which he replied, "We could give some one a small amount to take the place of James Moore and sign the deed." The fourth exception was to a question as to what he had stated about an effort made by Hartman and himself to sell the property to a lady, and what was the difficulty in effecting a sale to her, to which he replied, "What was stated in one of those letters, that the title was imperfect?"

It must be borne in mind that the only duty which the assignee of a leasehold estate owes the reversioner is the payment of the stipulated rent accruing due, and the taxes becoming demandable, so long, and so long only, as he continues 407 to be the holder of the leasehold estate. Whenever he devests himself of this estate by a valid assignment to another, even though it be without a valuable consideration, the reversioner cannot complain. The creditors of the assignee might, in a proper proceeding, attack an assignment made without proper consideration, but the reversioner could not do so. What might be held a fraud upon them could not be so held as against him. Mr. Poe says in section 388 of his work on Pleading, that a real assignment, under which the party retains in himself no beneficial interest, "even when made to a pauper and for the express purpose of escaping further liability, will not be thereby rendered fraudulent if the act be really designed to operate as it appears" It is therefore vain to appeal to this court in the language of the appellee not to "lend its sanction to so unworthy a transaction as was sought to be effected by the attempted assignment of the term in this case." The only question for our consideration is whether the case was properly submitted to the jury to determine whether the assignment was a real and bona fide assignment, and if was such, neither the court nor the jury were concerned with the motives which influenced the one in conveying and the other in receiving the transfer of the title.

The four exceptions to the testimony may be considered together. Each of these exceptions were taken to questions propounded to Grafflin for the purpose of introducing the acts and declarations of Hartman, as agent of his wife, in reference to the sale, long after the transaction was closed and his agency was terminated. But the evidence is clear that his agency was only to sell the property, and that the deed had been executed by Mrs. Hartman, the consideration paid by Grafflin passing to her his promissory note therefor for one hundred dollars, and the deed recorded and accepted by him,

long before the acts and declarations of Hartman sought to be introduced. It was only during the course of the negotiations which culminated in this sale and conveyance that Hartman could be regarded as the agent of his wife. "The declarations of an agent are admissible only because treated as the declarations 408 of the principal, and the latter is bound by them only while the former is acting within the scope of the duties for which he was employed. When these duties are ended, his representative character of necessity ceases': Phelps v. Georges Creek R. R. Co., 60 Md. 536. "Declarations or admissions of an agent by his own authority, and not accompanying the making of a contract, or the doing of an act in behalf of his principal, nor made at the time he is engaged in the transaction to which they refer, are not binding on his principal, and are not admissible in evidence": Franklin Bank v. Pennsylvania etc. Steam Nav. Co., 11 Gill & J. 28, 33 Am. Dec. 687. There is no authority or reason for treating the agency of a husband for his wife as more extensive in scope, or longer in duration, than that of any other agent similarly constituted. The ruling upon each of these exceptions was therefore erroneous.

We discover no defect of proof as to delivery of this conveyance. "No precise form of delivery need be resorted to. It may be actual or verbal. Acknowledgment and recording are sufficient to warrant presumption of a legal delivery by the grantor": Stewart v. Redditt, 3 Md. 67.

The possession of the clerk, after recording, will be regarded as the possession of the grantee. "A certified copy of an instrument required by law to be recorded proves itself as prima facie evidence of all circumstances necessary to give it validity": Warner v. Hardy's Lessee, 6 Md. 525; Hutchins v. Dixon, 11 Md. 29.

There is nothing in this case to defeat or rebut this prima facie evidence. On the contrary, the evidence is that Grafflin accepted the conveyance. He paid the agreed price by his own promissory note. He accepted the recording ticket, and subsequently accepted and held the deed. He authorized a lady who was negotiating for the purchase of the lot from him to use the stable on the premises, thereby practically entering into possession of the property, and he expressly claimed title thereto in the two letters which have been referred to. All the requirements of the law as to delivery and acceptance are thus gratified.

409 The appellant contends that the plaintiff's first prayer, which was granted, was defective in submitting to the jury a question of law, viz., whether the alleged deed of assignment of the leasehold estate was "a good and sufficient conveyance thereof." If any question had been raised in this case as to the legal effect of the deed in respect to its execution, acknowledgment, or the description of the property it purported to convey, this would have been a fatal defect. But the plain purpose of that clause in the prayer was to permit the jury to find their verdict for the defendant, notwithstanding they found in favor of plaintiff upon all the other facts recited in the prayer, if they found that she had, in good faith, by the very deed of assignment offered in evidence, devested herself of all interest in the land. That this was the purpose we think sufficiently appears in the language of the plaintiff's second prayer, which instructs the jury there was no evidence legally sufficient to show that the defendant had devested herself of all estate and interest in, and control over, the lot of land. We do not think, in view of this language, that the jury could have been misled by the language objected to in the first prayer, and if there was no other erroneous ruling in the case, we should hesitate to hold that reversible error. Those words might well be regarded, in the light of the second prayer, as meaning, and understood by the jury to mean, "by a bona fide conveyance," and so understood, they could not have injured the defendant. Upon a new trial, however, the possibility of being misunderstood should be avoided by more careful language.

