568

THE MAIN POINT LEFT UNSOLVED

[1898

The bases did indeed "meet in great part McKinley's demands," but not in the most essential; that is, action looking to immediate cessation of hostilities, for nothing could be more vain at this moment than expectancy that a truce would be asked for by the insurgents. General Woodford expressed to the Spanish ministers at the conference that the final proposition would not be acceptable. "Taken," he said, "in connection with the one relating to the 'pacification of Cuba,' [it] does not mean immediate or assured peace. It means, when read with the other, continuation of this destructive, cruel, and now needless war." 1

"The conference," telegraphed the minister to the President, "has turned as I feared on a question of punctilio. Spanish pride will not permit the ministry to propose and offer an armistice; which they really desire because they know that armistice now means certain peace next autumn. I am told confidentially that the offer of armistice by the Spanish government would cause revolution here. Leading generals have been sounded within the last week and the ministry have gone as far as they dare go to-day. I believe the ministry are ready to go as far and as fast as they can and still save the dynasty here in Spain. They know that Cuba is lost. Public opinion in Spain has steadily moved toward peace. No Spanish ministry would have dared to do one month ago what this ministry has proposed to-day." 2

This telegram was at once an expression of the American minister's disappointment, an attempt to excuse the inaction of the Spanish ministry, and the transmission of a covert hope that the American government would give Spain another opportunity.

The president of the home-rule government of Cuba, Señor José Maria Galvez, now took part in the question, become so deeply momentous and acute, in a telegram sent through the governor-general to Washington, which was a protest against any effort of the American government to force upon Cuba any form of government without the consent of its people, and an expression of the hope that the President of the United States would aid in the re-establishment of peace in Cuba under the sovereignty of the

1 General Woodford to Mr. Day, March 31, 1898, Foreign Relations, 1898, 727.

2 Telegram, March 31, Ibid., 727.

1898] THE POPE'S OFFER OF GOOD SERVICE

569

mother country.1 A manifesto was, at the same time, issued by the home-rule government to the people of Cuba to join in the realization of peace and concord."

Affairs were, however, sweeping with a torrential force which only one thing could stay: a declaration that, for the time at least, no more shot were to be fired by Spain. The Vatican, kept informed evidently by Archbishop Ireland (now in Washington by order of the Pope to work for peace), appreciated this if Spain did not, and the Spanish ambassador near the Holy See telegraphed from Rome that he was informed that "the President of the republic desires to reach a settlement, but he is finding himself helpless against Congress. The difficulty lies in who should ask for a suspension of hostilities. The President . seems well disposed to accept the offices of the Pope; and the latter, willing to aid us, inquires, first, if the intervention of his holiness to ask the armistice would save the national honor; second, if such intervention would be acceptable to her majesty and the government."4

Señor Gullon replied to the ambassador: "The moment the United States government is disposed to accept the aid of the Pope, Spain and her government will gladly accept his mediation," promising "further to accept the proposal that the holy father shall formulate a suspension of hostilities; informing his holiness that for the honor of Spain it is proper that the truce should be accompanied by the retirement of the American squadron from the waters of the Antilles, in order that the American republic may also show its purpose not to support-voluntarily or involuntarily— the insurrection in Cuba," a not surprising request in view of the proportions of the fleet now assembled at Key West.

Señor Gullon, calling at once upon the American minister, by a not unnatural error mentioned the offer of the Pope as made at the suggestion of President McKinley. He gave General Woodford to understand that his government would accede to the Pope's desire; but going so far, said General Woodford in telegraphing the inter1 Foreign Relations, 1898, 728. 2 Ibid., 731.

'Polo de Bernabé to minister of state, April 4, 1898, Spanish Cor. and Docs., 111.

*Señor Merry del Val to minister of state, April 2, 1898, Ibid., 109. 5 Telegram, April 3, 1898, Ibid., 110.

570 SPAIN OFFERS UNCONDITIONAL ARMISTICE [1898

view, "asks that the United States will show its friendship for Spain by withdrawing our war-ships from the vicinity of Cuba and from Key West as soon as the armistice has been proclaimed. That the Spanish government will continue this armistice so long as there are any reasonable hopes that permanent peace can be secured in Cuba. He asks your immediate answer as to withdrawal of warships at once after proclamation of armistice. I still believe that when armistice is once proclaimed hostilities will never be resumed and that permanent peace will be secured. If under existing conditions at Washington you can still do this, I hope that you will.

