more than that, but the news from the Cape Verde islands caused many changes in the movements of the Americans. The question of naval superiority had to be a settled certainty for us before we could risk an army on transports large enough to cope with that of Spain. Two of our opening campaign calculations were broken by the adventure upon which Cervera was ordered, but there was no Roosevelt in Spain to see to it that there was target practice by our enemies, or abundance of coal and fixed ammunition. The lack in Civil Service reform in Spain had partially disarmed her Navy. Money had been appropriated, but did not get as far as the ships. Cervera knew he was sent on a desperate errand, and had not even the coal as he approached southern Cuba to risk a run to Cienfuegos, which is connected by rail with Havana. Hence, he sheltered his squadron in Santiago, and drew the decisive land battle of the war there. Our Cuban allies turned out to be less numerous, warlike and victorious than represented by the Bureau provided for the American Press at Key West. There were those who remained of the opinion, after Cervera was located, that the Santiago combat would be a minor matter, and the decisive conflict near Havana. Roosevelt was not deceived. He had the fighter's instinct that told him the first fight was to come off at Santiago, and that the first would be the last, at least the greatest. It was fortunate for the Americans that Cervera had to run into Santiago, and that the facilities for coaling there were so inadequate he could not get to Cienfuegos, where the Spanish army at Havana could be moved by railroad; and the American regular army, with the few volunteers ready, could not have beaten the great Spanish army intrenched there. Suppose twenty thousand Spanish troops had been waiting at Santiago, and well supplied. The regiments sufficient to defeat them on that line would have been constrained to wait for re-inforcements until yellow fever time. It is, in the light of these facts, of the highest interest to note the pushing qualities, the headlong run for a transport, the hasty, impetuous landing and dashing advance, that placed the Rough Riders dismounted at the front and enabled them to get into the fight.

The action was most dramatic, and the combats in the tropical jungle exceedingly exacting and dangerous. We are supplied with reports of the severity of the Spanish fire. The casualty lists tell of the deadly work done. We have three accounts from President Roosevelt-all of the deepest interest and corroborating and corroborated from all sides. Before these accounts came in order the dispatches to and from Washington and the battlefields by wire. We have the descriptions of the features of warfare, as seen in the lights and shadows, written with time and material for permanency. Next, the official reports of Col. Roosevelt and of Col. Wood, the superior officer of the famous Lieutenant Colonel, Brigadier General Young, commanding the Brigade; Major General Joseph Wheeler, commanding the Division. First of all

we have the sworn testimony, before the Commission of Investigation of the Spanish War, of President Roosevelt; and it is given with his extraordinary intelligence and fearlessness, making such an inside history as is rare in the accounts of military operations. The testimony was taken November 22nd, 1898, and is invaluable as "the true inwardness." Hereafter, when we make ready for war, we will need to study this story. It goes to the bottom facts and presents them as was done in the Police and Civil Service investigations, and later, in the affairs of the State.

That such a personal force as that of the Twenty-Fifth President should have been called for positively by the National Republican Convention at Philadelphia with a continuity that dismayed opposition, and an energy and resolution that could not be denied, and that all plans and purposes should be set aside, is a proof of our capacity to govern ourselves, of the highest order; and the key to the pertinacity of the pressure for Roosevelt was the conviction, with due respect to all others, that, if President McKinley were by some mysterious dispensation of misfortune called away, Roosevelt was the man, who should be his successor, and certain to command respect and confidence -that our system of government, at once simple and majestic, should move on without jeopardy.

He

Col. Roosevelt, examined by General Wilson, was asked his name and the position he held during the war with Spain. He was Lieutenant Colonel from May 6th until July 8th, when he was made Colonel; and from August until September, he was Second Brigade Commander of the Cavalry Division. He joined the cavalry regiment known as Rough Riders, at San Antonio. "was busy learning his own duties. It was due Col. Wood's energy that the regiment was enabled to get to the field." This remark was a very handsome compliment to Wood, for the great mass of volunteers did not succeed in leaving their home camps of instruction.

