nothing shall be done to impair the strength of the wall as a party wall. McMinn v. Karter (Ala.), 22 South. Rep. 517. A party wall, built by one of two adjoining owners, and resting partly on the ground of each, must be one that both parties can use, and have the right to use; and the owner of a lot who sells part of it, restricting, by condition in the deed, the height of the building to be erected thereon, cannot extend a party wall built between the two parts above such height for his own exclusive use, but, if extended, it must be built without openings, and the owner of the other part will have the right to use it, on proper payment, by adding to the height of his building. Fidelity Lodge No. 59, I. O. O. F., New Castle, v. Bond (Ind. Sup.), 45 N. E. Rep. 338. Under McClain's Code, sec. 3195, providing that, where a person builds a partition wall, the adjoining owner "may make it a wall in common by paying one-half of the appraised cost at the time of using it," the erection of a temporary shed, 10 feet high, and open on two sides, with one end of its batten roof resting on a 2x6 scantling, nailed to a two-story partition wall on the adjoining lot, is not such an appropriation of the wall as will charge the owner of the shed with contribution, or justify his grantee in assuming that such contribution has been paid, so as to entitle him to make permanent use of the partition wall without contributing to its cost. Beggs v. Duling (Iowa), 70 N. W. Rep. 732. Where one, in the erection of a new building on his land, demolishes an old party wall and erects a new one, and as a result his neighbor's building settles and is damaged, he is not liable for the damages unless it is shown affirmatively that the settling occurred through negligence or want of skill in the demolition and reconstruction of the wall. Levy v. Fenner (La.), 20 South. Rep. 895, 48 La. Ann. 1389. A sealed agreement under which a party wall was built by one of the parties provided that, when the other should build and use the wall, he should pay onehalf its cost; that it should be kept in repair at their joint expense; that, in all conveyances of the lots by either party, the wall should be reserved as a partition wall; and that these stipulations should bind their heirs, assigns, etc. Held, that these covenants ran with the land. Kimm v. Griffin (Minn.), 69 N. W. Rep. 634. Plaintiff, the owner of a lot, built on one part of it, and then conveyed the other part, making the middle line of the wall of the building the dividing line. He then conveyed the remaining lot to defendant, who subsequently purchased the first lot, the deed containing no reservation of the wall, or of the right to compensation. Held, that under Act April 10, 1849, providing that in all conveyances the right to compensation for the party wall shall be taken to have passed to the purchasers unless otherwise expressed, the right of plaintiff to compensation for the use of the wall passed to defendant. Voight v. Wallace (Pa. Sup.), 179 Pa. St. 520, 39 W. N. C. 443, 36 Atl. Rep. 315.

1. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.-Acceptance of a check of less than the amount of a liquidated debt, though the check state that it is in full, does not, in the absence of any other consideration, operate to discharge the balance of the debt.-MYERS V. GREEN, Ind., 51 N. E. Rep. 942.

2. ACCIDENT INSURANCE - Limitation of Agent's Authority.-A woman who purchased an accident ticket insuring her against loss of time is not bound by a limitation of the agent's authority, of which she had no notice, whereby he was authorized to insure women against death only.-TRAVELERS' INS. Co. OF HARTFORD V. EBERT, Ky., 47 8. W. Rep. 865.

3. APPEAL Abstract of Record.-Appellant's abstracts, in the absence of a counter abstract, must contain enough of the record to enable the court to pass on alleged errors, without going to the transcript for further information.-SNODDY V. JASPER CO., Mo., 47 S. W. Rep. 906.

4. APPEALS-Bill of Exceptions-Motion for New Trial. Where the motion for a new trial, which was overruled, is not preserved by the bill of exceptions, matters of exception not constituting a part of the record proper will not be noticed on appeal.-REYNOLDS v. CITIZENS' RY. Co., Mo., 47 S. W. Rep. 895.

