street. All other streets running in the same direction were left open on the east by the platter, to connect with streets of additions likely to be made, in which event the triangle would be necessary. The town, by resolution, opened up for traffic such street for its full length, and worked a portion thereof. Held, that such triangular strip was dedicated to and accepted by the town, and was within the street.-MCHUGH V. TOWN OF MINOCQUA, Wis., 78 N. W. Rep. 478. 76. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Powers of Council.Where a municipal corporation formally declares that an executed contract for a local improvement has been abandoned, and refuses to levy an assessment to raise money to pay the price, the contractor may sue therefor, though the contract provides that no payment shall be made until the cost is collected by assessment.-WESTON V. CITY OF SYRACUSE, N. Y., 53 N. E. Rep. 12.

77. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Sewers-Assessments. -An ordinance providing for the construction of a sewer does not, by authorizing property owners within the district assessed for its construction to make connections therewith, the right to regulate the manner of making such connections being reserved to the town, grant away the municipality's police power.GRAY V. TOWN OF CICERO, Ill., 53 N. E. Rep. 91.

78. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Streets-Obstructions. -The authority of a railroad company to construct its road across a street, with the assent of the municipal authorities, does not entitle it to obstruct a street with abutments or piers, in support of its structure, to the great inconvenience of the public.-DELAWARE, L. & W. R. Co. v. CITY OF BUFFALO, N. Y., 53 N. E. Rep. 44. 79. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Street Sprinkling-Assessments.-St. 1897, ch. 419, § 2, requiring assessments for street sprinkling to be in proportion to the foot frontage of each estate on the street watered, does not provide for a tax, as to improved property, so in excess of the benefit received as to be a taking of property without compensation, in violation of Const. U. S. Amend. 14, as not due process of law.-SEARS V. BOARD OF ALDERMAN OF CITY OF BOSTON, Mass., 53 N. E. Rep. 138.

80. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Violation of Ordinance. Where a person accused of violating a village ordinance has been arrested, brought before the vil lage mayor, the case adjourned for trial to a certain hour of a future day, and the accused, after giving bail for his appearance for trial at the time fixed, is liberated, and fails to appear at the hour fixed for his trial, such mayor is without jurisdiction to proceed with the trial until the accused appears; and should the mayor, in the absence of the accused, proceed to try, convict, and sentence him, such conviction and sentence will be void.-TRUMAN V. WALTON, Ohio, 53 N. E. Rep. 57.

81. MUNICIPAL IMPROVEMENTS-Benefits.-In proceed. ings to determine the question of benefit to certain property derived from the improvement of a street, evidence that the improvement has already been paid for by the commissioners in charge of the improvement is inadmissible.-SWEET V. WEST CHICAGO PARK COMMRS., Ill., 53 N. E. Rep. 74.

82. NEGLIGENCE-Dangerous Premises.-An owner of a building gave permission to certain parties to use certain rooms in the building until such time as repairs should be begun in the building. After the repairs were commenced, such persons continued to use the rooms. Held, that a third party, attempting to use the rooms after the repairs were begun, on the invitation of the licensee, and injured because of the dangerous condition of the passageway because of the repairs, could not recover from the owner of the building.BREHMER V. LYMAN, Vt., 42 Atl. Rep. 613.

83. PARTNERSHIP Termination.-Where a partner notifies his partner in writing that he will not pay another dollar into the firm, and that, if such other partner cannot carry on the business with the then capital, and will not put in any more, he had better wind it up, it terminates the partnership, except in so

far as was necessary to wind up the business.-AVERY V. CRAIG, Mass., 53 N. E. Rep. 153.

84. PLEADING-Partnership.-Where parties are sued jointly, and are described as doing business under a firm name, it is error to exclude evidence of one that he was not a partner of the other at the time of the transaction in suit, though such partnership is not put in issue by a special plea.-MCKISSACK V. WITZ, Ala., 25 South. Rep. 21. 85. PLEDGES Conversion.-A pledgee of chattels, who converts them, is liable to the owner for only the excess of their value over his lien.-FARRAR V. PAINE, Mass., 53 N. E. Rep. 146.

86. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Sureties-Application of Funds. Where a dealer borrowed sums from different persons to buy cattle with which to fulfill contracts for the delivery of cattle, a surety on one of the loans, who had also personally advanced money to the dealer for the same purpose, and who received the proceeds of the cattle contracts, might apply such proceeds to his individual loan, and was not bound, as against a cosurety, who afterwards renewed the suretyship with knowledge of the facts, to distribute such proceeds ratably among all the lenders, both the sureties being also sureties on the cattle contracts.-SANDERS V. WETTERMARK, Tex., 49 S. W. Rep. 900.

87. PROCESS Execution.-An officer charged with the execution of process must do so unless it is void on its face, or the court issuing it is without jurisdiction; but he is not bound to inquire into the regularity of the proceedings prior to its issuance.-SPEAR V. STATE, Ala., 25 South. Rep. 46.

88. RAILROAD COMPANY-Condemnation of Land.-In a condemnation of real estate for railroad purposes, the de jure existence of the company cannot be deter. mined, since whether or not it has a legal existence can only be inquired into in a direct proceeding.-MORRISON V. FORMAN, Ill., 53 N. E. Rep. 73.

90. RAILROAD COMPANY-Mortgage — Subsequent Extension of Line.-A mortgage by a railroad company of "the railway, rails, bridges, and real estate belong. ing to or held by said company," and "all the tolls, incomes, issues, and profits to accrue from the same or any part thereof," does not cover an after-acquired line or extension of the road, as it is, in terms, limited to that then owned by the mortgagor, and the income mortgaged is also limited to that accruing "from the same."-LOUISVILLE TRUST Co. v. CINCINNATI INCLINED PLANE RY. CO., U. S. C. C., S. D. (Ohio), 91 Fed. Rep. 699.

91. RAILROAD COMPANY Negligence.-It is negli. gence for a railroad company, in digging a trench along its track near a crossing, to throw a pile of dirt into the highway, so as to frighten horses thereon.PARKS V. SOUTHERN RY. Co., N. Car., 32 S. E. Rep. 387. 92. RAILROAD COMPANY-Negligence Contributory Negligence.-Though train employees do not intend to run cars into a street crossing, and the cars do not in fact reach the street, so that no crossing signals are necessary, yet the cars may be put in motion so near the street in a manner and under circumstances that would be negligence as to travelers thereon.-SAN ANTONIO & A. P. RY. Co. v. PETERSON, Tex., 49 S. W. Rep. 924.

93. RAILROAD COMPANY — Right of Mortgagee-Road. -Neither the mortgagee of a railroad property nor the purchaser at sale under the mortgage is entitled to enforce the covenants of a lease made by the mortgagor after the execution of the mortgage, binding the lessee to make good all depreciation of the property from wear or otherwise during the term of the lease, when the depreciation was such as would or might have fol. lowed the use of the property by the mortgagor, and

would not have constituted waste, which could have been restrained or recovered for by the mortgagee. GRAND TRUNK RY. Co. v. CENTRAL VT. R. Co., U. S. C. C., D. (Vt.), 91 Fed. Rep. 696.

94. RAILROAD COMPANY - Street Railways Negli. gence. In the absence of any other adequate explanation, negligence of a street car company may be inferred from the going off the track of a car, injuring a passenger, there being evidence that it had gone off the track an hour before, and that immediately before it again ran off, causing plaintiff's Injury, it was run. ning at the rate of 15 miles an hour, down a grade, and around a curve.-HARRIMAN V. READING & L. ST. RY. Co., Mass., 53 N. E. Rep. 156.