Col. Roosevelt testified that before leaving San Antonio, tents and blankets were found for almost everybody, but some could not get shoes. His regiment was armed with Krag-Jorgensen carbines, and a forty-five calibre six-shooter. The men did not have sabers, but were to have machetes that didn't come in time; but it didn't make a particle of difference that they didn't come. The last of May the regiment left San Antonio, and were four days getting to Tampa. On reaching that place, there was no one to show the regiment where to camp, the railroad system was in a condition of congestion, and there were twentyfour hours of utter and absolute confusion. Some of the regiments were dumped miles out of Tampa; but the six troops Roosevelt commanded were brought into town, when he had to take matters into his own hands, get the horses watered and fed, and buy food for the troopers. Finally they got into camp, and after twenty-four hours, everything went smoothly. But the Colonel

thought somebody might have met his troopers to show where the camp was. Asked whether he was re-imbursed for the outlay in the purchase of supplies, the answer was, "Oh, Lord, no; that was a personal matter."

The water supply came to the camp in a thin iron pipe. It was good, but it got hot in the sun. The usual army ration was good, and as the men were plainsmen, they were used to cooking and cooked for themselves. After four days they moved down to Port Tampa, and the Colonel thought "there was a good deal of higglety pigglety business," but it might have been due to the congested condition of the road. They were told to take a track at twelve o'clock and a train, and there was nobody to tell where the train was; and at three o'clock they were moved to another track and at six o'clock got some coal cars, not intended to take the troopers, but the Colonel said, "We construed it that they were, and went down on them." He further testified, “We had been told if we didn't get aboard by daybreak, we'd get left; we didn't intend to get left, and we took those coal cars and slipped down."

The Colonel didn't know who was responsible for the confusion or delay; but he thought where there were so many regiments to embark on so many transports, it might have been settled the day before what regiment was to go on each transport, and try to have the first ten regiments and the first ten transports come together, so that when the transports were loaded, they could pull out; and then ten other regiments take more transports, and so on. The quay was swarming with ten thousand men, and transports were pulling in from mid-stream, but nobody could tell which transport to get on. General Shafter said to find the Quartermaster, Colonel Humphrey, but the Quartermaster wasn't in his place, and hadn't been for some time; so Colonel Wood and Colonel Roosevelt hunted him up, by going for him in opposite directions, and he told them to go on the Yucatan, which was coming in at the dock. Colonel Wood jumped in a boat and went out to the transport, and Roosevelt found that the Yucatan was allotted to the Second Infantry and the SeventyFirst New York. He pleasantly remarked: "I ran down my men and left the guard, and took the rest and rushed them down to the dock, and got on the Yucatan, holding the gang-plank against the Second Infantry and the SeventyFirst New York, and those soldiers had to spend two nights on a train." The Colonel at this point gave the note of triumph. "But we had the Yucatan!" As to the explanation of all this confusion, the Colonel modestly testified: "I was only a Lieutenant-Colonel and can give the facts, but do not know the explanation."

His regiment had had ten or twelve days' rations, good except in one particular, and that made it all bad. Instead of having canned corned beef, which is excellent, they had canned fresh beef, which was exceedingly bad. The Colonel didn't think more than a tenth of it was eaten. When the men got very

hungry, and ate it, it nauseated them at the worst; and the best of it was tasteless and insipid, and no salt was issued with the travel rations. If they had had salt and onions, and means for cooking, an eatable stew would have been possible. Arrangements were made by which the men were allowed to cook coffee. There were no arrangements for ice. No horses were taken. The field officers took their horses on another transport. The sleeping accommodations of the men were not good; those who slept on deck were the best off. There were sufficient medical supplies and three surgeons; but they waited off Port Tampa for five days. It took seven days to reach Santiago, and it was two days before they disembarked. There was a great lack of material for disembarking. When the Colonel was Assistant Secretary of the Navy, he had a naval aide, Lieutenant Sharp, who was there, off the coast of Cuba with a converted yacht. He came along and loaned a Cuban pilot, who took the Yucatan a mile and a half nearer the shore than any other transport. They had a dynamite gun and two Colt's automatic guns aboard, and got them ashore, but could not land the baggage or food, because there were not boats enough. The men had three days' equipment of rations. Roosevelt's baggage consisted of a light mackintosh, and the next day he got a tooth brush. Next morning the officers' baggage was taken ashore. The Colonel adds: "One of my horses was drowned, but I got on the other. Colonel Wood got both of his, and Major Brody got neither of his." General Young commanded the brigade.

