thereon to him during his lifetime, "and after his death the sum of $500 to the sister J." The deed was duly recorded. Thereafter the father discharged the mortgage of record, reciting that it had been duly paid and satisfied, and a new mortgage was given making no provision for J. Held, that the recording of the mortgage constituted a gift to J inter vivos, and the discharge of the mortgage thereafter would not release the liability thereunder to J.-HOLMES V. MCDONALD, Mich., 78 N. W. Rep. 647.

51. GUARDIAN Sale of Ward's Property - Setting Aside.-Equity has jurisdiction to set aside a colorable sale by a guardian of an incompetent of his ward's land, whereby the property passes into his own hands, though the sale was made under the jurisdiction of the probate court.-GAYLORD v. Goodell, Mass., 53 N. E. Rep. 275.

52. HABEAS CORPUS Criminal Law.-The writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to avoid a trial on an information merely because of irregularities.-EX PARTE ECKHART, Tex., 50 S. W. Rep. 349.

54. HUSBAND AND WIFE Agency Notice. Where a trustee under a mortgage, with knowledge that it had been satisfied, also acts as his wife's agent at the trustee's sale, and buys in the land for her, she cannot reap the benefit of his fraud, and exempt herself from its consequences by asserting she had no knowledge of it.-ALLEN V. GARRISON, Tex., 50 S. W. Rep. 335.

55. INFANTS - Vacation of Deed-Estoppel. A recital in a deed that the grantor is over 21 years of age does not estop her from avoiding the deed on the ground of her infancy, even against creditors of the grantee, who have acquired liens on the land conveyed on the faith of that recital.-WILSON'S GUARDIAN V. WILSON, Ky., 50 S. W. Rep. 260.

56. INJUNCTION - Jurisdiction of Court.-A federal court, which is without jurisdiction to determine the question as to the ownership of property, will not, at the instance of one claimant, issue an injunction to preserve and protect it pendente lite.-DAVIDSON V. CALKINS, U. S. C. C., S. D. (Cal.), 92 Fed. Rep. 230.

57. JUDGMENT Certification.-Since a judgment, to be admissible in evidence, must be certified to by the officers of the court rendering it, a judgment of a jus. tice of the peace certified to by the officers of a circuit court is not admissible.-I. B. ROSENTHAL MILLINERY Co. v. LENNOX, Tex., 50 8. W. Rep. 401.

58. JUDGMENTS-Grounds for Setting Aside-Fraud.A court of equity will not set aside a judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, on the ground of fraud, because of false statements made by the defendants to the court as to their financial condition, by which the court was induced to render, and the plaintiff to accept, a judgment for less than the amount sued for or than was actually due.-UNITED STATES V. BEEBE, U. S. C. C. of App., Fifth Circuit, 92 Fed. Rep. 244.

59. JUDGMENT-Res Judicata.-A judgment for defendant in an action on an express contract for board is not a bar to an action on an implied contract for nursing and attention during the same period, though the causes of action might have been joined.-SCHUSTER V. WHITE'S ADMR., Ky., 50 S. W. Rep. 242.

60. JUDGMENTS-Revival-Scire Facias.-The purpose of a proceeding by scire facias to revive a personal judg. ment is not to raise the issue of the validity of the orig. inal judgment, but to give the debtor an opportunity to show, if he can, that it has been paid, satisfied or released, and, if he cannot, to avoid the statute of lim. itations against it, and to give the creditor a new right of enforcement from the date of the judgment of revival. Such proceeding is not a substitute for an action of debt on the judgment, but one which may be

maintained concurrently with such action, and without regard to its pendency.-LAFAYETTE County, Mo., v. WONDERLY, U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 92 Fed. Rep. 313.

61. JUDICIAL SALES-Rights of Purchaser.-A purchaser at a master's sale, in equity, acquires such an interest in the property, by the acceptance of his bid, as to entitle him to appeal from an order refusing to confirm the sale.-MAGANN V. SEGAL, U. S. C. C. of App., Sixth Circuit, 92 Fed. Rep. 252.

