more troops were now needed at Santiago, or if fighting were to be done, then the order for this regiment would be approved by all; but it is a wholly different matter to send them into a pestilence that other soldiers, who are probably more nearly immune than they, may be removed from the danger. A solemn sense of my duty to these young men impels me, therefore, to request most earnestly and urgently that the order for their removal to Santiago be revoked. I send this without the knowledge of any officer or man in the regiment. "A. O. BACON,

"United States Senator."

"Santiago de Cuba, August 4, 1898.-Summoned by Major General Shafter, a meeting was held here this morning at headquarters, and in the presence of every commanding and medical officer of the Fifth Army Corps, General Shafter read a cable message from Secretary Alger, ordering him, at the recommendation of Surgeon General Sternberg, to move the army into the interior of San Luis, where it is supposed to be more healthful.

"As a result of the conference, General Shafter will insist upon the immediate withdrawal of the army north, or within two weeks. As an explanation of the situation, the following letter from Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, commanding the First Volunteer Cavalry, to General Shafter, was handed by the latter to the correspondent of the Associated Press for publication:

"Major General Shafter, Sir: In a meeting of the general and medical officers called by you at the Palace this morning, we were all, as you know, unanimous as to what should be done with the army. To keep us here, in the opinion of every officer commanding a division or brigade, will simply involve the destruction of thousands. There is no possible reason for not shipping practically the entire command North at once. Yellow fever cases are very few in the cavalry division where I command one of the two brigades, and not one true case of yellow fever has occurred in this division, except among the men sent to the hospital at Siboney, where they have, I believe, contracted it. But in this division there have been fifteen hundred cases of malarial fever. Not a man has died from it, but the whole command has been so weakened and shattered as to be ripe for dying like rotten sheep, when a real yellow fever epidemic, instead of a fake epidemic like the present, strikes us, as it is bound to if we stay here at the height of the sickness season, August, and the beginning of September. Quarantine against malarial fever is like quarantine against the toothache. All of us are certain, as soon as the authorities fully appreciate the conditions of the army, they will order us to be sent home.

""If we are kept here, it will in all human possibility mean an appalling disaster, for the surgeons here estimate that over half the army, if kept here

during the sickly season, will die. This is not only terrible from the standpoint of the individual lives lost, but it means ruin from the standpoint of the military efficiency of the flower of the American Army, for the great bulk of the regulars are here with you. The sick list, large although it is, exceeding four thousand, affords but a faint index of the debilities of the army. Not ten per cent are fit for active work.

""Six weeks on the North Maine coast, for instance, or elsewhere, where the yellow fever germ can not possibly propagate, would make us all as fit as fighting cocks, able as we are, and eager to take a leading part in the great campaign against Havana in the Fall, even if we are not allowed to try Puerto Rico.

"We can be moved North, if moved at once, with absolute safety to the country, although, of course, it would have been infinitely better if we had been moved North or to Puerto Rico two weeks ago. If there were any object in keeping us here, we would face yellow fever with as much indifference as we face bullets. But there is no object in it. The fever immune regiments ordered here are sufficient to garrison the city and surrounding towns, and there is absolutely nothing for us to do here, and there has not been since the city surrendered. It is impossible to move into the interior. Every shifting of camp doubles the sick rate in our present weakened condition, and, anyhow, the interior is rather worse than the coast, as I have found by actual reconnoissance. Our present camps are as healthy as any camps at this end of the island can be.

"I write only because I can not see our men, who have fought so bravely and who have endured extreme hardship and danger so uncomplainingly, go to destruction without striving, so far as lies in me, to avert a doom as fearful as it is unnecessary and undeserved.

"Yours respectfully,

""THEODORE ROOSEVELT, "Colonel Commanding First Brigade." After Colonel Roosevelt had taken the initiative, all the American general officers united in a Round Robin addressed to General Shafter. It reads:

"We, the undersigned officers, commanding the various brigades, divisions, etc., of the army of occupation in Cuba, are of the unanimous opinion that this army should be at once taken out of the Island of Cuba, and sent to some point on the seacoast of the United States; that it can be done without danger to the people of the United States; that yellow fever in the army is not now epidemic; that there are only a few sporadic cases; but that the army is disabled by malarial fever to the extent that its efficiency is destroyed, and that it is in a condition to be practically entirely destroyed by an epidemic of yellow fever which is sure to come in the near future.

"We know from the reports of competent officers and from personal observations, that the army is unable to move into the interior, and that there are no facilities for such a move if attempted, and that it could not be attempted until too late. Moreover, the best authorities of the island say that with our present equipment we could not live in the interior during the rainy season without losses from malarial fever, which is almost as deadly as yellow fever.

"This army must be moved at once or perish. As the army can be safely moved now, the persons responsible for preventing such a move will be responsible for the unnecessary loss of many thousands of lives. Our opinions are the result of careful personal observation and they are also based on the unanimous opinion of our medical officers with the army, who understand the situation absolutely.

"J. FORD KENT,

"Major General Volunteers, Commanding First Division 5th Corps.

"J. C. BATES,

"Major General Volunteers, Commanding Provisional Division. "ADNA R. CHAFFEE,

"Major General, Commanding Third Brigade, Second Division. "SAMUEL S. SUMNER,

"Brigadier General Volunteers, Commanding First Brigade Cavalry. "ADELBERT AMES,

"Brigadier General Volunteers, Commanding Third Brigade, 2nd Division.

