is referable to either cause, he died from accident, and not from self-destruction.-TRAVELERS' INS. CO. OF HARTFORD, CONN., V. NICKLAS, Md., 41 Atl. Rep. 906.

63. LIMITATIONS- Action against County.-An action against a county to enforce a liability arising from au indebtedness of a former county charged upon the new county by the act creating it is upon a specialty created by the statute. As no liability against the new county could arise from the original obligation alone, such obligation is but an element in the cause of action, the statute being the other and indispensable element; hence limitation against such action runs only from the creation of the new county, and not from the maturity of the original debt.-ROBERTSON V. BLAINE COUNTY, U. s. C. C. of App., Ninth Circuit, 90 Fed. Rep. 63.

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64. LIMITATIONS Alienating Wife's Affections.-A complaint for alienating a wife's affections, stating that, four years before, defendant began to poison the wife's mind, does not show that it is barred by the twoyears limitation, when it appears that the wife did not leave her husband, and declare she would no longer live with him, until two weeks before suit commenced. -BOCKMAN V. RITTER, Ind., 52 N. E. Rep. 100.

65. MARRIAGE-Evidence.-Where there are no impediments existing, an agreement and present consent between the parties to then take each other as man and wife, followed by cohabitation, is sufficient to constitute a valid common-law marriage in this State; and, upon an examination of the testimony, it is held to be sufficient to sustain the finding of marriage made herein.-SHORTEN V. JUDD, Kan., 65 Pac. Rep. 286.

66. MASTER AND SERVANT-Compensation-Preferred Claims.-Services of plaintiff, who expected to be man. ager of defendant's store, in going East with defendant, and assisting him in buying goods, are not within 3 How. Ann. St. § 8749m, authorizing persons having preferred claims for labor to join in chancery, in cases of fraud or assignment for the benefit of creditors.LAWTON V. RICHARDSON, Mich., 77 N. W. Rep. 265.

67. MASTER AND SERVANT-Independent Contractors. -A subcontractor is liable for the negligent acts of servants of the contractor in hoisting material to be used by the subcontractor, since in doing such acts they are the servants of the subcontractor.-PIONEER FIRE PROOF CONSTRUCTION CO. V. HANSEN, Ill., 52 N. E. Rep. 17.

68. MASTER AND SERVANT-Negligence.-A servant is not required to use diligence to discover defects not obvious in appliances furnished him, but may assume that the master has discharged his duty in furnishing them.-TERRELL COMPRESS CO. V. ARRINGTON, Tex., 48 S. W. Rep. 59.

69. MORTGAGEES-Duty to Pay Taxes.-As between the first mortgagee and the second mortgagee, it is the duty of each to pay the taxes; and one cannot acquire a tax title on the mortgaged premises, as against the other.-NORTON V. MYERS, Minn., 77 N. W. Rep. 298.

70. MORTGAGES-Recording.-A mortgage which was not recorded because it would impair the mortgagor's credit is fraudulent as against a subsequent judgment creditor, who extended credit on the faith of the mortgagor's apparently unincumbered title to the land.BELCHER V. CURTIS, Mich., 77 N. W. Rep. 310.

71. MORTGAGE OF GOOD WILL AND FRANCHISES OF NEWSPAPER.-A sale under a chattel mortgage cover. ing a newspaper plant, and "the circulation, franchises and good will thereof," vests the purchaser with the right to equitable relief against the mortgagor or its assigns, to the extent of restraining them from using the name of such a newspaper, or from publishing and circulating a newspaper by the same or a different name as the newspaper or successor of the newspaper covered by the mortgage.-LAWRENCE V. TIMES PRINTING CO., U. S. C. C., D. (Wash.), 90 Fed. Rep. 24.

72. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Contracts for Lighting Streets.-Where a statute gives power to a munici pal corporation to contract for the lighting of its

streets and other public grounds for a period not exceeding 10 years, the conclusive implication is that such corporation is forbidden to contract for a longer period. And where such corporation undertakes, by the passage of an ordinance, to contract with an elec. tric light company for an exclusive privilege to such company for the use of its streets, and stipulating for the lighting of the streets, etc., for 99 years, at a given price per month, such ordinance is ultra vires and void, and the contractual stipulations therein are equally void, and neither party can enforce them.-CITY OF WELLSTON V. MORGAN, Ohio, 52 N. E. Rep. 127.

73. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - Improvements-Assessments.-A judgment assessing the cost of an improvement is void where the contract for the improvement was let nearly a month before the ordinance providing for the improvement and the special assessment was passed.-THALER V. WEST CHICAGO PARK COMMRS., Ill., 52 N. E. Rep. 116.

74. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Improvements-Ordinance.-An ordinance for the paving of a street which provides that the curbstones shall be bedded upon flat stones, without stating the kind of flat stones, fails to specify sufficiently the nature, character and description of the improvements, and is void.-LUSK v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Ill., 52 N. E. Rep. 54.

75. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Liability for Tort of Mayor.-A city ratifying the trespass of its mayor in having electric wires torn down from where they had a right to be is liable therefor.-COMMERCIAL ELECTRIC LIGHT & POWER Co. v. CITY OF TACOMA, Wash., 55 Pac. Rep. 219.

76. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Powers-Encroachment on Street.-A municipality has no power to confer on a person the right to maintain a permanent encroachment on a street, exclusively for private use.— SNYDER V. CITY OF MT. PULASKI, Ill., 52 N. E. Rep. 62. 77. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Public Improvements -Assessments.-Under City and Village Act, art. 9, § 50, providing that contracts for public improvements, to be paid for by special assessment, shall be let to the lowest bidder, in the manner to be prescribed by ordinance, there can be no assessment for a pavement 53 feet wide; the contract, therefore, under which it was constructed, having been made, and work having been begun, before the passage of the ordinance authoriz. ing it, and while there was an ordinance merely au thorizing a pavement 61 feet wide. -PELLS V. CITY OF PAXTON, Ill., 52 N. E. Rep. 64.

78. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Sewers.-A city which ordered the construction of a sewer in a street under tracks of a railroad company whose easement in the street was dominant to the city's estate in such street, must compensate the company for the cost to it of strengthening the walls of the sewer in order to bear the weight of girders carrying the tracks over it, and the cost of raising the tracks to overcome the elevation of the sewer, since the construction of the sewer directly invaded a vested estate and was not a mere consequential injury entailed by the construction of street improvements.-MAYOR, ETC. OF CITY OF BALTIMORE V. COWEN, Md., 41 Atl. Rep. 900.

79. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Street ImprovementOrdinance. An ordinance providing that a street shall be paved 15 feet each way from its center between designated streets, and that the same shall be paid for by special taxation, except at street crossings and op. posite property owned by the city, is not objectionable, as giving no rule of apportionment of the assessment, since its terms are a declaration that the improvement shall be paid for according to frontage.—CRAMER V. CITY OF CHARLESTON, Ill., 52 N. E. Rep. 73.

80. NUISANCE-Ordinance.-The ordinary use of prop erty cannot be interfered with by assuming that it is a nuisance per se.-STATE V. MARSHALL, La., 24 South. Rep. 186.

81. PARENT AND CHILD-Injuries Resulting in Death. -Under Rev. St. 1889, § 4425, authorizing parents to sue

for damages for injuries resulting in the death of their minor child, if unmarried at its death, an allegation that deceased was a minor six years of age is a sufficient allegation that he died unmarried.-BAIRD V. CITIZENS' RY. Co., Mo., 48 S. W. Rep. 78.

Presumptions.

82. PARENT AND CHILD-Services The presumption that father and daughter, living together as a common family, did not intend that either should receive pay for services or board and comforts furnished the other, may be rebutted by an express contract to pay, or by facts and circumstances excluding the intention that the services or things furnished were gratuitous.-COLLINS V. WILLIAMS, Ind., 52 N. E. Rep. 92.

83. PARTNERSHIP - Accounting.-In an action for an accounting between alleged co partners, it was unnecessary for plaintiff to offer to place defendants in statu quo respecting certain securities which they had discharged, where such securities were alleged to have been obtained from him by them through certain frauds practiced on him by them.-RICHARDS V. FRASER, Cal., 55 Pac. Rep. 246.