62. LIMITATIONS-Infant Heirs.-Where the holder of notes secured by a vendor's lien died, leaving a widow and infant children, and no administration was had on his estate, limitations commenced to run against the rights of the widow and the children to enforce the lien simultaneously, because their interest was joint.— STAUFFER V. BRITISH & AMERICAN MORTG. CO., Miss., 25 South. Rep. 299.

63. MASTER AND SERVANT-Assumption of Risk.—An employee of a subcontractor for putting cornices on a building, who, notwithstanding the foreman for the subcontractor is waiting for anchors to hold the cornice in place, and refuses to order the workmen to go on with the work till the anchors arrive, announces his willingness to go on with the work if the foreman of the original contractor is satisfied, by proceeding with the work assumes the risk of injury from the fall. ing of the cornice.-HOMERSKY V. WINKLE TERRA COTTA CO., Ill., 53 N. E. Rep. 346.

64. MASTER AND SERVANT-Assumption of Risk.-A railroad employee whose duties require him to go on the tracks of the company within a city does not assume the risk incident to the operation of trains within such city in a manner prohibited by the ordinances thereof, under Burns' Rev. St. 1894, § 7083, making a railroad company liable for injuries to employees through the negligence of co-employees in charge of engines or trains.-PITTSBURG, C., C. & ST. L. RY. CO. v. MOORE, Ind., 53 N. E. Rep. 290.

65. MASTER AND SERVANT-Negligence of MasterProximate Cause.-Where an employee, while going from one floor to another of the master's store on an elevator, in the discharge of his duty, is injured by the fall of the elevator, caused by a defect therein due to the master's negligence, the master's liability is based on his failure to use the necessary degree of care to provide a safe means of transit for his employee.MCGREGOR V. REID, MURDOCK & Co., Ill., 53 N. E. Rep.

323.

66. MASTER AND SERVANT- Railroads Train Dis patchers. The law does not designate the train dispatcher of a railroad company as the one whose duty it is to give to employees operating trains such infor mation as is necessary to enable them to operate the trains in a reasonably safe manner.-HOUSTON & T. C. R. Co. v. STEWART, Tex., 50 S. W. Rep. 333.

67. MORTGAGES-Payment to Mortgagee after Assign. ment. Where a mortgagor has no notice of the assign. ment of the mortgage, or of circumstances to put him on inquiry, a payment by him to the mortgagee discharges the mortgage.-MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF KEN. TUCKY V. HALL, Ky., 50 8. W. Rep. 254.

68. MORTGAGE-Subrogation-Parties -A subsequent mortgagee paying a first mortgage and a lien for lum. ber put into an uncompleted building on the land, under an agreement with the mortgagor, known to the lumberman, that he is to have a first lien for such pay. ment, is entitled to be subrogated under the first mort. gage, and the lien paid, so as to assert a lien prior to that of the lumberman for furnishing the lumber for completing the building.- WASHBURN V. THOMAS, Kan., 56 Pac. Rep. 539.

69. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Action by TaxpayerTaxation.-The taxpayer of a municipal corporation has a standing in court to sustain averments of illegality of a corporate act.-CITY ITEM CO-OPERATIVE PRINTING CO. v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, La., 25 South. Rep. 313.

70. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Improvements-Part Performance.-Where a city council, by resolution, provided for construction of sidewalks forming a continuous system, it has no right to accept a part performance, leaving intervening spaces of greater or less extent between the portions of the sidewalk.-BERWIND V. GALVESTON & H. INV. Co., Tex., 50 S. W. Rep. 413.

71. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Jurisdiction of Circuit Court.-Const. art. 12, § 20, prohibits the general assembly from granting the right to construct and operate a street railroad within a municipality without first acquiring the consent of the local authorities. The freeholders' charter of St. Louis, which, under Const. art. 9, § 25, is the organic law of the city, by article 10 gives the municipal assembly power by ordinance to deter. mine all questions with regard to street railways, section 6 giving any such company the right to use another company's tracks on payment of just compensation, under such regulations as may be prescribed by ordinance. Ordinance No. 12,652 provides that such compensation shall be determined by commissioners, to be appointed in a manner prescribed. Const. art. 6, § 22, gives the circuit court appellate jurisdiction from inferior tribunals, as may be provided by law. Held, that the municipal assembly might by ordinance confer on the circuit court jurisdiction to review the award of the commissioners.-GRAND AVE. RY. Co. v. LINDELL RY. Co., Mo., 50 S. W. Rep. 302..

72. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Street Railroads-Use of Tracks. Under the charter of St. Louis, which allows one street railway to use another's tracks on pay. ment of a just compensation, and Ordinance No. 12,562, § 3, requiring the commissioners appointed to ascertain the just compensation to hear proofs as to such damages as they may deem just, where the company whose tracks are used did not have an exclusive franchise to use the street, but had agreed to permit any other road to use its tracks, it is not entitled, as part of the compensation, to loss of profits from competition of the other company.-GRAND AVE. RY. Co. v. CITIZENS' RY. Co., Mo., 50 S. W. Rep. 305.

73. NATIONAL BANK-Ultra Vires-Lease.-Where a national bank executed a lease before the comptroller of currency had authorized it to do business, the di. rectors and stockholders are not liable thereon where they are not named as parties, and there are no words to bind them to its covenants.-SEEBERGER V. MCCORMICK, Ill., 53 N. E. Rep. 340.

74. NEGLIGENCE Injury to Infant Contributory Negligence of Parents.-In an action by an infant in its own right for personal injuries resulting from the neg. ligence of a third party, the fault or negligence of its parents, contributing to the injury, cannot be imputed to the child.-CHICAGO G. W. RY. Co. v. KOWALSKI, U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 92 Fed. Rep. 310.

75. PARTNERSHIP-Husband and Wife.-An attachment issued against the property of an alleged firm, consisting of husband and wife, is properly dismissed upon proof that no such firm exists, since it does not authorize the attachment of either their separate or community property.-CLEVELAND V. SPENCER, Tex., 50 S. W. Rep. 405.

76. PARTNERSHIP-Notes Individual Liability.-Action was against "A and B, partners, doing business under the style of A and B." The notes sued on were signed by defendants individually, and there was nothing on their face to indicate a partnership. The summons followed the complaint. Held, that the action was against defendants as individuals.-COMPTON V. SMITH, Ala., 25 South. Rep. 300.

77. PLEADING-Abatement.-A plea in abatement in attachment is bad which sets up another suit, pending in the chancery court, but does not show that the chancery court had jurisdiction, or that plaintiff's remedy is as ample there as at bar.-CARBOLINEUM WOOD PRESERVING & MANUFACTURING Co. v. MEYER, Miss., 25 South. Rep. 297.

78. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Mutual Duties.-An agent who has done his full duty in making a purchase for his principal at the lowest possible price cannot be required to deliver to the principal property received from the seller after the termination of the agency.LAMB KNIT GOODS Co. v. LAMB, Mich., 78 N. W. Rep. 646.

79. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Building Contracts-Construction.-Sureties on a contractor's bond, in favor of school trustees, conditioned on the contractor's performance of a contract to erect a school house, requiring the payment of all claims for material furnished in the work, are liable to material-men whose claims for furnishing material for the school house are not paid.-BROWN V. MARKLAND, Ind., 53 N. E. Rep. 295.

80. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Release of Surety-Alteration of Contract.-Where the release of a contractor's surety from the obligation of a building contract on account of subsequent changes therein, without his consent, is involved, the true meaning and intent of the contract should be ascertained according to usual rules of construction; but, when the expressed intention of the parties has been determined, the obligation of the surety is strictissimi juris, from which he is discharged by any alteration of the substantial terms of the contract, whether the same be harmful or beneficial to him. Where the contract authorizes the parties to enter into auxiliary contracts for alterations of the work from that shown in the plans and specifications, without invalidating the primary contract, the parties may stipulate, without releasing the surety, for such enlargement or extension of the work as, in nature, magnitude and expense, would be consistent with, and bear a reasonable and subsidiary relation to, the work first undertaken.-UNITED STATES V. FREEL, U. S. C. C., E. D. (N. Y.), 92 Fed. Rep. 299.

