burg or Perryville. The centre under Gilbert, and the left under McCook, were therefore directed on the latter place, and the right under Crittenden, was sent by the Lebanon road, which passes four miles to the south of Perryville. The afternoon of the 7th the centre corps had arrived within three miles of Perryville, and was drawn up in order of battle. As the enemy was apparently in the act of concentration for battle at that point, orders were sent to Crittenden and McCook respectively to move forward early in the morning into position on the right and left of the centre. Buell had expected an attack early in the morning on the centre corps while it was isolated, but as it did not take place, no formidable attack was apprehended after the arrival of the left corps, which took place about 10 a. M. Considerable cannonading had been going on during the morning between the centre corps, and the firing extended thence to the left, and became brisker as the day advanced, but it was not supposed to proceed from any serious engagement. At four o'clock, however, an aid from McCook arrived and reported to Buell, who was with the centre, that the general was sustaining a severe attack, which had been going on for several hours, and which he would not be able to withstand unless reinforced! This action, thus precipitated, is known as the battle of Perryville, or Champion Hills. It was fought on the part of the Confederates by two divisions against the left corps under McCook, and as the enemy caught that corps isolated and in the act of formation, he was able to inflict heavy damage upon it, the casualties numbering about four thousand. Though the corps was much shaken in the first event, it afterwards recovered itself, and maintained its ground so stubbornly that at nightfall the Confederates were compelled to draw off without any material advantage.

No doubt was entertained that Bragg would endeavor to hold his position at Perryville, and accordingly Buell issued orders to the commanders to join battle next morning. Day

light, however, revealed the fact that he had retired towards Camp Dick Robinson. Buell then advanced in pursuit; but Bragg, constantly refusing battle, retired southward in the direction of Cumberland Gap. The pursuit was pushed as far as Loudon, where Buell called a halt, not being minded at that season of the year to attempt a campaign in the rough, barren, and difficult mountain region of East Tennessee. When, therefore, it was clear that the enemy had abandoned the invasion, Buell turned his columns south-westward into 'Middle Tennessee, with the purpose of removing the line of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. By the end of October the army reached Bowling Green and Glasgow, whence Buell designed pushing forward immediately to Murfreesboro.' But, on the 30th of October, he was superseded by Rosecrans.

The circumstances under which General Rosecrans assumed command of the Army of the Ohio committed him to an immediate offensive, as well for moral as for material reasons. The events of the extraordinary summer campaign, whereof I have presented the outline in the preceding chapter, were thought to have been highly favorable to the Confederates, who had been able to throw back the Union army from the Tennessee to the Ohio, and had, after ravaging Kentucky, succeeded in making good their escape to whence they came. Now, though these events were in no wise out of the ordinary tenor of war, and may now be studied with a perfectly philosophic composure, they must be estimated, not in the "dry light" of history, but in the effect they, at the time, produced on an excitable, patriotic, and unreasoning public. The invasion itself created profound alarm-a sentiment which, by one of those rapid transitions that come over masses of men in time of war, changed into deep disgust and humiliation when it was seen that the enemy "escaped" with impunity. This feeling found official expression in the removal of General Buell from the command of the army. Judging

this act in the catholic spirit that should be brought to the interpretation of the war, we may not be disposed to censure the Administration for a measure measure that undoubtedly was prompted by a well-meaning motive; but it is at the same time incumbent on us to render equal justice to one who has been the object of most unmerited obloquy.

Buell, like McClellan, was unfortunate in attaining a great command at a time when the country's experience of war made it certain that many victims must fall. But he was an eminent soldier, of a grave, high order of mind, distinguished for the breadth of his military views, the soundness of his combinations, and the vigor, but not brilliancy of his execution. His theory was to fight only for important objects, to manœuvre so as to gain strategic advantages, and to make success as certain as possible. He would do nothing for popular effect, and had not that pliability and those arts that are so useful for a commander in the early stages of a popular war, and that often enable mediocre men who possess this talent to attain success. He was a good disciplinarian, and the army was never at any subsequent period in such condition of efficiency as it was under his command. Also, it must be remarked, that he never lost the confidence of his army, which always cherished unbounded respect for his ability.

It will thus have sufficiently appeared that the very circumstances under which the command fell to General Rosecrans implied that he should speedily assume the offensive, and the enemy very soon took such a course as made the Government tenfold more urgent that he should do so. When Rosecrans assumed command the army was in the vicinity of Bowling Green and Glasgow; and the garrison which General Buell had left at Nashville, under Negley, was closely beleaguered by Forrest's cavalry, and Breckenridge's division of infantry. Rosecrans, therefore, determined first of all to relieve Nashville, which he did by sending forward McCook's corps to that place. But, before he could throw for

ward the remaining corps, it was absolutely essential to repair the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, which was badly broken. This work consumed the greater part of November, by the end of which month the railroad was put in repair, and the whole army concentrated at Nashville.

Now, while Rosecrans was engaged in this necessary preliminary duty, Bragg, who, on his retirement from Kentucky, had passed by Cumberland Gap to Knoxville, and thence to Chattanooga, put his army again in motion northward. Passing up the railroad to within forty miles of Nashville, he assumed an intrenched position at Murfreesboro', whence he began to demonstrate in many motions of offence. It was plain, therefore, that the campaign which had been left indecisive was about to be forced to an issue in a battle that must decide the fate of Kentucky and central Tennessee. Both sides energetically pushed forward preparations for aggressive action; but Rosecrans was beforehand with his antagonist, and having, by the last week in December, succeeded in accumulating sufficient supplies for a campaign, he began the manœuvres that resulted in the battle of Murfreesboro'. The events of this great action now remain to be told.

II.

THE BATTLE OF MURFREESBORO'.

CHRISTMAS-DAY of the year 1862 passed amid festivities that smoothed the wrinkled face of war and lent a wholly peaceful air to the rival camps at Nashville and Murfreesboro'. But before daybreak next morning Rosecrans, having completed all his preparations, put his army in motion amid a drenching rain. It advanced in three columns, and skirmishing began almost from the start, for Bragg's superiority in cavalry enabled him to confine his adversary almost within his infantry lines. By the night of the 30th Rosecrans had