is not of record till then, and it is therefore consistent both with the rule of law and the facts recited in the scire facias." It is very true that by the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 86, s. 8, all commissions, writs, or other process may bear teste, and be made returnable on any day certain in term or vacation to be named in such commission, writ, or other process; but that is a privilege conceded to the Crown of naming a special day for the return, which may be waived, and if it is not availed of, the advantage conferred by the statute is lost. This variance, therefore, between the scire facias and the inquisition is a vital defect in the whole proceedings, for which a writ of error lies, as a debt of record is necessary to ground the proceedings, and there can be no such debt till the return of the inquisition. from him as soon as he got near them; he was unable Parry. We could not do that, as the daughter did not reside on the premises, but she said she would tell her father, and it is clear that she keeps out of the way on purpose. WIGHTMAN, J.-I do not think you have done enough. If I were to grant you this judgment, any one who knocks at the door and can't see the tenant, might stick up the declaration on the door and then sign judgment. Rule refused. DAY . TUCKETT. The Court will not grant a rule for the inspection of a document in the possession of another party merely to enable him the better to frame his plea. Collier moved for a rule calling upon the plaintiff to produce an IOU for the inspection of the defendant. An action had been brought by the plaintiff against the defendant for slander in imputing to the plaintiff that he had been guilty of forging an IO U. The defendant stated in his affidavit circumstances from which he drew his conclusion that the defendant was guilty, but that he was unable to prepare his plea without an inspection of the document. (Browning and Another v. Ayhoin, 7 B. & C. 204.) WIGHTMAN, J.-It is a most extraordinary application, and I cannot grant it. Rule refused. the commissioners to inquire whether John Dean is now indebted to her Majesty in any and what sums of money for the duties aforesaid, and the commisssion is tested on the 28th of February, in the sixth year of her Majesty's reign. It is argued that the commissioners are confined to the inquiry, whether John Dean was indebted on that day. The inquisition, which is also set out on the record, was taken on the 1st of March, in the same year, and the commiss'oners find, on the oath of good and lawful men, therein mentioned, that John Dean, on the day of taking this inquisition, is justly and truly indebted to her Majesty in the sum of 2621. 10s. for duty of customs on certain foreign silk by him the said John Dean imported into the United Kingdom from foreign parts, between the 1st day of February, 1841, and the 14th day of February, 1841, and the said 2621. 10s. and every part thereof still remains due and unpaid; and we are of opinion that there is no inconsistency whatever between the finding of the jury and the authority given to the commissioners; for the inquisition finds the duty to have become due on the 14th of January, 1841; and as the inquisition further proceeds to find that it still remained due and unpaid on the 1st of March, the day on which the inquisition is taken, it follows, necessarily, that the jury find the duty to be due on the 21st of February, the day on which the commission was issued; indeed it is manifest, from the special finding of the origin of the debt, that it must have been a debt from the 14th of February, 1841, for it has been decided that the importer of goods from a foreign country becomes liable, on importation, to the duties of customs payable thereon. See the Attorney-General v. Armstead and Others; and the latest day of the inquisition in this case is found to be the 14th of February; but even if the origin of the debt had not so distinctly appeared on the inquisition, it appears, from the inspection of a great number of commissions and inquisitions taken thereon, with which we have been furnished from the year 1777 downwards, that the commissions and inquisitions have always been framed in the same precise form as the present, so that the course and practice which is the law of the Courts would have been a sufficient sanction for the form in which the documents in question are issued, even without any other answer to the objection first taken. The second objection raised upon the record was, that the writ of scire facias issued before the commission was returnable, and, therefore, before any debt appeared upon the record, the commission being returnable on the 15th of April, and the scire facias bearing teste on the 30th March, and being made returnable on the same day as the commission, namely, the 15th of April; but we are of opinion that the objection amounts only to an irregularity, and not to error on the record. In the case of Rex v. Pearson, and others on which the plaintiff in error relies, the are filed of record. An and the inquisition, which objection, which is precisely the same as the present, and effects. In this suit an order was made appointwas treated by the defendant as matter of irregularity log a receiver, and in equity for the purpose of Wilde, contrà.-1st. The inquisition is in the usual and ordinary form. (Manning, Exch. Prac. 261-2.) Here it is clear that the debt was due at the time of the commission. It arose from the importation of goods, made prior to the issuing of the commission; and it is a necessary inference that the debt was due at that time. The 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 56, s. 2, imposes the duties on all goods, &c. imported, and from that time of importation the duties were payable. This was expressly laid down in The Attorney-General v. Ansted (12 M. & W. 520). The finding of the inquisition is in effect that the debt existed all the time from importation to the return of the inquisition. 2nd. The objection is merely technical, and cannot arise on a writ of error. It is not a point of substance, but merely an irregularity in the issue. Rex v. Pearson was an application to set aside the writ for irregularity. The scire facias here is a proceeding merely of mesne process; it is the first step to bring in the party, as in an audita querela, where the party appeared upon the scire facias and demurred, for that the scire facias bore date the 23rd of October, and the audita querela the 3rd of November after; but the Court disallowed the demurrer, because here the seire facias is only to bring in the party, and in the nature of a mesne process. (Vaughanv. Lloyd, 1 Ventr. 7.) And in Reed v. Wilmot (1 Ventr. 220), where, in an action of false imprisonment, the plaintiff demurred to a justification by the defendant of a capias in an inferior court, because it was not shewn that a sum. mons was issued first, Lord Hale, in allowing the demurrer, said that " on a writ of error this error is not assignable, because a fault in the process is aided by appearance." Robert v. Andrews (Cro. El. 83, Error); and B. Bacon, Ab, Error, K. 5, are to the same effect. It is not, in truth, necessary to cite au. thority to shew that when there is a mere irregularity, error does not lie. Here the commission is tested the 21st February, and it was returnable the 15th April. It was actually returned the 1st of March. The inquisition was on the 1st March, and the scire facias was dated on the same day. The defendant appeared on the 25th May. The scire facias was founded on the commission might have issued on this inquisition previous to its return (West on Extents, p. 48); and if an extent might issue, à fortiori a scire facias. Chambers, in reply.