84. PARTNERSHIP Mortgages.-A partner, who had executed a note and mortgage to the firm to secure his debt to it, afterwards "sold and transferred his right, title, and interest in and to all the assets" of the firm to the other members. Held, to convey the title to the note and mortgage to the remaining members of the firm, so as to give them the power to enforce them without any other final adjustment of the partnership accounts.-CAMPBELL V. BANE, Mich., 77 N. W. Rep. 322. 85. PAYMENT-Voluntary Payment-Mistake.-Where a dispute as to the amount of rent due arose between a landlord and tenant, and the tenant, with full knowledge of all the facts, paid the amount claimed by the landlord, he cannot recover the disputed part of it back as paid under a mistake.-LAMB V. RATHBURN, Mich., 77 N. W. Rep. 268.

86. PLEADING Statute of Frauds.-Where the bill does not show that an alleged agreement creating a trust was not in writing, an objection that the agree ment is void under the statute of frauds, because not in writing, cannot be raised by demurrer.-WHITING V. DYER, R. I., 41 Atl. Rep. 895.

88. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY Bail Bond-Validity.Under Gen. St. § 969, authorizing a discharge of sureties on a criminal recognizance on surrendering their principal to the sheriff before rendition of judgment on scire facias and payment of costs, they are entitled to a discharge on their offer to pay costs before such judgment, where their principal had escaped, and had been arrested by the sheriff under a different charge than that under which the recognizance was given, and had been surrendered by them to the sheriff after such arrest.-HUSTON V. PEOPLE, Colo., 55 Pac. Rep. 262.

89. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Guaranty-Notice of Default. Where one gives a bond to a town conditioned for performance of another's contract to supply it with light, he is a surety, and not a guarantor, and hence is not entitled to notice of his principal's default.-ToWN OF SULLIVAN V. CLUGGAGE, Ind., 52 N. E. Rep. 110.

90. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Release-Contract.-Sureties on a bond of a contractor for execution of his contract are released by his being required, without their knowledge, to do a higher and more costly class of work than contracted for.-SOUTHERN BRIDGE CO. v. BOGENSHOT, Tenn., 48 S. W. Rep. 97.

91. PUBLIC LANDS-Headright Certificates.-On an issue whether a partial location of a headright certifi cate, made by one claiming it entirely, but whose source of title did not appear, inured to the exclusive

benefit of one of two joint owners of the certificate, an instruction, without evidence warrantying it, that the presumption is that a location in the name of two joint owners is made for both, is harmless, since a charge ground on the evidence would not be more favorable. -ESTELL V. KIRBY, Tex., 48 S. W. Rep. S.

92. QUIETING TITLE Possession.-Complainant acquired title to the lands in suit by conveyance from one who had purchased them under a decree for taxes. At the date of the conveyance defendant was in possession by a tenant. Complainant procured the ten ant to yield possession to her without process. Held that, as defendant's title had terminated by operation of law, complainant's possession, necessary to enable her to maintain a bill to quiet title, was not wrongfully obtained.-LILLIE V. SNOW, Mich., 77 N. W. Rep. 241.

93. RAILROAD COMPANY-Negligence.-An attempt to drive over a crossing ahead of a freight train, which was in plain view, and moving at about eight miles an hour, in spite of the warning of the flagman, given when the driver had abundant time to avoid the dan ger, which results in a collision, wherein the driver was killed, is negligence sufficient to prevent a recov ery.-HANSON V. PENNSYLVANIA R. Co., N. J., 41 Atl. Rep. 868.

94. RAILROAD COMPANY Negligence of TravelerLook and Listen.-The failure of a person about to cross a railway track, on a highway, at grade, to look and listen for an approaching train, or to stop for such purpose, where the view of the track is obstructed, or where there is noise which he may thus control, and which may prevent his hearing such train, is negli. gence, as a matter of law, which will bar a recovery for an injury resulting from a collision with a train at such crossing.-BLACKBURN V. SOUTHERN PAC. Co., Oreg., 55 Pac. Rep. 225.

