were so marched across the Etowah and beyond as to cloak the flanking move, but Johnston detected it on the very day of starting, and took position at New Hope Church, just east of Dallas, covering the various roads leading back to the railroad. Hood was on the right at the church, Polk in the centre, and Hardee on the left, crossing the road to Atlanta. On the 25th Hooker, in Thomas's advance, had got up near the church, and after Geary's division had skirmished severely all the afternoon, an hour before sunset he got the other two divisions in hand, and assaulted Stewart's division of Hood's corps at the church for two hours with tremendous fury, ceasing only when night and the storm made him desist. The next three days, however, were taken up with constant fighting all along the lines, resulting from Sherman's endeavors to deploy and push his troops close up to the enemy's intrenchments; and, on the afternoon of the 27th, this effort culminated in a fierce assault of Cleburne's position, which Johnston reports to have been repulsed "with great slaughter." This officer estimates his own loss in each of the two main engagements at four hundred and fifty, and that of the Union forces at about three thousand in each. On the 28th, however, Sherman says that a "bold and daring assault" on McPherson while the latter was "in good breastworks," received a "terrible and bloody repulse." Constant skirmishing continued till the 4th of June, during which interval Sherman had worked to the left and covered the roads leading back to Allatoona and Ackworth, the former of which he had resolved to use as a second base for his now attenuated line of supplies.

Ten days of this dead-lock and unprosperous grapple, however, was already too much for a soldier of Sherman's temperament, and he determined once more to turn the enemy out of his position. To move again to the right would throw the Union force too far from the railroad, which Sherman was compelled to keep open and use. He therefore began to work

gradually and methodically across to the left, and Johnston, watching, followed in a parallel line also to the east, and so, face to face, the armies reached the railroad, Sherman at Ackworth, and Johnston at Marietta. In front of the latter town, Johnston took up a formidable position on the mountain chain, which, with Kenesaw on his right, Lost Mountain on the left, and Pine Mountain thrust forward in the centre, formed a complete defence for Marietta and the railroad. His troops busily threw up intrenchments and felled trees in front, while Sherman, at Ackworth, was receiving large reinforcements, consisting chiefly of two divisions under Blair, and Long's cavalry brigade; and meanwhile, he had repaired the railroad to the very rear of his camp, and unloaded ample provisions within his lines. At length, when ready to advance, Sherman found the same problem presented anew to him at Kenesaw which he had solved at Dalton, at Resaca, and at Dallas. This time, however, he was loath to risk its solution in the same way; for his army was near at the end of a greatly prolonged line of supply, and a detachment of a flanking force to the right or left was a more serious affair than it had hitherto been. The preparations of the enemy showed that this position was not to be abandoned, like the one at Cassville, but to be fought, like the one at Resaca: and so strong was it by nature and art that any detour of his might be met by an attack from forces easily detached from the small numbers required to hold Marietta. Accordingly he abandoned his previous methods for the time, and resolved to experiment directly against the hostile breastworks. He marched from Ackworth on the 9th of June, his troops full of confidence, well fed, and encouraged by reinforcements. The fighting commenced the next day, and lasted, now in skirmish and now in battle, but always without respite, till the 3d of July. Hood was on the Confederate right, Polk in the centre at Pine Mountain, and Hardee on the left; while McPherson was on the Union left, Thomas in the centre, and Schofield on the right.

Through dense thickets and almost impassable ravines, Sherman's troops slowly worked their way for many days, suffering much each day from the fire of their enemy, who had greater immunity, from his advantages of ground. During the battle of June 14th, General Polk was killed by a cannonball, and Loring succeeded him; next day Pine Mountain was abandoned, and a few days later, Lost Mountain. While these costly advances, however, were creditable to the gallantry of the assailants, they did not improve their position. For, in truth, Johnston's previous line had been extremely faulty by reason of its length; and the tempting natural positions of those mountains, joined to some rational expectation that his enemy would again attempt to get round his left, in which case he would probably have sallied and attacked him, had induced Johnston to grasp a reach of ground disproportionate to his force. Indeed, it was this very fact which had partly influenced Sherman, who saw it in his initial reconnoissance, to attack his position; and his main effort had been to break through between Kenesaw and Pine Mountain by a strong and well-officered force, composed of the corps of Hooker, Howard, and Palmer. But, instead of piercing the line, he had only rolled it back and condensed it; since Johnston, seeing his error, had now put his centre, Loring's corps, on Kenesaw as a salient, with Hood on the right flank drawn back across the Marietta and Canton road, and Hardee on the left aross the Marietta and Lost Mountain road. Hood was afterwards shifted to the left of Hardee, and on the 22d suddenly and savagely attacked, near the Kulp House, Hooker's corps and a brigade of Schofield who was on the right; but, after a spirited advance, he was checked and driven back with very severe loss.