5. APPEAL-Jurisdiction-Title to Realty.-An action of trespass to recover damages for cutting and remov ing trees from plaintiff's land, where the title to the land is a collateral issue, does not involve "the title to the real estate," within Const. art. 6, § 12, so as to give the supreme court jurisdiction of an appeal.-ROTHROCK V. CORDZ-FISHER LUMBER CO., Mo., 47 S. W. Rep. 907.

6. APPEAL-Jurisdiction-Title to Realty.-An action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance, and subject the land conveyed to the payment of a judgment, does not involve the title to real estate, so that a review of the judgment of the court of appeals may be had in the supreme court as a matter of right.-TIPTON V. MCCALLA, Kan., 54 Pac. Rep. 1055.

7. APPEAL-Review.-Where one creditor has a judg. ment lien on several properties of the judgment debtor, and others have liens, some on all the properties and others on a part only, a bill to marshal assets will lie. -ROWND V. STATE, Ind., 51 N. E. Rep. 914..

8. ASSIGNMENT Certificate of Deposit.-An assign. ment of a certificate of deposit transfers to the assignee whatever right or equity the assignor may have had in the fund thus represented, although such as. signor may not have had the full title to said certificate or the immediate right to the possession thereof.— FIRST NAT. BANK OF ATCHISON V. WATTLES, Kan., 54 Pac. Rep. 1103.

9. ASSUMPSIT-Action - Conversion.-Where posses. sion of property is obtained under contract between the parties, and the refusal to deliver amounts to a conversion, plaintiff can sue in trover for such conversion, or, waiving the tort, sue in assumpsit for its value.-NEWMAN V. OLNEY, Mich., 77 N. W. Rep. 9. 10. ATTACHMENT - Ratification of Levy.-If, in an attachment in which the goods of a stranger to the suit have been taken and sold under the writ, the plaintiff. with knowledge of the true ownership of said goods, receives the proceeds of the sale, it constitutes a rati, fication of the levy.-OMAHA NAT. BANK V. ROBINSON, Neb., 77 N. W. Rep. 73.

11. BAILMENT OR SALE.-A merchant was to sell goods on consignment during one month, on trial, and to account each week for goods sold, at prices desig. nated. At the end of the month he was to make final settlement, and receive a commission. He paid the transportation charges, and placed the goods in his store apart from his own, and the owner's tickets on the goods were not removed. Two payments from proceeds of goods sold were made to the owner, who credited them to the former's account, in which the goods were marked "Consigned," and entered the Balance due." No settlement was had nor commission paid before the goods were attached by a creditor of the consignee. The agreement was verbal. Held, that a bailment was created, and not a sale, though no limitation was placed on the price at which the consignee could sell.-HARRIS V. COE, Conn., 41 Atl. Rep. 552.

12. BANKS-Liability for Act of Officer-Collateral.-A bank is not liable to a company for proceeds of the company's note, made payable to one who was presi. dent of the bank and an officer of the company, though in negotiating it he used the bank's name, and though he deposited the proceeds in it; it having been to his own credit, and he having used the same.-CITY ELECTRIC ST. RY. Co. v. FIRST NAT. BANK, Ark., 47 S. W. Rep. 855.

13. BANKS AND BANKING — Notice-Knowledge of Offcers. Where a bank director and a cashier executed a note as makers, the director being in fact only a surety for the cashier, who obtained a loan on it from the bank, without any other bank official having knowl edge of the suretyship, the director was liable as principal, since knowledge to him and the cashier, in such case, was not knowledge to the bank.-FIRST NAT. BANK OF BRANDON V. BRIGGS' ASSIGNEES, V., 41 Atl. Rep. 580.

14. BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION - Change of Beneficiaries.-Though one assured by an ordinary life insurance policy has not the right, as a general rule, to change the beneficiary named in such policy, the beneficiary in an endowment certificate issued by a mutual benefit society has no vested right in the contract of insurance evidenced thereby, as such contract is between the society and the member to whom the certificate is issued, and not between the society and the

beneficiary named in the certificate; and, therefore, where there is no provision in the statute under which the society is organized, or in the charter or by-laws of such society, or in the certificate itself, either expressly providing for or prohibiting a change of the beneficiary, the power to make such change is vested in the member during his lifetime, by reason of the character and purposes of such society.-DELANEY V. DELANEY, Ill., 51 N. E. Rep. 962.