93. RAILROAD COMPANY-Preferential Liens for Labor and Materials.-The doctrine of the federal courts which recognizes the claims of those furnishing labor or supplies necessary to keep a railroad a going con. cern as entitled to priority of payment over its mort. gage indebtedness is applicable to telegraph and telephone lines, which are given the power of eminent do main, and otherwise recognized as important public agencies of modern business and commerce.-KEELYN V. CAROLINA MUT. TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO., U. S. C. C., D. (8. Car.), 90 Fed. Rep. 29.

96. REMOVAL OF CAUSES-Local Prejudice.-After the expiration of the term at which an order for removal was made by the circuit court on the ground of local prejudice, such order cannot be reviewed on a motion to remand on the ground that the evidence on which it was based was insufficient.-PARKS V. SOUTHERN RY. Co., U. S. C. C., W. D. (N. Car.), 90 Fed. Rep. 3.

97. REMOVAL OF CAUSES-Local Prejudice-Discretion of Court. The amount and manner of proof required to authorize the removal of a cause on the ground of local prejudice under the acts of 1887 and 1888 must be left to the discretion of the court passing on the appli cation, and after the term has expired at which an or der of removal on such ground was made it cannot be reviewed, and the cause remanded, on the ground that the showing was insufficient.-CROTTS V. SOUTHERN Rr. Co., U. S. C. C., W. D. (N. Car.), 90 Fed. Rep. 1.

98. REPLEVIN-Bond.-The failure of the court to enter judgment for defendant against plaintiff and sureties on the bond, in an action of replevin decided adversely to plaintiff, does not preclude defendant from recovering from plaintiff the value of the property replevied.-NORWOOD V. INTERSTATE NAT. BANK OF TEXARKANA, Tex., 48 S. W. Rep. 3.

99. RES JUDICATA-Voluntary Nonsult.-A matter is not res judicata, though litigated in the courts of a State, and passed upon by its supreme court, where, after such decision is made, and the case remanded the plaintiff takes a voluntary nonsuit, as permitted by the State law, and no final judgment is entered.UNION BANK OF RICHMOND, VA., V. BOARD OF COMMRS.

of Oxford, N. CAR., U. S. C. C., E. D. (N. Car.), 90 Fed. Rep. 7.

100. SALE-Conditional Sale.-Under one contract of sale, providing that the title should not pass until pay. ment of the price, property was sold for resale, and delivered at different times, and part payments were made from time to time. One general account was kept, and the part payments were credited thereon, and not on any particular goods. Before full payment of the price, the vendee resold it in payment of a preexisting debt. Held, that the title remained in the original vendor, the purchase for a pre-existing debt not being a purchase for value in due course of business.-HENCH V. EACOCK, Ind., 52 N. E. Rep. 85.

101. SALE-Conditional Sale-Resale.-Where an original seller consents to a sale by his immediate purchaser to another, and that the latter shall assume the payment of the purchase money, he becomes the "original purchaser," within Act 1889, ch. 81, § 1, providing that, where personal property is sold on condi. tion that title remain in the seller till consideration is paid, the seller, after regaining possession for default in payment, shall, within a certain time, have a public sale thereof, and in default thereof, unless it is waived, the "original purchaser" may recover of him the part of the consideration paid.-TSCHOPICK V. LIPPINCOTT, Tenn., 48 S. W. Rep. 128.

102. SALE-Fraud-Rescission.-An instruction that the seller of machinery might rescind and replevy it if the buyer did not, at the time of the sale, intend to pay for it, is not misleading because of its omission to state the rights of intervening bona fide purchasers, where the right to recover was elsewhere stated to be subject to the condition that the property had not passed to such a purchaser.-HACKER V. MUNROE, HI., 52 N. E. Rep. 12.

103. SALE-Lunatics-Liability for Price.-A lunatic, who has purchased merchandise, cannot escape liability for the price, where the contract of sale was fair, and was made by the seller in ignorance of the buyer's lunacy, and the seller cannot be placed in statu quo.— FLACH V. GOTTSCHALK CO. OF BALTIMORE CITY, Md., 41 Atl. Rep. 908.

104. SALE-Rescission-Misrepresentation.-A manag ing partner representing to a seller to the firm that it had a cash capital of a certain sum, which was deposited in a bank by a co-partner, does not make a misrepresentation justifying a rescission of the sale, though his agreement with his co-partner precludes him from drawing out more than half such sum.STANDARD HORSESHOE Co. oF SOUTH WAREHAM V. O'BRIEN, Md., 41 Atl. Rep. 898.