Sherman, however, had now been a month south of Ackworth, and three weeks operating in vain against Kenesaw. The enemy was in stronger position than ever at the latter point, and had suffered comparatively little, while his own

troops had been undergoing herculean labors, and had been cut up by the constant fire from the enemy's breastworks. It would not do to remain longer in this position, shifting and developing the lines with little profit; and yet the other alternative, that of "flanking," besides the objections which were entertained to it three weeks before, would, if now adopted, suggest the query why it had not been chosen then, with saving of time and troops. Accordingly, Sherman felt authorized to make one grand assault against the heights of Kenesaw, with the desire of piercing the position. Three days' notice was given to the subordinate commanders, that the preparations might be complete. On the 27th, the batteries, planted for the purpose, opened a terrific cannonade for several hours, and then, precisely at the moment fixed, two large armies rushed forward, Thomas and McPherson cach assaulting at the prescribed points, the former mainly striking Hardee's corps and the latter Loring's. They were both completely repulsed, the killed and wounded being, according to Sherman, "about three thousand, while we inflicted comparatively little loss: " indeed, the Confederate official loss was less than five hundred, while it was thought that the Union loss was as many thousands.

Quick of apprehension, and not needing several experiments to teach him what one had demonstrated, Sherman no longer doubted as to his proper course. Feeling that his men had done all they could do for him in direct assault, he was content to resort once more to the old manœuvre : and this time he executed it with even greater tactical brilliancy than before. After a few days' skirmish he moved McPherson, on the night of July 2d, once more on a flank march by the right down toward the Chattahoochie; whereupon the same night Johnston abandoned Kenesaw and Marietta, and moved back on the railroad five miles from Marietta to Smyrna Church. Sherman eagerly pressed his columns, hoping to assail his antagonist while delayed by crossing the river; but he found

that this event had been forseen, and the Chattahoochie covered with works, at the desired point, and an advance intrenched line thrown up at Smyrna. But pressing hard against this latter point, Thomas forced the skirmish line, where it was held by Smith's division of Georgia militia, just thrown in, and this, with other menaces, compelled the garrison to fall back to the intrenched river line which, at the point where the railroad crosses at Turner's Ferry, made an admirable bridgehead to the river, also, retired the whole Confederate line. During four days' brisk skirmishing, Sherman, by degrees, threw a large force across the Chattahoochie, above Turner's Ferry, Schofield crossing at Soap Creek, on the 7th, Howard two miles below at Power's Ferry, on the 8th, while McPherson's whole army lay ready and able to cross above, at Roswell. All these forces built strong bridges, and intrenched their positions without much opposition, as the fordable nature of the river induced Johnson to take up his line along Peachtree Creek and the Chattahoochie below that point. However, as a consequence, on the night of the 9th, Johnson abandoned his strong position on the west bank of the river at Turner's Ferry, and in that act left Sherman, as the guerdon of his well-manœuvred and well-fought campaign, the unchallenged mastery of all North Georgia between the Tennessee and the Chattahoochie.

II.

BATTLE OF ATLANTA.

In the latter days of the Confederacy, the grim fatality which from the outset had walked with it, side by side, along its destined course, silent and unseen; seemed to throw off, at length, the cloak of invisibility, to stab it boldly with mortal blows. Looking at that epoch even with such light as the few subsequent years of history have thrown upon it, in the logic of events and the character of the actors, we may find ration