15. BILLS AND NOTES-Collateral Security-Pre-existing Debt. The holder of a negotiable note acquired before maturity as collateral security for a pre-existing debt will be protected as an innocent holder unless he had notice, when he acquired it, of equities existing between the maker and payee.-ALEXANDER V. BANK OF LEBANON, Tex., 47 8. W. Rep. 840.

16. BILLS AND NOTES-Conditions-Parol Evidence.Parol evidence is not admissible to show that an agreement to pay, contained in a note, was a conditional, and not an absolute, promise.-TRUMBULL V. O'HARA, Conn., 41 Atl. Rep. 546.

17. BILLS AND NOTES · Execution Ratification.Where notes purport to have been executed by a firm, their execution is ratified by a written acknowledg. ment of the firm of indebtedness to the holder, reciting that it is evidenced by notes executed by the firm then overdue, the notes being the only ones so held, notwithstanding three of them were not due until a few days after the acknowledgment.-RICHARDS V. JEFFERSON, Wash., 54 Pac. Rep. 1123.

18. BILLS AND NOTES - Note Secured by Mortgage.The holder of a note which is secured by a mortgage may maintain an action at law on the note, where neither note nor mortgage contains stipulations making the mortgaged property primarily liable for the debt.-GRABLE V. BEATTY, Neb., 77 N. W. Rep. 49.

20. BILLS AND NOTES Sureties on Note Release.Where a creditor, by promissory note signed by three persons, two of whom were sureties, having as further security for his debt a mortgage upon personal prop. erty, takes charge of such personalty, the same being sufficient in value to discharge the debt, and fails to appropriate it to the payment of the note, the sureties will be discharged from liability thereon. Especially is this true when the inducement held out to the sureties to undertake the obligation was a statement by the creditor that he had a mortgage upon personalty as additional security.-BARRETT V. BASS, Ga., 31 S. E. Rep. 435.

21. BILLS AND NOTES-Transfer-Payment to Original Payee.-A debtor is chargeable with notice of the transfer by his creditor of a negotiable instrument on which he is maker, and thereafter he cannot safely pay the original creditor, although he is ignorant of such transfer.-HOLLINSHEAD V. JOHN STUART & CO., N. Dak., 77 N. W. Rep. 89.

22. BUILDING ASSOCIATIONS Contracts What Law Governs.-A by-law of a building association located in New York required all payments to be made to its secretary, at its principal office. Held, that a member residing in Virginia must be considered as having contracted with reference to such by-law, which made his contract performable in New York.PEOPLE'S BUILDING, LOAN & SAVINGS ASSN. V. TINSLEY, Va., 31 S. E. Rep. 509.

23. BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS-Loans.-Where a special contract with an agent of a building and loan association is relied on as a defense to an action to foreclose a mortgage given to such association, it must be pleaded.-INTERSTATE SAVINGS & LOAN ASSN. V. KNAPP, Wash., 55 Pac. Rep. 48.

24. CARRIERS-Passengers-Negligence.-A stockman traveling with the consent of the railroad company on a freight train, in charge of stock carried by the company for him, is a passenger.-CHICAGO & A. R. Co. v. WINTERS, Ill., 51 N. E. Rep. 901.

25. CARRIERS-Package Sent in Care of Third Person. -An express package was directed to one person "in care of" another, and the latter declined it. The addressee demanded it of the express company, which refused, although it knew he was the person addressed. The company had no claim on it. Held, that the addressee could maintain replevin for the package, since the one in whose care it was sent had no interest in it.- UNITED STATES EXP. Co. v. HAMMER, Ind., 51 N. E. Rep. 953.

