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In short, it warms their moral feelings, and elevates their religious thoughts. Like oil, it keeps them from rusting. Like a whetstone, it gives them a new edge. Take away this practice from the constitution of the Quakers, and you pull down a considerable support of their moral character. It is a great pity, that, as professing Christians, we should not more of us incorporate this noble principle individually into our religion. We concur unquestionably in customs, through the fear of being reputed singular, of which our hearts do not always approve, though nothing is more true than that a Christian is expected to be singular with respect to the corruptions of the world. What an immensity of good would be done, if cases of persons, choosing rather to suffer than to temporize, were so numerous as to attract the general notice of men! Would not every case of suffering operate as one of the most forcible lessons that could be given, to those who should see it? And how long would that infamous system have to live, which makes a distinction between political expediency and moral right?

CHAP

CHAPTER VI.

A fourth trait is, that in political affairs they reason upon principle, and not from consequences-this mode of reasoning ensures the adoption of the maxim of not doing evil that good may come had Quakers been legislators, many public evils had been avoided which are now known in the world-existence of this trait probable from the influence of the former trait-and from the influence of the peculiar customs of the Quakersand from the influence of their system of discipline upon their minds.

1

THE next trait which I shall lay open to the world as belonging to the Quaker-character is, that in all those cases which may be called political, the Quakers generally reason upon principle, and but seldom upon consequences.

I do not know of any trait which ever impressed me more than this in all my intercourse with the members of this Society. It was one of those which obtruded itself to my notice on my first acquaintance with

them,

them, and it has continued equally conspicuous to the present time.

If an impartial philosopher from some unknown land, and to whom our manners and opinions and history were unknown, were introduced suddenly into our metropolis, and were to converse with the Quakers there on a given political subject, and to be directly afterwards conveyed to the west end of the town, and there to converse with politicians, or men of fashion, or men of the world, upon the same, he could not fail to be greatly surprised. If he thought the former wise, or virtuous, or great, he would unavoidably consider the latter as foolish, or vicious, or little. Two such opposite conclusions as he would hear deduced from the reasonings of each, would impress him with an idea that he had been taken to a country inhabited by two different races of men. He would never conceive that they had been educated in the same country, or under the same Government. If left to himself, he would probably imagine that they had embraced two different religions. But if he were told that they professed the same, he would then say that the

precepts of

this religion had been expressed in such doubtful language that they led to two sets of principles contradictory to one another. I need scarcely inform the reader, that I allude to the two opposite conclusions, which will almost always be drawn, where men reason from motives of policy or from moral right.

If it be true that the Quakers reason upon principle in political affairs, and not upon consequences, it will follow as a direct inference, that they will adopt the Christian maxim, that men ought not to do evil that good may come. And this is indeed the maxim which you find them adopting in the course of their conversation on such subjects, and which I believe they would uniformly have adopted, if they had been placed in political situations in life. Had the Quakers been the legislators of the world, we should never have seen many of the public evils that have appeared in it. It was thought formerly, for example, a glorious thing to attempt to drive Paganism from the Holy Land; but Quakers would never have joined any of the crusades for its expulsion. It has been long esteemed, again, a desideratum

in

in politics, that among nations differing in strength and resources a kind of balance of power should be kept up; but Quakers would never have engaged in any one war to preserve it. It has been thought, again, that it would contribute to the happiness of the natives of India, if the blessings of the British constitution could be given them instead of their own; but Quakers would never have taken possession of their territories for the accomplishment of such a good. It has been long thought, again, a matter of great political importance, that our West-India settlements should be cultivated by African labourers; but Quakers would never have allowed a slave-trade for such a purpose. It has been thought, again, and it is still thought a desirable thing, that our property should be secured from the petty depredations of individuals; but Quakers would never have consented to capital punishments for such an end. In short, few public evils would have arisen among mankind, if statesmen had adopted the system upon which the Quakers reason in political affairs, or if they had concurred with an antient Grecian philosopher, in con

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