered, he was one of two members who thought the explosion internal. Both were convinced otherwise against their prepossessions.

The incompleteness of the Spanish examination on which was found an internal explosion, is shown by the statement (Sen. Rep. 885, 55 Cong., 2 Sess., 625) of the principal Spanish diver, that "the bilge and keel of the vessel throughout its entire extent were buried in the mud, but did not appear to have suffered any damage," a statement in most complete disaccord with the facts. It should be noted that the total work of the Spanish divers was but seventeen and a half hours, as shown by the records in the Spanish report.

Even if proof which seemed so conclusive to the American court of inquiry had not existed, it is difficult to reconcile with the theory of accident the destruction of an American man-of-war at such a time and in such a place, by the only occurrence of such a character known in American naval history. That a ship peculiarly safe as to her arrangement of magazines, with no powder aboard except that known to be of stable character (the usual brown powder of the period), with all her high explosives, as gun-cotton, in the after part of 'Cong. Record, 55 Cong., 2 Sess., 3293.