for the great admiral, and for every officer and sailor of his fleet; that we should testify our appreciation of the debt under which this country lies to him. and to them, and indeed to all their comrades in our forces afloat and ashore. THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

It will be observed that the President has contended for the necessity of a large margin of discretion. Secretary Long is the author of the dispatch commanding Admiral Sampson to be cautious.

We quote a few of the many happy, strong and gracious things that President Roosevelt has had to say of Admiral Dewey.

"Admiral Dewey has done more than add a glorious page to our history; more even than do a deed the memory of which will always be an inspiration to his countrymen, and especially his countrymen of his own profession. He has also taught us a lesson which should have profound practical effects, if only we were willing to learn it aright. In the first place, he partly grasped and partly made his opportunity.

"One factor in Admiral Dewey's appointment-of which he is very possibly ignorant—was the way in which he had taken responsibility in purchasing coal for the squadron which was to have been used against Chile, if war with Chile had broken out, at the time General Harrison was President. A service will do well or ill at the outbreak of war, very much in proportion to the way it has been prepared to meet the outbreak during the preceding months.

"No small part of the good done by the admirable war college, under Captains Mahan, Taylor and Goddrich, lay in their insistence upon the need of the naval officer's instantly accepting responsibility in any crisis, and doing what was best for the flag, even though it was probable the action might be disavowed by his immediate superiors, and though it might result in his own personal inconvenience and detriment. This was taught not merely as an abstract theory, but with direct reference to concrete cases; for instance, with reference to taking possession of Hawaii, if a revolution should by chance break out there during the presence of an American war-ship, or if the warship of a foreign power attempted to interfere with the affairs of the island.

"For the work which Dewey had to do willingness to accept responsibility was a prime requisite. A man afraid to vary in times of emergency from the regulations laid down in time of peace would never even have got the coal with which to steam to Manila from Hong-Kong the instant the crisis came. We were peculiarly fortunate in our Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Long; but the best Secretary that ever held the Navy portfolio could not successfully direct operations on the other side of the world. All that he could do was to choose a good man, give him the largest possible liberty of action, and back him up in every way; and this Secretary Long did. But if the man had been timid about taking risks, nothing that could be done for him would have availed. Such a

The danger would have been of pre

man would not have disobeyed orders. cisely the opposite character. He would scrupulously have done just whatever he was told to do, and then would have sat down and waited for further instructions, so as to protect himself if something happened to go wrong. An infinity of excuses can always be found for non-action.

"Admiral Dewey was sent to command the fleet on the Asiatic station primarily because he had such a record in the past that the best officers in the Navy believe him to be peculiarly a man of the fighting temperament and fit to meet emergencies, and because he had shown his willingness to assume heavy responsibilities. How amply he justified this choice it is not necessary to say. On our roll of Naval heroes his name will stand second to that of Farragut alone, and no man since the Civil War, whether soldier or civilian, has added so much to the honorable renown of the Nation or has deserved so well of it." There are no more characteristic utterances from President Roosevelt than the above. He especially commends Admiral Dewey because he was a man who would take risks, and this is "an inspiration to his countrymen." The President points out that if a man in Dewey's place had been “timid about taking risks," "such a man would not have disobeyed orders" but would have obeyed them however wrong and ruinous. That is to say such a timid man would not have risked an iron clad if ordered not to do so. The President significantly adds: "The danger would have been of precisely the contrary character;" that is to say, there would have been danger in the obsolete orders. Dewey risked all the ironclads he had, and cut the cable on account of the Spaniards at the same time, even though he could not hear from Washington, except by steamboat, running eight hundred and twenty miles from Hong-Kong to Manila Bay.

In his first Message to Congress President Roosevelt says: the iron clads should be worn out in hard work, and he proposes to change the whole character of the Naval service. He is emphatic, peremptory and eminently right about this.

Lieutenant General Miles when on a visit to relatives at Cincinnati was reported to say:

"I am willing to take the judgment of Admiral Dewey in the matter. He has been a commander, of a fleet and as such has known the anxieties and responsibilities which rest on a man under these circumstances. He was instrumental in the destruction of one Spanish fleet and knows and realizes the feelings that encompass an officer under such conditions.

"I think Dewey has summed up the matter in a clear and concise manner and I believe his conclusions will be indorsed by the patriotic people of the United States. I have no sympathy with the efforts which have been made to destroy the honor of an officer under such circumstances."

The President directed the Secretary of War to call the attention of General Miles to this interview, to ascertain whether the "observations of a co-ordinate branch of the Government, in a matter now pending, was made as reported," and "to afford opportunity for explanation in writing."

To the Secretary's letter General Miles made this reply:

"Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C., December 20, 1901.The Honorable, the Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.-Sir: Replying to your note of the 19th inst., I have the honor to state that my observations, as substantially reported, had no reference to the action, pending or otherwise, of a co-ordinate branch of the service. They were merely my personal views based upon matters set forth in various publications which had been given to the world and concerning which I conceive there was no impropriety in expressing an opinion, the same as any other citizen, upon a matter of such public interest. My observations were in no sense intended as a criticism of any action taken by a co-ordinate branch of the service, and the statement that I had no sympathy with any efforts tending to disparage a distinguished and gallant officer likewise had no such reference.