-1st. The commission gives no authority except for the particular purpose of the inquiry, which was to ascertain whether Dean was indebted at the date of the said commission. The commissioners had no authority to hear one word on the trial except under that specific authority. No practice can cure this evil. The Attorney-General v. Ansted is in favour of the defendant. The duties are due on importation, and primâ facie they are chargeable on the importer; but the goods may remain in the warehouse, or be taken out by some assignee of the bill of lading." The Warehousing Act, 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 57, was intended," says Baron Parke, "to give the merchant time for payment of the duties until the goods are either exported or taken out for home consumption." So in this case, an assignment might have taken place between the date of the commission and the inquisition; and, in that case, the assignee and not Dean would be liable. 2nd, as to the scire facias. There is no authority to issue a scire facias in the vacation: if issued in the vacation, it ought to be tested as of the preceding Term: a writ with a bad teste ought to be regarded as of the preceding Term. Although Rea v. Pearson was a case on motion, it does not follow that because you come early, you may not come afterwards. Wilde claimed a general reply, on the part of the Crown, in revenue causes in this Court, which was allowed. He said that the 'scire facias, being tested in vacation, was cured by the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 86, s. 8, and insisted that the objection, if any, being matter only of irregularity, could not be ground of error. Cur, adv. vult. Tuesday, April 28. TINDAL, C. J. now delivered the judgment of the Court. The first objection raised on this record is, that the finding of the commissioners under the inquisition is not in conformity with the inquiry directed by the commission. The commission, as it appears upon the record when set out on oyer, directs only, and so held by the Court. The scire facias in BAIL COURT. Thursday, June 4. (Before Mr. Justice WIGHTMAN.) Judgment against the casual ejector-Service of the Parry moved for judgment against the casual Friday, June 5. LIPSCOMBE, Executor, v. Turner.. When a defendant in a cause consents, by a judge's order, to a stay of proceedings on payment of debt and costs, the latter to be taxed as between attorney and client, such costs only should be allowed as necessarily arise out of the action above (unless specially provided for in the order), Where, therefore, the creditors of a deceased party file a creditors' bill and a receiver is appointed, but restrained from bringing any action without the assent of the Master to whom the suit is referred, and it becomes necessary to sue a debtor to the estate, and for that purpose steps are taken to procure the assent of the Master, and the action is afterwards stayed upon the undertaking of the defendant to pay the debt and costs, to be taxed as between allorney and client, the costs of obtain ing the Master's consent to sue ought not to be allowed on taxation. T. W. Saunders shewed cause against a rule to re-. view the Master's taxation. The facts of the case were these:-One John Holland, being the assignee of mortgage of some funded property in which the defen dant, who was the mortgagor, had a life interest, died leaving the plaintiff and another (since dead) his executors. Subsequently, the creditors of Holland filed a bill in Chancery for the administration of his estate him from taking any proceedings at getting in the estate with the assent of the Master to whom the cause stood referred. Many applications having been made to the defendant by the receiver, for the payment of the mortgage debt, and in which he was distinctly informed that, unless he made some settlement, the Master would be applied to for his authority to sue, and, no arrangement being made, the receiver took the necessary steps to obtain the sanction of the Master to the bringing of this action, which being obtained, the action was brought in the name of the surviving executor against the defendant accordingly. After the action had proceeded some time, the defendant consented to an order to stay proceedings, on payment, at a certain day, of debt and costs, to be taxed as between attorney and client. On the taxation the Master allowed the costs of the proceedings to obtain the consent of the Master in Chancery to the bringing of the action, amounting to about 57., to which allowance the defendant objected, and in respect of which this rule was obtained. It was now insisted, that as the taxation was agreed to be upon the principle of attorney and client, and as the costs of obtaining the Master's assent were neces sarily incurred, and without which assent this action could not have been commenced, and would, in the ordinary course, be payable by the client to his attorney, they were fairly chargeable upon the defendant, whose conduct it was which rendered the action ne cessary, and who, by agreeing to such a course of taxation, must be presumed to undertake to save the plaintiff harmless of all the costs necessarily incurred in bringing the action. J. Browne, in support of the rule, argued that, notwithstanding these costs were necessarily incurred be fore bringing the action, yet they had become so in consequence of the Chancery suit, which, for their own security, the creditors had thought proper to institute, and which, therefore, should not be saddled on the defendant, who could only, in fairness, be called upon to pay the costs incurred (as between attorney and client) in the action itself; the preliminary proceedings in Chancery being no part of the action, but the steps rendered necessary (not by the defendant) in order to institute it, and that if it was intended to saddle the defendant with them, they should have been specially provided for in the order staying the proceedings. Cur, adv. vult. JUDGMENT. His Lordship to-day gave the following judgment: In this case, which was a motion to review the Master's taxation, an action had been brought upon a mortgage-deed against the mortgagor, by the executor of the assignee of the mortgage. It appears, that on the death of the assignee of the mortgage, his creditors filed a bill for the administration of his estate and effects, and a receiver was appointed, who, however, was restrained by the order appointing him from bringing any action, unless by the permission of the Master, to whom the cause stood referred, and this obviously for the benefit of the estate, in order to prevent needless costs being incurred, and operated as a sort of injunction against the receiver himself. After the proceedings in the action had gone on for some time, there was an order by which it was agreed that they sould be stayed upon certain terms, by which the defendant on a certain day was to pay the debt and costs, the latter to be taxed as between attorney and client. The costs were taxed accordingly; and on the part of the plaintiff it was insisted