26. CARRIERS-Passengers-Damages.-Where a pas. senger notifies the conductor that she wishes to alight, and the car slows up on nearing the place, but starts suddenly when she is preparing to alight, she may recover for injuries resulting from being thrown to the ground by the jerk.-SPRINGFIELD CONSOL. RY. Co. v. HOEFFNER, Ill., 51 N. E. Rep. 884.

27. CARRIERS OF GOODS.-Where a railroad company agreed, in consideration of a consignor's routeing freight by its line, to furnish through refrigerator cars for transportation of perishable products, the agreement is not superseded by a bill of lading given by a connecting carrier at the original point of shipment, whereby liability was lessened, the contracts being independent of each other.-ST. LOUIS & S. W. RY. Co. v. ELGIN CONDENSED MILK Co., Ill., 51 N. E. Rep. 911.

28. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS-Expulsion of Passenger. In an action by a passenger for ejecting him from a train, an instruction that if the conductor refused his ticket, and demanded a different ticket or fare, and ejected the passenger for non-compliance, the expul. sion was unlawful, unless the passenger was guilty of such misconduct as to justify the expulsion, was erroneous, where it ignored the company's evidence, which, if true, showed a good defense; and this though the point was covered in a charge for defendant.BALTIMORE, C. & A. RY. Co. v. KIRBY, Md., 41 Atl. Rep.

777.

29. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS-Street Railways-Neg. ligence. A street railway company is liable to a pas senger who, without any contributory negligence, following the invitation and direction of the motorman, leaves the car from the front door, on a dark night, and where the ground was broken, and, after taking a few steps, catches her feet in some way, and falls.30WASH V. CONSOLIDATED TRACTION Co., Penn., 41 Atl. Rep. 743.

30. CHATTEL MORTGAGE-Mortgagor in PossessionValidity. Where a mortgage on a stock of goods, by its conditions, permits the mortgagor to remain in possession and sell the mortgaged property in the usual course of trade, and it is not controlled by statutory regulation, and the rights reserved show that it is intended as a shield to the mortgagor, and it operates as a fraud upon the rights of creditors, the mortgage is void in law. MCKIBBON V. BRIGHAM, Utah, 55 Pac. Rep. 66.

31. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Indeterminate Sentence.Act March 8, 1897, known as the "Indeterminate Sentence Law," is not unconstitutional, as an ex post facto law, in being applied to a sentence on conviction of a crime committed before its passage, since such a sentence does not add to or increase the punishment beyond that existing when the crime was committed.DAVIS V. STATE, Ind., 51 N. E. Rep. 928.

32. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Taking" Private Property-Municipal Corporations.-Changing the grade of a street after it had been once established, and buildings erected with reference thereto, is not "a taking" of property, within Const. art. 1, § 23, providing that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation being first made theretor." -GARRAUX V. CITY COUNCIL OF GREENVILLE, S. Car., 31 S. E. Rep. 597.

33. CONTRACT-Parol Evidence.-Where negotiations take place between parties which result in their reaching an agreement in reference to the subject-matter of the negotiations, and the parties subsequently reduce their agreement to writing, and sign and deliver the same, then, in the absence of fraud or mistake, or an ambiguity in the writing, it constitutes the best and the only competent evidence of the contract originally made.-STATE BANK OF CERESCO V. BELK, Neb., 77 N. W. Rep. 58.

34. CONTRACT Consideration.-The relinquishment of a timber-culture entry, which carries with it certain valuable improvements, made for the benefit of another person, and that he might file a homestead entry thereon, all under mutual agreement, is a sufficient consideration for the latter's promise that the former might crop the land.-PEOPLES V. EVENS, N. Dak., 77 N. W. Rep. 93.

35. CONTRACT-Parol Evidence-Damages.-While a written contract, within the statute of frauds, cannot, so long as it remains executory, be altered orally, so as to bind the parties, as a part of the contract, yet evidence is admissible to prove an oral waiver of performance according to the terms of the contract as a ground of forfeiture, as, for example, by orally agree. ing to extend the time of payment.-SCHEERSCHMIDT V. SMITH, Minn., 77 N. W. Rep. 34.