105. SALE - Warranty Notice Waiver.-Where a seller warranting machinery was notified of defects, and on his promise to remedy them the buyer executed notes for the price, he cannot, on failing to remedy, complain that the notice of defects was not given, nor the machinery returned, in the time or manner stipu lated for, nor insist that the use by the buyer thereafter was a ratification of the sale, though it was stipulated that it should be.-C. AULTMAN & Co. v. RICHARDSON, Ind., 52 N. E. Rep. 86.

106. SALE-Warranty-Notice of Breach.-Where one bought a machine on an agreement that a warranty thereof would be considered fully satisfied unless the buyer gave the seller and the agents from whom they purchased written notice within 10 days after trial and its failure to fulfill the terms of the warranty, and the buyer gave the agent selling it a verbal notice of defects, and he, acting for the seller, undertook to remedy them, no other notice is required, since notice to the agent was notice to the principal.-PORT HURON ENGINE & THRESHER CO. V. SMITH, Ind., 52 N. E. Rep.

106.

107. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-Verbal Contract.-Specific performance of a verbal contract will not be de. creed where the contract is not clearly established.CUPPY V. ALLEN, Ill., 52 N. E. Rep. 61.

108. TRUSTEES Appointment. Appointment of trustees by the holder of the debt secured by the trust deed, on failure of the trustee named therein to act, being authorized by the deed, is valid.-PERRIN V. TRIMBLE, Tenn., 48 S. W. Rep. 125.

109. USURY-What Law Governs.-A usurious building and loan note negotiated in Texas is governed by the laws of that State, though executed and perform. able in another State, according to the laws of which it would not be usurious.—PEOPLE'S BUILDING, LOAN & SAVING ASSN. V. BESSONETTE, Tex., 48 S. W. Rep. 52.

110. VENDOR'S LIEN-Foreclosure.-A petition to fore close a vendor's lien described the land as a certain square, and referred to a certain deed as containing a better description. The deed described the square, and, in addition thereto, an adjoining rectangle. Held, that the reference in the petition did not enlarge the description therein so as to embrace the rectangle, within the rule that, where a description by metes and bounds is followed by a reference to some other writ ing for a further description, the latter cannot be looked to to enlarge the former.-SANGER V. ROBERTS, Tex., 48 S. W. Rep. 1.

111. VENDOR'S LIEN-Foreclosure-Limitations.-Rev. St. 1895, art. 3358, providing that "every action other than for the recovery of real estate, for which no lim itation is otherwise prescribed, shall be brought within four years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued, and not afterwards," does not apply to an action to foreclose a vendor's lien on real estate, reserved in the deed of the property, since, by article 3356, suits evidenced by or founded on written contracts are required to be brought within four years after accrual of the cause of action.-FLEWELLEN V. COCHRAN, Tex., 48 S. W. Rep. 39.

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Fraud-Estoppel.

112. VENDOR AND PURCHASER Where, in an action for the price of land, the defendant seeks to recoup his damage for plaintiff's fraudu lent representations as to value, but does not seek to rescind the sale, the fact that defendant paid a part of the price, and accepted a deed, with knowledge of the fraud, does not estop him from setting up fraud as a defense.-MORMAN V. HARRINGTON, Mich., 77 N. W. Rep. 242.

113. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Liens-Assignment.The assignee of a purchase-money note, which was a first lien on the land, was also the assignee of a me chanic's lien judgment, which was inferior to the equi. table title of the purchasers under trustee's sale of the vendee's interest, and he afterwards assigned the mechanic's lien judgment, the transfer containing no covenants of warranty or representations that the vendor held no other liens on the land. Held, that the assignment did not carry with it the legal title represented by the purchase-money note.-DAVIS V. HERTMAN, Tex., 48 S. W. Rep. 50.

114. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Sale of Land-Rescis sion. Where a buyer contracts for the purchase of, and pays part of the consideration for, land for which a good title is to be furnished, he may recover the consideration so paid, if the seller declares that he cannot furnish a good title, and rescinds the contract.-ELDER V. CHAPMAN, Ill., 52 N. E. Rep. 10.