that, in addition to the ordinary costs of the action, he was entitled to certain costs incurred in Chancery in apply. ing for leave to commence the action; and some instances were referred to of a somewhat similar nature, as in applying to the Court of Chancery for affidavits, or to the Court of Bankruptcy for the proceedings under a fiat, or applying for an order to sue in forma pauperis, in all of which cases the costs are allowed on taxation as between attorney and client; but I think those cases are not applicable, as they arise necessarily out of the cause, and are incident to the cause itself; but in the present case the application by the receiver to the Master has no relation to the particular cause in question, but to relieve him of a sort of injunction in order to enable him to bring the action; it appears to be a sort of personal disability which disables him from suing, and the defendant has really nothing to do with it; it is an accident, which occurs in consequence of the creditors having thought proper to file a bill in Chancery, and not a matter which necessarily arises out of the action. It seems to me that these costs hardly come within the general view which has been adopted in a taxation as between attorney and client, the principle of which is rather that the ordinary costs as between party and party should be taxed upon such a scale as to include all the costs of the plaintiff in the action. I think, therefore, that the costs in Chancery in this matter ought not to be allowed. I felt some doubt upon the subject, certainly, and therefore was anxious to take time in considering it. Rule absolute. NEWTON and ANOTHER v. STEWART. When, in an affidavit verifying a plea in abatement for non-joinder, the number of the house in the street at which the party is said to reside is stated, and it is prayed an affidavit that such statement is untrue, the plea will be set aside. Keane shewed cause against a rule calling upon the plaintiff to shew cause why the plea in abatement, and the affidavit in support thereof, should not be set aside, &c. The plea in abatement was that of the nonjoinder of twenty-four other parties (defendants), and several objections were taken to the sufficiency of the plea and affidavit, amongst which was the following: the affidavit described one of the parties who ought to have been joined as "George Augustin Brown, of No. 22, Gower-street, Bedford-square, in the county of Middlesex ;" and it was shewn by affi. davit that no such person resided there. Upon this objection it was urged, in support of the plea, that the description was sufficiently certain, and that it would have been enough to have given the street without the number of the house, the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 42, s. 8, merely requiring that the "place of residence of such person shall be stated with convenient certainty," &c. WIGHTMAN, J.-This description, perhaps, might have been sufficient if you had stated "Gower-street" generally; but you point out the very house as the residence of the party, and why should the plaintiff seek elsewhere? You are bound by the description which you have given. ̧ Rule absolute, the defendant to plead issuably in four days, taking notice of trial for the dy adjournment day. Saturday, June 6. (Before Mr. Justice WIGHTMAN.) BUTTERWORTH v. WILLIAMS. When a summons is heard at chambers, and the parties are referred to the Court, they are bound to apply promptly. Martin, Q. C. and Bovill shewed cause against a rule to amend the judgment-roll by stating therein the true date of the issuing and return of the fieri facias in this cause into the county of Kent, and the writ of testatum fieri facias the: ein mentioned. It appeared that the venue in this case was Kent, and that final judgment was entered up on the 23rd February last, and a testatum fi. fa. issued into the city of London on the same day, under which the defendant's goods were seized; that no original fi. fa, was issued into Kent until the 26th February; that on the previous 24th, the defendant signed a declaration of insolvency, which was duly filed on the 25th, upon which day a fiat duly issued against him, notice having been given to all parties of the act of bankruptcy on the previ ous 24th; that, on the 2nd of March, a summons was obtained, at the instance of the official assignee, to set aside the testatum fi. fa. for irregularity, on the ground that no writ of execution into Kent had been returned and filed previously to the issuing and executing of the testatum fi. fa. which summons was dismissed in consequence of the production of the office copy judgment-roll, containing the return and filing of the original fi. fa. before the issuing of the testatum; that, on the 10th March, another summons was obtained to erase the entry on the judgmentroll of the return of the fi. fa. and of the award and issuing of the testatum fi. fa. on the ground before mentioned; and that, upon the hearing of such summons, it was agreed between the parties, with the assent of the judge, that the subject should be adjourned to be heard by the Court, which adjournment was indorsed "Adjourned to be heard by the Court." The present rule was moved on the 5th of May following. It was now contended that this application was made too late; that the question having been adjourned from the 10th of March, the parties should have come promptly to the Court early in the ensuing term, and not have delayed the application until the latter end of it. (Warner v. Haddon, 9 Dowl. 960; King v. Birch, 3 Q. B. 425; Bate v. Lawrence, 2 Dowl. & L. 83.) Jervis and Jones, contrà, argued that as this was a case in which third parties were interested, the usual rule as to promptness in applying does not apply. WIGHTMAN, J.-You were aware of this on the 10th of March, and were then referred to the Court. You are not to be allowed to come at any time. If I permit this motion to proceed, it will be a precedent in future cases. The objection to the writ amounts, if to any thing, only to an irregularity, and you were, therefore, bound to have come promptly. Rule discharged. Monday, June 8. (Before Mr. Justice WILLIAMS.) Upon a motion for judgment as in case of a nonsuit, for Power, contrà, argued that the affidavit was suff. cient, as the fact of the cause being a town one must be well known to the other side. WILLIAMS, J.-As under one state of circumstances you are in time, and under the other you are not, you should shew by your affidavit the actual state of the facts. It is the duty of the party who applies for a rule to shew to the Court all the facts which are necessary to entitle him to it. Rule discharged with costs. (Before Mr. Justice WIGHTMAN.) Rule absolute to amend the judgment and declaration, on payment of the costs of amendment and of this motion. Wednesday, June 10. COMPTON . TAMLYN. An affidavit sworn with a view to a proceeding which does not take place, cannot afterwards be used in support of a distinct matter. J. Brown shewed cause against a rule for an attachment for not paying two sums of money pursuant to an award, and he proposed to read an affidavit made last Term, with a view to a motion which was not then made. Barstow objected that the affidavit could not be received, inasmuch as it was a merely voluntary one, not made in any proceeding now before the Court, and upon which therefore perjury could not be assigned. Brown contended that the affidavit could be used, and that perjury could be assigned upon it as used in shewing cause against a rule, for that the merely swearing to the affidavit without its being used is sufficient to constitute perjury. WIGHTMAN, J.