II.

THE SIEGE AND FALL OF VICKSBURG.

It was apparent to General Grant from the moment he went in person to Young's Point that the true line of operations against Vicksburg was from the south; but if he was prompted first to exhaust every other expedient, it was because the difficulties seen to beset that mode of action were in reality appalling. It would be necessary first of all to march the army for thirty or forty miles down the west bank of the Mississippi, so as to gain a point where the passage might be made below the enemy's works. It would be requisite that the gun-boats and transports should run the gauntlet of the batteries, in order to cross the army to the east bank and cover the passage. It would then remain to make the crossing of that great and difficult river in face of all the opposition the enemy could bring against the operation. And when these three conditions should be fulfilled, the perils that in the very nature of things attended the execution of the plan, would only have begun. For it would then be necessary for Grant to cut himself entirely off from his base, and launch into the interior of the land, without a new base secured in advance-with the promise of any base at all contingent upon his beating the enemy in the open field, swinging round in rear of Vicksburg, and so operating with his right as to force open the line of the Yazoo.

These considerations serve to fix the character of the plan of operations. It cannot be called a brilliant strategic inspiration, for the move was an obvious one, and had suggested itself even to the rank and file of the army. But if the conception was easy, the execution involved difficulties that might well affright the stoutest heart. Of this there could be no more striking proof than is presented in the fact that the high-vaulting and audacious mind of Sherman shrank

Bahala Cr.

from the enterprise; and on the 8th of April, after the movement below had been initiated, that officer, in a written communication to General Grant, suggested that the army should be transported back to the line of the Tallahatchie and Yallabusha, as a base of operations against Vicksburg. It can only be said that there was that in the composition of General Grant's mind that prompted him to undertake that which no one else would have adventured. Unmoved by all the perils of the operation, he resolved to go below.

The movement was initiated on the 29th of March, 1863, when the Thirteenth Corps, under General McClernand, was put in motion to cross the peninsula opposite Vicksburg from Milliken's Bend to New Carthage. The march was made with much difficulty, and in face of many obstacles, and finally, when New Carthage was reached, the region was found to have been converted by inundation into an island: so that the advance had to be pushed twelve miles further south, making the distance to be traversed from Milliken's Bend thirty-five miles. McClernand's corps was followed, as fast as supplies and ammunition could be transported over horribly bad roads by the Seventeenth Corps, under McPherson.

This the initial operation being completed, it next fell to Admiral Porter to execute the perilous enterprise of running the gauntlet of the batteries for the purpose of affording the force below the means of passing the Mississippi, and protection in the operation. This exploit was performed in the most brilliant manner, the fleet of gun-boats, together with three transports laden with stores, and protected in their vulnerable parts with hay and cotton, were prepared on the 16th to make the trial trip. The expedition was readily manned by eager volunteers, and under cover of the darkness, the vessels succeeded in passing safely through the fiery ordeal, with the loss of but one of the transports, which was set on fire by a shell. These boats succeeded in getting by

so well, that General Grant ordered six more to be prepared in like manner for running the batteries; and on the night of the 22d of April five of them made the passage, one being lost. The damage suffered by the transports was soon repaired, and five were found available for service, as were also six barges out of twelve that had been sent in tow of the last six boats that ran the blockade.

It now remained to make the passage of the Mississippi. This operation it was resolved to execute at Grand Gulf, where the lowest of the Vicksburg system of works was located. This point is seventy-five miles below Milliken's Bend, and as the water transportation was insufficient for the conveyance, they made the march overland to Hard Times, opposite Grand Gulf. For the reduction of this latter place, a combined land and naval force was prepared, and on the 29th of April, Porter, with the fleet and so much of McClernand's corps as could be embarked on the transports, moved against it. With his wonted energy, Porter commenced the attack, which was continued for several hours. But the Grand Gulf batteries, erected on high bluffs, proved too strong for the navy, and Grant, fearing to risk his men in an attempt at storming the works, determined to turn them by landing at a point lower down the river. To carry out this object, he directed the army to march by the right bank, and to be prepared to cross opposite Bruinsburg; whilst the transports should, as soon as it became dark, run the fire of the batteries at Grand Gulf, and so take up positions in readiness to ferry the army across. These movements, both by land and water, were accomplished without loss. The 30th, McClernand's corps was safely ferried across and landed on the east bank of the Mississippi, and started out on the road to Port Gibson, twelve miles north-east of Bruinsburg, and in the rear of Grand Gulf. McPherson's corps followed as rapidly as it could be put across the river. The initial movement was thus in every respect a success a result due