In what acquisition of information? Emer the main problems we are dealing with beliefs that may be true or false and our Two fundamental points now emerge, which give us an outgence of line of our further procedure. One is, that if perplexity should appear about any of the beliefs involved in these modes of of logic thinking, then I should at once find myself in the fourth type of thinking. I should be facing a problem whose desired solution would control the resultant process of thinking, including the occurrence of suggestions and the search for evidence which would terminate, if successful, in a more acceptable belief. In the æsthetic situation the problem is to decide whether my feeling of pleasure is merely personal, or points to an objective quality of the scene. In the other case the problem might be to determine the meaning of the words, as, for example, if the language were foreign or the inscription blurred; then the resulting belief would be one as to the real meaning of those letters on the slab. Or it might be to decide whether the information were reliable or not, and would involve scanning the tablet and its surroundings, and recalling related knowledge already in my possession, for possible signs that it was set up as a mere joke, or were otherwise not to be trusted. The resulting belief in this event would be one as to the correctness or incorrectness of the information contained by the tablet. Now all this indicates pretty specifically the two major ways in which it would appear possible to improve our thinking, so far as it is subject to improvement. For one thing, we need to devote ourselves to a thorough analysis of this problem-solving type of thinking. For we have seen that thinking which can be right or wrong, correct or incorrect, is thinking occupied in reaching and using a grounded belief about real facts, and it now appears that whenever we are actively engaged in searching for such a belief, or when question has been raised about the adequacy of one already accepted, it is thinking of this sort which takes place. A belief which has been thus actively established or tested always appears in our experience as the solution of a problem, and the reflective process involved is controlled in a definite way by the felt need of attaining the solution. Our question here will accordingly be: What form does this problem-solving type of thinking naturally tend to take, and in what ways can it be regulated and improved so that the issuing beliefs will be as correct and dependable as possible? In the second place, since it is evident that we tend frequently to accept beliefs which come in other ways than as a result of careful reflective thinking, we need to understand why it is that we do this, and to discover how we can be more alert to question those ideas pressing upon us that are really untrustworthy, and (since none of us personally has time to investigate everything) where we can turn for the most dependable information on questions which we have not directly examined. If we improve our thinking as fully as possible in these two ways it would seem, granted that we are right in But why improve our thinking? the above considerations, that we shall have done all that we can do to correct the processes by which we accept and use beliefs about real facts in our world. Is such improvement possible? Well, like every other study, logic assumes that "knowledge is power"-that is, that understanding of the conditions on which any process depends means greater control over the process concerned. If this is the case, then knowledge of the principles of right thinking, by which in the present volume is meant an inquiry along the two general lines just surveyed, ought to issue in improved habits of thinking. But now why should we try to improve our thinking? Why not continue in our present habits of acceptance and our present methods of solving our difficulties, without going to the labor of securing such improvement as a reflective study of reflection might bring? How important is it, in short, to have correct beliefs rather than incorrect ones, to think rightly rather than wrongly? The first answer to this question is that in point of fact we do find ourselves from time to time involved in perplexities, and the way in which we as human beings are equipped to meet them is to reflect in the manner above illustrated. And in order to solve these problems in the best manner possible we need to follow the best technique that is possible. How often we make mistakes in our thinking, which we or others subsequently correct but too late to be of help in our original difficulty! How often we reach results which seem satisfactory at the time, but which we later discover to be far less adequate than those we might have reached had our thinking been wiser and more secure! The answer, indeed, is the same as should be given to the question, why ever reflect at all? Did we get into no difficulties, or had we the capacities of an ant rather than those of a man, it would, perhaps, not be necessary to think reflectively, nor valuable to study logic. But being what we are, and living the life we do, there would seem to be no real issue as to the importance of improving our thinking. Moreover, this importance is seen to be the greater as com pared with that of other studies, when we note that thinking is involved in all of them, and that, therefore, real improvement in our habits of reflection ought to bear some fruit in increased efficiency in all of our intellectual work. Indeed, one cannot even question the value of a study of reflection without thereby raising a problem which must be solved, if at all, by reflection. But it is surely unnecessary to multiply words on this point. When we find ourselves caught in an urgent problem, on whose solution our lives and welfare, or those of others, depend, a question as to the value of improved thinking seems quite superfluous. Then nothing else is quite so important as to gain correct beliefs about the facts which thus bear upon us, and our whole conscious energy is absorbed in the effort to secure them. The rescue of the boy in the barrel illustrates this clearly enough. Yet it must be admitted that the question can be given a form which is pertinent and demands a more thorough answer. Granted that we do find ourselves frequently in perplexity, is reflective thinking really our only, or most adequate, means of attack? What are the possible alternatives that Mother Nature has developed? Can it be shown clearly that it would not be wiser to meet these difficulties in which we are plunged, or at least some of them, by some different method than that of reflection, if some other method be psychologically possible? This question we shall face frankly in the following chapter, with the aid of material made available by the modern science of comparative psychology. our Why, also, should we be seriously troubled about the occa- Why sional acceptance of an incorrect belief about something? Doubt- criticize less we are apt to be satisfied, in situations where urgent practical. beliefs? pressure is absent, with beliefs that turn out in time to have been quite false and undependable. But is this a matter of such great moment? Do not most of these mistaken ideas involve not the slightest difficult consequence? Why, therefore, is it worth our while to acquire such alertness in guarding against their acceptance and in insisting upon their criticism and correction? Well, it is true that many of our incorrect notions involve no unfortunate results for anybody. The experience with the memorial tablet is a case in point. Suppose there were really indications that the information on the tablet should not be accepted, indications that a critical observation could discover and interpret, while I, through a too trustful habit, failed to notice them and went away believing as true a historical statement that was really false. Here the consequences would surely not be perilous; in fact, I might easily go through the rest of my life without getting into the slightest difficulty through entertaining that false belief. But such is clearly not the case with many of the beliefs which we tend to accept in precisely the same way without reflective testing—that is, on the authority of others. Suppose we glance at some previous period in human history and see how universally prevalent were beliefs which have now, in all educated circles at least, been relegated to the limbo of superstition. Not many generations ago, in our Western World, for example, it was a practically universal belief that our earth was the astronomical center of the universe, that heavier bodies fell with greater acceleration than light ones, that night air, was apt to cause malaria, that people who doubted the prevalent religious ideas were apt to be immoral, that old women who acted queerly were probably trafficking with the devil and should be executed by torture. Almost nobody raised any question about the truth of such notions, but kept on believing them for no more rational reasons than the ones which decided the style of their clothes and the language they spoke. Indeed, it was dangerous even to question them, for one who questioned was himself regarded with suspicion as seeking to upset the very foundations of the life to which society was committed. But it would hardly be maintained that such ideas as these were not fraught with disastrous results for those whom they affected. To believe in the earth as the center of the universe -still more to believe it flat, as was for most people an accompanying superstition-was to support a whole set of doctrines |