tral American states, Chili, and Argentina, which have all signed treaties to arbitrate every question with each other-rational conduct which Admiral Mahan's own country would, but for a few politicians in the United States Senate, have emulated through treaties with England, France, and Germany. Questions of "conscience" to-day belong chiefly to domestic politics, like slavery, suffrage, socialism, education, and temperance. When the abuse of weaker peoples, like the Armenians, becomes a question of "conscience," a joint conference of Powers and the employment of organised nonintercourse can accomplish what no single nation can achieve by forcible aggression and dictatorship.

Three powerful adjuncts to arbitration as means of promoting a rational settlement of difficulties are practically ignored by Admiral Mahan. These are neutralisation, non-intercourse, and peace budgets. The first two will be treated in the next chapter. The peace budget has not yet been widely broached, but is big with promise for the future. It was one of the recommendations made by the Interparliamentary Union, composed of the statesmen of the world, at their great meeting in London in the summer of 1906. Had one dollar been devoted to peace for every thousand in the annual war budget, it would have given us $200,000 in 1906, when certain people were thrown into a childish panic over a score of Japanese men found in the schools of San Francisco. This sum put into the hands of a commission appointed by the

President would have enabled us to invite here fifty eminent Japanese, and to have sent fifty of our distinguished citizens to Japan. It would have provided for an interchange of thought, for receptions, lectures, innumerable courtesies, and have led to a vastly better understanding, besides providing for systematic helpful work in the press and pulpit of the Pacific coast-worth far more than the cost of a battleship in assuring hysterical citizens of safety. A dollar spent in winning friends by promoting understanding is worth a thousand spent in preparing to fight would-be friends when we have turned them into enemies. with proud and sensitive Orientals, courtesy and good-will are our most powerful methods of maintaining peace. As soon as the enormous possibilities of this new method are understood, pressure should be brought to bear on Congress from every State to vote annually at least the price of one torpedo-boat, to deal with a problem which is primarily psychological and can never be settled by the costly, diabolic mechanisms of destruction. The common-sense rapprochement between England and France, already infinitely beneficial, the helpful interchange of visits and courtesies between English and German editors and merchants, Secretary Root's friendly visit to South America and his kindly offices in promoting peace between the states of Central America, are but a slight beginning of the great, systematic conciliation work to be done in case of incipient friction

long before arbitration is to be employed. This should play an enormous part in the future programme of the American government, which makes such loud claims of its pacific purposes. This must be in addition to increased official and diplomatic measures and be entrusted largely to tactful specialists and journalists. Great Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer has given the pledge of his government to the establishment of a peace budget, the value of which he warmly recognises. He asked for $300,000 per annum and was voted $80,000. Japan devoted perhaps $500,000 to the entertainment of the American fleet; but one tenth of that sum, as some one has said, would have provided for the reception of fifty American editors in Japan or of Japanese editors in America and have been of far greater value in promoting international amity than the whole costly and spectacular world cruise. It is not sailors who make war so much as journalists. It is probable that the price of one battleship, wisely expended in three or four leading nations, could do more for the peace of the world than all its combined navies. The disbursal of such a budget would probably be by a commission appointed by the President. Its influence would be vastly out of proportion to the slight expenditure in creating that good-will and confidence on which national security depends; and as an agency for promoting international justice and the world's peace it would be vastly more promising than all of Admiral Mahan's battleships.

CHAPTER VII

NEUTRALISATION AND NON-INTERCOURSE

AMEASURE of great promise which increased

international organisation renders possible is the neutralisation of weak and exposed countries, thus freeing them from danger and aggression, as the Philippines might be freed, with the consequent cutting off of half our navy. No nation could refuse the request of our government to guarantee autonomy and neutrality to the archipelago when we withdraw. A refusal would be tantamount to advertising prospective aggression. The neutralisation of Switzerland, Belgium, and Norway, and the self-renouncing agreement between England and the United States to leave the three thousand miles of borderline between the United States and Canada unguarded are some of the notable beginnings in the use of a method which will in the future play a gigantic part in sidetracking jealousy and preventing friction. Who can question that, since France, Great Britain, Germany, and Russia "agree together to respect her autonomy and to act in concert in her support if she should be menaced by any Power," Norway is now free to

spend her united resources in building herself up, instead of in guarding her frontier? The agreements, signed in April, 1908, in Berlin and St. Petersburg, by the Powers bordering on the North and Baltic Seas, to respect each other's territory, is a matter of great moment which has received amazingly little attention. The possibilities of these measures should be discussed a thousand times as much by our citizens as the technical questions of turrets, armour belts, etc., with which the papers have deluged us, as if the safety of the republic from invasion depended solely upon these. Neutralisation of the ocean, which involves the immunity of private property at sea in time of war, would mark an immense stride forward; England's refusal to agree to this at the Second Hague Conference was a world misfortune and a cardinal blunder. A half century ago Whewell, whose admirable version of Grotius like so much besides attests his profound grasp of international law, pronounced neutrality "the true road to a perpetual peace," and declared that the safety of the world depends on making neutrality easy.

Since 1785, the United States has stood for the immunity of private property at sea from capture in time of war; yet the piracy which has been forbidden in war on land has remained to disgrace the naval code of international law. Benjamin Franklin's last official act in Europe before his return home in 1785 was to sign a treaty with Frederick the Great, containing this memorable clause: “Al