Courthouse, as he had earlier at Cedar Creek and Murfreesboro'. Before midnight he had the satisfaction of knowing that his baffled enemy had retreated from his front, leaving but a skirmish line behind. II. BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS. The vast line of Confederate earthworks which once engirdled Petersburg and Richmond, after stretching from left to right full thirty-five miles, paused on the White Oak road where the Claybourn road crosses, and thence carried its retired flank a few miles northerly along the latter highway. To what point on the continent this parapet might have been prolonged, under some circumstances, one dares not affirm; but it found a terminus at last from the lack of defenders. With 40,000 effective men, General Lee had long held it against a double investing force, though his cordon of trenches spanned two rivers, covered two cities, and protected a line of railroad which, once destroyed, would have ruined his position. But when his persistent adversary opened a fresh campaign by moving once more far out on the Confederate right a flanking column, which embraced not only two infantry corps, but 9000 well-mounted horsemen, Lee's resources were so strained that no dexterity of management could relieve them. Four miles due west of the terminus of the main Confederate line, was a cross-roads as important as any which that line covered in its course; it was the intersection of the White Oak road with the one running from Dinwiddie to the Southside Railroad, and the junction was known as Five Forks, since there five paths radiate. The possession of Five Forks by the Union forces, would enable them to march thence by what is called the Ford road against the Southside Railroad; it became, therefore, a point of strategic importance. To furnish forth a garrison for the Five Forks, which might also serve to confront the Union column which was marching to turn the Confederate right, Lee resorted to the well-worn device of stripping the Petersburg intrenchments. The force he had so collected, consisted of Pickett's division, 7000 strong, which for nine months had seen comparatively little service, Bushrod Johnson's division, 6000 strong, and the two small brigades of Wilcox and Wise, in all 15,000 men. It was this force which made the attacks in the battles of White Oak Ridge and Dinwiddie Courthouse, as already narrated. On the morning of April 1st, Sheridan began a new movement against Five Forks. To him, during the night, General Meade had wisely assigned the command of all the forces designed for the attempt, consisting of his own cavalry, now about 8000 strong, McKenzie's cavalry division, 1000 strong, and the Fifth Corps now 12,000 to 13,000 strong- the losses of Warren and Sheridan during the three days previous having been from 2500 to 3000 men. A movement of such a character required a single head, and neither General Grant nor General Meade was to be present at its execution, their head-quarters being many miles distant from the battle-ground. The remainder of his army, the forces of Parke, Ord, Wright, and Humphreys, General Grant retained in their intrenched lines, awaiting the issue of Sheridan's contest; for although well aware that the garrison of Petersburg had been weakened for concentration on Lee's right, he preferred in place of a co-operative attack to attend Sheridan's fortune, and, that being made sure, to assault the next day. The plan of battle was brilliant in its simplicity. It was to drive the enemy by means of the cavalry back to Five Forks, to keep him within the works there, and to make a cavalry feint of turning his right: then, under that curtain of horse which Sheridan so well knew how to draw, while behind its impenetrable screen he manoeuvred the footmen, he would secretly move the Fifth Corps up on the enemy's left, and swing it full against that flank, cutting off the whole force from Petersburg and capturing it. The topography of the region around Five Forks gives the clew to the Confederate movements. The general position assumed by its garrison, and by the forces of Sheridan at Dinwiddie and of Warren at White Oak Ridge, on the 31st, had been that of a triangle, of which the Union column occupied two angles and the Confederates a third. Partly to secure the obvious advantage of the offensive, and partly to prevent the Union, forces from advancing with impunity against Five Forks, both by the Dinwiddie and White Oak roads, and so executing the manœuvre which Sheridan did the next day execute, Lee fell upon Warren's corps on the morning of the 31st as we have seen. But this manœuvre had uncovered the strategic position itself to Sheridan, who, advancing on the Dinwiddie road, had seized Five Forks. No advantage gained against Warren would make amends for giving Sheridan free course; and accordingly the Confederates hastily rushed back, and drove Sheridan's advance from Five Forks, a movement more readily made after their severe check by Miles and Griffin it is easily seen how in the subsequent advance, General Warren says he "met with but little opposition." In the same way, after having driven Sheridan to Dinwiddie that same night, the Confederates were again obliged to withdraw their main force towards Five Forks, to prevent the Fifth Corps from marching on the White Oak road, and so seizing that point and cutting off their retreat. Accordingly, Sheridan had little difficulty, during the morning of April 1st, in executing the first part of his scheme. At daylight, Merritt's two divisions, with Devin on the right and Custer on the left, Crook being in the rear, easily drove the force left in their front from Dinwiddie to the Five Forks. Merritt, by impetuous charges, then expelled the Confederates from both their skirmish lines, and, in fine, at two o'clock |