-That may be in a case actually depending, but here, at the time it was sworn, it was intended for another purpose than that for which it is now used. The affidavit must be made in the course of some judicial proceeding; there was no proceeding in Court when this affidavit was made, and it is now intended to make use of it for a purpose for which it was not sworn. It cannot be used. (The case then proceeded.) Rule absolute. Thursday, June 4. BURFIELD . ASH.-Tyrwhitt moved for a rule calling upon the parish officers of Burfield to shew cause why a certiorari, issued to bring up an order of sessions, confirming an order of justices, subject to a special case, should not be lodged with the clerk of the peace. The writ had been issued long since, and was in the possession of the parish of Burfield, but they had taken no further steps to bring up the proceedings. (2 Hawk. c. 27, s. 8; 1 Keb. 102, 194.) Rule nisi. REG. . MARY DIX.-Jones, Serjt. moved for a certiorari to bring up an indictment found against the defendant for perjury, Rule absolute. ↑ against a rule to set aside a judgment in ejectment, and all DOE dem. DAVIS v. ROE.-V. Williams shewed cause subsequent proceedings, on the ground that the tenant in possession had given no notice to his landlord. Rule absolute, on payment of costs. REG. . DICKSON.-C. Jones, Serjt. applied for a cer tiorari to remove into this court an indictment for perjury Writ granted. Saturday, June 6. v. REG. v. SWINBURN and ANOTHER.-Olter moved for a Rule discharged upon a peremptory undertaking. } the judgment-roll by inserting the Christian name of Bramwell shewed cause against a rule for amending the defendant therein. It appeared that the name of the defendant had been inserted in the writ and de-aside so much of the former rule herein as directed the pay ment of costs. claration as Hume. The defendant, however, Rule refused. having taken out a summons and obtained an order judgment signed herein. BUSHELL . BOORD.-Petersdorf moved to set aside the for payment of the debt by instalments, signed his name Rule nisi.. REG. V. THE JUSTICES OF CHESHIRE.-Egerton shewed as Robert Montague Hume; but the officer of the cause against a rule calling upon these justices to enter conCourt having refused to allow judgment to be signed, tinuances and hear an appeal. Townsend, contrà. except as the defendant was described in the declaration, the judgment was signed accordingly. It now being intended to proceed to outlawry against the defendant, it was thought desirable to amend the entry by the insertion of the Christian names of the defendant; and against this application it was contended that the Court had no power to amend, and that, even if it permitted the amendment, the judg ment would not tally with the other proceedings. O'Brien, contrà, argued that the Court had power to make the amendment, and that if it were necessary that the other proceedings should tally with the judgment, they also could be amended. (Moody v. 3 Dowl, 496.) WIGHTMAN, J. thought that the amendment would be proper in this case, and that the declaration could be made conformable. Rule absolute. for judgment as in case of a nonsuit. Bramwell, contrà. SNOOK v. DANIEL.-Bovill shewed cause against a rule Rule discharged on a peremptory undertaking. Ex parte NICHOLLS.-Collier moved for a certiorari to remove into this court an order of the Quarter Sessions of defects apparent on the face of the original order. Cornwall confirming an order in bastardy, on the ground of Wednesday, June 10. Writ granted Ex parte WINN.-Whitehurst, Q.C. moved for a rule niai Lincolnshire, to grant a certificate under the 3 & 4 Vict. c. for a mandamus, commanding the Overseers of Bassingham, 61, in order that the applicant may obtain an Excise beer licence. Rule nisi. (Before PARKE, B.) INGRAM v. FERGUSON. Work and labour - Advertisements in newspapers · Compliance with 6 & 7 Wm. 4, c. 76-Onus of proof of-Pleading-Illegality. In an action of work and labour, for inserting advertisements in a newspaper, it is not incumbent on the plaintiff to shew compliance with the provisions of [the statute 6 & 7 Wm. 4, c. 76, which requires that before a newspaper shall be printed or published, the proprietor shall lodge a declaration and certificate; for if the necessary steps have not been taken by the plaintiff, the publication and contract are illegal, and the defendant must plead the illegality of the contract. Assumpsit-For work and labour, for the insertion of advertisements in the Railway Mail newspaper. Plea-Non-assumpsit. Knowles, Q.C. and Brown, for the plaintiff, proved that the defendant was a provisional committee-man of a railway, and that the advertisements in question had been inserted in the Railway Mail, of which paper the plaintiff was the proprietor. At the close of the case, of the declaration would also determine the question necessary. The case then went to the jury on the merits, and June 9 and 10. (Before Mr. Baron PARKE.) LAW v. WILSON. Liability of provisional committee-men. It must also be shewn that, when the defendant con- Where a man merely allows his name to be inserted in concern. This was an action for goods sold and delivered to and Rawlinson, for the defendant. It appeared that, in the month of September last, Jervis, Q.C. (with him Hawkins) submitted, for the defendant, that the case for the plaintiff had failed, inasmuch as he had not offered any proof of compliance on his part with the provisions of the Act 6 & 7 Wm. 4, c. 76, the sixth section of which enacts that "no person shall print or publish, or cause to be printed or published, any newspaper, before there shall be delivered to the commissioners of stamps and taxes, or to the proper authorized officer at the head office for stamps in Westminster, Edinburgh, or Dublin respectively, or to the distributor of stamps or other proper officer appointed by the said commis. sioners for the purpose in or for the district within which such newspaper shall be intended to be printed and published, a declaration in writing, containing the several matters and things hereinafter for that purpose specified: that is to say, every such declaration shall set forth the correct title of the newspaper to which the same shall relate, and the true description of the house or building wherein such newspaper is intended to be printed, and also of the house or building wherein such newspaper is intended to be published, by, or for, or on behalf of the proprietor, and shall also set forth the true name, address, and place of abode of every person who is intended to be the printer, or to conduct the actual printing of such newspaper, and of every person who is intended to be "72, Lombard-street, Sept. 30, 1845. the actual publisher thereof, and of every person who "Sir,-At the request of Mr. Bradley, we forward shall be a proprietor of such newspaper, who shall be you a prospectus of the Southampton, Petersfield, resident out of the United Kingdom, and also of every and London Direct Railway,' and shall feel obliged person resident in the United Kingdom, who shall be by your informing us whether you desire to have your a proprietor of the same, if the number of such last-name inserted in the list of the provisional committee mentioned persons, exclusive of the printer and pub- of the company. lisher, shall not exceed two, &c." Now this is an action for work and labour on an implied contract of payment for the insertion of advertisements in the newspaper, of which the plaintiff claims to be the sole proprietor. It is, therefore, apprehended that he ought to prove a compliance with the section abovenamed, before he can sue in this action. [PARKE, B. -You have not pleaded the illegality of the contract.] Jervis.