..

"The Austrian ambassador," he continued, "has heard me read this despatch and says he will guarantee that Spain will do this. I know that the queen and her present ministry sincerely desire peace and that the Spanish people desire peace, and if you can still give me time and reasonable liberty of action, I will get you the peace you desire so much and for which you have labored so hard." 1

The immediate reply to General Woodford from Washington was that "the President has made no suggestions to Spain except through you. He made no suggestions other than those which you were instructed to make for an armistice to be offered by Spain to negotiate a permanent peace between Spain and insurgents, and which Spain has already rejected. An armistice involves an agreement between Spain and insurgents which must be voluntary on the part of each, and if accepted by them would make for peace. The disposition of our fleet must be left to us. An armistice to be effective must be immediately proffered and accepted by insurgents. Would the peace you are so confident of securing mean the independence of Cuba? The President cannot hold his message longer than Tuesday."

On April 4 General Woodford was informed that "Congress may very possibly take decisive action [at] middle or end of this week," and was directed to notify consular officers to arrange to leave Spain in case of rupture of relations. He was also instructed the

1 Telegram, April 3, 1898, Foreign Relations, 1898, 732.

2 Mr. Day to General Woodford, April 3, 1898 (telegram), Ibid., 732. Foreign Relations, 1898, 733.

1898] QUEEN REGENT'S PROPOSED PROCLAMATION 571

next day, "In case of necessity intrust the legation to British embassy." 1

On April 5 General Woodford telegraphed the President: "Should the queen proclaim the following before 12 o'clock noon of Wednesday, April 6, will you sustain the queen, and can you prevent hostile action by Congress?

"'At the request of the holy father, in this passion week, and in the name of Christ, I proclaim immediate and unconditional suspension of hostilities in the island of Cuba.

" "This suspension is to become immediately effective so soon as accepted by the insurgents in that island, and is to continue for the space of six months, to the 5th of October, 1898.

""I do this to give time for passions to cease, and in the sincere hope and belief that during this suspension permanent and honorable peace may be obtained between the insular government of Cuba and those of my subjects in that island who are now in rebellion against the authority of Spain.

"I pray the blessing of Heaven upon this truce of God, which I now declare in His name and with the sanction of the holy father of all Christendom.'

"Please read this in the light of all my previous telegrams and letters. I believe this means peace, which the sober judgment of our people will approve long before next November, and which must be approved at the bar of final history.

"I permit the papal nuncio to read this telegram, upon my own responsibility and without committing you in any manner. I dare not reject this last chance for peace. I will show your reply to the queen in person, and I believe that you will approve this last conscientious offer for peace." "

1

1 Foreign Relations, 1898, 734.

2 Ibid., 734.

CHAPTER XXIX

SPAIN'S PRACTICAL ACCEPTANCE OF AMERICAN DEMANDS.-COLLECTIVE NOTE OF THE FOREIGN POWERS. THE PRESIDENT'S MES

SAGE. THE JOINT RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS. THE DECLARA

TION OF WAR

SPAIN had now practically accepted the American demands in full, unless Mr. Day's telegram of March 25, mentioning "full selfgovernment with reasonable indemnity," which his telegram of March 28 defined as meaning Cuban independence, and which was given as the basis on which the President would "assist in [the] consummation [of peace]," was to be considered a demand for immediate independence.' But the minister's message brought a telegram, sent at midnight of March 5, which he could hardly consider encouraging, and which apparently shows that the die was already considered cast. It said: "The President highly appreciates the Queen's desire for peace. He cannot assume to influence the action of the American Congress beyond a discharge of his constitutional duty in transmitting the whole matter to them with such recommendation as he deems necessary and expedient. The repose and welfare of the American people require restoration of peace and stable government in Cuba. If armistice is offered by the government of Spain the President will communicate that fact to Congress. The President's message will go to Congress tomorrow. It will recount the conditions in Cuba; the injurious effect upon our people; the character and conditions of the conflict, and the apparent hopelessness of the strife. He will not advise the recognition of the independence of the insurgents, but will recommend measures looking to the cessation of hostilities, the restora

This was communicated unofficially but never officially to the Spanish government.