1662 THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA A REVIEW OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE THE AFFAIRS OF SPANISH-AMERICAN THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA. BY JOHN GUITÉRAS, M. D. The recognition of belligerent rights is the first active step a nation may take towards intervention in a struggle between foreign nations, or between a nation and a portion of its territory contending for independence. The recognition takes the form of a proclamation of neutrality, that is, the third nation declares its neutrality as between the parties in the contest. This is the first step of intervention, and is, naturally, the least objectionable. The neutral nation simply takes cognizance of a fact-the fact that a state of war exists, and declares its neutrality as between the two parties. If this neutrality is maintained in good faith the recognition is not, according to international law, a hostile measure. The United States have repeatedly granted the rights of belligerency to numerous nations and struggling colonies. Such actions have never given rise to any serious conflict; they have given rise to nothing beyond an occasional remonstrance when the action has been judged precipitate. But even when the step is of more serious import than the recognition of belligerent rights; when it amounts to the recognition of sovereignty, it is not a breach of law, even though it may prove to have been precipitate. This is very clearly set forth by Mr. Webster in his famous answer to Mr. Hülsemann, the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires at Washington. The United States had sent Mr. Mann to Hungary on a secret and confidential mission to obtain information as to the prospects of Hungary in her revolutionary movement against Austria. Mr. Hülsemann, complaining that the mission was a violation of the law of nations, drew forth a spirited reply from Mr. Webster, (Wharton's Digest of International Law, Vol. I, p. 188): "If, therefore, the United States had gone so far as to formally acknowledge the independence of Hungary, although, as the result has proven, it would have been a precipitate step, and one from which no benefit would have resulted to either party, it would not, nevertheless, have been an act against It should be clearly understood that the recognition of belligerent rights is nothing more than an acknowledgment of the existence of a state of war. If we so understand it we can more readily apply our common sense to the elucidation of individual cases. We should avoid, then, many of the perplexities of international law wherein we may blind ourselves when we wish not to see what is evident. The use of the term acknowledgment of a state of war keeps the question of fact clearly before our eyes, and prevents confusion with another and more difficult question— the recognition of the rights of sovereignty or nationality. Does a state of war exist? that is the question of fact. And is this so intricate a question that it may not be discussed with advantage by all parties concerned? We, as a people, are deeply interested in Cuban affairs. We ask, in the name of common sense, whether there be not a state of war in Cuba. We read in the daily press that Spain has set on foot military expeditions against Cuba; that these armaments surpass all efforts of the nation since the Napoleonic wars; that there are daily conflicts of armed forces in Cuba; that there is to be a winter campaign; that the Cubans have regularly organized forces under a civil government; that this government is practically the continuation of one with which the Spanish government came to terms in 1878; that in dealing with this contest we ourselves have to invoke the neutrality laws of this country. If all this be not war, then, is it not high time that we should ask what means this great armament in our Southern waters ? The right of citizens to judge in these questions as matters of fact has been recognized by the United States. Our government has taken strong grounds against those who held them to be questions of law. I quote from instructions of Mr. Cass, Secretary of State, to Mr. Clay, November 26, 1858, as follows: "Mr. Osma insists, however, that a civil war in one country can not be known to the people of another but through their own government; that the existence or non-existence of civil war is a question not of fact but of law, which no private person has a right to decide for himself; that foreigners must regard the former state of things as still existing, unless their respective governments have recognized the change. But I am very clearly of the opinion that an American citizen who goes to Southern Peru may safely act upon the evidence of his own senses." Our Government has also declared its own independence to act in these matters. President Grant in his first Annual Message says: "The principle is maintained, however, that this nation is its own judge when to award the rights of belligerency, either to a people struggling to free themselves from a government they believe to be oppressive, or to independent nations at war with each other." The question immediately arises: What are the facts upon which such judgment may be based; or, in other words, what are the conditions that constitute the occasion for the acklowledgement of the existence of a state of war? I shall quote several authorities upon the requirements for recognition, and I submit to the reader, whether these requirements have not been fulfilled by the Cubans in their present contest. In the correspondence between Mr. Adams and Earl Russel, extending from April 7 to September 18, 1865, Mr. Adams lays down the following rule: "Whenever an insurrection against the established government of a country takes place, the duty of governments, under obligations to maintain peace, and friendship with it, appears to be, at first, to abstain carefully from any step that may have the smallest influence in effecting the result. Whenever facts occur of which it is necessary to take notice, either because they involve a necessity of protecting personal interests at home, or avoiding an implication in the struggle, then it appears to be just and right to provide for the emergency by specific measures, precisely to the extent that may be required but no farther. It is, then, facts alone and not appearances or presumptions that justify action. But even these are not to be dealt with farther than the occasion demands: a rigid neutrality in whatever may be done is of course understood. If, after the lapse of a reasonable period, there be little prospect of a termination of the struggle, especially if this be carried on upon the ocean, a recognition of the parties as belligerent appears to be justifiable; and at |