-The plaintiff must make out that he sues on a legal contract; he has no right, by law, to print or publish his paper till he has proved that he made such a declaration as is required by the Act. [PARKE, B.-No. All that he says by his declaration is, that he, at your request, printed certain advertisements in the Railway Mail, and he has proved it, or, at least, given evidence to go to the jury to that effect; that is enough for him to do, in an action for work and labour. If the work and labour were illegal, you must plead the illegality specially.] Jervis.-We may not have the means of pleading it; we may not know who the plaintiff is, or what the Railway Mail is? [PARKE, B.-Then you can have particulars of the plaintiff's demand, which will supply you with all that knowledge. Jervis.-But suppose, when the declaration is produced, it should be found not to correspond with the imprint required by the Act to be attached to the end of every newspaper. PARKE, B.-Then that would be illegal, and you must plead it. Jervis.-If your lordship looks at the imprint, you will see that the paper professes to have been printed and published, at the office of the Railway Mail, by Charles Ingram, and also published by F. Kennedy, of Fetter-lane and Royal Exchange. If the declaration did not correspond with this, the plaintiff could not recover; and it is contended that the plaintiff ought to shew such correspondence. The production "We are, &c." In reply to this letter the writers obtained no of this deliberation was a resolution to return 25s. On behalf of the plaintiff's case, there was, under defendant had, upon any occasion, acted in the con- the debts. it was concern, Mr. Baron PARKE, in summing up, said, it was in the first instance necessary for the plaintiff to make out that there had been an express contract entered into by the defendant in person, or by his agent, and that it was only upon such ground that he could recover. The question was, whether the person who entered into the contract with the plaintiff was the authorized agent of the party who was sought to be made liable? There was no doubt that in the first instance the claim was upon Brooks, the secretary, but if that party contracted the debt as the agent of another, then the question arose as to whether the defendant was that other. In the present instance the plaintiff, there was no doubt, could have brought his action against Brooks, or against the managing committee, but he had not chosen to sue either of these, against either of whom he could have had no difficulty in proving his claim, but rather chose to select a member of the provisional committee. The acting committee had abandoned the and had then made a claim upon the provisional committee. But the managing committee had clearly made themselves liable for these debts, for they it was who had conducted the concern and had authorized the contraction of debts. But, so far as the jury was concerned in the present case, the ques tion was, whether it had been made out to their satisfaction that the defendant had rendered himself liable by consenting to become a director. That consent was clearly not in the terms of the present form of action in so far as the description was concerned. The defendant consented to become a director, not a provisional committeeman, and the promoters of the company or the managing committee had thought proper to make him that which, as far as the evidence went, he had not consented to become. The jury, before they could make him liable to this claim, must be satisfied that he had given his consent, or had meant to become a member of the provisional committee; and, further, that in that capacity he had intended to take upon himself all the responsibilities which the managing committee might think proper to incur. Then there was another matter for them to take into consideration. The defendant, it was admitted on the part of the clerk of the company, had not only not taken up his shares, but had never acted as a committeeman, or taken the most remote participation in the business. He did not accept the settlement of 50 shares; he had in no way interfered in the concern, nor had he attended any meeting, and he had refused to answer or take any notice of the numerous letters which had been sent to him from the office of the company. It, moreover, appeared that the provisional committee had had no power to interfere with the managing committee. If the jury were of opinion that the defendant had not given his consent to become a provisional committeeman, there was then an end to the case. There had been no evidence offered to shew what the duties of the provisional committee were, but all had gone to establish the responsibility of the managing committee, and that those parties were responsible for all acts and debts they incurred, either by themselves or by their agent. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant. Mr. Baron PARKE then said, that it was not to be supposed that because a man allowed his name to be inserted in the list of provisional committeemen, he made himself responsible for every act or every liability of a managing committee, unless it could be proved that he had acted in the conduct of the con cern. CENTRAL CRIMINAL COURT. Friday, May 15. (Before the Hon. C. E. Law, Recorder.) REG. v. JOHN HAYES and ELLEN MAYES. A and B were indicted for jointly uttering counterfeit coin. The evidence was, that A went into a shop and uttered the same, B remaining outside at a distance of fifty yards. Held, that before B could be convicted it must be shewn that he was so near to A as to be able to assist her in such uttering as by a sign, &c. Sed quare. In this case the prisoners were indicted for the joint uttering and putting off of a counterfeit halfcrown under 2 Wm. 4, c. 34, s. 7. Baldwin and F. J. Smith appeared for the prosecuThe prisoners were undefended. tion. The facts proved were, that the two prisoners were in company together, and that Hayes had been seen to hand something to the woman Mayes, but what it was he so passed could not be distinctly shown. Immediately afterwards the woman went into a shop, and then gave the counterfeit half-crown in payment for some small articles. Hayes went to the door of the shop with Mayes, and then stayed in the street, but passed once while she was in the shop, and then remained three doors off, a distance of near fifty yards, until he was joined by the woman; they then walked away in company. The RECORDER.-Is there any case to go to the jury of a joint uttering against the male prisoner? Baldwin.-It is submitted that there is. He was seen to pass the door once while the woman was in the shop, and then remained three doors off. It may be a question whether or not he was in such a position as to see what she was about, or what passed in the shop; but still, as the two prisoners were together before the female prisoner uttered the coin, and after, it is for the jury to say whether or not they think there was a concert between them. The RECORDER.