"LEONARD WOOD,

"Brigadier General Volunteers, Commanding Second Cavalry Brigade. "THEODORE ROOSEVELT,

"Colonel Commanding Second Cavalry Brigade.”

General Alger seems to have been excited when he wrote:

"It would be impossible to exaggerate the mischievous and wicked effects of the 'Round Robin.' It afflicted the country with a plague of anguish and apprehension. There are martyrs in all wars, but the most piteous of these are the silent, helpless, heartbroken ones who stay at home to weep and pray and wait the mother, the sister, wife and sweetheart. To their natural suspense and suffering these publications added the pangs of imaginary terrors. They had endured, through sympathy, the battle-field, the wasting hardships of the camp, the campaign in the tropics, the fever-stricken trench. They might at least have been spared this wanton torture, this impalpable and formless yet overwhelming blow."

In his "Rough Rider" history, President Roosevelt gives his opinion in distinct and decisive terms, as follows:

"We should have probably spent the summer in our sick camps, losing half the men and hopelessly shattering the health of the remainder, if General Shafter had not summoned a council of officers, hoping by united action of a more or less public character, to wake up the Washington authorities to the actual condition of things. As all the Spanish forces in the province of Santiago had surrendered, and as so-called immune regiments were coming to garrison the conquered territory, there was literally not one thing of any kind whatsoever for the army to do, and no purpose to serve by keeping it at Santiago. We did not suppose that peace was at hand, being ignorant of the negotiations. We were anxious to take part in the Porto Rico campaign, and would have been more than willing to suffer any amount of sickness, if by so doing we could get into action. But if we were not to take part in the Porto Rico campaign, then we knew it was absolutely indispensable to get our commands north immediately, if they were to be in trim for the great campaign against Havana, which would surely be the main event of the winter if peace were not declared in advance.

"Our army included the great majority of the Regulars, and was, therefore, the flower of the American force. It was on every account imperative to keep it in good trim; and to keep it in Santiago meant its entirely purposeless destruction. As soon as the surrender was an accomplished fact, the taking away of the army to the north should have begun.

"Every officer, from the highest to the lowest, especially among the regulars, realized all of this, and about the last day of July, General Shafter called a conference, in the Palace, of all the division and brigade commanders. By this time, owing to Wood's having been made Governor-General, I was in command of my brigade; so I went to the conference too, riding in with Generals Sumner and Wheeler, who were the other representatives of the cavalry division. Besides the line officers, all the chief medical officers were present at the conference. The telegrams from the Secretary stating the position of himself and the Surgeon-General were read, and then almost every line and medical officer present expressed his views in turn. They were almost all Regulars and had been brought up to life-long habits of obedience without protest. They were ready to obey still, but they felt, quite rightly, that it was their duty to protest rather than to see the flower of the United States forces destroyed as the culminating act of a campaign in which the blunders that had been committed had been retrieved only by the valor and splendid. soldierly qualities of the officers and enlisted men of the infantry and dismounted cavalry. There was not a dissenting voice, for there could not be. There was but one side to the question. To talk of continually shifting camp or of moving up the mountains into the interior was idle, for not one of the plans could be carried out with our utterly insufficient transportation, and

at that season and in that climate they would merely have resulted in aggravating the sickliness of the soldiers. It was deemed best to make some record of our opinion, in the shape of a letter or report, which would show that to keep the army in Santiago meant its absolute and objectless ruin, and that it should at once be recalled. At first, there was naturally some hesitation on the part of the Regular officers to take the initiative, for their entire future career might be sacrificed. So I wrote a letter to General Shafter, reading over the rough draft to the various Generals and adopting their corrections. Before I had finished making these corrections, it was determined that we should send a circular on behalf of all of us to General Shafter, and when I returned from presenting him mine, I found this circular letter already prepared and we all of us signed it. Both letters were made public. The result was immediate. Within three days the army was ordered to be ready to sail for home. As soon as it was known that we were to sail for home the spirits of the men changed for the better. In my regiment the officers began to plan methods of drilling the men on horseback, so as to fit them for use against the Spanish cavalry, if we should go against Havana in December. We had, all of us, eyed the captured Spanish cavalry with particular interest. The men were small, and the horses, though well trained and well built, were diminutive ponies, very much smaller than cow ponies. We were certain that if we ever got a chance to try shock tactics against them they would go down like nine-pins, provided only that our men could be trained to charge in any kind of line, and we made up our minds to devote our time to this. Dismounted work with the rifle we already felt thoroughly competent to perform."

Colonel Roosevelt commanding a brigade was never hard to understand. He did not for a moment hesitate to accept the responsibility, and he took it in this case. The alarms of General Alger were not supported by dangers, and there was no cause for outcry as to military discipline. Spain was no longer a belligerent. Her fleets had been destroyed, so that there was no question about the command of the seas. We were masters in the Philippines and the West Indies. Cuba could not receive reinforcements or munitions of war. The United States had an overwhelming army of volunteers, and we could crush the Spanish army in the West end of the island and invade the Spanish peninsula, capturing all the islands belonging to Spain in the Mediterranean and on the African coast. There was one great peril, and it could not be concealed,-that of the yellow fever pestilence. Our army was in a hotbed of fevers, and if it had not been removed with more system and celerity than it had been disembarked, there would have been an awful and wholly useless sacrifice of brave men.

All the Spanish war ships were destroyed, and the army of the Santiago