81. RAILROAD COMPANY-Fires Set by Locomotives.— A building on a lot adjoining a railroad right of way was set on fire by sparks from an engine. Property adjacent to such lot, but not abutting on the track, was destroyed by the spread of the fire. Held, that the railroad company was liable for the property so destroyed, under Rev. St. 1889, § 2615, providing that a railroad company shall be liable to every person whose property may be destroyed by fire communicated by engines in use on the road.-LUMBERMAN'S MUT. INS. Co. v. KANSAS CITY, FT. S. & M. R. Co., Mo., 50 S. W. Rep. 281.

82. RAILROAD COMPANY-Insolvency and Receivership.-A guarantor of a debt contracted by a railroad company for rails, who pays the debt, has no greater claim in equity to a lien on the road superior to a prior mortgage than the seller of the rails would have if unpaid.-FARMERS' L. & T. Co. v. STUTTGART & A. R. R. Co., U. S. C. C., E. D., Ark., 92 Fed. Rep. 246.

83. RAILROAD COMPANY-Negligence.-The failure of a flagman sitting on the beam of the pilot of an engine to keep a lookout in passing along the streets of a city was not negligence, that not being a part of his duty.LOUISVILLE & N. R. Co. v. CREIGHTON, Ky., 50 S. W. Rep. 227.

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84. RAILROAD COMPANY Regulations - Crossing Streets.-Code 1892, § 3555, requiring a railroad company to make easy grades over a "highway" which its road crosses, and to keep such crossing in good order, applies to city streets as well as roads in the country.— HAMLIN V. SOUTHERN RY. Co., Miss., 25 South. Rep. 295. 85. RAILROAD COMPANY Street Railroads Negli. gence.-A boy 11 years of age, standing at night on the off side of the down-town track of defendant company's street railway, waiting for a car on the up-town track (which was furthest from him) to pass, and, that car having passed, without looking up the track nearest him, to see whether or not it was safe to cross, steps on the track, 12 or 15 feet in front of an approaching down-town car, trips and falls, is run over and his foot crushed. Held a case of want of care on his part,

barring recovery of damages; it being shown that, notwithstanding effort on part of motoneer to arrest car, it could not be done in that distance.-O'ROURKE V. NEW ORLEANS CITY & L. R. Co., La., 25 South. Rep. 323.

86. RAILWAY COMPANY-Street Railroads-Receivers. -Since a heater, furnished to an electric railway com. pany after a test showing that it would save a certain sum per month in fuel, was not necessary to keep the company in operation, the seller has no preferred claim for payment out of the receipts of the company after it goes into the hands of a receiver.-MCCORNACK V. SALEM CONSOL. ST. RY. Co., Oreg., 56 Pac. Rep. 518. 87. REAL ESTATE AGENT Brokers.-An agent to sell real estate cannot be deprived of his commission where a sale made by him was not consummated because a third person claimed a lease on the property.-REID V. THOMPSON, Ky., 50 S. W. Rep. 248.

88. REMOVAL OF CAUSES Petition Jurisdictional Facts.-Where a petition for removal shows that the requisite amount is involved, and alleges that plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different States, it contains sufficient to give the federal court jurisdiction of the cause, and may be amended, by leave of court, by supplying more specific allegations going to establish the same jurisdictional facts, such as the citizenship of the parties.-STADLEMANN V. WHITE LINE TOWING CO., U. S. C. C., D. (Minn.), 92 Fed. Rep. 209.

89. REPLEVIN -Distress.-Where a tenant replevies property taken under a distress warrant, and gives bond for the satisfaction of the judgment, this does not release the lien of the distress warrant.-MCEVOY V. NIECE, Tex., 50 S. W. Rep. 424.

90. REPLEVIN OF DEAD BODY.-Under How. Ann. St. § 6856, providing for replevin where "personal goods and chattels" have been unlawfully taken or detained, and sections 8346 and 8347, providing for judgment for defendant, when plaintiff fails in his case, for a return of the property or its full value, replevin will not lie to recover the body of plaintiff's brother in the hands of an undertaker, to whom it had been delivered by the authorities of a hospital.-KEYES V. KONKEL, Mich., 78 N. W. Rep. 649.

91. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE Indefinite Contract.The consideration for an agreement to convey lands was the payment of a sum of money, and the delivery on demand, "at the mill," of lumber which the vendor intended to use in a house situated not far from the premises in question. The lumber had not yet been manufactured, and the vendee owned a sawmill at a distance, from which it could only be transported at considerable expense to the place where the vendor intended to use it. It was the intention of the parties that the vendee should erect a sawmill on the lands purchased. The testimony as to the mill at which the parties intended the delivery to be made was conflicting. Held that, the contract being indefinite, the vendee could not enforce specific performance of the agreement until a tender by him of the lumber at the premises where he intended to erect the sawmill.DAVID V. ANDERSON, Öreg., 56 Pac. Rep. 523.

92. TAXATION OF NATIONAL BANKS-Validity.—St. Ky. 1894, ch. 108, providing for a tax on the "franchise" of corporations, associations, etc. (section 4077), taking the whole act together, and especially sections 4078-4081, is to be construed, not as a tax on the franchise in the technical sense, but upon all the intangible property of the corporation; and this tax not being levied upon the shares of stock in the names of the shareholders, nor equivalent in law to a tax so levied, the provision is void as applied to national banking associations, as not being authorized by Rev. St. U. S. § 5219, which permits the States to tax the shares in such an association in the names of the holders thereof.- OWENSBORO NAT. BANK V. CITY OF OWENSBORO, U. S. S. C., 19 S. C. Rep. 537.

93. TRUSTS Parol Evidence to Establish.-In an action to recover on a note payable to one now deceased,

parol evidence is admissible to establish a trust relation existing between the payee and certain parties claiming the proceeds of the note.-THOMPSON V. CARUTHERS, Tex., 50 S. W. Rep. 331.

94. TRUST DEEDS-Foreclosure-Subrogation.-A purchaser of property subject to a trust deed, which he assumed, is not subrogated to the rights of the holder by thereafter purchasing at a sale thereunder, so as to enable him to defeat the lien by mortgage, which was a second lien on the property, of which he had notice at the time he purchased from the owner.—GULLING V. WASHOE COUNTY BANK, Nev., 56 Pac. Rep. 580.

95. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Action for Price-Pleading. Where a purchaser of realty enters into posses. sion of the premises, in an action on a note given for the price the complaint need not allege a tender of the deed, thereby casting on the purchaser the burden of alleging and proving the failure of consideration of the deed in case the vendor's title proves defective.SAYRE V. MAHONEY, Oreg., 56 Pac. Rep. 526.

97. WATERS-Water Rights- Easements Over Public Lands.-Rev. St. U. S. § 2339, provides for the enforce. ment of water rights that have become vested by local customs and uses, and for the confirmation of a right of way for canals through public lands for the use of such water rights. Section 2340 directs that all patents shall be subject to such vested rights. Held, that a person is not entitled to an easement over any public lands for a reservoir used in connection with water rights, under such sections, until he has first acquired a vested and accrued water right.-NIPPLE V. FORKER, Colo., 56 Pac. Rep. 577.

98. WATERS AND WATER COURSES-Diversion.-A part of the waters of a spring that fed a stream percolated into defendant's well. The jury found that the operation of the well prevented water from coming into the stream from springs, excepting the surface flow, and diverted the waters of the stream to some extent, but did not cause water flowing in the channel of the stream to escape. Held, that the operation of the well did not cause the withdrawal of water after it reached the channel of the stream.-WILSON V. WARD, Colo., 56 Pac. Rep. 573.

99. WILL-Defeasible Fee-"Dying Without Issue.”— The words, "dying without issue," and similar expressions, in wills, will not be treated as referring to the death of the devisee before that of the testator, or during the existence of some particular estate provided for, where the will contains controlling language indicating a different intent.-COOKSEY V. HILL, Ky., 50 S. W. Rep. 235.

100. WILLS-Legacies - Construction.-A bequest to testator's daughter of a certain sum, and providing that if she shall die, leaving no child surviving her," then said sum shall be equally divided among testa. tor's other heirs, refers to her death during the lifetime of the testator.-MORGAN V. ROBBINS, Ind., 53 N. E. Rep. 283.