95. REAL ESTATE BROKER Commission.-Under a real estate broker's contract to find a purchaser it is not essential, to his earning commissions, that he literally bring the vendor and vendee together, or that he even inform the vendor of the identity of the proposed purchaser. It is sufficient if, by his influence on the mind of the vendee, he be the efficient cause of the two assuming the regulations of vendor and vendee.HAMBLETON V. FORT, Neb., 78 N. W. Rep. 498. 95. RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES - Evidence-Ecclesiastical Government.-The ecclesiastical government of Bap. tist churches is purely congregational, each church being a sovereignty, and the councils being advisory merely; and hence a resolution by a council that no person believing in Martinism should be recognized, and that the council was the only competent authority to determine its membership, and the action of a Bap tist association and a general convention in recogniz. ing a dissenting minority of a particular congregation as the true Baptist church, was conclusive on the majority only as to who should be recognized as members of such councils, but not as to which branch of a divided church was the true one.-JARRELL V. SPROLES, Tex., 49 S. W. Rep. 904.

97. REPLEVIN BOND Evidence.-Evidence that defendant in replevin was not the owner of the horse replevied is admissible on the question of the amount for which he should have execution, in an action by him for breach of condition of the replevin bond in failing to enter the replevin writ.-EASTER V. FOSTER, Mass., 53 N. E. Rep. 132.

98. RES JUDICATA — Conclusiveness.-A decree foreclosing a vendor's lien, and adjudging the title and right of possession to be in the vendor, is conclusive against the assignee of a subsequent mortgagee, who was not made a party but who employed attorneys to represent his interest.-BOMAR V. FT. WORTH BLDG. ASSN., Tex., 49 S. W. Rep. 914.

99. SET-OFF — Pleading.-A plea of set-off, alleging that at the time suit was commenced plaintiff was indebted to defendant in a certain sum, by liquidated or by unliquidated demand, as the case may be, amounting to said sum, to wit, a certain date, and due at that date to defendant, is not objectionable as failing to show what the demand is, or when it was due.-FINNEY V. DENNY, Ala., 25 South. Rep. 45.

100. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.-Even when time is made of the essence of a contract, the failure of a party to comply with a condition within the particular time limited will not work a forfeiture nor defeat the right to enforce specific performance, where such condition is complied with within a reasonable time, and no cir. camstances have intervened to render it unjust or inequitable to grant such relief, but, on the contrary, it would be inequitable to withhold it.-CAMP MFG. CO. V. PARKER, U. s. C. C. of App., Fourth Circuit, 91 Fed. Rep. 705.

101. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-Laches.-Mere lapse of time before resort to a court of equity to compel an assignment of a part interest in a patent to which a complaint is equitably entitled, will not necessarily bar a decree for such relief; but if the delay be great, and the circumstances such as to make it inequitable to permit an account of profits to be demanded, an assignment will be decreed only on terms that an ac

counting be denied.-HARRIGAN V. SMITH, N. J., 42 Atl. Rep. 579.

102. TAXATION-Assessment.-A petition to restrain the collection of a tax because based on a fraudulent overvaluation of the assessor, which alleges merely that the assessment was never by the assessor presented to the board of equalization, or passed on directly by such board, does not show that the board did not approve the assessment complained of.-CLAWSON LUMBER CO. v. JONES, Tex., 49 S. W. Rep. 909.

103. TAXATION-Exemptions Library Buildings.-A library building leased for a term of years by the library association, on condition that the lessee should keep a public reading room similar to one formerly kept by the association on one floor of the two-story building, is not real estate occupied by a library association "solely" for library purposes, within Pub. Acts 1893, No. 206, § 7, subd. 4, so as to be exempt from taxa. tion.-IN RE WOMEN'S TEMPERANCE ASSN. OF MANISTEE, Mich., 78 N. W. Rep. 466.

104. TAXATION-Legality-Recovery of Payments.The statutes provide two methods of recovering back illegal taxes paid under protest. When the tax is imposed on land not subject thereto, or which has been. twice assessed for the same year, the person paying the tax must present a claim to the county board; and, if it be not allowed, he must, if he wishes further to contest, appeal to the district court; but if the tax be levied for an illegal or unauthorized purpose, or if the tax be bad for any other cause not falling within the first class, he may maintain an original action therefor. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Nemaha Co., 69 N. W. Rep. 958, 50 Neb. 393, followed.-CHASE COUNTY V. CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. Co., Neb., 78 N. W. Rep. 502.