36. CONTRACT-Variation of Contract by Parol.-J agreed, in writing, to furnish B certain specified work and materials for a fixed sum, and in so doing to as sume certain contracts for materials previously ordered from dealers. Held, in a suit by J to recover under such agreement, that it was not competent to prove a contemporaneous oral agreement that the amount of the contracts assumed should be the limit of cost of materials to J, and that B should make good any excess of actual cost.-BANDHOLZ V. JUDGE, N. J., 41 Atl. Rep. 723.

37. CONTRACT PROCURED BY FRAUD. A contract which a party is induced by a false representation to sign without reading, and without a knowledge of its contents, is void, although he might have discovered the fraud by reading it.-ALEXANDER V. BROGLEY, N. J., 41 Atl. Rep. 691.

38. CONTRIBUTION—Assignment-Account.-Payment of bond by one of the two obligors gives him a right of contribution to the extent of the other's primary obligation.-PULLY V. PASS, N. Car., 31 S. E. Rep. 478.

39. CONVERSION-Title to Property.-Where judgment is obtained for conversion of property, satisfaction thereof vests title to the property in defendant as of the time when the conversion occurred.-GREER V. LAFAYETTE COUNTY BANK, Tex., 47 S. W. Rep. 737.

40. CORPORATIONS-Assignment of Insurance Policies -Preference.-When a corporation assigns certain policies of insurance to its banker, in satisfaction of various items of indebtedness, and in preference to other creditors, in the absence of statutory restric tions and insolvent laws, unless there is express proof of fraud, participated in by the assignee, the assignment will be upheld.-BURNHAM, HANNA, MUNGER & CO. V. MCCORNICK, Utah, 55 Pac. Rep. 77.

41. CORPORATIONS Consolidation.-A corporation formed by the uniting of two or more corporations is to be considered a consolidation, as regards the filing of articles of agreement, though it takes the name of one of the constituent corporations.-CHICAGO & E. I. R. Co. v. STATE, Ind., 51 N. E. Rep. 924.

42. CORPORATIONS-Dividend-Transfer of Stock.-A dividend on corporate stock declared after the right to the income has been severed from the ultimate ownership of the stock belongs to the person entitled to the income so far, and only so far, as it is derived from the earnings of the stock after such severance.-LANG V. LANG'S EXER., N. J., 41 Atl. Rep. 705.

43. CORPORATIONS- Issuance of Stock-Statute Requiring Full Payment.-The effect of the statutes of Virginia relating to stock in corporations, in providing

that shares shall not be sold to subscribers for less than their par value, is simply to render any agree. ment between the corporation and the stockholder ineffective to relieve the latter from full accountability, to the extent of the par value of his stock, in favor of creditors of the corporations.-BARCUS V. GATES, U. S. C. C. of App., Fourth Circuit, 89 Fed. Rep. 783.

44. CORPORATIONS-Judgment-Principal and Surety. -Where a bank, as plaintiff, obtains judgment for the sole purpose of collecting a debt due from one defendant, its right to so proceed is not impaired by the consideration that another defend nt, sustaining the relation of surety to the first, will be released by such enforcement by the bank of its right to receive pay. ment.-SOLOMON V. C. M. SCHNEIDER & Co., Neb., 77 N. W. Rep. 65.