In the afternoon there was a hard march for the men; but the Colonel was on his horse, and it was perfectly easy, he says, for him. The men were clothed in the regular winter army clothes, which made it hot in the jungle, but all that had gone wrong was forgotten, or at least neglected, for "about nine o'clock in the evening we reached Siboney, at which time we were well to the front; no other regiment was ahead of us." And the fighting boys were in high spirits, and needed to be, for as they got the fires kindled and supper cooked, "there came down a very heavy rain storm, and then we went to bed." The Colonel doesn't say what sort of bed it was. At midnight Colonel Wood came, and they were to march at daybreak the next morning, along a hill trail to the left, and other troops were to go up the valley trail to the right, and where the trails come together they expected to strike the Spaniards, and so they did.

The march next morning was a hard one, and going up the hill made it so hard, the Colonel didn't appreciate the object of so much speed. Over a hundred men fell out exhausted; others dropped their blankets and packs; but the Colonel rejoiced afterward, for he saw, if they hadn't marched that way, they wouldn't have been able to strike the Spaniards just when they did. They were looking for a fight, and it was a triumph to get there and get into the real war business. They were marching in single file-the jungle was too thick

for flankers to be put out, and Sergeant Fish, under Captain Capron was of the advance guard. After about two hours, there was a halt, word sent down that the Spanish outposts had been discovered, and Colonel Wood gave the order to cease talking, and see that the magazines were all loaded. Colonel Wood gave Roosevelt instructions to deploy with two troops to the right. One troop was deployed to the left and immediately afterward the firing began between that and the point where Sergeant Fish was. Roosevelt deployed to the right and Major Brody to the left, under a "pretty brisk fire."

The Colonel says: "It was a brisk skirmish, and it being my first experience, and with smokeless powder in use, it took me a little time to make out exactly what was up, and I couldn't see the Spaniards for a long time. They were using smokeless powder; but, fortunately, I knew one rule, that if you are in doubt go ahead and be sure you go toward the guns!' We finally discovered the Spaniards through Mr. Richard Harding Davis, who was with me on the line. He pointed across the ravine to an elevation, where he thought were some Spaniards, as he could see their hats; and I got my glasses on them and saw they were Spanish hats, and got my men volley firing on them and they were driven out and ran back where there were other Spaniards, and pretty soon we had them all going back." Some troops were seen on the right flank across the ravine, and proved to be our own regulars. A sergeant named Lee climbed a tree, and waved a guidon, so that the regulars should not fire on the volunteers. There was a report that they had fired a volley at Roosevelt's regiment, but it was not known. The right wing being established, Roosevelt moved to the left to the centre of the regiment, where Colonel Wood was. Major Brody was shot at this time and had to go to the rear, and Roosevelt was sent by Colonel Wood to the left wing, and was there in the thick jungle with three troops with him, and lost touch of the right wing until he heard them cheer.

The regiment was firing at the Spaniards, where there was a sugar house and plantation. When the men were heard cheering on the right, Roosevelt testified: "I knew they must be charging; so, then I charged too, and we drove the Spaniards out of that plantation and sugar house and came to a halt, and didn't know exactly what had become of the rest of the regiment." A false report was circulated that Colonel Wood was killed, and Roosevelt started out to find the missing men of the regiment. He had arranged his own wing behind an overgrown and sunken road, and to his delight met Colonel Wood, asked him where the Spaniards were, and he said they had run away. Immediately afterward, General Chaffee came along, and Roosevelt's words of this are: "I think, before that, three troops of the Ninth Cavalry came along just ahead of General Chaffee, and I then found the thing was all over." A Spanish mule loaded with beans was captured; and as the men were about out of pro