105. TRADE-NAME-Injunction. Where a manufacturer of watches in the city of Waltham had acquired a great reputation, and had used the word "Waltham" originally in a mere geographical sense in connection with his watches, but such word had, by long use, come to have a secondary meaning, as a designation of the watches which the public had been accustomed to associate with the name, another person beginning the manufacture of watches a long time thereafter would be enjoined against using the words "Waltham" or "Waltham, Mass.," upon plates of its watches, without some statement distinguishing them from watches made by plaintiff.—AM. WALTHAM WATCH Co. V. U. S. WATCH CO., Mass., 53 N. E. Rep. 141. 106. TROVER-Defenses. Defendants in trover for stock cannot show that an assignment of the stock to plaintiff was fraudulent; it being before plaintiff delivered it to one of the defendants, and before suit by one of the defendants against the assignor, in which the stock was attached.-HINE V. COMMERCIAL BANK OF BAY CITY, Mich., 78 N. W. Rep. 471.

107. TRUSTS-Bank Deposits.-To prevent competi tion in securing a deposit of municipal funds, a banker agreed with two other banks that, in consideration of their offering a lower rate of interest than he, the deposit should be equally distributed between the three, and that he would not withdraw any of it from them except to pay drafts on him by the municipality. He also agreed with the sureties on his indemnity bond to the city to make such deposits in said banks to secure them. Held, that the city was entitled to funds deposited in the banks pursuant to the agreement with them and with the sureties, as against the banker's assignee for the benefit of creditors, since they were held by the banks in trust for it.-CITY OF MARQUETTE V. WILKINSON, Mich., 78 N. W. Rep. 474.

to the certificates of deposit. The trustee mailed a receipt of the collaterals deposited to the bank, stating that they were deposited to secure such certificates. The time when this receipt was delivered to the depositor did not appear, but it was found among his papers after his death, and he had knowledge of the deposit prior to his death. Held, in an action against the trustee for surrendering the securities without authority, that it would be presumed that the bank delivered the receipt to the depositor within a reasonable time after receiving it, and that he accepted it.SEEHORN V. AMERICAN NAT. BANK, Mo., 49 S. W. Rep. 886.

110. TRUST DEED-Satisfaction-Failure to Discharge on Record.-Civ. Code 1886, § 1869, provides that if, on satisfaction of a "mortgage," the holder thereof does not discharge it of record within three months after a written request by the mortgagor, the holder shall forfeit a penalty. Held, that the maker of a trust deed to secure a debt due to defendant cannot recover the penalty on defendant's refusal to satisfy the deed of record within three months after written request, as a trust deed is not a mortgage within the statute.SOUTHERN BLDG. & LOAN ASSN. V. MCCANTS, Ala., 25 South. Rep. 8.

111. TRUSTS AND TRUSTEE Right of Beneficiary to Sue. A beneficiary cannot sue the trustees at law for his share, where the amount thereof has not been determined, nor the accounts of the trustee settled.HUSTED V. THOMSON, N. Y., 53 N. E. Rep. 20.

112. USURY - Mortgages-Shares of Stock.-The mere fact that certain shares of stock in the mortgagor company were found among the effects a deceased mortgagee, and that the promoter of the mortgagor company, in negotiating with the representatives of the mortgagee, had promised certain shares of stock in the company as an inducement to bring about the loan secured by the mortgage, is insufficient to show usury in the transaction, where one of said representatives testified that the agreement was merely that he was to have shares of stock for his services, and that after the loan he gave the certificate of stock, found among decedent's effects, to decedent, as a gift.-SHORT V. POST, N. J., 42 Atl. Rep. 569.

113. VENDOR'S LIEN-Vendor Trustee for Purchaser.A vendor of real estate, who has not executed a deed, has a lien upon the vendee's equitable estate as secu. rity for payment of the purchase money according to the terms of the agreement, and holds the legal title in trust for the purchaser.-HASLAM V. HASLAM, Utah, 56 Pac. Rep. 243.