101. WILLS-Residuary Clause--Construction.-Where a testator directs his residuary estate to be converted into cash, and divided "equally" among his heirs-atlaw, such heirs take per capita, and not per stirpes.RAMSEY V. STEPHENSON, Oreg., 56 Pac. Rep. 520.

102. WITNESSES-Transactions with Persons.-Under a plea of non est factum in an action on a note purporting to have been signed by a person since deceased by making her mark, plaintiff cannot testify for herself as to the genuineness of the signature of the attesting witness; that being a part of the alleged transaction with the decedent.-CUNNINGHAM'S ADMR. V. SPEAGLE, Ky., 50 S. W. Rep. 244.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., JUNE 2, 1899.

A wholesome lesson will be taught strikers who openly defy constituted authority, and trample upon the rights of others, by the recent action of United States District Judge Rogers, Western District of Arkansas, in the case of United States v. Percy Jones et al. This was a proceeding against certain individuals for contempt in the violation of a restraining order of the court, having for its object the protection of the property of the Western Coal & Mining Co. from injury by insolvent and irresponsible parties, and the protection of its employees and others seeking employment from it in the conduct and management of its business. It appears that certain members of the Miner's Union in defiance of the injunction, resorted to force in attempting to coerce employees of the company. Judge Rogers in committing the defendants to jail, delivered an opinion which is admirable in point of clearness as well as in the accurate and conservative statement of the propositions of law governing the relative rights of employers and employees. While assuming to take no part in labor troubles either in behalf of the companies or in behalf of the miners, the court admitted both the right of the companies to work their mines and of the miners to cease work or to work as they please, but properly insisted that if the miners do not choose to work, that they abstain from interfering with other persons who desire to work, and who are protected in that right by the restraining order of the court. It is not necessary to cite authorities to show that the Supreme Court of the United States have said over and over again, and in cases that are quite recent, that any person in this country has a constitutional right to go where he will and work at what he will, with only one proviso, and that is that it is a lawful avocation or calling, and that he exercise it in such a way as to respect the legal rights of others present. This right belongs to every man, whether he be rich or poor, white or black, high or low, and it is useless to cite authorities to show that whatever the police powers of a State may be, they are to be exercised in subordination to the provisions of the federal

constitution. "It is not necessary," says Judge Rogers "to mince words about these strikes. Anybody who supposes that a strike is anything but a force, unless it means force, has never given the subject any consideration. The courts have said so over and over again. What would a strike amount to if men should simply lay down their tools, intending to be peaceable? tending to be peaceable? No sooner had they done so, than the company would simply go and employ other men, as it has a right to do, the men employed would go to work, as they have a right to do, and then the strikers would have their strike on their hands, and no controversy with anybody. But it is at this juncture when companies proceed to employ others to take their places, that the real objects and purposes of a strike is disclosed. It is then that force is invoked, and it is that the parties who engage in the strike involve themselves in criminality. It is when they use force to, prevent people, who, under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, as construed by the Supreme Court of the United States in repeated cases, from going wherever they will and working at any lawful vocation they will, in any State they choose, that they involve themselves in illegal conduct and subject themselves to the restraining powers of the court and to criminal prosecutions under the statutes of the States. The investigation of the case goes to disclose the fact and demonstrate that, while ostensibly the local union at Denning, through its officers professes that the purpose was the strike should be carried on peaceably, their members, as soon as they left the lodge, became themselves, confessed criminals going into the State court and pleading guilty to assault made upon persons engaged in the company's service, and in this way violating the injunction of the court, which prohibited them from interfering with or molesting the employees of the company in the discharge of their duties. It is argued that there was no conspiracy upon the part of these defendants to violate the injunction, or to permit any of the alleged crimes to which some of them have pleaded guilty. It will not do to say, that in order to violate an injunction, a conspiracy must exist. One man may violate an injunction as well as a thousand. This injunction plainly tells not only. all the strikers in common, but tells all of

them separately and individually, exactly what his duty is,-to desist from whatever is forbidden by the injunction. The testimony in this case discloses the fact, that the policy of these men was, not to go in a body and openly and defiantly violate the injunction by assaulting the employees of the company, but that some one, while others were present to witness what was done, should assault and beat persons who were engaged in the companies' service, and that for the purpose of preventing them from continuing in the service of the company, and preventing the company from operating its mines. It will not do to say that because these assaults made under these conditions, were violations of the State laws, and because the parties making them had been punished by the State laws, they were thus relieved from the penalties inflicted for disobedience to the restraining order granted by this court. So far as that is concerned, they stand just where they did before they were fined. They answered to the State for the infraction of its laws, and they must now answer to the United States for their contumacy in violating the injunction of this court."