There was error in granting the second prayer which withdrew the case from the jury. There was evidence that Mrs. Hartman intended to sell and convey her estate and interest in this land, and that when she executed the deed of assignment she did so in good faith, for that purpose, and that she believed James Moore was the true name of the purchaser. There was evidence that Grafflin negotiated for the purchase of this property for himself; that he directed the deed to be made in the name either of James Moore or Louis Moore; 410 that he paid the agreed price of one hundred dollars by his own promissory note; that he accepted the recording ticket for the deed, and subsequently accepted the deed itself, and claimed title to the property. This evidence certainly tended to sustain the defendant's contention that she had in good faith devested herself of all estate and interest in the land, if we

have correctly stated the law in this case, as to the adoption by Grafflin of the name of James Moore, and as to the legal presumption of delivery arising upon the facts of the case; and if this evidence is believed by the jury, it would have supported a verdict in the defendant's favor.

The defendant's first and second prayers we think correctly state the law of the case. The first prayer is drawn to meet the theory that Grafflin gave the name of James Moore as that to be inserted in the deed. The defendant's husband was her agent to sell this property and have the deed prepared. He knew that Grafflin was the real purchaser, and it must be presumed that she intended to convey to the real purchaser by whatever name he gave.

The second prayer is drawn to meet the theory Grafflin attempted to set up-that he gave the name of Louis Moore. This is entirely immaterial, however, to the defendant's contention, since if Grafflin accepted the conveyance drawn in the name of James Moore, he is bound by such acceptance, though he had directed it to be made to Louis Moore. The only effect the giving of the name of Louis Moore instead of James Moore can have is to strengthen the proof that he was the actual purchaser, and as such preferred to use his own first name, discarding the surname only to avoid his creditors. For the errors indicated, the judgment must be reversed. Judgment reversed, with costs to the appellant above and below, and new trial awarded.

A Contract Entered into Under an Assumed Name is binding. One not engaged in fraudulent or criminal purpose may enter into a contract under any name he may choose to assume. All that the law looks to is the identity of the individual. When that is established, the act will be binding on him and upon others: Scanlan v. Grimmer, 71 Minn. 351, 70 Am. St. Rep. 526; Sparks v. Dispatch Transfer Co., 104 Mo. 531, 24 Am. St. Rep. 351. Therefore, if the true owner conveys property by any name, the conveyance transfers title: Fallon v. Kehoe, 38 Cal. 44, 99 Am. Dec. 347. And if the owner of real estate executes a deed to a fictitious grantee, and then under the name of such grantee executes another deed thereof to another, the latter obtains a good title: David v. Williamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co., 83 N. Y. 265, 38 Am. Rep. 418. As to whether the record of chattel mortgage under an assumed name imparts notice, see Mackey v. Cole, 79 Wis. 426, 24 Am. St. Rep. 728; Alexander v. Graves, 25 Neb. 453, 13 Am. St. Rep. 501.

The Implied Authority of a Wife to act for her husband and bind him by her contracts is discussed in the note to Wanamaker v. Weaver, 98 Am. St. Rep. 627.

Am. St. Rep., Vol. 118-28

The Recording of a Deed is prima facie evidence of its delivery: See the note to Brown v. Westerfield, 53 Am. St. Rep. 547; Creighton v. Roe, 218 Ill. 619, 109 Am. St. Rep. 310, and cases cited in the crossreference note thereto.

STUMP v. WARFIELD.

[104 Md. 530, 65 Atl. 346.]

TRUSTS-Power to Sell and Reinvest-Right to Mortgage.If a trustee is authorized to sell and dispose of the trust property and reinvest the proceeds, he can execute a valid mortgage for the purchase money of property purchased, or any part thereof. (p. 437.)

TRUSTS-Power to Sell-Right to Mortgage.-Power in a trustee to grant and convey absolutely does not authorize him to mortgage the trust property. (p. 438.)

TRUSTS-Power of Sale-Limitation.-If a feme covert is given only an equitable life estate with power of disposition of the property absolutely for a purpose clearly defined, the limitation operates as a negation of any other purpose. (p. 439.)

TRUSTS-Power of Sale-Right to Mortgage.-A trustee or life tenant with power of sale absolutely is not authorized to mortgage the trust property to secure money loaned for the purpose of paying taxes, interest due on a purchase money mortgage and other expenses connected with the trust property, and such mortgage affects only the interest of the life tenant and not that of the remaindermen. (p. 441.)

TRUSTS-Power to Sell-Right to Mortgage.-If a donee of a power to sell land also has an interest in his own right, a conveyance or mortgage of the land by him, not appearing expressly or impliedly to be made in the execution of the power, passes his interest only. (p. 441.)

MORTGAGES-Assignment-Power of Sale. If the assignee of a first mortgage is also the mortgagee in a second mortgage to secure the payment of the first and also additional money loaned by him, a sale by the attorney named in the second mortgage as agent to sell in case of default is not a foreclosure of the first mortgage, and passes only the interests bound by the second mortgage. (p. 442.)

TRUSTS-Power to Sell-Right to Mortgage Rights of Remaindermen.-If a trustee or life tenant, with power of absolute sale, executes a mortgage on the trust property which is not a valid execution of the power, and conveys only the interest of the life tenant, without binding the interest of the remaindermen, they are entitled to recover the property by action in ejectment against the purchaser under the mortgage foreclosure, and in possession after the death of the life tenant. (p. 445.)

POWERS-Mortgages Under-Subrogation. If there is a first mortgage, which is a valid execution of a power, and a second mortgage which is not a valid execution of such power, and conveys only the life interest of the donee in the power, and the purchaser, under