114. VENDOR AND PURCHASER Pleading. Where a vendor, in a suit for specific performance of an agree ment to pay off a mortgage on the land conveyed, answered that the contract was procured by fraud, and asked that it be canceled, but failed to appear at the hearing, and permitted judgment to go against him that he pay off the mortgage, the judgment was a conclusive adjudication as to the alleged fraud.-BARBER V. KENDALL, N. Y., 53 N. E. Rep. 1.

115. WATERS-Wharves - Piers.-A pier constructed from a wharf into the river, on land belonging to the State, by permission of the city, and under statutory authority, where its maintenance by itself would destroy the use of the wharf, is an accretion to the wharf, and both are real property.-BEDLOW V. BEDLOW, N. Y., 53 Pac. Rep. 26.

116. WATER COMPANIES Regulation of Rates.-Act June 6, 1891, authorizes incorporated cities to fix the rates for the supply of water furnished by any company or corporation to cities and the inhabitants thereof. Held not unconstitutional so far as it applied to city ordinances passed before its enactment, which fixed particular rates or charges for water supplies.CITY OF DANVILLE V. DANVILLE WATER CO., Ill., 53 N. E. Rep. 118.

117. WILLS - Action for Legacy.-A legatee suing trustees under the will for support, payable, under the will, out of the rents of certain land, need not make as

parties other legatees, whose support is payable out of the rents of the same land, and who have an estate in remainder in the land, in order to obtain a judgment for support pending the action.-MCCREARY V. ROBIN. SON, Tex., 49 S. W. Rep. 933.

118. WILLS Bequest of Use of Residence.-A will gave testator's widow the use of his homestead dwelling and buildings connected therewith, and the right to certain provisions, with the right of offering a home to her parents and testator's brother and sister, should she desire to do so, for any period she chose, and as long as she continued to reside therein. Another clause bequeathed certain property, including the homestead dwelling, in trust, with power to sell, except that the homestead should not be sold while testator's wife and sister, or either of them, resided thereon. In case of the widow's death before that of the sister, the trustees should tender to the latter the free occupancy of said dwelling during her life, with the same privileges as the wife enjoyed. Held, that the sister had no right to occupy the dwelling until after the widow's death.-REEVE V. TROTH, N. J., 42 Atl. Rep. 571.

119. WILLS-Construction-Equitable Conversion.—A clause of a will, void as devising real estate to aliens, does not make void, for repugnancy, a subsequent clause converting it into personalty, and providing for payment thereof to the same persons.-GREENWOOD V. GREENWOOD, Ill., 53 N. E. Rep. 101.

120. WILLS-Precatory Trust.-Testator appointed his widow his executrix, with directions that a certain house be not sold during her life, but used as a home for herself and their children. He also directed that no part of the real estate should be sold during the widow's life, unless necessary to support herself and children. The third item read: "Having full faith and confidence in my beloved wife, and knowing that she will wisely and prudently manage the affairs of the family and look after the welfare of our children, I therefore bequeath" all the estate to her, to be ex. pended for her own use and for the support of the home for herself and the children. Held, that the wife took a fee in all the property, since the words are insufficient to create a precatory trust.-LLOYD V. LLOYD, Mass., 53 N. E. Rep. 148.

121. WILLS-Trusts-Devise Over.-A testator devised all his property to his only daughter, subject to the life estate of his wife, appointing his brother as trustee to manage it until she should attain majority, when it was to be made over to her, if she should be then liv. ing. In case of her death without issue, the property was to go to nephews and nieces. At the making of the will the daughter was 9 years old, and at testator's death 13. Held, that the death of the daughter contemplated was during her minority, and her title was absolute after majority.-COLBY V. DOTY, N. Y., 53 N. E. Rep. 35.