115. WITNESS-Privileged Communications-Attorney and Client. The reason for the rule which precludes an attorney or counsel from disclosing transactions or conversations between himself and his client ceases as to the contents of written instruments after they have been executed by the client, and neither such general rule nor the statute of New York (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 835, 836) prevents a counsel who prepared a codicil to the will of a client, since deceased, which codicil has been destroyed, from being required to state, if within his knowledge, whether such codicil was executed, and, if so, its contents, though he cannot, under the statute, be required to testify as to the transactions or conversations leading up to its execution.-FAYERWEATHER V. RITCH, U. S. C. C., S. D. (N. Y.), 90 Fed. Rep. 13.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., JANUARY 27, 1899.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin has recently, in the case of In re Bruss-Ritter Co., decided a question of some perplexity as to the time of the taking effect of the new bankruptcy law, the court holding that the intention of the act, to have force and effect from the date of its passage, is expressly declared in the concluding paragraphs, and that with the purpose of congress thus established to have the law take effect from July 1st, the proviso to postpone the filing of petitions thereunder in voluntary cases one month, and involuntary cases four months, cannot operate to nullify that purpose for a reasonable preparatory time so directed for commencing the proceedings, and that while it is probably true that the authority granted to congress by the constitution to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy cannot be exercised by the mere abolishing or suspension of State insolvency provisions without furnishing a system of remedies in their place, yet such system is provided by this act, and the fact that petitions may not be received before the time fixed is a mere regulation of procedure, the time and manner of commencing actions being always subject to regulation, and in no

sense can it be held that the remedies of

suitors which are presumably adequate and complete, are thereby impaired.

The reading of the Bible in public schools as a supplementary text book of reading where the teacher is not allowed to make comments and where the reading takes place at the close of school sessions from which any pupil may be excused, on application of parents, has been declared by the Supreme Court of Michigan in Pfeiffer v. Board of Education, not a violation of any of the provisions of the Michigan constitution. This view is in harmony with the leading adjudicated cases on the subject. The question came before the Supreme Court of Maine as early as 1854. Donahue v. Richards, 38 Me. 398. Though the provisions of the constitution of that State differed substantially from

that of other States, the reasoning and conclusion of the Maine court is of argumentative value. The common schools, they say, are not for the purpose of instruction in the theological doctrines of any religion or of any sect. The State regards no one sect as superior to any other, and no theological views as peculiarly entitled to precedence. It is no part of the duty of the instructor to give the ological instruction, and, if the peculiar tenet of any particular sect were so taught, it would furnish a well-grounded cause of complaint on the part of those who entertained different or opposite religious sentiments. But the instruction here given is not in fact, and is not alleged to have been, in articles of faith. No theological doctrines were taught. The creed of no sect was affirmed or denied. The truth or falsehood of the book in which the scholars are required to read was not asserted. No interference, by way of instruction. with the views of the scholars, whether derived from parental or sacerdotal authority, is shown. The Bible was used merely as a book in which instruction in reading was given. But reading the Bible is no more an interference with religious belief than would reading the mythology of Greece or Rome be regarded as interfering with religious belief or affirming the Pagan creeds. A chapter in the Koran might be read, yet it would not be an affirmation of the truth of Mohammedanism, or an interference with religious faith. The Bible was used merely as a reading book, and for the information contained in it, as the Koran might be, and not for religious instruction. If suitable for that, it was suitable for the purpose for which it was selected. No one was required to believe, or punished for disbelief, either in its inspiration or want of inspiration, in the fidelity of the translation or its inaccuracy, or in any set of doctrines deducible or not deducible therefrom. A similar view was entertained by the Supreme Court of Iowa in Moore v. Monroe, 64 Iowa, 367. In treating of the effect of the provision in the several State constitutions corresponding to that under discussion, Judge Cooley, in the work above cited (Constitutional Limitations), says, at page 470: "The American constitutions contain no provisions which prohibit the authorities from such solemn recognition of a Superintending Providence in public transactions and enterprises

as the religious sentiment of mankind inspires, and as seems meet and proper in finite beings. Whatever may be the shade of religious belief, all must acknowledge the importance of recognizing in important human affairs the superintending care and control of the great Governor of the Universe, and of acknowledging with thanksgiving His boundless favors, or bending in contrition when visited with the penalties of His broken laws. No principle of constitutional law is violated when thanksgiving or fast days are appointed, when chaplains are designated for the army and navy, when legislative sessions are opened with prayer or the reading of the Scriptures, or when religious teaching is encouraged by the general exemption of the houses of religious worship from taxation for the support of the government.”