"Very Respectfully,

"NELSON A. MILES, Lieutenant General."

On the following day General Miles wrote this letter and had it handed to the Secretary of War:

"Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C., December 21, 1901.-The Honorable, the Secretary of War-Sir: Referring to my note of yesterday, and in order that there may be no misunderstanding, I desire to say that for several years a distinguished and gallant officer has been assailed by parties who have endeavored to write him and other high officials down, until finally he appealed against such assaults to a co-ordinate branch of the Government.

"That co-ordinate branch of the Government granted him a court of inquiry, and, as I understand it, they unanimously exonerated him from such epithets as coward, poltroon, et cetera, and their opinions were given to the public for the information of all citizens. When I said that I had no sympathy with those who had endeavored to destroy the reputation of a high officer, who, like all other officers, regards his honor more sacred than life, I had in mind and referred to those assaults against which the Admiral had appealed for protection and justification, and certainly not to a co-ordinate branch of the Govern

ment.

"I request that this note be laid before the President, and have no objection to its being made public.

"NELSON A. MILES, Lieutenant General."

Secretary Long seems to have been moved to prevent any more "trial of Schley." The country was not of the opinion that Schley was tried, but they have read the testimony; and there need be no hard feelings as to the dissolution of the court. The people do not require any more courts to know the state of the case. The Secretary has also approved of "the Majority Report," and that is not of moment, for the testimony is published. There are several competent persons who can state their views. Mr. Long says:

"And after careful consideration the findings of fact and the opinion of the full court are approved."

Perhaps the main matter was that no ironclad-thinly clad-ship of ours, was hurt except the Brooklyn, and she was not disabled. This was according to the policy, but the order not to risk an ironclad was disregarded by Schley. Concerning Secretary Long's opinion of Dewey, we have this:

"As to the points on which the presiding member differs from the majority

of the court, the opinion of the majority is approved.

"As to the further expression of his views by the same member with regard to the questions of command on the morning of July 3, 1898, and of the title to credit for the ensuing victory, the conduct of the court in making no finding and rendering no opinion on those questions is approved-indeed, it could with propriety take no other course, evidence on these questions during the inquiry having been excluded by the court.

"The Department approves the recommendation of the court that no further proceedings be had in the premises.

"The Department records its appreciation of the arduous labors of the whole court.

"JOHN D. LONG, Secretary of the Navy."

This is Mr. Long's opinion, and it is to be valued according to the final, general judgments. It is not in harmony with the reasons why Dewey was according to President Roosevelt, sent to the Asiatic Station. There he took "risks," even took a "loop" five miles long out of the cable. Dewey might have said much more, but it did not seem necessary.

Among the risks Dewey took were the torpedoes. He knew the Spaniards had a supply, but remembered Farragut, and ran right along, at full speed. 'Another risk was the nine-inch Krupp guns, three in a row at the Lunetta battery. One of the bolts from a Krupp gun passed over the Olympic and struck the water five miles down the bay. Taking such risks was contrary to the orders of the Navy Department.

Secretary Root's reprimand is one thing as he wrote it and another in the highly colored reports of it. We remark the difference between cold fact and warm color in all that has been said on the prosecuting side of the Santiago controversy.

The Secretary of War is an extraordinarily forcible writer. His public papers are remarkable for striking statements. The "reprimand" is directed by the President and the General's explanation is "not satisfactory." The first article of regulations governing the army, is quoted as follows:

"Deliberations or discussions among military men conveying praise or censure or any mark of approbation towards others in the military service are prohibited."

That is the way it stands, and General Miles did not seem to have it fresh in his mind. However, everybody else said the same Miles did.

Senator Foraker approved Dewey's decision and announced President Roosevelt as his candidate for the Presidency in 1904, and that seems to cover the whole ground. The best point Secretary Root makes, is that the Army had not been involved in the "unfortunate and bitter controversy" in the Navy Department. That is well taken if there is any difference of opinion about the Navy matter in the Army. In the last sentence of the reprimand, the Secretary of War gives a bit of that fervid form of expression of which he is a

master:

"It is of no consequence on whose side your opinion was, or what it was. You had no business in the controversy and no right, holding the office which you did, to express any opinion. Your conduct was in violation of the regulations above cited and the rules of official propriety; and you are justly liable to censure, which I now express."

In regard to the second letter of General Miles, there is an edged instrument used in the P. S. as follows:

"P. S.-Your second letter of explanation, dated to-day, received since the above was written, does not change the case. The necessity for repeated explanations but illustrates the importance of the rule which you have violated."

As for involving the Army in the naval conflict, concerning which Secretary Root expresses fear, it is to be related that during the time the army was involved at Santiago for several days' severe fighting, the Navy did not become very much involved in aiding the army-nothing done at any rate that risked an iron clad, and in the language of the President "the man chosen" as Commander-in-Chief of the American fleet, was "timid about taking risks," and did not disobey orders, but fell into "the dangers" the President described, as "of precisely the contrary character"—that is of obeying under stress of high responsibility timid orders, instead of taking telling risks.

We are not stating or leading up to an inference, that we have found an inaccuracy or inconsistency in the compliments the President has paid Admiral Dewey, because he has not agreed with him in all things. On the contrary, what the President once said to the Admiral, that he was selected for command of a remote squadron because he would not obey the orders of absentees, whose