122. WILLS-Vested Remainder-Trust Deeds.-Pursuant to a decree of divorce requiring the husband to convey certain property in trust for the maintenance of his children and divorced wife, he conveyed lands owned by him in fee to a trustee, by deed requiring the trustee to sell them, invest the proceeds, and pay the income to the wife during her life, and on her death to reconvey the entire trust fund to the grantor or his heirs. Held, that the deed conveyed a life estate only in trust for the wife, and hence the remainder of the husband was vested.-HOBBIE V. OGDEN, Ill., 53 N. E. Rep. 104.

123. WITNESSES-Transactions with Decedents.-Under Starr & C. Ann. St. ch. 51, § 2, prohibiting a party from testifying when the adverse party is an executor, etc., unless when called as a witness by such adverse party, etc., the deposition of complaint, taken at his own instance, cannot be considered, where defendant dies pending suit, but before testifying therein, even though deponent had been cross-examined, and was called and cross-examined at the trial by defendant.SMITH V. BILLINGS, Ill., 53 N, E. Rep. 81.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., MAY 5, 1899.

The case of Atlantic City R. Co. v. Godin, recently decided by the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, involving the theory upon which the existence of the marriage relation depends, is interestingly reviewed by Mr. E. Q. Keasbey in a late issue of the New Jersey Law Journal. The question there arose as to the efficacy of what is known as a common law marriage, the court adopting the theory of contract, and declared that it was well settled in this country that no more is necessary to constitute a legal marriage than that a man shall declare in words of the present tense that a woman is his wife, and that she shall assent. No witness need be present and no particular ceremony is necessary. Mr. Keasbey called attention, by way of contrast, to the case of Voorhees v. Voorhees' Exrs., 1 Dick. Chan. 411, and to the fact that the conclusions in the two cases were different, suggesting "the inquiry whether there is not a defect in the theory that the fact of marriage depends upon contract." In the Voorhees case the logic of the chief justice, based upon that theory, was unanswerable. He said that since the woman had no suspicion that her marriage was not lawful, there could have been no new contract, and, therefore, the relation begun unlawfully remained unlawful after the impediment was removed. There was no contract except the unlawful ceremony, and, therefore, there was no marriage. Justice Garrison, dissenting, referred to the Breadalbane case (Campbell v. Campbell, L. R. 1 H. L. Cas. 182), in which marriage was regarded as an estate or existing fact evidenced by connubial conduct and repute, and in which a contrary conclusion in a similar case was reached. He insisted that the doctrine of the presumption of consent from connubial conduct was principle having its root in public policy and not a rule of evidence for determining whether the parties had actually interchanged consent. The doctrine rests, he said, on the necessity of presuming something that is not proven, and that purpose of the presumption is to establish the status of marriage wherever there is matrimonial conduct.

The majority of the court, however,

regarded the connubial conduct as merely presumptive evidence of consent, and held that there was no marriage where it appeared affirmatively that there was not an actual agreement of marriage, even though both parties, after the impediment was removed, believed that they were man and wife. In the case recently decided, the only difference was that, after the death of the lawful wife, there was some evidence of an actual contract of marriage between the man and woman, and there was the testimony of the niece of the woman saying that the man had said, "Your aunt is now my lawful wife."

In both cases the original conduct was unlawful, and in both the woman supposed it to be lawful by reason of a marriage ceremony and was ignorant of any impediment. In both the union was continued after the impediment was removed, and the parties lived together as husband and wife. The only difference was that in the one no words of contract were used afterwards, because the woman had no suspicion that they were needed; in the other there was an expression in words of the intention which was carried out in fact in the other. The court holds that in the one case there was a marriage and in the other there was illicit intercourse. The distinction is based on the theory that marriage is a contract, and that the contract must be evidenced in words, and that it is sufficient if the words be spoken between the parties themselves without a ceremony and without witnesses. Such a marriage is called a common law marriage, and the court of errors, while adopting the doctrine of the common law marriage, makes it question of evidence of an actual contract rather than a principle of public policy to be applied to certain cases in which connubial conduct should be regarded as involving the consequences and responsibilities of marriage. "The truth is," says Mr. Keasbey, "that a marriage without a ceremony, or public declaration of some sort, was unknown to the common law of England. The rule that consent alone was sufficient was a doctrine of the medieval canon law which was never adopted in England and was abrogated by the council of Trent. It was Chancellor Kent who declared in obiter dictum in 1809, that no formal solemnization of marriage was necessary and repealed in his commentaries