46. CORPORATIONS

Membership-Evidence.-In proceedings instituted by a creditor of a corporation to charge another person with liability as one of the cor porate shareholders, the books of the corporation, other than the stock subscription book, if unsupported by other evidence, are inadmissible to prove membership in the company.-HINSDALE SAV. BANK V. NEW HAMPSHIRE BANKING CO., Kan., 54 Pac. Rep. 1051. 47. CORPORATIONS Mortgages-Judgments.-Under Code, § 1255, providing that mortgages of corporations shall not exempt property or earnings from any judg ment for torts committed by the corporation, a purchaser at foreclosure sale takes subject to a judgment against the corporation for a tort committed after the making of the mortgage, notwithstanding the judg. ment was obtained subsequent to the sale.-WILMING TON & W. R. Co. v. BURNETT, N. Car., 31 S. E. Rep. 602. 48. CORPORATIONS-Promoter's Liability.-Where one formed a company for the purpose of purchasing land on which he had previously procured a personal option and acted for it in making the purchase, concealing from the subscribers and directors that he had purchased the land at a much less sum than that at which he sold it to the company, he is liable to the company for the profits of the sale thus made to it.-EXTER V. SAWYER, Mo., 47 S. W. Rep. 951.

49. CORPORATIONS-Street Railroad-Implied Powers. -From the naked power to construct a street railroad no authority can be derived to construct a freight belt railroad in and around a city, solely to transfer freight cars to and from factories and other railroads.-SOUTH & N. A. R. Co. v. HIGHLAND AVE. & B. R. Co., Ala., 24 South. Rep. 114.

50. COUNTIES-Indebtedness-Power of Legislature.Counties have no authority to incur indebtedness bearing interest, or to issue interest-bearing warrants, without express legislative authority.-Daggett v. LYNCH, Utah, 54 Pac. Rep. 1095.

51. COVENANTS-Breach - Incumbrances.-An unrestricted covenant against incumbrances contained in a deed for the conveyance of lands is broken by the existence of an outstanding term in the lands, and an action for such a breach of the covenant may be maintained notwithstanding the existence of the outstanding term was known to the grantee when he accepted the conveyance.-DEMARS V. KOEHLER, N. J., 41 Atl. Rep. 720.

52. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-Gaming.-A servant charged with participating in the keeping of his master's disorderly house may put in evidence representations made to him by his master respecting the nat re of the business carried on by the master in the house, by which representations the servant claims he was led to believe that the business was lawful.-STATE V. ACKERMAN, N. J., 41 Atl. Rep. 697.

53. CRIMINAL LAW-Arson-Evidence.-An allegation in an indictment for arson that a barn was within the curtilage of the dwelling house of a person named is satisfied by proof that it was within the curtilage of a dwelling house owned by her and occupied by a tenant.-COMMONWEALTH V. ELDER, Mass., 51 N. E. Rep. 975. 54. CRIMINAL LAW - Arson Possession of Stolen Goods. When, in the trial of a criminal case, the Staterelies upon the possession of stolen goods by the ac cused as a circumstance tending to show guilt, the time which elapsed between the commission of the offense charged and such possession is a material matter for consideration by the jury; and, in charging upon this subject, reference to the element of recency should never be omitted by the presiding judge. - SHARPE V. STATE, Ga., 31 S. E. Rep. 541.

55. CRIMINAL LAW Embezzlement by Bailee.-Upon the trial of an indictment for the fraudulent taking and converting of money intrusted to an agent, it is legitimate for the defendant to prove that the fund was drawn and misappropriated, without his knowledge or consent, by another person, to whose control he had subjected it.-BURNETT V. STATE, N. J., 41 Atl. Rep. 719. 56. CRIMINAL LAW - Evidence of Co-conspirators.Every act and declaration of each member of a conspiracy to commit crime, in pursuance of the original concerted plan, and with reference to the common object, done or made during the pendency of the criminal enterprise, is, in contemplation of law, the act and declaration of them all, and is therefore original evidence against each of them.-MERCER V. STATE, Fla., 24 South. Rep. 154.

57. CRIMINAL LAW - Forgery.-An indictment for forgery, charging defendant with "selling and delivering," with intent to defraud, a forged deed of trust, with intent to have the same uttered and passed, knowing the deed to be forged, is good, under Rev. St. 1889, § 3646, prohibiting the "passing, uttering or publishing" of forged paper.-STATE V. MILLS, Mo., 47 S. W. Rep. 938. 58. CRIMINAL LAW-Homicide-Duty to Retreat.-The well settled rule is that where a party is himself at fault, and provokes the difficulty, he cannot justify killing his adversary in the affray that he himself has brought about, unless he in good faith withdraws from the combat in such manner as to show his adversary his intention in good faith to desist.-PADGETT V. STATE, Fla., 24 South. Rep. 145.