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

ASSOCIATION EXCHANGES -EXPULSION OF MEMBERS BY LAWS-VALIDITY.-The Supreme Court of Illinois decides, in Greene v. Board of Trade, 51 N. E. Rep. 599, that a rule of the Chicago Board of Trade, providing that when any member commits any grave offense, or act of dishonesty involving the association, the board of directors shall appoint a committee from their number to make a preliminary investigation as to whether charges should be preferred to the board, is not unreasonable and against public policy; that when a committee of the board of directors of the Chicago Board of Trade makes a preliminary investigation of charges against a member of the Board of Trade, to determine whether a trial of such charges shall be had, the member is not entitled to notice of such preliminary investigation; that the fact that charges against a member of the Chicago Board of Trade are preferred by a member of the board of directors which is to try the member upon such charge is no ground for enjoining such trial; that a rule of the Chicago Board of Trade that a member being tried before the board of directors for violation of the by-laws of the board shall not be allowed to be represented by professional counsel is not unreasonable or against public policy; that the fact that a member of the Chicago Board of Trade by virtue of his membership has made contracts between customers does not prevent the board from expelling such member for violation of its rules, as such contracts can be enforced by the customers in their own names; and that customers dealing with a member of the Chicago Board of Trade are conclusively presumed to have dealt with him with ref

erence to the rules of the board, which provide that members can be expelled for misconduct.

ANIMALS-HUMANE SOCIETY-KILLING ANIMALS.-In Goodwin v. Toucy, 41 Atl. Rep. 806, decided by the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, it was held that section 3670 of the General Statutes of Connecticut, providing that an agent of the humane society may destroy any animal "in his charge" when, in his judgment and that of two reputable citizens, such animal appears to be "injured, disabled, diseased past recovery, or unfit for any useful purpose," does not authorize him to take an animal properly hitched on a street, and kill it, however bad its condition may be, it not being abandoned or cruelly treated or

having any contagious disease; but, to authorize the killing under such conditions, the agent must have taken it, and the owner, neglected to retake it after a reasonable time therefor, under section 3667, providing, when any person arrested for cruelty to animals is at the time in charge of a vehicle drawn by an animal cruelly treated, an agent of the society may take charge of it, and shall give notice to the owner, and care for it till the owner take charge of it, provided he shall take charge of it within sixty days, and there shall be a lien on it for such care; or, under section 3668, authorizing such agent to take charge of any animal found abandoned, neglected, or cruelly treated, requiring him to give notice to the owner, and permitting him to provide for it till the owner take charge of it, and declaring the expenses of such care a charge against the owner.

BILLS AND NOTES-NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT -PURCHASERS FOR VALUE-STOLEN PROPERTY. -It is held by the Court of Chancery Appeals of Tennessee, in Whiteside v. First National Bank, 47 S. W. Rep. 1108, that purchaser, for value, before maturity, and in due course of trade, of negotiable paper indorsed by the payee in blank, from one who has stolen it, acquires a title good even against the owner; that negotiable paper, taken without notice, before maturity, as collateral security for a loan made at the time, is held by the taker as an innocent holder; that where stolen negotiable paper was transferred to an innocent holder as collateral security, the court will not, for the purpose of defeating his title, presume that the loan secured by it was usurious, even where the lender testified that he did not remember the rate of interest, and that where one whose reputation in the community was good, who had theretofore held a responsible public office, negotiated paper of one who was a surety on his official bond, and with whose sons he shared the same office, the fact that such person was insolvent and indebted to the transferee bank, of which the other transferee was president, and wherein the borrower's paper had been protested, was not sufficient to put the transferees on inquiry as to his title.