reference to the canon law as his authority, and it was strongly opposed by Chief Justice Parsons in 1810. The rule has been frequently declared in this country, but, unless it is regarded as a rule of public policy as suggested by Justice Garrison and not as a rule of evidence, it will have the dangerous consequences of giving the sanction of the law to marriages of the most secret character and depriving the State of all control of the entrance into a relation which in all civilized States is regarded as one in which the State has a peculiar interest for the protection of society. It would be most unfortunate for the community if the people generally understood that no public act was required to make a marriage lawful. It would hardly be tolerable in a civilized State if marriages generally were made by a few words said by a man to a woman in the act of yielding to the natural passions that bring them together. If this is the law now, it is high time that the legislature should provide the safeguards that now depend upon the sense of propriety which tradition has preserved in the minds of the people. It may be that it will be sufficient to extend to our own citizens the provisions of the statute requiring a license in the case of the marriage of non-residents, for the court of errors took pains to say it did not consider the effect of this statute in deciding the case above referred to."

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT — JURISDICTION-ERROR OF STATE COURT-CONTRACTS.In Turner v. Board of Commissioners, 19 S. C. Rep. 464, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, it was held that where the supreme court of a State has done nothing more than construe its own constitution and statutes, in holding that county bonds issued in aid of a railroad were void under such laws, which were in force at the time the bonds were issued, there being no subsequent legislation on the subject, the United States Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review the correctness of the decision, on a writ of error to the State court, under the allegation that a contract has been impaired thereby. The following is from the opinion: "The supreme court of the State held that the bonds were void because the acts under which they were issued were not valid laws, not having been passed in the manner directed by the constitution. The court further held that the bonds were not authorized by the

above sections of the Code, and that as they purported, by recitals on their face, to have been issued under the act of 1879, the bondholders were estopped from setting up any other authority for their issue, such as the ordinance of the constitutional convention above mentioned. 31 S. E. Rep. 481.

The bondholders have brought the case here, claiming that by the decision below their contract has been impaired, because, as they allege, the supreme court of the State had decided before these bonds were issued that the acts under which they were issued were valid laws and authorized their issue, and that in holding the contrary after the issue of these bonds the State court had impaired the obligation of the contract, and its decision raised a federal question proper for review by this court.

"But in this case we have no power to examine the correctness of the decision of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, because, this being a writ of error to a State court, we cannot take jurisdiction under the allegation that a contract has been impaired by a decision of that court, when it appears that the State court has done nothing more than construe its own constitution and statutes existing at the time when the bonds were is sued; there being no subsequent legislation touching the subject. We are therefore bound by the decision of the State court in regard to the meaning of the constitution and laws of its own State, and its decision upon such a state of facts raises no federal question. Other principles obtain when the writ of error is to a federal court.

"The difference in the jurisdiction of this court upon writs of error to a State, as distinguished from a federal court, in questions claimed to arise out of the contract clause of the constitution, is set forth in the opinion of the court in Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U.S. 103, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 80; and from the opinion in that case the following extract is taken (page 111, 159 U. S., and page 82, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep.):

"The distinction, as to the authority of this court, between writs of error to a court of the United States and writs of error to the highest court of a State, is well illustrated by two of the earliest cases relating to municipal bonds, in both of which the opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Swayne, and in each of which the question presented was whether the constitution of the State of Iowa permitted the legislature to authorize municipal corporations to issue bonds in aid of the construction of a railroad. The supreme court of the State, by decisions made before the bonds in question were issued, had held that it did, but, by decisions made after they had been issued, held that it did not. A judgment of the district court of the United States for the district of Iowa, following the later decisions of the State court, was reviewed on the merits, and reversed, by this court, for misconstruction of the constitution of Iowa. Gelpeke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 206. But a writ of error to review one of those