59. CRIMINAL LAW - Homicide-Intentional Act.-Deceased and accused (acquaintances, without previous ill feeling) got into a fist fight over a scarecrow placed by the deceased and others, for a joke, at the roadside, along which accused passed shortly thereafter. It was dark, and in the fight accused stabbed deceased with a knife. Held, that the stabbing was not intentional, so as to justify an instruction as to murder in the second degree.-STATE V. BOWLES, Mo., 47 S. W. Rep. 892.

a

60. CRIMINAL LAW- Homicide Self-defense.-In prosecution for murder, where the plea was self-defense, there was evidence that, at the time defendant shot deceased, he was being pursued by him and an angry crowd, one of which had an open knife in his hand, another à pistol, and another bricks. Held, that an instruction that the jury must acquit if defendant had reasonable cause to believe "deceased" was about to kill him was too narrow, since defendant, if he believed any of the crowd were about to kill him, had the right to shoot and kill any of them.-STATE V. ADLER, Mo., 47 S. W. Rep. 794. 61. CRIMINAL LAW

Indictment-Assault with Intent to Kill.-Under Code Proc. § 1320, providing that a defendant may be found guilty of any offense necessarily included within the crime charged, the crime of assault and battery is necessarily included in that of assault with intent to commit murder, and hence an information charging the latter offense does not charge more than one offense, though it also charges assault. -STATE V. MICHEL, Wash., 54 Pac. Rep. 995.

64. CRIMINAL LAW-Larceny Evidence. Where a purchaser of goods delivers to the seller a bill of money exceeding in amount the price of the goods, intending that the seller shall return the proper change, and the latter accepts the bill for this purpose, but, instead of returning the correct change, appropriates to his own use, fraudulently and with intent to steal the same, the bill so received, he is guilty of simple larceny.FINKELSTEIN V. STATE, Ga., 31 S. E. Rep. 589.

65. CRIMINAL LAW-Larceny-Venue.-Where a thief stealing a steer transports it into another county, the venue of the theft is properly laid in the latter county, as each transportation of stolen property from one county to another is a fresh theft.-STATE V. WILLIAMS, Mo., 47 S. W. Rep. 891.

67. CRIMINAL LAW-Rape

Capacity to Commit.-A boy under 14 years of age is conclusively presumed to be incapable of committing either rape or an attempt to commit rape.-FOSTER V. COMMONWEALTH, Va., 31 S. E. Rep. 503.

68. DEBTOR and CreditoR-Order on Debtor-Acceptance.-An order by a creditor, in favor of a third person, on the debtor to pay to the third person a portion of an entire debt, is inoperative in law, if without the acceptance or consent of the debtor.-HOPKINS WASHINGTON COUNTY, Neb., 77 N. W. Rep. 53.

V.

69. DEED-Cancellation-Fraud.-The allegations in the petition and the amendments were sufficient to make out a case of fraud, authorizing the rescission of the contract and the cancellation of the deed and mortgage upon plaintiff's property; and the court, therefore, erred in sustaining the demurrer to the peti tion as amended.-CASEY V. HOWARD, Ga., 31 S. E. Rep. 427.

70. DEED-Cancellation-Fraud.-An aunt bought a farm, and had her nephew made the grantee in the deed. At her agent's request, she exacted a mortgage from her nephew for the price. He testified that he executed the mortgage on her agreement to release it as soon as her agent was gone, and that she afterwards executed a release, after reading it over. She testified that she did not read the release when she signed it, and that she supposed she was signing a note, which her nephew brought to her and requested her to sign. A year after she knew that she had executed the release she requested him to say nothing about his farm to other relatives, as she did not want them to know that she had helped him. Held, that she was not entitled to a cancellation of the release.-SHAFFER V. COWDEN, Md., 41 Atl. Rep. 786.