An opinion recently rendered by Judge Holdom, of the Superior Court of Cook County, in the case of Winslow Bros. Co. v. Building Trades Union, is like that of Judge Rogers, a statement of the rights and limitations of strikers and employees. Recognizing that it was beyond the province of the court to enter the lodge room of a union and dictate as to laws passed for their own governance, Judge Holdom declined to enter an injunction restraining the men from ordering a strike, and in so doing greatly pleased the strikers. But the judge held that outside their council chamber the men are restrained from acts or threats of violence to person or property, and this was entirely satisfactory to the employers.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORSEXTRATERRITORIAL FORCE-STATE INSOLVENT LAW. The operation of voluntary or common law assignments upon property situated in other States has been the subject of frequent discussion in the courts, and there is a general consensus of opinion to the effect that such assignments will

be respected, except so far as they come in conflict with the rights of local creditors, or with the laws or public policy of the State in which the assignment is sought to be enforced. The cases in this court are not numerous, but they are all consonant with the above general principle. Black v. Zacharie, 3 How. 483; Livermore v. Jenckes, 21 How. 126; Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307; Hervey v. Locomotive Works, 93 U. S. 664; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269; Barnett v. Kinney, 147 U. S. 476, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 403.

But the rule with respect to statutory assignments is somewhat different. While the authorities are not altogether harmonious, the prevailing American doctrine is that a conveyance under a State insolvent law operates only upon property within the territory of that State, and that with respect to property in other States it is given only such effect as the laws of such State permit, and that, in general, it must give way to claims of creditors pursuing their remedies there. It passes no title to real estate situated in another State. Nor, as to personal property, will the title acquired by it prevail against the rights of attaching creditors under the laws of the State where the property is actually situated. Harrison v. Sterry, 5 Cranch, 289, 302; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213; Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 322; Blake v. Williams, 6 Pick. 286; Osborn v. Adams, 18 Pick. 245; Zipcey v. Thompson, 1 Gray, 243; Abraham v. Plestoro, 3 Wend. 538, overruling Holmes v. Remsen, 4 Johns. Ch. 460; Johnson v. Hunt, 23 Wend. 87; Hoyt v. Thompson, 5 N. Y. 322; Willetts v. Waite, 25 N. Y. 577; Kelly v. Crapo 45 N. Y. 86; Barth v. Backus, 140 N. Y. 230, 35 N. E. Rep. 425; Weider v. Maddox, 66 Tex. 372, 1 S. W. Rep. 168; Rhawn v. Pearce, 110 Ill. 550; Catlin v. Silver-Plate Co., 123 Ind. 477, 24 N. E. Rep. 250. As was said by Mr. Justice McLean in Oakey v. Bennett, 11 How. 33, 44: “A statutable conveyance of property cannot strictly operate beyond the local jurisdiction. Any effect which may be given to it beyond this does not depend upon international law, but the principle of comity; and national comity does not require any government to give effect to such assignment when it shall impair the remedies or lessen the securities of its own citizens. And this is the prevailing doctrine in this country. A proceeding in rem against the property of a foreign bankrupt, under our local laws, may be maintained by creditors, notwithstanding the foreign assignment." Similar language is used by Mr. Justice Story in his Conflict of Laws, section 414.

In Security Trust Co. v. Dodd. the Supreme Court of the United States recently considered this question with reference to a statute of Minnesota, providing that any insolvent debtor "may make an assignment of all his unexempt property for the equal benefit of all his bona fide creditors, who shall file releases of their demands against such debtor, as herein provided;" that such assignments shall be acknowledged and filed, and,