-Can you cite any case where it has been held a joint uttering, where one was not so near as to contribute to aid the other in any way, by sign or otherwise? The learned Recorder referred to Rex v. Soares (Russ. & Ry. 25.) Baldwin.-There is no case exactly in point: the one which is most near to it is Rex v. Skerritt (2 C. & P. 427.) He referred also to 1 Russ. Crimes & Mis. 83. The RECORDER.-I think, as this is a statutable offence, that they must both contribute to the uttering. If it were merely a misdemeanor it would be different. This may be a conspiracy to utter bad money, but that is not within the statute. If this had been the first case, and I had to decide whether this was an offence within the statute or not, I should say yes; and that all who were engaged in it were guilty. But it has not been so held in any of the cases I have been able to find, but rather the other way, and I do not like to be the first to throw any doubt upon the ruling. The RECORDER (in summing up).-Unless you are prepared to say, that the male prisoners contributed to the uttering, you cannot convict him. He may have been guilty of another offence, but not the one at present charged by the indictment which you have to try. To make him a joint utterer, he must have been so near to the woman at the time she uttered the coin, as to be able to aid her by a sign; or to assist her in the uttering, by encouraging her with his countenance or personal aid and assistance. If you think he was so near that she might act under his control, as by his telegraphing, or otherwise, you may, under such circumstances, find him guilty; should you be satisfied that he did, in fact, deliver that bad coin to her, and which she afterwards delivered to the witness, you may then find her guilty of the "putting off." Payne cited R. v. Page and Jones (9 Car. & Pay. 767.) Verdict, Guilty. In this case the learned Recorder has stated the law on this point according to former decisions, though, at the same time, he intimated that he did so contrà his own opinion. The distinction here lies in the difference between accessaries in felony, and accessaries in misdemeanors. The former are principals in the second degree, but the latter are principals in the first degree. Whatever, therefore, would make a person an accessary in felony, would make him a principal in a misdemeanor. The cases of Rex v. Elsee, 1 Russ. on Cr. and Mis. 81; Reg. v. Page and Jones, suprà, were clearly decided on the same principle as if the charge had been that of felony. With all due deference, this seems to be incorrect. The right view would appear to be that taken by Mr. Greaves, in his edition of Russell on Crimes, that where, in cases of this nature, the evidence would satisfy the jury, if the case had been a felony, that the party absent was an accessary, he would, in a misdemeanor, be a principal. (See 1 Russ. Cr. 82, n. b, in which the principle, as here stated, is strongly supported; see also Reg. v. Moland and Others (2 Moody, C. C. R. 276). There is no distinction between a statutable and common law misdemeanor; when an offence is made a misdemeanor by statute, it is made so for all purposes. (R. v. Roderick, 7 C. & P. 795.) Irish Reports. COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. (SITTINGS IN BANCO.) This was an application on behalf of Isaac Butt, esq. one of her Majesty's counsel, for liberty to file a criminal information against Mr. Frederick Jackson, one of the attorneys of the Court, for having, by writing certain letters to the prosecutor, and by other means, sought to induce him to commit a breach of the peace by fighting a duel with the defendant. Bennett, Q. C. in support of the motion.-The transaction arose out of some observations made by Mr. Butt in an address to the jury at the Commission Court, on behalf of a Mrs. Scott, who was tried on an indictment for bigamy, Mr. Jackson being the attorney for the prosecution. The affidavits of Mr. Butt stated that he had been retained by Messrs. M'Gusty and Snagg to defend Mrs. Scott at the last commission at Green-street, on two separate charges of bigamy, one for intermarrying with a person named Galway, her husband, James Carter, being then alive; the second, for intermarrying with John Bindon Scott, in the year 1833, James Carter being then living; and that, upon the 8th of April, he received his instructions from those gentlemen as Mrs. Scott's attorneys, and was informed by them that the case was one of great hardship against his client, and that criminal proceedings were instituted against her for the purpose of thereby terminating in a summary manner certain suits pending in the Court of Chancery and in the Ecclesiastical Court, and that the criminal proceedings were instituted by the attorney in the Chancery cause, for Mr. John Bindon Scott, the lady's husband, under circumstances of hardship and oppression, after a long interval of time, and not until after Mrs. Scott had refused to accede to a compromise proposed between her and Mr. Scott, and that deponent had been informed that the prosecution would be sustained by testimony of a discreditable nature, and that every effort would be made by the prosecutors to blacken the character of Mrs. Scott, who from the length of time which had elapsed would be placed at a disadvantage in meeting such charges. The trial took place on the 13th of April, before Mr. Baron Richards and Mr. Justice Ball, and a jury of the city of Dublin, and upon that occasion deponent was the prisoner's leading counsel, Mr. Peebles and Mr. O'Hagan being with him. The case for the prosecution occupied two days; and on the 15th, deponent addressed the jury for the prisoner, and in his address strongly reflected on the object of the prosecution and the conduct of the persons engaged in its management. Deponent stated also, that he was merely actuated by the desire honestly and faithfully to discharge his duty to his client; and that he did not at the time, or now, believe that he exceeded his duty, and that he was not influenced by any feeling of hostility to Mr. Jackson, or the other persons engaged in the prosecution; and that he then and still believed that it was necessary for the effectual and valid defence of his client to strongly reflect on the character of the prosecution; and that, had he neglected to make the observations in question, the defence of his client would not have been as effectual as it ought to have been, in conformity with his instructions. On the 17th of April Mrs. Scott was acquitted; but a second indictment having been found against her for marrying Mr. Scott, her first huband, Carter, being still alive, counsel for the prosecution sought that this trial should be postponed; but at deponent's suggestion the question of postponement stood over till the following Monday, when the parties were to be ready to proceed, if the postponement should not be granted by the Court. The affidavit then proceeds to state that on the same evening deponent was waited on by Captain R. Blackwood, who stated that he came from his friend Mr. Jackson, and handed deponent the following letter, which is in the handwriting of Mr. Jackson: at liberty to consult some members of his own