71. DEED-Correction of Mistake.-In an action to correct a mistake in a deed, declarations of the grantor, since deceased, made before and after the making of the deed, as to how he intended to make it, are not admissible in evidence, being made in the ab

sence of the grantee, and not at the time when the deed was written or acknowledged.-GISH V. NOLEN, Ky., 47 S. W. Rep. 757. 72. DEED - Delivery

Acknowledgment.-Grantor's

leaving a deed with the officer to take his wife's acknowledgment is not a delivery, if there was no instruction to deliver.-PERKINS V. THOMPSON, N. Car., 31 S. E. Rep. 387.

73. DEED-Delivery-Estoppel.-The presumption of the delivery of a deed which arises from the fact that it has been recorded is not conclusive, and, between the parties to the instrument, may be rebutted; yet when it appears that such deed was duly recorded at the instance of the grantor, and then delivered to a third person as an escrow, the grantor may, as to third persons who purchase for value on the face of the record, and without knowledge or notice of non-delivery to the grantee, be estopped from denying delivery.EQUITABLE MORTG. Co. v. BUTLER, Ga., 31 S. E. Rep.

396.

74. DEED-Signature Procured by False Representation.-One of several grantors in a deed is not liable on a warranty therein, where his signature and acknowledgment to the deed were procured by the false representation of the deputy clerk, as grantee's agent, that it was only a quitclaim deed.-SIBLEY V. HOLCOMB, Ky., 47 S. W. Rep. 765.

75. DIVORCE-Attorney's Fees of Wife.-A husband is liable for reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the wife in the prosecution of a bona fide suit for divorce, based on justifiable grounds, where the wife has no separate property, and the suit was dismissed through the collusion of the husband and wife, without the knowledge of her attorney.-CECCATO V. DEUTSCHMAN, Tex., 47 S. W. Rep. 739.

76. DOWER-Adverse Possession. - Where land is in the possession of one holding under a widow's dower right therein, which has never been set off to her, limitations do not run in favor of the occupant as against the widow until dower is assigned or the widow dies.OSBORN V. WELDON, Mo., 47 S. W. Rep. 936.

77. EJECTMENT-Adverse Possession.-A party conveyed land to his four sons, his wife not joining. After his death two surviving sons conveyed part of the land to the widow for life, remainder to her children, in lieu of dower, but the deed was defectively acknowledged. The widow held possession for over 10 years. After her death her heirs brought action to recover their interest. Held, that the possession of the widow, she having only a life estate, did not cast on her heirs such title by adverse possession as they could enforce in ejectment against the legal title.-CAPERTON V. HALL, Ala., 24 South. Rep. 122.

78. EJECTMENT-Right of Way.-When the owner contracts with a railroad company to sell to it a right of way over his land, receives a part of the purchase money in cash, and takes promissory notes for the balance, reserving title to himself until the same are paid, and consents to the placing on the land of railroad track, etc., as a part of a continuous line, an action of ejectment cannot thereafter be maintained by such owner to dispossess the company of the right of way so procured.-ATLANTA, K. & N. RY. Co. v. BARKER, Ga., 31 S. E. Rep. 452.

79. EQUITY-Substitution of Parties-Assignment of Interest. The assignee of a claim for damages for the infringement of a trade-mark pending a suit by the assignor against the infringer, in which an injunction has been granted and a decree entered for an accounting, may have the benefit of the prior litigation, and be substituted as complainant in the existing suit, by filing an original bill therein in the nature of a supplemental bill.-WALTER BAKER & CO. v. BAKER, U. s. C. C., W. D (Va.), 89 Fed. Rep. 673.

80. ESTOPPEL BY DEED.-Where a person holding part of a headright survey under a deed of doubtful validity because of an indefinite description obtained a deed of a definite portion of the survey from the