elements of deliberation and premeditation. It was murder, of course, but not in the first degree. It is not always, however, a good defense.

In a recent murder case in Philadelphia the accused killed a woman, and then in his defense urged the plea of intoxication. He claimed that he was intoxicated to such a degree that he was unconscious of his act. To the minds of the jurors the facts and circumstances of the case did not seem to support this view, and he was convicted of murder in the first degree. In the case of the People vs. Fish' it was held that "if the accused be sober enough to and does form an intent and so deliberate upon and premeditate the crime, then he is responsible the same as if he had been perfectly sober, and that he is guilty, even though intoxicated." When a person becomes voluntarily intoxicated in order to facilitate the accomplishment of a crime, the proof of the intoxication is no defense at all. If it could be so regarded, or if it could even be urged in mitigation of punishment, it would probably be the preliminary act to most cases of crime.

Voluntary drunkenness is no defense to crime when the wrongful act is planned or partly executed before the individual becomes intoxicated. In the case of Hamlin vs. the State,2 Hamlin was convicted of murder in the first degree. In attempting to escape from prison he killed a watchman. He petitioned for a new trial on the ground that he was intoxicated at the time of the murder. It was known that for some time previous he had made preparations for the escape by bribing one of the watchmen, but afterward decided to escape by attacking the guard and making a bold dash, and that he had waited for two hours for an opportunity to make the attack. It was claimed that while thus waiting the prisoner became intoxicated. In refusing his petition for a new trial the Supreme Court of Errors held that, conceding that Hamlin was intoxicated when the attack was made, he had previously participated in the preparations therefor, even to the extent of taking human life, he having armed himself; that in view of these facts the attack and its consequences were premeditated, and the intoxication at the time of the murder could be of no avail as a mitigating circumstance.3

In most cases of murder in which the plea of intoxication has been successfully introduced it has been urged only in order to rob the crime of the element of deliberation and premeditation, and secure a verdict of murder in the second degree, instead of the first degree. Murder in the second degree includes those cases in which there is a design to effect the death of a person, but without deliberation or premeditation. Can it be said that in all cases in which an individual while in a state of alcoholic frenzy kills another that he has the design to effect the death of the person killed? In other words, is it an intentional killing? To the layman, even to the skilled jurist, it would seem as if this question must be answered in the affirmative. The crime is often accompanied by words and acts which naturally seem to imply the intent to kill, and it is generally conceded, even by the counsel for the defense, that the defendant must have intended to kill at the moment when the crime 1125 N. Y., 136. 3 Med. Jurisp., Hamilton.

2 48 Conn. Rep., 92.

was perpetrated. Alienists, however, are well aware that individuals in certain mental conditions may perform acts which are often of a criminal nature and which appear to be done purposely, but which are perpetrated without consciousness. There must, of course, be a subconscious condition remaining, because if all consciousness is abolished, the individual becomes absolutely insensible; but a subconsciousness may exist while the higher consciousness remains dormant. In this state of subconsciousness acts may be performed of which the individual will have no knowledge whatever when his higher consciousness awakes. This subconscious state is seen in psychic epilepsy, hypnosis, somnambulism, and in alcoholic epilepsy and some cases of alcoholic mania. Can an individual in a condition of subconsciousness form a design to kill? Clearly he cannot. If this state of mind can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the jury to have existed at the moment of the homicide, the crime cannot be regarded as murder at all, but must be considered merely as manslaughter.

For a long time this condition of subconsciousness was practically denied by the courts, but in the case of the People vs. Leonard,' Judge Peckham, after citing section twenty-two of the penal code, stated as follows: "When it appears upon the trial that the defendant was intoxicated when he committed the homicide, the jury should be instructed that if the intoxication has extended so far in its effects that the necessary intent, deliberation, and premeditation were absent, the fact of intoxication must be considered and a verdict rendered in accordance therewith. In such a case the intoxication need not be to the extent of depriving the accused of all power of volition or of all ability to form an intent."

It cannot for a moment be claimed that all persons who commit crimes while intoxicated are in an automatic or subconscious condition. Whether they are or not must be proved by the circumstances attached to each particular case, but when it is so proved, the charge of intent to kill should fail.

Intention is also an essential element in such important crimes as burglary and forgery; and intoxication, when proved, may be considered by the jury in determining the question of whether there was intent or not. In the crime of arson the case is different. If the firing was committed wilfully, the plea of intoxication will not avail. In the case of the People vs. Jones 2 it was held that intoxication is not to be considered in a case of arson, where it appears that the act of setting on fire was wilfully done, it being of no consequence what the intention

was.

Crimes committed by dipsomaniacs during a paroxysm of the disease or by those afflicted with alcoholic insanity should be regarded in the same light as crimes committed by lunatics generally. The dipsomaniac is commonly regarded as a drunkard, who differs from other inebriates only in that his indulgences are periodic. Dipsomania is in reality a form of insanity, and the blind craving for drink is merely one 1 143 N. Y., 360. 2 Edin. Sel. Cas., 86.

of many symptoms of the disease. During a paroxysm a dipsomaniac may commit a criminal act. If so, the deed is usually regarded as if it had been perpetrated by one in a condition of voluntary intoxication. If it can be shown that the homicide, for instance, was accomplished during an attack of maniacal furor, the evidence that such a state was induced by voluntary inebriety may be introduced to diminish the grade of the crime from murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree, or even, according to a decision previously mentioned, to manslaughter, but if the view is held that the dipsomaniac is guilty of voluntary intoxication, it cannot relieve him from the responsibility of his act. On the other hand, dipsomania is regarded as a form of insanity, and if it is further understood that the inebriety is merely a symptom of a serious mental disease, and for which he is in no way responsible, then the law should hold him just as guiltless of crime as if the act had been perpetrated by an individual suffering from any other form of insanity, or, more properly speaking, his case should be judged by the law applicable to the insanity, and not to inebriety.