pro fession upon the subject, which appeared to him to involve the privileges of the Bar in some degree. De ponent further states that he was taken by surprise by the communication, and that his postponement of a reply to it was not with the intention of noticing it in the manner the defendant intended, and that several members of the Bar, to whom he had disclosed all the facts which had occurred, advised him that he was imperatively bound not to give any explanation relative to what he had stated in court in defence of his client. On the following Monday, the Court having refused to postpone the trial, and no evidence being produced to sustain the second charge, Mrs. Scott was a second time acquitted. Immediately after her acquittal, Mr. Butt, seeing Captain Blackwood apparently waiting for him, and he being then engaged in defending a libel case, he went out and appointed to see him at eight o'clock that evening, and Captain Blackwood having accordingly called, he wrote the following letter, and gave it to him for Mr. Jackson : "72, Leeson-street, "Tuesday, April 21st, 1846. "SIR-I have to acknowledge the receipt of your note of Saturday, which was on that day handed me by Captain Blackwood. "Whatever observations I made on the occasion to which your note refers I made in the discharge of my professional duty. I am bound to say, that in making those observations I meant nothing more than to discharge that duty, and I had no other motive. "Further than this I do not feel myself at liberty to reply to the questions in your note. I cannot recognize your right to call me to account for what I have done in the discharge of my professional duty; and anxious as I am to give the fullest explanation to any gentleman who might feel himself aggrieved by any thing I may have said, I feel that I owe it as a duty to my profession to say, in reply to your note, that I do not feel myself called on to answer the questions which it puts to me.-I have the honour to be your very obedient servant, "ISAAC BUTT. "Frederick Jackson, esq. Harcourt-street." The affidavits then proceed to state that Captain B. not considering this letter satisfactory, asked whether deponent would refer him to a friend for the purpose of a hostile meeting? or did he refuse to do so? which deponent most unequivocally did. The affidavit then states the receipt of the following letter from Mr. Jackson on the 22nd inst. : "9, Harcourt-street, Wednesday morning, 66 April 26th, 1846. "SIR,-Your letter of Tuesday evening's date, in reply to mine of Friday last, has been handed to me by my friend Captain Blackwood. In it I find you shelter yourself from the personal responsibility which one gentleman necessarily incurs, and to which every person in society who has the pretensions of being a gentleman is liable, when he gratuitously and wantonly insults another under the subterfuge of professional privilege,' and the allegation of acting in the discharge of a duty.' Both pleas-the one for not making a generous reparation where an injury had been inflicted, and the other for not affording that satisfaction which the laws of honour demand when an insult had been offered-are untenable and untrue. The solicitor by whom you were employed gave to me personally, and through my counsel, his unqualified denial, and that denial was voluntary, of having instructed you to use any observation of an offensive nature towards me, and his total dissent from their application as regarded my conduct in the case. With respect to the real cause of your shrinking from a responsibility which you deliberately incurred, without perhaps fully calculating upon the ulterior consequences in which your conduct would involve you (for of this I fully acquit you), I shall not venture to designate it or you by the term or epithet which naturally suggest them. selves; but I confidently expect that the members of both professions, as well as the public, will drawi their own conclusions as to the course you have taken, and be much more likely to come to the conviction that in adopting it you have been influenced much more by the consideration of your personal "Making all due allowance for the liberties con- safety than actuated by a regard for the assertion of ceded to counsel, and the privileges claimed by advo-professional privilege.'-I have the honour to be, cates, it is absolutely necessary that I should know Sir, your very humble servant, whether, in the observations made by you, it was your intention to convey any thing offensive to myself in my capacity as a gentleman, or derogatory to my character as a professional man? "9, Harcourt street, "Friday evening, April 17th. "SIR,-An impression was made by a sentence contained in your speech on Wednesday, that you used language, direct or implied, to the import that you knew Mr. Jackson, and that although you did know him, you did not shrink from saying that his conduct in bringing forward this case was unmanly and disgraceful.' "Not wishing to interfere in the slightest degree with your duties to your client, I have forborne from making this application until the termination of the trial; and I send my friend Captain Blackwood with this letter, who will be the bearer of any communication you wish to make. I have the honour to be, Sir, your very obedient servant, "FREDERICK JACKSON. "Isaac Rutt, esq. Q.C. &c. Leeson-street." The prosecutor states, that having read over the letter, he stated that he could not give an answer to it until the proceedings pending against Mrs. Scott were disposed of, and that in the mean time he should feel "FREDERICK JACKSON. "To Isaac Butt, esq., Q.C. 72, Leeson-street." Deponent further stated, that on the 23rd April he read in Saunders's News-letter, three other letters, which he believed were inserted by direction of Mr. Jackson; one to the editor, requesting him to insert the correspondence; one from Capt. Blackwood to Mr. Jackson, and one from Mr. Murdock, a mutual friend; and that deponent had been advised by counsel, that in consequence of certain observations, in Jackson's last letter, inserted in Saunders's News letter, it would be necessary for him to disclose to the Court the nature of the instructions which he received for the defence of Mrs. Scott, and the facts relative to the origin of the prosecution, and the conduct of Mr. Jackson, in relation to certain propost tions made to Mrs. Scott; and that deponent, prior to the trial, in a consultation at which Mrs. Scott's solicitor attended, took particular pains to ascertain whether he could rely upon the facts of which he had been instructed, and the circumstances which in his opinion reflected upon Mr. Jackson, when he was informed by Mrs. Scott's attorney that he could, and that Mr. Jackson must admit the truth of the facts on oath, if examined; and deponent states that his reason for making such particular inquiries was, that Mr. Jackson had always been considered a very respectable man. Deponent further states, that the other counsel engaged with him in the case concurred in the general tone of observation adopted by him in the conduct of the case, and that part of his instructions consisted of the sworn answer of Mrs. Scott in the Chancery cause, in which she stated the making of certain propositions to her relative to the abandonment of criminal proceedings. These propositions are of such a nature, that unless the Court require it, I should wish to avoid detailing them. BLACKBURNE, C. J.