Alcoholic insanity is not always a complete defense to crime. Generally it may be said that "if a lunatic is laboring under such a defect of reason as either not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or not to know that the act was wrong, he cannot be held accountable on a criminal charge." Therefore if one who is suffering from alcoholic insanity, acting in conformity with a delusion, commits a criminal act, he is held blameless. But if, though insane, he commits a criminal act, judged by motives which have no connection with his insanity, the defense of insanity can avail him nothing. An alcoholic lunatic who commits homicide under the delusion that his victim is poisoning him or has debauched his wife does an insane act and is clearly not guilty of crime, but if he kills another for the sake of needed money or in revenge for an actual injury, he must be regarded as sane so far as the commission of such acts is concerned, and is fully as responsible for them as if no insanity existed.

Sudden and often uncontrollable impulses to kill or injure, known as morbid impulses, are not uncommon with alcoholic lunatics and dipsomaniacs. They may understand the nature and consequences of these impulses and know that it is wrong to yield to them, and yet be absolutely unable to resist. Such unfortunates, unless insanity is well marked, are not recognized in law as having any valid defense. The law as it now stands is well expressed in the decision in the case of the People vs. Coleman: "A criminal act cannot be excused upon the theory of an irresistible impulse when the offender knew what he was doing and had the ability to discover his legal and moral duty in respect to it." It is not difficult to understand the view the law takes in regard to the irresistible impulse. If it was once admitted as a valid defense, it is more than probable it would be urged as an excuse for the majority of crimes. Nevertheless, there is a small proportion of cases in which the irresistible impulse should be a good defense, and probably, in time, jurists will come to recognize this fact.

THE STIGMATA OF DEGENERATION.

THE question of degeneracy in its medicolegal relations has come into greater and greater prominence in recent years, owing to the researches of numerous investigators in the rich fields afforded by the asylum, the reformatory, and the prison. It is now apparent that insanity, imbecility, drunkenness, epilepsy, and criminal tendencies in antecedents may, with or without modification or intercourse, become the woeful heritage of the children; that there is a proclivity in a tainted family to the progressive deterioration which we call degeneracy, and that such degeneracy may often be recognized by the signets of morbid heredity set upon the victims. The writer believes the subject of such importance to both physician and lawyer that it is accorded a special chapter in this book; and the chapter is founded upon the studies he has made and published elsewhere from a considerable experience in reformatories, prisons, and institutions for idiots and insane.

Definition of Degeneracy.-Degeneracy may be defined as a morbid deviation from the normal original type or standard. It is recognized, as a rule, in its effects upon the intellectual life, in the deviations from the intellectual habits and social conduct which are held in common with our fellows. To the class of degenerates belong not only many criminals, idiots, and insane individuals, but also the great majority of persons called cranks or eccentrics-the people who live a sort of original life, with peculiarities of mental habit and conduct, and who are characterized as feeble-minded, quaint, odd, queer, or singular.

A man of talent or of genius often presents eccentricities of this kind, but such deviation from the original normal standard need not be morbid in character; it may be a deviation toward a higher and better standard, recognized by his contemporaries or posterity to be such. It might be difficult at times to distinguish between the eccentricities of genius and the eccentricities of degeneracy. There are one or two indications or tests which will aid us in this. One of the indications-in fact, the chief test of a normal state-is, naturally, conformity to the social condition in which a man lives. This test applied by itself, however, does not exclude talented individuals and geniuses. Another criterion must be applied to these cases. Is there conjoined with the eccentricity a morbid self-centering of his interests? It is in individuals who concern themselves little with the affairs of the world, but much with personal and selfish matters, that eccentricity of intellectual habit or

1 Medical Record, June, 1888; American Journal Insanity, July, 1895; Inter national Dental Journal, December, 1895; State Hospitals Bulletin, July, 1896.

conduct warrants a grave diagnosis. Now, one of the essential characteristics is its inclusion of transmissible elements, so that the degenerate individual not only bears in himself the germs which render him more and more incapable of fulfiling his own functions in human life, but, by his hereditary bequests, he menaces the intellectual stability of his descendants.

So much for the definition of the term degeneracy. We will now pass on to a consideration of the indications of degeneracy.

STIGMATA OF DEGENERATION.

The indications of degeneracy are known as stigmata hereditatis, or stigmata of degeneration. They may be defined as anatomic or functional deviations from the normal which in themselves are usually of little importance as regards the existence of an organism, but are characteristic of a latent or marked neuropathic disposition. These stigmata are vices of functional and organic evolution. The deviations from the normal may be in the way of excesses or arrest of development. They must be distinguished from the deficiencies or deformities produced by accidents at birth or by disease. I have said that these stigmata are anatomic and functional. But it is more convenient to divide the functional group into physiologic and psychic classes. It is the latter which we are more apt to observe in our relations with degenerate individuals. The psychic stigmata are always characterized by a want of balance or lack of proportion between certain undeveloped or excessively developed faculties and other faculties which are normal. Defect of moral sense, of attention, of memory, will, judgment, or unbalanced excess of musical or mathematic aptitudes may be cited as instances of psychic stigmata. Hence the following three divisions may be made of all the degenerative indices:

Anomalies of the eye: Flecks on the iris; strabismus; chromatic asymmetry of the iris; narrow palpebral fissures; albinism; congenital cataracts; microphthalmos ; pigmentary retinitis; muscular insufficiency. Anomalies of the ear.

Anomalies of the limbs: Polydactyly; syndactyly; ectrodactyly; symelus; ectromelus; phocomelus; excessive length of the arms. Anomalies of the body in general: Hernias; malformations of the

VOL. I.-35