-There is no necessity, Mr. Bennett, for your detailing them. Bennett.-Mr. Butt, in his comments upon Mr. Jackson's conduct, acted upon his instructions, part of which consisted of facts which had been sworn to, and also upon what appeared at the trial of Mrs. Scott. BLACKBURNE, C. J.-The Court are of opinion that you have stated most abundantly sufficient grounds for the granting a conditional order. Rule nisi accordingly. THE LEGISLATOR. Summary. East of Fife Railway law whereby a married woman charged with the commission of any crime is, in case her husband be pre Great Grimsby and Sheffield Junction Solly's Estate. Portsmouth Harbour Pier Caledonian and Dumbartonshire Junction Railway Ayrshire Bridge of Weir and Port Glasgow Junction Rail- way Bridgwater and Taunton Canal, Railway, and Harbour Leith Paving Knaresborough Branch Extension coercion, unless it appear that she did not so act; and all rules of law contrary to the provisions of chap. I. of the said schedule shall be, and the same are hereby repealed and annulled. (a) 3. That no person shall, after the passing of this Act, be liable to prosecution by an indictment or information in respect of any offence against the person not included in the said schedule. 4. Provided that nothing hereinbefore contained shall exempt any person from prosecution by indictment or information in respect of any offence against the person not included in the said schedule in any case where, by any Act or Acts of Parliament, persons committing such offence are made specially punish-able on account of the party against whom or the place wherein such offence is committed. (b) 5. Provided also that nothing herein contained shall exempt any offender from any proceeding in respect of any offence against the person in which any magistrate or commissioner is or shall be empowered to: exercise any summary jurisdiction without trial by jury. 6. Provided also that as regards any offence against the person perpetrated before the day of 1846, and also as regards any offence against the person in part perpetrated by any act done before that London and South Western Railway, Farnham and Alton day, and which offence shall be completed or consum Branch THE proceedings of the Parliament have Scottish Central Railway, Alloa Branch been of small professional interest, however important to the public. It may now be considered as certain that no one of the projected Law Reforms will be carried during the pre-Forth and Clyde and Monkland Navigation Junction sent session, which will necessarily be hurried to an early close, with the passing only of such measures as are absolutely essential to state emergencies. With this assurance, all interest in them ceases. Herculaneum Docks Wakefield, Pontefract, and Goole Railway. SESSIONAL PRINTED PAPERS. Kew Gardens, &c.-Paper Railway Bills Classification-Sixteenth Report of Committee Capital Crime-Paper Westminster Bridge and New Palace-Second Report of Committee Colonial Land and Emigration Commission-Sixth Report Criminal Law-Second Report of Commissioners Outrages (Tipperary, Limerick, Clare, Leitrim, and Roscom- Railways-Copy of Minute of Board of Trade respecting the Homicides (Ireland)-Returns Railway Bills Classification-Seventeenth Report of Com mittee mated on or after that day, the offender shall be. punishable as if this Act had not been passed. 7. That after the passing of this Act every offence in respect of which it is declared by the said schedule. that the offender shall incur the penalties of the 6th or any higher class, shall be tried in the same manner, a and be subject to all the same rules of procedure as if such offence were by the said schedule declared to be a felony; and every offence in respect of which it is declared by the said schedule that the offender shall incur the penalties of any lower class, shall be tried in the same manner, and be subject to all the same rules of procedure, as if such last-mentioned offence were by the said schedule declared to be a misdemeanor, (c) HOUSE OF LORDS. NEW LAW OF SETTLEMENT. THURSDAY, June 11.-The Earl of WINCHEL-~ SEA expressed his hope that this measure would not receive the assent of Parliament. It was a,. highly objectionable one. thought any discussion on the measure at present The Earl of RADNORA premature. He did not agree with his noble friend; on the contrary, he thought that the present law of settlement was a great grievance to the poor, and that the ministerial measure was a step in the right direction for its improvement. After a few words from Lord ABINGER,-the Earl of WICKLOW expressed his disapproval of the government measure. If introduced into Ireland it would destroy the whole benefit of the poor-law system there. He thought{1 that government had not been called upon, and were wrong in introducing it at all.-Lord REDESDALE : was of opinion that a more mischievous plan than that of a union settlement could not be adopted. HOUSE OF COMMONS. POOR REMOVAL BILL. FRIDAY, June 5.-Sir J. GRAHAM moved that the House go into committee on the Poor Law Removal Bill. After some discussion on a point of order, Mr. E. DENISON moved as an instruction to the committee the following resolutions : "After a day to be fixed for each union, all paupers of the parishes comprising the union shall be settled in the union, and not in any such parish of West India Produce-Account Bills in Progress. Draft of a Bill, intituled "An Act for Consolidating Be it enacted, &c. "That such paupers be maintained, and all expenses defrayed from a fund levied from each parish in the proportion of the expenditure for the relief of the poor incurred by such parish for the last seven years. "Debts already charged on the rates, and interest due in respect of such debts, shall not be affected by the change." Col. Wood was of opinion that the poor-law settlement question would ultimately compel the legislature to pay that attention which its importance re 1. That the schedule to this Act annexed shall be deemed and taken to be parcel of this Act, and that (a) Upon the subject of marital coercion, see the note to the four chapters of the same, and the ten sections of article 9 of section 1, of chap. I. of the schedule. the said chapters, and the 146 articles of the said section 3, is occasioned by the limited nature of the digest (b) The necessity for this provision as an exception to sections, and the headings thereof and the numbers now submitted to your Majesty, should it be proposed to thereof, respectively, shall be deemed and taken to be pass it into a law before the completion of the whole digest enacted by this present Act, as if each and every of of crimes and punishments. No such clause would be nethe said chapters, sections, articles, headings, and cessary if the whole digest were completed. The following numbers had been expressly and in terms herein re-intended to apply, viz. treason in shooting at the Queen, the are examples of the offences to which the above provision is cited, with the usual words and in the usual forms of offence of striking a judge whilst in the execution of his enactment, or declaration, or proviso, as the case may office, &c. be; and that from the passing of this Act every one guilty of any offence described in, or defined by, the said schedule, shall be liable to such punishment as is therein appointed in respect of such offence. |